


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THE EARLY CAREER OF FULVIA.

Quanta erit infelicitas urbis illius, in qua virorum officia mulieres occupabunt. So Lactantius, quite probably reflecting Cicero in the *De Re Publica*, sets a text for those who would consider the influence of women in the political life of Cicero's own time.¹ Not only through the institution of political or dynastic marriage, so vital to the balance of affairs in the last century of the Republic, but also in the exercise of personal talents and influence were women able to attain power in a state wherein their official potential was limited strictly to certain religious positions.² Few women even in this period of marital maneuvering could claim so remarkable a progression of husbands as Fulvia, in succession wife of P. Clodius Pulcher, C. Scribonius Curio, and M. Antonius.

The practice of modern scholars, in the light of the prominence of Fulvia as Antony's wife in the first phases of the second triumvirate, has been to assume that only with her marriage to the future triumvir did she assert herself in the political field.³ It is my doubt that this limitation is likely or indeed

¹ Lactantius, *Epit.*, 33 (38), 5; cf. K. Ziegler's placement of the passage in his 5th Teubner edition of Cicero, *Rep.* (1960).

² On political marriages see, e. g., Lily Ross Taylor, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (Berkeley, 1949), pp. 7, 25, 34, 39, and chapters VI and VII *passim*, and J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Roman Women* (London, 1962), chapter II *passim*. On personal influence, Cicero, *Att.*, XI, 11, 2, in which Brutus' mother Servilia announces that she will see to it that Brutus and Cassius are relieved of their insignificant appointments as grain commissioners.

³ Drumann-Groebe, II, p. 311, and Münzer, *R.-E.*, VII, s.v. Fulvius, no. 113, col. 281, see her historical rôle as beginning after the death of

possible for the wife of the tribunes Clodius and Curio that leads me to consider the very scant evidence on the early career of Fulvia to pose and perhaps answer two questions: why was Fulvia able to achieve three such important marriages, and was she in any way influential in the careers of either of her first two husbands.

* * *

The three husbands of Fulvia were of consular family and distinguished prospects. Clodius, whose *transitio ad plebem* only emphasizes his patrician Claudian origins, was son and grandson of a consul, grandson of a censor, and brother of a future consul and censor, and possessed of three sisters each of whom married a consul.⁴ Curio, whose senatorial family had reached the consulship only with his father in 76, could view his father's eminence in the state with satisfaction and his own promise with conviction.⁵ The Antonii, with ancient but obscure origins in the

Caesar. So also Barbera Förtsch, *Die politische Rolle der Frau in der römischen Republik* (Stuttgart, 1935: Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft, V), p. 103, and Enrica Malcovati, *Clodia, Fulvia, Marzia, Terenzia* (vol. I of the series *Donne di Roma Antica* in *Quaderni di Studi Romani*, 1945), p. 27.

⁴ His grandfather, Appius Claudius Pulcher, cos. 143, cens. 136, *princeps senatus*, married an Antistia and produced at least five children: (1) Gaius, cos. 92, (2) Appius, father of the tribune, cos. 79, (3) Claudia, a Vestal, (4) Claudia, wife of Tiberius Gracchus, and (5) Claudia, wife of Q. Marcius Philippus. Clodius' father married Caecilia Metella, daughter of Metellus Balearicus, cos. 123, and sister of Metellus Nepos, cos. 98, and fathered three sons (Appius, cos. 54, cens. 50, Gaius, praet. 56, and the tribune) and three daughters (the sometime wives of Q. Marcius Rex, cos. 38, Q. Metellus Celer, cos. 60, and L. Licinius Lucullus, cos. 74). The further ramifications of relationship demonstrable serve only to prove the continuing vitality of the Claudii Pulchri. For partial stemmata see Groag, *P. I. R.*², II, opposite p. 238, and Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939), genealogical table I (the Metelli). Münzer treats of the family in *R.-E.*, III, 2, s.v. Claudius, nos. 296 (cos. 79), 297 (cos. 54), and Fröhlich, *R.-E.*, IV, 1, s.v. Clodius, nos. 48 (the tribune), and 66, 67 and 72 (his sisters).

⁵ On the elder Curio see Münzer, *R.-E.*, 2nd ser., 3rd half-vol., s.v. Scribonius, no. 10 (his son is no. 11), and Syme, *R.R.*, p. 19, n. 4. He married Memmia, daughter of a *tribunus monetalis* of the Marian era. Cicero, who retained his friendship for Curio in spite of occasional political difference, also took an interest in the son that remains almost constant, excepting those times when the younger Curio could not escape the stigma of his friendships (with Clodius, *Att.*, I, 14, 5; with

plebeian nobility, reappear in strength at the beginning of the first century; Antony could claim two consular grandfathers, one of whom was also censor, and two consular uncles, one of whom was to become censor.⁶ Each of these young men was, as we shall see, on the brink of a promising career. Each by family connections should have been able to marry brilliantly.

What was Fulvia's offering to such a marriage? The Fulvii were among the most distinguished of republican plebeian noble families. For two hundred years the name appears in the consular *fasti*, starting in 322.⁷ But no consular Fulvius is known after 125 B.C. for the remainder of the Republic. Indeed Syme (*R.R.*, p. 19) can say that during the Sullan restoration of the oligarchy the "Fulvii, the Sempronii and the Livii were almost extinct." It is significant, therefore, that Fulvia's father, M. Fulvius Bambalio, himself possibly the last male of his line to bear the name, married the last daughter of another plebeian noble house, the Sempronii Tuditanii.⁸ Bambalio, whose cog-

Antony, *Phil.*, II, 44-5, where Curio himself is strangely spared). In a passage of the *Brutus* (280-1) Curio is praised for his oratorical skill, chided for his impatience in seeking honors, and characterized as capable of reaching the highest offices had he listened to moderate counsel. See also n. 27.

⁶ Grandson of M. Antonius the orator, cos. 99, cens. 97, and of L. Julius Caesar, cos. 90, cens. 89. Nephew of C. Antonius (*Hybrida*), cos. 63, cens. 42, and of L. Julius Caesar, cos. 64. M. Antonius Creticus, Antony's father, whose marriage to a Julia brought Antony connection with the elder and more distinguished branch of the family of which C. Caesar was soon to elevate the more obscure branch, reached the praetorship in 74. For the grandfathers and uncles see Klebs, *R.-E.*, I, 2, s.v. Antonius, nos. 28 (cos. 99) and 19 (cos. 63), and Münzer, *R.-E.*, X, s.v. Julius, nos. 142 (cos. 90) and 143 (cos. 64). Creticus is no. 29. C. Caesar's relationship to Antony is shown in Münzer's stemma of the Julii Caesares, *R.-E.*, X, cols. 183-4.

⁷ See Münzer's article on Fulvius, *R.-E.*, VII, col. 229, and T. R. S. Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, indices, and on the appropriate years. The family apparently came from Tusculum (Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* [Stuttgart, 1920], pp. 64-5) and Fulvia's connection with the famous Fulvii is attested by Cicero (*Phil.*, III, 16), who refers to her as Tuscan.

⁸ For Bambalio see Münzer, *loc. cit.* (n. 3), no. 40. His daughter is no. 113. Sempronius Tuditanus, last male of his line and father-in-law of Bambalio, is no. 89 in *R.-E.*, 2nd ser., 4th half-vol., s.v. Sempronius (Münzer gives a stemma in cols. 1439-40). See also Münzer in *Hermes*, XLIX (1914), p. 209 and especially n. 1, for the relationships of Tuditanus.

nomen was apparently drawn from his stuttering (Dio, XLV, 47, 4), is not known to have held office. Cicero, in the Dio passage just cited, suggests that he was something of a joke. His direct connection with the Fulvii of the preceding generation is uncertain. Sempronius Tuditanus, Fulvia's grandfather, is rather better known, but for the unfortunate reason that he was feeble-minded for at least part of his life (Cicero, *Phil.*, III, 16; Val. Max., VII, 8, 1, etc.). He is not known to have held office, although he was the son of the consul of 129 and uncle through his sister's marriage of Q. Hortensius Hortulus, the orator. This does not appear to be a promising heritage for Fulvia to bring as a dower to her ambitious husbands.

But there is another dower element which she may have had, and possibly in abundance—money. Cicero, in a sarcastic remark about Fulvia to Antony in the third Philippic (16) says: *tuae coniugis, bonae feminae, locuples quidem certe, Bambalio quidem pater, homo nullo numero.* There seems to be no reason to doubt the adjective *locuples* here, since Valerius Maximus suggests that it may well have been true. In the passage cited above (VII, 8, 1) he is discussing Tuditanus' madness and his appearance in the Forum in tragic costume to scatter coins among the people; he adds: *testamento filium instituit heredem, quod Ti. Longus sanguine eius proximus hastae iudicio subvertere frustra conatus est: magis enim centumviri quid scriptum esset in tabulis quam quis eas scrip:isset considerandum existimaverunt.* *Filium* has long been suspect, and is obelized by Kempf in his latest Teubner edition (1888), although it is the reading of his two principal 9th century manuscripts, L and A. *Filiam*, the reading of the epitome of Julius Paris, appears in the margin of A.⁹ The reasoning of those who have doubted the manuscript reading, e.g., that a son or daughter could not likely be challenged by *Ti. Longus* as a next-of-kin, has led them to propose *Ofilium* (Lipsius), *Fulvium* (Perizonius) or *Fulviam* (Perizonius, accepted by Halm). Inasmuch as *Ofilium*, though palaeographically most simple, introduces a person otherwise unconnected with Tuditanus in the few references to the latter, I believe the less obvious *Fulvium* or *Fulviam* preferable readings, with some logical Roman leaning toward the male heir

⁹ Kempf in his annotated edition (Berlin, 1854), pp. 587-8, discusses the reading and the arguments at length.

(son-in-law), but nothing to prevent the old man from naming his granddaughter as his heir. The distinction between father and daughter becomes important in connection with a point to be discussed below, the identification of Clodius' first wife, and I therefore propose that *Fulviam* be the accepted reading. Such an inheritance, to judge from Cicero's description of Tuditanus scattering coins from the rostra and from the fact that he was probably the only male blood-heir of his generation, would have brought Fulvia a fair sum of money, and as the only daughter of Fulvius and Sempronia, each the end of the family line, she may well have been an heiress of some worth, not to be despised by young nobles of expensive habits and sparse income.

Clodius is stigmatized as rapacious and spendthrift in fairly routine but credible denunciation by Cicero (e.g., *Har. Resp.*, 42). More significant is a passage in Varro (*R.R.*, III, 16, 1-2) in which Clodius' brother Appius as one of the speakers remarks on the poverty he and his family had known after their father's death: *nam cum pauper cum duobus fratribus et duabus sororibus essem relictus, quarum alteram sine dote dedi Lucullo, a quo hereditate me cessa primum et primus mulsum domi meae bibere coepi ipse, cum interea nihil minus paene cotidie in convivio omnibus daretur mulsum.*¹⁰ The appearance of *mulsum* on the table of an Appius Claudius does not, one assumes, mean abject poverty, in spite of the *pauper* above. But it implies that three politically ambitious sons and two remaining unmarried daughters of a great patrician house could well be considered in some straits. There is no evidence to suggest that Metellus Celer took his Clodia without a dowry; certainly the careers of the three brothers were expensive.

The date and circumstances of Fulvia's marriage to Clodius have not been established. Clodius seems to have spent a good portion of the time between his father's death and his tribunate abroad. From 73 to 68 in Lucullus' army, then deserting to another brother-in-law, Marcus Rex, in Cilicia in 67, he is on the staff of L. Licinius Murena in Gaul in 64.¹¹ He is back in

¹⁰ The father's death in 76 (see Broughton, *M.R.R.*, II, p. 94) while proconsul in Macedonia apparently found Clodia Tertia already married to Q. Marcus Rex.

¹¹ For Clodius' career see Broughton, *M.R.R.*, II, p. 140 and n. 10, pp. 148, 164, and Fröhlich, *loc. cit.* (n. 4).

Rome to attend the Bona Dea rites in 62 and to stand for the quaestorship, which he held in Sicily after his acquittal in 61. His marital status is not mentioned until his tribunate in 59-58, when Cicero (*Phil.*, II, 48) hints of an affair between Antony and Clodius' wife. Inasmuch as Cicero seems to suggest the beginning of something that was to continue (*etiam . . . iam tum*), it is apparent that this wife was Fulvia. However it has usually been assumed that Clodius was first married to an otherwise unknown Pinaria, since Cicero (*Dom.*, 118, 134, and 139) reveals that the pontifex who presided at the dedication of Cicero's Palatine property to Libertas was both the brother-in-law of Clodius and the stepson of L. Murena; this pontifex is not named here, but Murena's stepson is called L. Natta in *Mur.*, 73.¹²

Lily Ross Taylor, endeavoring to explain the election of the undistinguished Pinarius Natta to the pontificate, has made the suggestion that no such Pinaria existed, but that the wife of Clodius and sister of the pontifex was none other than Fulvia herself.¹³ Noting that by 52 Fulvia and Clodius had been married long enough to have two children, probably since 58 (*Phil.*, II, 48), that Clodius supported Finarius for the pontificate (*Dom.*, 118), and that the sister of Pinarius in that passage and in 139 "has Fulvia's characteristic energy," Miss Taylor proposes that Sempronia was married first to a Pinarius (whence a son L. Pinarius Natta), then to Fulvius Bambalio (a daughter Fulvia), and finally to L. Licinius Murena (to whom Natta and Fulvia would be step-children). She further suggests (p. 397 and n. 36) that this Natta was the husband of Caesar's niece and father of that L. Pinarius who was (with Q. Pedius) second heir to Caesar after Octavian.¹⁴

¹² See Drumann-Groebe, II, pp. 309-10, and Münzer, *R.-E.*, XIII, 1, s.v. Licinius, no. 123, and XX, 2, s.v. Pinarius, nos. 19 (the pontifex) and 29 (his sister).

¹³ "Caesar's Colleagues in the Pontifical College," *A.J.P.*, LXIII (1942), pp. 396-7 and especially n. 34. At the kind suggestion of Professors Taylor, Berthe Marti, and Eroughton I have examined at Bryn Mawr the unpublished papers of the late Freeman Adams and have found that in a careful study of the Pinarii he too was inclined to accept Miss Taylor's hypothesis that Clodius' "Pinaria" was really Fulvia.

¹⁴ Such a series of marriages is not at all inconsistent with the

There is much to commend this suggestion that the ghostly Pinaria be replaced by the very real Fulvia. Although Fulvia's two children by Clodius scarcely require their marriage as early as 58, Miss Taylor's comment on the character of Fulvia is most apt, and the mother-daughter team pressing Natta into action for Clodius in 58 previews the same pair in their effective appearance at Milo's trial in 52 (Asc., 35). The awkwardness of having to dispose of Pinaria (divorce or death) in 58 to make way for Fulvia (cf. comment above on Cic., *Phil.*, II, 48) is eliminated. Fulvia's own position as prospective bride would be greatly enhanced: she would no longer be simply the wealthy daughter of two moribund noble houses, but would have political and perhaps social attractiveness as the stepdaughter of the consul of 62, first of his praetorian family to reach the consulship, recently proconsul of both Gauls, and presumably wealthy himself or canny enough to use the wealth of his wife and friends well (as witness his indictment for *ambitus* after his success in an election known for its extravagant bribes).¹⁵ Murena's marriage to Sempronia could be defended by citing

probable ages of the participants and the resultant children. Natta, if possessed of enough influence to obtain the pontificate, was presumably not yet of an age for the quaestorship, to which as a connection of Caesar he could certainly aspire. I assume, therefore, that he was under 30 when elected to the pontificate and when he died in 56 (Cic., *Att.*, IV, 8a, 3). If we assume at the extreme that he was 30 in 56 and was born in 86, Sempronia could have married Pinarius about 88, at about, say 18. She would be about the same age as Cicero and Murena (the latter follows the orator by one year in the *cursus*). Fulvia should be born about 84-82, and the elder Pinarius apparently died in time for Sempronia to marry Bambalio 85-83. The marriage to Murena I would put for financial reasons before his praetorship in 65, or when the two were in their late 30's. I put Fulvia's age at about 22 when she married Clodius (62), 33 when she married Curio (51), and 37 or 38 when she married Antony (47-46). She was therefore in her mid-forties when she died in 40. If Murena and Sempronia were married in the early 60's, the conjecture that A. Terentius Varro Murena, cos. 23, was the son of the consul of 62 would make Varro Murena son of Sempronia and half-brother of Natta and Fulvia (but see Fluss, *R.-E.*, 2nd ser., 9th half-vol., *s.v.* Terentius, no. 92, col. 707, who doubts the conjecture).

¹⁵ Walter Allen, Jr., "The Acting Governor of Cisalpine Gaul in 63 B.C.," *C.P.*, XLVIII (1953), pp. 176-7, makes the suggestion of the governorship of both provinces.

alone the expense of his praetorship and his lavish celebration of the *ludi Apollinares* (cf. Pliny, *N.H.*, XXXIII, 53; Cic., *Mur.*, 37-8). The presence of Sempronia and Fulvia in the house of Murena would do much to explain the election of Natta, with few apparent qualifications other than his membership in the waning patriciate, to the pontificate in 58—such pressure as was later applied to Natta by the ladies, if turned to obtaining his election, would stir Clodius and Murena, if he was still alive, into action, and through Clodius might obtain the support of the triumvirs, one of whom was the absentee pontifex maximus and uncle-by-marriage of Pinarius.¹⁶ Further, we have noted that Clodius was on Murena's staff in Gaul in 64, and was back in Rome as worshipper of the Bona Dea and candidate for the quaestorship in the year of Murena's consulship. It is quite possible that the alliance through marriage with the Claudii would appeal to Murena, while marriage with the stepdaughter of the consul, his commander in Gaul, would not be unattractive to the ambitious Clodius. And we must remember, finally, that at Murena's trial in 63 he was defended by Cicero, Hortensius, and Crassus, with the latter of whom Clodius was soon to become very close, if their financial relationship had not already begun (and, incidentally, Hortensius was a cousin of Sempronia). I suggest then that the marriage took place in the year of Murena's consulship, a political alliance to the advantage of both families, though perhaps not so striking socially as the marriage in the previous year of the daughter of the *novus homo* Cicero to C. Calpurnius Piso Frugi.¹⁷

¹⁶ Miss Taylor notes (p. 403) that except for the elder Curio and Natta the nine men elected to the pontificate between 63 (the *lex Labienae*) and Caesar's restoration of coöptation in 49 were all of houses that had recently held the consulship. Murena may fill in part this lack in Natta's family.

¹⁷ The alternative interpretation is to have a Pinaria, stepdaughter of Murena, marry Clodius in 62 and die or be divorced in 58 to make room for Clodius' marriage to Fulvia, at a time when he must be thinking of campaigning for that expensive office, the aedileship, which he is to hold in 56. If a divorce were in question in 58 there is no doubt that Fulvia would have had a part in precipitating it. One should also note that if Sempronia was divorced from Bambalio as early as 62-58, Fulvia must have retained connections with her father, since Antony is said to have been fond of Bambalio (Cic. in Dio, XLV, 47, 4, speaking in 43, καὶ τὸν Βαμβαλίωνα ἀγαπᾷ).

Curio presents a somewhat different picture. He was no less ambitious, surely, but was from not so distinguished a family as that of Clodius and may have had better financial resources. Two incidents reflect his means. In the first Cicero writes to him (*Fam.*, II, 3, 1) not to expend too much money on funeral games in honor of his recently dead father; he does not emphasize inadequate funds, but rather common sense. Pliny (*N.H.*, XXXVI, 116-20) elaborates on this event by describing the outcome, in which Curio, who couldn't hope to compete with the richest, cleverly built a double theatre which by rotation could be joined to form an amphitheatre.¹⁸ Curio won election to the tribunate as *suffectus* to the convicted *designatus* Servaeus (Caelius in *Fam.*, VIII, 4, 2 and Cicero in II, 7, 1) in the year after he married Clodius' widow Fulvia.¹⁹ One might note, however, that at the time he most likely married Fulvia Curio, as Clodius before him, was considering the aedileship for 50. The other incident is a more obvious one in some ways, but also a matter of doubt—the question of the bribe reported as given to the tribune Curio by Caesar in return for the former's shift from opponent to partisan. If Curio did accept a bribe, or, euphemistically, a gift after the fact, his action serves to emphasize his continuing need for funds in spite of a wealthy marriage.²⁰

¹⁸ Par. 120 is most cogent: *nec fuit rex Curio aut gentium imperator, non opibus insignis, ut qui nihil in censu habuerit praeter discordiam principum.*

¹⁹ The exact time of the marriage (attested by Cicero, *Phil.*, II, 11 and 115) cannot be determined. Inasmuch as Fulvia and her mother appeared with dramatic effect at the trial of Milo early in April 52 (*Asc.*, 35), we can presume that Fulvia waited until after the trial to marry her husband's friend. Cicero's references to Curio's wife are nearly a decade later, in spite of their fairly intimate relationship in these years. The most likely time is between the trial and August 1, 51, when Caelius writes to tell Cicero in Cilicia of Curio's candidacy and begins a fairly regular and detailed series of letters reporting on Curio's doings as tribune. In fact, however, nothing prevents the time being so late as just before Curio's departure for Sicily in 49. On Curio's probable goal of the aedileship, see Münzer, *loc. cit.* (n. 5), col. 869, who bases the assumption on letters to Cicero from Caelius (*Fam.*, VIII, 4, 2; 5, 3; 8, 10; 9, 3), and Broughton, *M.R.R.*, II, p. 240, n. 2.

²⁰ W. K. Lacey, "The Tribune of Curio," *Historia*, X (1961), pp. 318-29 (hereafter referred to simply as Lacey), proposing a Curio more independent in course than usually pictured, argues against a

Velleius (II, 48, 3-4) characterizes him *suae alienaeque et fortunae et pudicitiae prodigus . . . cuius animo neque opes ulla neque cupiditates sufficere posse*t. Harsh and redundant, perhaps excessive, yes, but symptomatic of Fulvia's first two husbands.²¹

Adverse propaganda has clearly colored our view of all three of these political figures, but Antony is well known to have been the object of particularly vicious attack, notably in his own time by two experts, Cicero and Octavian. Since both, in a sense, were victorious and have survived to us as prime representatives of their ages, the extraction of the "real" Antony has been extraordinarily difficult.²² For our purposes, however,

bribe and for a "reward" from Caesar's well-known liberality. However, in commenting on the silence about the supposed bribe on the part of Cicero, Caelius, and Atticus, he fails to mention *Brutus* 280, *qui si me audire voluissest ut cooperat, honores quam opes consequi maluisset*, and 281, *qui autem occasione aliqua etiam invitis suis civibus nactus est imperium ut ille cupiebat, hunc nomen honoris adeptum, non honorem puto*, both of which refer to Curio, and rather reflect Cicero's sadness at this character deficiency. On the other hand, if my assumption of Fulvia's wealth is correct, Lacey might have been happy to have used that source to explain the sudden affluence of Curio (p. 319).

²¹ In view of Velleius' ability as a writer of capsule character sketches, it is valuable to compare those of Clodius (II, 45, 1) and Curio (II, 48, 3-4). The one, *homo nobilis, disertus, audax*, the other *vir nobilis, eloquens, audax*; the particulars that follow these formulae are individual, but suggest that Fulvia was in good part consistent. There is no compact statement on Antony, an archfiend in Velleius' pro-Ciceronian view (see II, 66 on Cicero's death), but the isolated statements, even accepting their prejudice, ring true: *omnibus audendis paratissimus* (II, 61, 4), . . . *in quo turpiter deprehensa eius vanitas est* (60, 3), etc. Caelius, another friend of Curio, is compared with him in similar language in 68, 1.

²² Kenneth Scott, "The Political Propaganda of 44-30 B.C.," *M. A. A. R.*, XI (1933), pp. 1 ff., demonstrates both the routine nature of these attacks and the effectiveness of Antony's as well as Octavian's efforts. Recent years have seen efforts to readjust our views of the other husbands, too, e.g., S. L. Outchenko, "Du consulat de César au tribunat de Clodius," *V. D. I.*, no. 77 (1961), pp. 34-49, and E. Manni, "L'utopia di Clodio," *R. F. I. C.*, 1940, pp. 161-78 (hereafter referred to simply as Outchenko and Manri), both of which undertake to show considerable independence of action on the part of Clodius, and Lacey, who tries to do the same for Curio. I am much indebted to my colleague Professor Anna Pirseenok for her kindness in assisting me with Out-

certain evidence can be adduced which demonstrates that he, too, was extravagant in his tastes and in his use of money, and often in need of funds. First, he had no patrimony from his spendthrift father Creticus, whom Plutarch (*Ant.*, 1) calls a liberal giver from modest funds (*κεκτημένος γὰρ οὐ πολλὰ*) whose wife kept him from extravagance. Cicero in *Verrine III*, 213 speaks of him disparagingly, *Antonium . . . in mediis eius iniuriis et cupiditatibus mors oppressit*, while in Dio, XLV, 47, 3 and 5 he is made to taunt Antony with not having inherited property from Creticus. Creticus is perhaps best characterized by Sallust (*Hist.*, III, 16M): *perdundae pecuniae genitus vacusque curis nisi instantibus*. The stepfather who replaced him, P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura, executed by Cicero in 63, can have provided neither good example nor extensive inheritance for three ambitious young men with political careers to be made, and careers which were to be very close together (quaestorships in three consecutive years, Marcus 52, Gaius 51, Lucius 50). Antony proved worthy of both father and stepfather, according to Cicero. In the second Philippic (44-5), in a violent attack on the relationship between Antony and Curio, Cicero refers to an enormous debt of the youthful Antony (6 million sesterces, 250 talents in Plut., *Ant.*, 2, 3) for which Curio went surety (and which Plutarch says he incited Antony to incur). Cicero persuaded the elder Curio to cover the debt because of his belief in the son's potential, but to bar Antony from his house and his son's company (Plutarch omits Cicero's rôle in the story). Somewhat later Antony's wild and spendthrift living angered Caesar and worked to Antony's disadvantage in advancement (Plut., *Ant.*, 9-10); when Caesar's displeasure became clear, Antony changed his ways and settled down to marry Fulvia. In short, like most young men of his class, means, and prospects, Antony would profit by a financially rewarding marriage. It goes without saying that Fulvia's position was in no way demeaned by marriage with an Antonius.

I have attempted to show that Fulvia, perhaps a marital liability if only the daughter of two declining houses, was by virtue of wealth and position as a consular's stepdaughter a quite acceptable match for three young nobles early in their careers

chenko's Russian article, of which I give here the French title provided by the journal.

during an enormously intricate phase of republican political development. There were other factors, too.

Fulvia was apparently a woman of some personal charm. The literary sources make little mention of her personal attributes, but if the portrait bust published by Helbig and the coin types thought by some to represent the features of Fulvia are properly attributed, she was attractive enough to have made the prospect of marriage with her appealing for more than financial reasons.²³ Even if one must regretfully admit the improbability of a certain portrait, the physical charms of a woman who could achieve a happy if not entirely faithful marriage with a Clodius, a Curio, and, initially at least, an Antony must have been noteworthy. The implication of the happy marriage to Clodius is drawn from Cicero's statement (*Mil.*, 28 and 55) that Clodius travelled everywhere with his wife, and was by exception without her in the encounter with Milo at Bovillae, and from Asconius' description (28 and 35) of her grief over Clodius' body and at Milo's trial.²⁴ So little of record exists for the marriage with Curio that we can only presume its felicity from the speed with which it was probably effected after Clodius' death and the brief time available to the couple for disenchantment before Curio's departure and death. Plutarch's description of Fulvia's complete control over Antony (*Ant.*, 10, 3) and his playful attempts to make her a happier type in spite of her serious nature (10, 4, told with somewhat different effect by Cicero, *Phil.*, II, 77) sug-

²³ W. Helbig, "Osservazioni sopra i ritratti di Fulvia e di Ottavia," *Monimenti Antichi*, I (1889), pp. 572-90, with two plates. The certainty of this attribution, which in large part depends upon supposed coin likenesses of Fulvia, is not strong. Harold Mattingly, *Roman Coins* (ed. 2, London, 1960), p. 72, n. 2, comments that the case for coin portraiture of Scribonia and Fulvia is very doubtful, although sure portraits exist of both Octavia and Cleopatra. For the coins in question see H. A. Grueber, *C.R. R.B.M.*, I, p. 570, particularly the note on no. 4215, and p. 575, the note on no. 4229; II, p. 394, the note on no. 40. Further, Barclay V. Head, *Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Phrygia* (London, 1906), pp. lxi and 213, note on nos. 20 and 21.

²⁴ The obscurity of Valerius Maximus, III, 5, 3 (is Fulvia wearing a *pugio* in the manner of a military commander, or, as some have interpreted the passage, is Clodius in some way clinging to her as a *pugio* to a commander?) makes questionable Münzer's use of this passage to illustrate the closeness of the marriage (col. 281 in *R.E.*, VII).

gests an initial happiness. Perhaps one could add Antony's fondness for Bambalio (sneered at by Cicero in Dio, XLV, 47, 4).

Each of Fulvia's marriages produced children, a factor of some importance to dynamically conscious Roman noble families. Hence she had another point in her favor for the second and third marriages, particularly in the case of Antony, who may have been anxious for a son.²⁵

There remains an additional point which will serve as a transition to the second question (Fulvia's possible influence on the careers of Clodius and Curio). There is a hint and insinuation, as I have mentioned, that the relations later formalized by Fulvia with Antony may have begun while she was still married to Clodius (*Phil.*, II, 48). I believe that Antony's sudden divorce of his first wife Antonia (assuming no marriage to Fadia) resulted in part from pressure on the part of Fulvia, then twice widowed, to make legal a relationship which had existed perhaps as far back as 58.²⁶ There is no literary evidence to suggest an

²⁵ Fulvia's two children by Clodius were P. Clodius Pulcher, who perhaps reached the praetorship after Actium (cf. Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 425, and *P. I. R.*², II, p. 240, no. 987), and Clodia, briefly married to Octavian in 43-41 (*P. I. R.*², II, p. 257, no. 1057). By Curio she had a like-named son who was put to death by Octavian after Actium as a follower of Antony (Dio, LI, 2, 5 and Münzer, *R.-E.*, 2nd ser., 3rd half-vol., s. v. *Scribonius*, no. 7). By Antony, M. Antonius Antyllus, killed by Octavian after Alexandria (*P. I. R.*, I, p. 93, no. 638) and Iullus Antonius, reared by Octavia, favored by Augustus, and fatally involved in the downfall of the elder Julia in 2 B.C. (*P. I. R.*², I, p. 153, no. 800). Prior to the marriage with Fulvia Antony had children (*liberos*) by the daughter of a freedman, Q. Fadius, though I suspect without marriage (Cic., *Att.*, XVI, 11, 1; *Phil.*, II, 3; III, 17, XIII, 23). One cannot entirely discount the possibility of marriage, especially if Q. Fadius was wealthy, but Cicero's terminology is consistent about the relationship (*liberos habuisse, suscepit liberos, sustulerit liberos*) and emphasizes only the recognition of the children; the only formal suggestion other than the recognition is in the use of *generum* (*Phil.*, II, 3) to describe Antony's relationship to Fadius, a word I take as sarcastic and not literal. Hence the birth of Antyllus probably gave Antony his first legitimate male heir—and Fulvia had already demonstrated her ability to produce sons. Antony had had a daughter by Antonia and went on to have two daughters by Octavia and twins (a boy and a girl) and a son by Cleopatra, at least 10 children by five women.

²⁶ So Cicero (*Phil.*, II, 99) states that Antony did not divorce Antonia until he was already provided with another marriage prospect. Cicero

affair with Curio during Clodius' lifetime; we can only note the sporadic association between the two men and Fulvia's remarriage shortly after the latter's death.

One of the elements that makes Fulvia's choice of husbands intriguing is the relationship among the three men themselves. Again this area is beset with the prejudices of contemporary sources, but all are agreed that there was a fair amount of involvement. It will be advantageous first to put down the careers of the three to the time of Fulvia's last marriage:²⁷

and Plutarch (*Ant.*, 9), with slightly different emphasis, indicate that Antony used the suspicion of adultery between Antonia and Dolabella, then tribune, to justify the divorce of the former and political opposition to the latter. Dolabella's activities as tribune in 47 were clearly enough to exasperate Antony, Master of the Horse for the absent Caesar (see Dio, XLII, 29-33). The adultery charge (Fulvia's idea?) would provide a fine emotional point and at the same time clear the way for Fulvia, whom he probably married immediately. A. C. Clark, in his edition of the *pro Milne* (Oxford, 1895), assumes that Curio's rejection of Cicero's invitation to aid Milo's campaign reflects Fulvia's control over Curio in 53 (p. xxi); so also he notes (p. 37) that Antony was probably accusing Milo because he was already under Fulvia's influence.

²⁷ Broughton, *M.R.R.*, II, and the appropriate articles in *R.E.* form the basis for most of this list. Fröhlich, *loc. cit.* (n. 4), no. 48, does not suggest a birthdate for Clodius, but 91 seems appropriate to a quaestorship in 61. The dating of the Vettius case is that of Lily Ross Taylor, "The Date and Meaning of the Vettius Affair," *Historia*, I (1950), pp. 45-51, who emphasizes Curio's influential position even at this time. Cicero (*Vat.*, 24) refers to Curio *princeps iuventutis, cum re publica coniunctiore etiam, quam ad illa aetate postulandum fuit*. This may be a complimentary phrase, or it may be technical and refer to Curio's position among the knights. See W. Beringer, *R.E.*, XXII, 2, s. vv. *princeps iuventutis*, col. 2391, and St. Weinstock, *R.E.*, 2nd ser., 12th half-vol., s. v. *transvectio equitum*, col. 2184, for comment on the difficulty of defining this expression during the Republic. Clodius' support for Cicero in 63 (*Plut. Cic.*, 29) seems to be refuted by Cicero himself (*Red. Sen.*, 4; *Red. Quir.*, 13, 21; *Har. Resp.*, 5, 42; *Mil.*, 37), but none of these need be more than automatic linking of Clodius to Catiline, another as dastardly as himself.

Clodius (b. ca. 91)	Curio (b. ca. 84)	Antony (b. ca. 82)
73?–68/67 <i>legatus?</i> (Syria)		
67 <i>praefectus classis?</i> (Cilicia)		
64. <i>tribunus militum?</i> (Tr. Gaul)		
63 supports Cicero against Cat.?		
62 marries Fulvia Bona Dea affair		
61–60 trial, <i>quaestor</i> (Sicily)	supports Clodius	
59	Vettius affair (mid-July)	
58 <i>tribunus plebis</i>		to Greece
57–55		<i>praefectus equitum</i> (Syria, Egypt)
56 <i>aedilis curulis</i> <i>XVvir s. f.</i>	<i>princeps iuventutis?</i>	
54	<i>quaestor?</i> (Asia)	informally in Gaul
53 candidate for <i>praetor</i>	<i>quaestor?</i> (perhaps to early 52)	to Rome as candidate for <i>quaestor</i>
52 candidate for <i>praetor</i> murdered January 18	<i>pontifex</i> (or by 51)	<i>quaestor</i> (Gaul)
52–51	marries Fulvia	<i>legatus</i> or <i>proquaestor?</i> (Gaul)
51	candidate for <i>aedilis</i> <i>tribunus plebis</i> design.	to Rome as candidate for <i>tribunus plebis</i>
50	<i>tribunus plebis</i>	<i>augur, tribunus plebis</i> <i>propraetor</i> (Italy)
49	<i>legatus</i> (envoy), <i>legatus</i> or <i>praefectus</i> (Italy), <i>propraetor</i> (Sicily and Africa) killed in August	<i>legatus?</i> (Pharsalus) <i>magister equitum</i>
48		<i>magister equitum</i>
47		marries Fulvia (or 46)
44		<i>consul I</i>

The earliest relationship was probably that friendship between Curio and Antony already mentioned, stigmatized by Cicero as unnatural (*Phil.*, II, 3, 44–5, 50, 86; cf. *Att.*, I, 14, 5; *Plut.*, *Ant.*, 2, 3–4). The nature of the intimacy need not concern us, for such charges are stock-in-trade in Roman political oratory; it is clear, however, that the two were close as young men. The timing of their acquaintance with Clodius is not certain. Plutarch (*Ant.*, 2, 4) speaks of Antony's brief alliance with Clodius, his fill of Clodius' mad policies and a fear of the anti-Clodian party which was forming; Antony escaped this by going to Greece (58), whence he was lured to Syria by a command offered by Aulus Gabinius (cf. Cic., *Phil.*, II, 48; Dio, XLV, 40, 2). We do not know if Antony was in that *grex Catilinae*

which undertook to support Clodius by opposing the bill *de religione* aimed at him in 61. That the leader of this band (Cic., *Att.*, I, 14, 5) was Curio suggests that at this one time, 62-61 and the years immediately following, the three may have been friends. There would be a chance that the two husbands-to-be witnessed Fulvia's first marriage. All three were presumably in Rome or Italy from Clodius' return from his quaestorship in Sicily in 60 until Antony's departure for Greece in 58.

Cicero says (*Phil.*, II, 48-9) that Antony was an intimate of Clodius during the latter's tribunate, and therefore he must have remained in Rome through a part of 58. Antony is pictured as going directly from Egypt to Caesar in Gaul before returning to Rome to stand for the quaestorship of 52 with Caesar's backing. The timing is unclear, but apparently the trip to Gaul was in late 55 or 54. Cicero then (par. 49) recounts an incident to which he also has referred in par. 21, Antony's attempt to kill Clodius when Antony was a candidate for the quaestorship (cf. also Cicero's speech in Dio, XLV, 49, 2). The only one of these passages that offers a reason for the attempt is the first, in which Antony is made to claim that only Clodius' death would atone for Antony's wrongs against Cicero. The causes are certainly to be sought elsewhere. In two letters to Quintus (*Q. Fr.*, II, 15, 2 [Watt], end of May 54, and III, 1, 4, September 54) Cicero suggests that Clodius is out of favor with the remaining triumvirs (Crassus had departed for Syria), of whom only Pompey was in Italy. In the second letter Caesar has apparently refused to reply to a letter of Clodius. The election disturbances of 54, which prevented the seating of consuls until July 53, were continued in late 53, and only plebeian officers were installed at the beginning of 52 (Dio, XL, 46, 3). Antony's candidacy, therefore, continued until after Pompey's seating as sole consul in the intercalary month (*V a. d. Kal. Mart.*) and the subsequent election of minor officers.²⁸ Clodius' death at the hands of Milo's gang had occurred January 18, and Antony's attack must therefore have come between spring 53, when he would have started his political campaign, and the chance meeting of Clodius and Milo at Bovillae. Caesar's affection for Cicero is reported several times by Quintus in 54, and Cicero

²⁸ See Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 234, and Lily Ross Taylor, *Party Politics*, pp. 148 ff., for details of the year's disturbances.

expresses reciprocation (*Q. Fr.*, III, 1, 9, 17, 25; *Att.*, IV, 17, 6-7). Cicero is uninterested in Pompey's gesture of reconciliation (*Q. Fr.*, III, 1, 15) and concerned about Pompey's support of Gabinius (III, 2, 1; 3, 3; 4, 1) but avoids a break with Pompey (4, 2). The year closes with Cicero reporting that all is still uncertain (7, 2 [Watt]) and in 53 he writes to Curio (*Fam.*, II, 5) that the disturbances are so great that he cannot even comment on them freely. Julia has died (*Q. Fr.*, III, 1, 25 and 6, 3 [Watt]), the split between Caesar and Pompey, though not sure, is becoming more likely, and in this atmosphere Antony comes from Gaul to seek the quaestorship, seeks out Cicero, and tries to kill Clodius. This sequence clearly suggests Caesar's irritation with Clodius, his assumption that Clodius is useful to Pompey and not to himself, and his willingness to be rid of Clodius finally.²⁹ If, as has been suggested, Antony had been for some time in liaison with Fulvia, there would be an additional personal reason for his interest in eliminating her husband.

Curio was probably in Asia in 54 and 53 and may have returned at about the time Antony would have been leaving for service as quaestor with Caesar in Gaul, which was after Milo's trial in the first days of April (*Asc.*, 36). Curio does not appear in the disturbances following Clodius' death or in the trial literature. Cicero's invitation to him in 53 (*Fam.*, II, 6) to aid Milo's candidacy for the consulship may reflect a cooling between Curio and Clodius rather than simply Curio's influence with the people and his friendship for Cicero. It is hard to accept the letter in other terms, since the Milo-Clodius clash was by then so bitter as to overcome even the Roman ability to lay aside feuds during times of mutual need. At the risk of excessive romanticism one might suggest a Fulvia involvement again as a source for such a lull in the friendship, a lull which the general warmth of Cicero's correspondence (*Fam.*, II, 1-6) in this year helps to confirm. Curio could have returned, then, found Fulvia

²⁹ See a similar interpretation by Manni, pp. 176-8. Caesar may have so viewed Clodius' defense of the Pompeian Aemilius Scaurus in 54. But this trial had the strange scene of Clodius and Cicero as two of the six defenders, and Pompey one of nine consulars who served as character witnesses. Asconius notes that even under such circumstances Cicero could not refrain from a jibe at C. Claudius and P. Clodius (22-3 on *Scaur.*, 34).

a widow, and have married her in the convenient months after Milo's trial and Antony's departure. This would help to explain the marriage with Curio if an affair with Antony was in progress from as early as 58.

Fulvia's marriage with Curio was cut short by the Civil War and Curio's departure for Sicily, Africa, and death in 49. Antony was with Caesar in Gaul probably until he returned in 50 to stand for the tribunate and the augurate, certainly by mid-year.³⁰ Curio supported Antony in this election (Cic., *Phil.*, II, 4), apparently with enthusiasm, since Cicero reports convictions *de vi* from among Curio's supporters in the campaign. The end of Curio's tribunate, which seems to have been Caesarian by any interpretation, and the beginning of Antony's, a violent and threatening speech against Pompey on Dec. 21 (*Att.*, VII, 8, 5), imply close political harmony if not personal friendship. Curio's departure to Caesar after his tribunate (Dio, XL, 66, 5) and his return as *legatus* to the Senate on the first of January (XLI, 1, 1) throw him into even closer relation with Antony until their mutual flight to Caesar with Cassius Longinus later in the month. There is no subsequent record of contact between the two in the war. Fulvia's whereabouts in this period are unknown, but she presumably stayed in Rome or nearby, safe because of Caesar's rapid overrunning of Italy. She had two young children by Clodius and was either pregnant with or delivered of a son by Curio. This circumstance, Curio's death in mid-August, and Antony's military rôle in Italy, at Dyrrachium and at Pharsalus suggest that no liaison with Fulvia could have resumed much before early winter, when Antony had returned as Master of the Horse and was in command in Rome.³¹

³⁰ He was augur before August 5-10, when Caelius writes of Domitius' chagrin at his defeat by Antony (*Fam.*, VIII, 14, 1, and cf. Hirtius, *B.G.*, VIII, 50, 1-3). Antony's election as tribune presumably followed, if the *comitia sacerdotum* came between those for the consuls and the praetors, which in turn usually preceded the election of minor officials and plebeian officers (see Lily Ross Taylor, *Party Politics*, p. 59; "The Election of the *Pontifex Maximus* in the Late Republic," *C.P.*, XXXVII [1942], p. 122, n. 7; and *op. cit.* [n. 13], p. 388).

³¹ Erik Wistrand, "The Date of Curio's African Campaign," *Eranos*, LXI (1963), pp. 38-44, reconfirms the dating of Curio's campaign and death to mid-August, after news of Ilerda (2 August) had reached Africa. On Antony, see Broughton, *M.R.R.*, II, pp. 272, 280, and 284, n. 1.

The problem of their relationship after Curio's death has been mentioned (p. 13 and n. 26).

To this point we have viewed these marriages primarily through the traditional approach to the husbands' careers. But with Fulvia one can fairly assume a certain amount of initiation in both any informal relations and the marriages themselves. Plutarch, for whom Fulvia does not play a major rôle, yet gives her a very strong character and considerable influence in the career of Antony (*Ant.*, 10, 3) : οὐ ταλασίαν οὐδὲ οἰκουρίαν φρονοῦν γύναιον οὐδὲ ἀνδρὸς ἴδιωτον κρατεῖν ἀξιοῦν, ἀλλ' ἀρχοντος ἀρχειν καὶ στρατηγοῦντος στρατηγεῖν βουλόμενον, ὥστε Κλεοπάτραν διδασκάλια Φουλβίᾳ τῆς Ἀντωνίου γυναικοκρατίας ὁφείλειν, πάντι χειρούθη καὶ πεπαιδαγωγημένον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀκροδισθαι γυναικῶν παραλαβοῦσαν αὐτόν. Antony tried to make her merrier (*ἱλαρωτέαν*), Plutarch goes on to say. Velleius Paterculus, picturing Fulvia only in the Perusine War period, describes her (II, 74, 2) in not unsimilar terms: *nihil muliebre praeter corpus gerens*. Although these are not entirely flattering comments, I accept them as fairly accurately reflecting the will and interests of Fulvia, whereas in Cicero and Dio, particularly the latter, one must watch for greater distortion because of a higher adverse propaganda level. It is not my purpose to clear Fulvia of the charges of cruelty and avarice both authors advance, but rather to see what reflection of her activities as wife of Antony can be seen in her earlier career through those of her husbands.³² The woman whose rôle in the Perusine War was prominent enough to establish the reputation Fulvia enjoyed did not become aware of her political potential suddenly.³³ There is indeed enough similarity of action and even of method in the careers of her husbands to suggest quite strongly that this woman whose ambition was to "rule a ruler"

³² Clearing has been undertaken in part by Enrica Malcovati and Barbara Förtsch (see n. 3). Balsdon, *op. cit.* (n. 2), pp. 49-50, is literal in his presentation of the sources but admiring of her loyalty and her strength.

³³ Appian (*B.C.*, V, 14 ff.) gives Fulvia a less prominent part in the war, and, perhaps reflecting Asinius Pollio or Augustan propaganda, shows L. Antonius as the protagonist. The scurrility of Octavian's verses aims at Fulvia and Manius (*Martial*, XI, 20, 3-8); the inscribed sling bullets (*C.I.L.*, XI, 6721) attack Fulvia (3-5 and 14), Lucius (13, 14) and, of course, Octavian (7). On the lateness of Fulvia's political prominence see n. 3.

may have played a vital if not publicly recognized part in all three careers.

Politically Clodius, Curio, and Antony began their advance in rather traditional fashion with some military experience (this must be assumed for Curio, but the assumption is fairly safe for one to whom Caesar can assign Sicily and Africa in 49). Each held a provincial quaestorship and then the tribunate of the plebs. If Curio was considering for a while the aedileship (see n. 19), he had precedent in Clodius' aedileship of 56. Curio had no time after his tribunate to develop his career toward the praetorship, which Clodius sought in 53 and 52, but both Curio and Antony were given propraetorian *imperium* for their commands of 49 in Sicily-Africa and Italy. The irregularities of war then promoted Antony to *magister equitum* (48-47) and *consul* (44) without the formal praetorship. One can argue that these are not very unusual progressions, but there is in each the optional tribunate, a popular cult and at various times a Caesarian line, and a strong suggestion of the concomitant personal and even extra-constitutional ambition. The presence of the same woman as wife to each during climactic moments of the career, and a woman *nihil muliebre praeter corpus gerens*, assumes some significance.

Fulvia's actual effect on Clodius' career can only be surmised from a few references. Perhaps the most significant is that in Cicero, *Mil.*, 28 and 55, mentioned above as an indication of a happy marriage, and reporting that by exception Clodius was travelling without his wife at Bovillae, whereas normally she went everywhere with him. This habit seems to have held with Fulvia, for in the spring of 44 she is found with Antony at Brundisium in camp, to the stern disapproval of Cicero, not only for her presence at the slaughter of the centurions, but for being in camp at all (cf. *Phil.*, V, 22, XIII, 18, and Dio, XLV, 12-13). The arrangements at Bononia in 43 by which Antony's stepdaughter by Fulvia is betrothed to Octavian strongly suggest the presence of Fulvia, whose part in the transaction was certainly a major one (she had been a stepdaughter of a politician herself). Dio (XLVI, 56, 3) notes that the suggestion was from Antony's troops, but with Antony's (and we should add, Fulvia's) prodding; Plutarch lets the soldiers' act be spontaneous (*Ant.*, 20). Such residence in military camp cannot be shown

during the marriage with Clodius, who seems to have spent the years during which he was probably married to Fulvia (62-52) in Italy, with the exception of an unexciting quaestorship in Sicily. To the extent to which his *collegia* had headquarters, however, I think we can say that Fulvia was not unknown in them. If we judge from her abilities as a recruiter and organizer in the Perusine War period, in fact, we may think that she had some not negligible part in the organization of the *collegia*. This is confirmed by Cicero's comment on her omnipresence with Clodius (*in raeda*, presumably a mobile command post, which he had by exception eschewed for a horse at Bovillae).

The dramatic appearance of Fulvia and her mother at the trial of Milo (Asc., 35) and Fulvia's tearful showing of the body and its wounds to the crowd on the day of the murder (28), natural as both gestures may have been, foreshadow Fulvia's use of herself and her family in the struggle for power after Caesar's death.³⁴ Appian's account of the affairs in Rome while Antony is besieging Mutina in 43 (B.C., III, 51) shows Fulvia and her son, still a boy, and Antony's mother Julia with other relatives and friends pleading with senators not to declare Antony an enemy of the state. This attempt fails, but early in 41 (B.C., V, 14) Fulvia and her children appear before the troops with L. Antonius and Manius to exhort them not to forget Antony or give credit in the settlement of the colonies to Octavian. With the same intent Fulvia dispatches her sons with Lucius (19) to accompany Octavian in leading out the final colony. The children are later used as an excuse for Fulvia to meet with Lepidus (21).

The participation of Fulvia in the proscriptions which followed Bononia in 43 was actual, I think, although we have no way to assure the extent of her rôle or the degree of exaggeration in the details passed on by later sources. The patent Augustan propaganda reflected by Dio, XLVII, 8, for example, shows Octavian saving lives as he could, Lepidus proving lenient, and only Antony and Fulvia raging like beasts. Fulvia is said to have initiated action against many through enmity or covetousness, and to have joined Antony in the most shameful mis-

³⁴ And perhaps Antony's own performance before the body of Caesar (Dio, XLIV, 35, 4 and 50, 1—the speech is 36-49).

treatment of the head of Cicero. Those they spared bought their lives. Plutarch (*Ant.*, 20, 2 and *Cic.*, 48, 4) significantly avoids any mention of Fulvia in connection with Cicero's death, putting the blame on Antony alone, but Appian (*B.C.*, IV, 29) demonstrates Fulvia's cruelty with the story of Rufus, his confiscated villa and Fulvia's similar mistreatment of his head. One would like to dismiss these horrors out-of-hand, but proscriptions there were, cruelty and avarice existed without doubt, and as Octavian cannot by all his propaganda be absolved of his share, neither can Antony and Fulvia, the latter prominent enough to have allowed the development of the propaganda, have been without guilt. It is interesting to note that Cicero, as he searches for qualities in Fulvia for exaggeration in his attack on Antony, chooses *avaritia* and *crudelitas*, and these were developed in the historians (*Phil.*, II, 113, VI, 4, XIII, 18). Since the best propaganda is the exaggeration of a known or credible element, we must expect to find in Fulvia such tendencies.

The comparable situation in her earlier marriage to Clodius unfortunately fails to produce extensive evidence of Fulvia's activity. The literature on Cicero's exile, the confiscation of his property and his subsequent recall and regaining of the property has little reference to the participation of Clodius' wife. His brother-in-law Pinarius Naata appears as pontifex at the dedication of the Palatine property to Libertas, as we have seen, urged to perform his religious rôle by his mother and his sister, who as Clodius' wife would profit immediately from the material gain at Cicero's exile (*Dom.*, 118, 139). It is certainly clear that Clodius profited from his year as tribune, regardless of the exaggeration in the charges against him. For example, Cicero (*Dom.*, 60-2, 107-8, 115-16, *Har. Resp.*, 30-1, 49) harps on the acquisition of his property by Clodius and the consuls of 58, on the adjoining house of Seius which Clodius bought cheaply, on the dismantling of Catulus' portico, and on Clodius' threat to built on the Carinae. There is no reason to dismiss this as fabrication; Clodius made no secret of his activities during his tribunate. Nor can one doubt that Clodius was paid by Brogitarus for his support (cf. *Har. Resp.*, 29). In short, Clodius, while riding the crest of a rather lucrative wave of income, was also acquiring property, position, and prospects that would take

a fortune to maintain. He was not, as we have seen, well endowed by his family, but had wisely added the stabilizing element of Fulvia's dowry and wealth to his own income, a step particularly needed in the light of the expensive career he planned for himself. Fulvia, who was certainly acquisitive if not avaritious, had by this year's activity gained a prized residence on the Palatine (*Dom.*, 100, *Har. Resp.*, 49), had enjoyed tremendous prestige as the wife of the tribune who was clearly a prime-mover of affairs in Rome, and, what I consider most important, had taken a hand herself in the control of those affairs.³⁵

It is this point, Fulvia's ambition, that impresses itself inevitably as one considers the careers of her husbands and the coincidences of her marriages. Several sources in the historians reflect this ambition, which was no doubt a convenient characteristic for Augustan propaganda to emphasize, both when the lines to Antony were being kept open and afterwards, when the theory controlling Augustus' settlements with the Senate and the people had to be rationalized. Appian's treatment is a good case in point. Although Manius is said to have aroused Fulvia's jealousy and caused her to spur L. Antonius on to war (*B.C.*, V, 19), Lucius himself in a great apology before Octavian censures Fulvia's approval of monarchy (i.e., the triumvirate) and says that he is opposed to monarchy by anyone, will support his brother if he will renounce monarchy, or, that failing, will support Octavian on the same terms. The honorable treatment of Lucius after this pronouncement must reflect Octavian's public espousal in 27 of just what Lucius is here made to represent, the restoration of the Republic and the return of the monarchic powers entrusted to the triumvirs. Fulvia, then, appears as a monarchist, that is, one addicted to the concept of individual power. And so she appears in most of the references to her during the second triumvirate. Her performance in the proscriptions has already been mentioned. During the aftermath, when a heavy war tax was levied on the 1400 richest women, the victims appealed to the women of the triumvirs (*App.*, *B.C.*, IV, 32). Octavian's sister Octavia and Antony's mother Julia received them sympathetically, but Fulvia had them driven from

³⁵ For comment on Clodius' use of the confiscated property see R. G. Nisbet in his edition of the *De Domo Sua* (Oxford, 1939), appendix V, pp. 206-9.

her door. Hortensia, in her successful speech on their behalf before the triumvirs, pointedly complained about Fulvia's rude treatment. Dio is perhaps most specific about her position of power. In 41 when P. Servilius and L. Antonius become consuls, Dio notes (XLVIII, 4, 1-6) that the real power lay with Antonius and Fulvia, and particularly with the latter. As mother-in-law of Octavian, wife of Antony, and one completely contemptuous of Lepidus, she assumed to herself the management of the state. Only through her could business be transacted, and only by her approval was Lucius voted his triumph *ex Alpibus* and his crowns. Indeed, it almost might have been Fulvia in the chariot, Dio remarks. Octavian, when he returned to Rome, broke with Lucius and Fulvia, divorced her daughter, and to maintain the hope of terms with Antony rather accused Lucius and Fulvia of aiming at supreme power (XLVIII, 5, 1-5). Fulvia's whole conduct in the period preceding and during the Perusine War is cast by Dio in the light of a woman in a general's rôle (XLVIII, 10-14), and this in differing degree is to be found also in Plutarch (*An.*, 28, 1; 30, 1) and Velleius Paterculus (II, 54, 2-3). In spite of Augustus' propaganda treatment of Fulvia she appears only incidentally in Suetonius (*Aug.*, 17, 5 and 62, 1) as mother of Clodia and of Antony's children, although in the latter passage the divorce of Clodia is attributed to trouble with the mother-in-law Fulvia.

This imperious personality remains a strong one even when shed of the bias of later writers. And it is precisely this strength of character and, as Plutarch describes her, this ability to train a man to follow that indicate her share in the decisions to contract the three marriages. Cicero himself flamboyantly confirms that Antony tended to be a follower rather than an initiator and was much dependent on his wife's orders (*Phil.*, VI, 4). The second Philippic's long attack on his relationship with Curio (3, 44-45, 50, 86) pounds on the same theme, and in the fifth Philippic (11) Cicero gives Fulvia a strong vote as the manipulator of the *acta Caesaris*. Perhaps a greater confirmation is Antony's very strange and detached conduct while in the East in the late forties, when without the efforts of Fulvia and his brother, for whatever motives, his cause would have been irreparably damaged long before Perugia. Antony's political adolescence under Caesar might have remained just that had his

mentor not been removed; even during Caesar's control of his career his predilections for high living endangered his position (Plut., *Ant.*, 10). Indeed it was when Caesar frowned, Plutarch asserts, that Antony put himself under the modifying influence of the serious-minded Fulvia, a seasoned director of husbands by now, of whom he had perhaps also had some experience before.

Consider then Fulvia's achievement: she attached herself legally to the three most promising young *populares* of their generation at just about the time when that promise was being realized.³⁸ She may have been married to Clodius in time to help him prepare for the year of his greatest success, 58. She most likely married Curio, already a young man of influence and connections though only a *quaestorius*, as he prepared for the office in which Clodius had made his mark. And Antony was clearly one of the leading figures of the state when Fulvia married him in 47 or 46 (already Master of the Horse after Pharsalus in 48-47, he was probably assured of a consulship despite the cooling between himself and Caesar suggested by Plutarch and confirmed by Antony's apparent failure to play a part in Spain or Africa or to have an official position between that just mentioned and the consulship of 44). Her importance in the public career of Antony is beyond question. Can it really have been less significant in those of Clodius and Curio, granted somewhat different times and potential for the achievement of power?

Inasmuch as the hand of the triumvirs, and particularly of Caesar, can certainly be seen in much of the legislative action of Clodius and Curio, it is in the area of personal ambition that one can best seek evidence of Fulvia's hand. But even here the astuteness of such a woman must have discerned that Caesar's advantage, or that of any of the triumvirs who seemed to be in the ascendant, was an excellent vehicle for the advancement of younger adventurers.

Clodius' legislation is usually assumed to have included some twelve bills, of which a number can clearly be assigned to the

³⁸ I consider the appellation *popularis* appropriate to Curio not only because of his final attachment to the cause of Caesar but also because during much of the period of his public activity he both associated with men of such persuasion and used their techniques.

goal of personal power.³⁷ The *lex frumentaria* with which he opened his legislative efforts was a common popular device, the demagoguery of which is obvious, although it need not have been pointed as directly at Cicero as Dio (XXXVIII, 13, 1-2) suggests. In this passage Dio puts with the *lex frumentaria* the *leges de censoria notione* and *de collegiis* as intended by Clodius to win for himself the immediate support of all the orders, and he adds (3) the *lex de iure et tempore legum rogandarum* after the comment *τούτοις οὖν αὐτοῖς δελέασας . . .* That all of these laws would have some point of favor with one or another of the orders is clear, but most significant is the fact that each also aided the personal goals of Clodius by providing him with popular support, some greater potential for immunity from censorial action, less hampering by *obmuntatio* and *intercessio*, and a chance to organize his followers. Dio is certainly right in seeing the psychological as well as the chronological connection among them. Two other sets of laws, *de capite civis Romani* and *de exilio Ciceronis* and *de rege Ptolemaeo et de insula Cypro publicanda et de exilibus Byzantium reducendis* (with perhaps a special bill *de Catone quaestore cum iure praetorio mittendo*) have been interpreted as triumviral measures designed particularly by Caesar to eliminate the probable opposition of Cicero and the certain opposition of Catc.³⁸ Such was the case, but one does not assign too much independence of action to Clodius to point out that in this instance the silencing of Cicero and Cato was vital not only to the triumvirs but also to any hope Clodius may have had of personal accomplishment and the achieving of personal power. That this was in his mind seems certain when the somewhat unclear but surely individualistic path he selected in late 58 and the years following is considered.³⁹ Clodius' aim

³⁷ See Giovanni Niccolini, *I fasti dei tribuni della plebe* (Milano, 1934), pp. 285-98 (hereafter referred to simply as Niccolini), and Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 193.

³⁸ E. g., M. Cary, *C. A. H.*, IX, pp. 523-7.

³⁹ The degree to which Clodius was bound to all or any one of the triumvirs will be debated indefinitely. Eduard Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompejus* (ed. 2, Stuttgart, 1919), pp. 103 ff., attributes a fair degree of independent political ambition to him. To Cary, *loc. cit.* (n. 38), p. 522, he was a "henchman of Crassus . . . (whose) most important services were rendered to Caesar, who borrowed him in 59-8 B.C. from his fellow-triumvir." Syme, *R. R.*, pp.

was personal and neither triumviral nor ideological; thus fairly we can say that the moves against Cicero and Cato, useful to the triumvirs as they were, were undertaken by Clodius within the framework of his own plans. We may add that the *leges de provinciis consularibus* and *de permutatione provinciarum* were in a sense enabling laws, assuring Clodius the support of Gabinius and Piso by the extraordinary assignment of attractive provinces to them. Independence from Pompey, whether aided by Caesar and Crassus or not, is found in the *lex de rege Deiotaro et Brogitaro*, which runs counter to settlements made by Pompey before he returned to Italy, and perhaps in the bill on Byzantium.⁴⁰ But to that gesture of independence I would attach two riders: Clodius as tribune both testing and vaunting the power his office gave him as an officer of the people, and Clodius as a rather venal Roman official making a good thing out of Brogitarus' ambitions. The little-known *lex de iniuriis publicis* was most likely a matter of financial advantage; there seems little hope of divining a major rôle for the possibly Clodian *lex de scribis quaestoriis*.

If we can say, then, that in a sense each of the politically-

459 and 33 ff., sees him as Crassus' man. Manni has Clodius begin as a Pompeian, obtain support from the triumvirs in general, attack first Pompey and then Caesar in a move for independence, lose hope for success with the death of Crassus, and finally by the last disturbances and his death give help to Pompey again by putting him in a position to become sole master of Rome. In "Cicero and the *Ager Campanus*," *T.A.P.A.*, XCIII (1962), pp. 471-89, David Stockton quite clearly considers Clodius as an agent of or collaborator with Crassus in the years just before and after Luca. Outchenko thinks Clodius was independent of the triumvirs although at times supported by them. He contends that Clodius headed a restricted "democratic" reaction of disenchantment to Caesar's consulate (pp. 42 and 49). That Clodius moved against Pompey in the latter part of his tribunate is certain, but the degree of his attacks on Caesar is less so; see F. B. Marsh, "The Policy of Clodius from 58 to 56 B.C." *C.Q.*, XXI (1927), pp. 30-6, in response to L. G. Pocock, "Clodius and the Acts of Caesar," *C.Q.*, XVIII (1924), pp. 59-65 and "A Note on the Policy of Clodius," *C.Q.*, XIX (1925), pp. 182-4. I incline to the view that Crassus' pay provided a focal point for Clodian loyalty, that Pompey and Caesar both faced his attacks (though the latter not necessarily in 58), and that Clodius was in reality opportunistically working for Clodius.

⁴⁰ Outchenko interprets as interference in foreign affairs the bills on Brogitarus and Byzantium and the Tigranes affair (p. 47).

oriented bills of Clodius, even those that bear the mark of a triumvir, is also manifestly advantageous to Clodius, to what extent can the same be said of Curio's legislation? Curio is known to have proposed six laws.⁴¹ There is some striking similarity to phases of Clodius' legislation.

First, there is the definite appearance of a program, initiating rather than simply reacting to situations, although Caelius (*Fam.*, VIII, 4, 2) comments to Cicero that Curio is notoriously disorganized (*qui nihil corsilio facit*).⁴² The bulk of the effort at legislation was apparently concentrated in the first three months of the tribunate, if we can accept Caelius' statement in February (*Fam.*, VIII, 6, 3) *Curioni nostro tribunatus conglaciatur*. The consuls have gotten only one routine measure through the Senate. Caelius notes (5) that Curio is, however, the object of much heated opposition, is furious at having been denied an intercalary month, and has turned popular (*levisime . . . transfugit ad populum*). Regardless of the accuracy of Caelius' reasoning, and he was in a position to know a good deal, the remainder of the tribunate is to be devoted to an open pro-Caesarian obstructionism in the problems involving Caesar's tenure in Gaul, his insistence on standing for the consulship *in absentia* and without laying down his *imperium*, and Pompey's equal unwillingness to surrender his proconsular powers while Caesar retained his, or, finally, to make a simultaneous surrender. Curio did somewhat begrudgingly change his regular approach to allow *supplicaciones* to be voted for Cicero when the consuls announced that they would not observe them in the present year (and thus would leave Curio more comitial days; cf. Caelius, *Fam.*, VIII, 11, 1-2, April 50). Of the six *rogationes* four (*de agro Campano*, *de regno Iubae publicando*, *de restituendo C. Memmio*, and *de itineribus*) were proposed before the rebuff of the pontifices on intercalation and two (*viaria* and *alimentaria*) are made by Caelius to follow Curio's *transitio ad populum* as a direct result of the public change of alignment.

⁴¹ See Niccolini, p. 323, and Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 249.

⁴² One may compare to the tribunates of both Clodius and Curio the rather shallow agency of Vatinius to Caesar as consul in 59. It may be argued, of course, that Vatinius was needed more as an enabler by the triumvirs while Caesar was actually in office. See Niccolini, pp. 282-3, and Broughton, *M. R. R.*, II, p. 190.

Lacey (p. 323) interprets the proposals on the Campanian district and Iuba's kingdom as both foresighted and Caesarian. Pompey's reaction to the former (*sed Pompeium valde nolle, ne vacuus advenienti Caesari, Fam.*, VIII, 10, 4) he attaches also to the latter, on the assumption that both proposals were aimed at providing Caesar with land for allotment for his troops.⁴³ This interpretation seems likely when one notes that Iuba had a connection with Pompey through his father (Caes., *B.C.*, II, 25, 4), whom the then Sullan praetor had restored to his throne in 81 (Plut., *Pomp.*, 12, 4; App., *B.C.*, I, 80). But laws providing for the acquisition of land by the state for distribution to discharged soldiers and for the assumption of an entire foreign kingdom and its revenues by the state were not limited to Caesar's advantage but had considerable demagogic potential for Curio himself, not unlike the gain in the Cyprus bill for Clodius. Similarly the bill to reduce luxury in travelling could be used to advantage before a Roman popular gathering, as Clodius' *lex de scribis quaestoriis* might have been used. On the other hand, the attempt to recall Memmius from exile must certainly have been a slap at Pompey, under whose *lex de ambitu* Memmius was convicted and who must have been furious at Memmius' subsequent accusation of his new father-in-law and prospective co-consul Metellus Scipio.⁴⁴ So Clodius had flouted Pompey's settlement in the Brogitarus affair. No one of these bills proposed before the supposed public shift to Caesar could have brought comfort to Pompey or have appeared as efforts by a supporter of the *boni*, as Caelius once hoped Curio might be (*Fam.*, VIII, 4, 2). Indeed, on the face of the legislation, there is little need for talking of a shift of alignment on Curio's part. The two bills which Caelius puts after the pontifical rejection of intercalation confirm the old rather than announce a new course for the tribune. One, for a *lex alimentaria*, is the routine approach to the people. The other, for a *lex viaria*, may have been Curio's most direct bid for personal power. Caelius has connected it to Curio's open profession for Caesar. Appian (*B.C.*,

⁴³ See the note on *valde nolle* in Tyrrell and Purser, III², pp. 124-5.

⁴⁴ See Appian, *B.C.*, II, 24. Curio had another strong reason for activity on Memmius' behalf—he was nephew to the exile, his mother's brother. See Münzer, *R.-E.*, XV, 1, *s. v.* Memmius, nos. 8 (uncle) and 38 (mother), and the stemma in cols. 607-8.

II, 27) in the chapter following his report of the bribes of Paullus and Curio from Caesar says that the bill was intended to give Curio himself a long-term appointment and that he proposed it knowing it would be defeated in order to give himself an excuse for disagreement with Pompey's supporters. I think Lacey (pp. 325-6) is wrong in rejecting this idea of personal gain of power for Curio in the proposal, although his suggestion that the importance of the bill to Caesar would be a chance at a five-year *imperium* after Gaul seems indisputable. I see no reason why Curio himself would not as likely be one of the ten holders of the *imperium* and hence obtain a kind of prorogation of his own power after his tribunate. This is particularly logical since he would presumably have no office of power in the city in the two years before he could hold the praetorship, and, like Cicero, he seems more likely to have preferred an urban or Italian post than a foreign assignment. It is a move that demonstrates more surface adherence to order than those of Clodius restoring the *collegia* and weakening the censorial potential. In fact, Clodius' sense of confidence was such that he failed to provide for an official base of operations in the interval between offices. Curio, albeit unsuccessfully, may have tried to do so under the influence of better advice.

This advice, I suggest, came from the wife who had shared the experiences and frustrations of Clodius in the tribunate and particularly had seen the later need for legal power as opposed to reliance on force and the overlords of the state, fickle as they could prove. In support one can cite Caelius' surprise that his friend Curio, *qui nihil consilio facit*, was organized enough to outmaneuver opposition to his candidacy from moderate and Caesarian sources,⁴⁵ and appear enough enamored of the *boni* to win Pompey's support. Further, the determination of Curio in the support of Caesar, his dogged unwillingness to yield in spite of a nature Caelius and Cicero both knew as *levis* and *facilis*, suggest the strength Fulvia herself was to show in the years when she was supporting Antony's cause in Italy while he was in

⁴⁵ So Lacey, pp. 320-1, on Caelius' letter to Cicero about Curio's candidacy (*Fam.*, VIII, 4, 2). Caelius' choice of words is significant: Curio is known to Caelius and Cicero for his *facilitas*; now he's all enthusiasm for the *boni* (*sicuturit*); in spite of his usual lack of planning he has been remarkably clever (*ratione et insidiis usus videretur*).

the East. Curio's position was almost more demanding than that of Caesar in the struggle of 50, since he was faced daily with enormous political pressure. When one reads the seven letters addressed to Curio by Cicero from Cilicia in 51-50 (*Fam.*, II, 1-7) there is one rather notable feature to be seen under the elaborate praise—Cicero seems to feel throughout that Curio needs the strength of his convictions, and particularly the advice of a more mature person. This is not simply Cicero's own vanity, but rather the recognition of an inherent weakness in Curio, that weakness Caelius notes in *Fam.*, VIII, 4, 2. So in *Fam.*, II, 1, 2; 3, 1; 4, 2; 5, 2 and 7, 1-2, Cicero emphasizes the need for just that decisiveness and control which Curio displays so very remarkably during his tribunate, and, presumably, during his marriage to Fulvia. In fact, Caelius' *ratione et insidiis usus vide-retur* (see n. 45) would to my mind admirably describe the very strength of character and cleverness of maneuvering for which Fulvia is in the next decade to suffer such serious attacks. I doubt that she is the moderator Cicero had in mind for Curio, but that she assumed the rôle is a good probability.

It is more difficult to assess the influence that Fulvia may have had on Clodius' program. If, as I have suggested, she married him as early as 62, then she would without a doubt have been able to impress her opinions on his legislation in the tribunate. Her force of personality as later documented and her everpresence at Clodius' side both favor her involvement in his political activities, and the similarities noted in the legislative programs of her first two husbands support that view. Whether she was able to exercise influence over Clodius prior to their marriage, as has been suggested she may have done in the case of Curio and Antony, remains uncertain, as does her own rôle in the arrangement of their marriage, although she and her mother surely were not passive elements in the negotiations if we can judge from their later performance.

Fulvia's politics were personally oriented, we can see. I wonder, however, if the fairly consistent Caesarian position of the three husbands cannot have been in some part the effort of Fulvia to steer them along the path best calculated to lead them to prominence and power (cf. n. 39). We must account for the coincidental cleverness of three courses of action: Clodius, in



the pay of Crassus while he lived, plays Caesar's part against the Pompey who was too obviously showing the indecisiveness that more than ever plagued his political career in his last decade when he was faced with skilful political adversaries; Curio, professing an interest in the *boni* that easily misled Pompey and may have fooled his friends Caelius and Cicero, plays Caesar's part at first less obviously and then quite openly in the very office to which he was elected as opponent to Caesar;⁴⁶ Antony, clearly a Caesarian but also stigmatized with probable justice as a follower and intemperate, comes close to outmaneuvering as astute a politician as Octavian, and certainly succeeds for a time in snatching Caesar's heritage and later the richer half of the empire as his personal domain. That Caesar himself was instrumental in the molding of these careers until 44 is obvious. But when we look at the three men from other than Caesar's point of view, their careers point to one element, the acquisition of personal power, and the single feature common to the three lives which stands to profit from the relentless pursuit of that goal is the daughter of Bambilio and the granddaughter of addled Tuditanus, whom modern scholars have been pleased to term the first Roman woman who played the rôle of a Prince's wife.⁴⁷ Her three husbands all died violent deaths as the price of their high goals. A woman who brought more good fortune to herself than to her husbands, Cicero says of her (*mulier sibi felicior quam viris, Phil.*, V, 11) and sure to be as fatal to Antony as to Clodius and Curio (*quoniam id domi tuae est, quod fuit illorum utriusque fatale, II, 11*). Though Cicero's meaning is clear, one is reminded that in the language of his day *fatalis* had yet to become so precisely ominous as it was later to be—Fulvia may well have been as much the agent of her husbands' success as the instrument of their destruction.

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⁴⁶ Syme, *R. R.*, p. 63, goes so far as to say that Fulvia aided the bribe of Caesar in winning Curio to Caesar's side.

⁴⁷ So Münzer, *loc. cit.* (n. 3), col. 234, followed, e.g., by Förtsch (p. 114) and Malcovati (p. 29) in the works cited in the same note, and Balsdon, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 50.

DIOTIMA'S CONCEPT OF LOVE.

I

It is generally assumed that Socrates' speech in the *Symposium* holds the key to the Platonic evaluation of the other speeches.¹ Presenting great difficulties to the interpreter, it has been the subject of much controversy.² In the first place, Socrates does not present his encomium in the form of a speech as the others had, instead offering his friends a dialogue in which he claims to have engaged with a priestess, Diotima.³ At any rate, she is presented as the teacher, while Socrates is the "naïve examinee."⁴ Some have interpreted this as a mark of Socrates' irony or social tact in view of the playful character of the occasion.⁵ One has observed that this could hardly be enough to

¹ Friedländer, *Plato*, I^a (translated by Hans Myerhoff [New York, 1958]), p. 140; Jowett, *Plato's Dialogues*, III^a (New York, 1914), pp. 284, 288; Bury, *The Symposium of Plato*^a (Cambridge, 1932), pp. LII, LIV, LXV; Hug-Schöne, *Platons Symposion*^a (Leipzig and Berlin, 1909), pp. XLIV, LI f.; Taylor, *Plato*^a (Meridian Paperback, New York, 1960), p. 224; Kranz, "Diotima von Mantinea," *Hermes*, LXI (1926), p. 438.

² See Bibliography by R. Wilpert in Apelt-Capelle, *Das Gastmahl*^a (Hamburg, 1960), pp. XXII-XXX.

³ Taylor (above, note 1), p. 224 (cf. Kranz [above, note 1], pp. 437 f.) maintains that Diotima is not the fictitious character which most scholars take her to be. (Bury [above, note 1], p. XXXIX; Hug-Schöne [above, note 1], p. XLVII). I see no way to settle this question. Gomperz (*Greek Thinkers*, II [translated by G. Berry, London, 1913]), p. 396 (cited by Bury), suggests that her name may refer to Dion of Syracuse; cf. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago, 1933), p. 45; cf. Hug-Schöne, p. 127.

⁴ Jaeger, *Paideia*, II (translated by G. Highet [New York, 1943]), p. 187.

⁵ "Socrates begins by exposing the ignorance of Agathon; next he makes the amend honorable by explaining that he had formerly shared that ignorance until instructed by Diotima" (Bury [above, note 1], p. XXXIX). "Spiel ist also alles, geistreiches Spiel, wie sich schickte" (Wilamowitz, *Platon*,^a II [Berlin, 1962], p. 174); cf. Jowett (above, note 1), pp. 284-5; Cornford, "The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's *Symposium*," in *The Unwritten Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1950), p. 71; Kranz (above, note 1), p. 439; Hug-Schöne (above, note 1), pp. XLVI f.

justify the creation of a Diotima.⁶ Thus Diotima's role has also been viewed as Plato's completion or criticism of the historical Socrates by means of the Platonic or idealized Socrates.⁷ Some have gone further, finding that all or part of Diotima's teaching negates the concept of the soul's immortality taught by Socrates in such dialogues as the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Republic*.⁸ The present study is, in part, an attempt to substantiate this position.

Besides the particular difficulties of the speech itself, any attempt to comprehend what Plato meant by Diotima's speech is also confronted with the perplexing problem of Plato's silence. In the dialogues, at least, Plato never gives an opinion in his own name. In this sense, Plato never said anything in the dialogues or he said everything in them.⁹ He speaks through a

⁶ "But while the spirit of liberal courtesy characteristic of a secure social order runs through the language and form of the Platonic dialogues, it seems impossible to derive the highest creation of Plato entirely from the sphere of social conventions" (Friedländer [above, note 1], p. 148).

⁷ Cornford (above, note 5), pp. 75, 79; Stenzel, *Plato's Method of Dialectic*² (translated by D. J. Allan [Oxford, 1940]), p. 4; Apelt-Capelle (above, note 2), p. 150, n. 58; Krüger, *Einsicht und Leidenschaft*² (Frankfurt am Main, 1948), pp. 176, 186; Friedländer (above, note 1), p. 148: "There is little doubt that the essential features of Diotima are a creation of the Platonic Socrates." However, Friedländer (*Platon*, III² [Berlin, 1960], p. 435, n. 36) does not go so far as Cornford or Krüger.

⁸ Grote, *Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates*³, III (London, 1888), pp. 17 ff.; Wilamowitz (above, note 5), p. 173, who believes Plato was not in earnest here. Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre*² (Hamburg, 1961), pp. 171 ff.; Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines*, I (New York, 1962), pp. 361-3; Hackforth ("Immortality in Plato's Symposium," *C.R.*, LXIV [1950], pp. 43-5; cf. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo* [Cambridge, 1955], p. 21) ascribes this to a temporary lapse into skepticism. Against Hackforth's views, see Luce (*C.R.*, LXVI [1952], pp. 137-41), Cherniss (*C.R.*, LXVII [1953], p. 131), and Bluck (*Plato's Phaedo* [New York, 1955], pp. 27 ff.).

⁹ One might be able to solve this puzzle, if one could accept all or some of the Epistles as genuine. Using the Seventh Letter for this purpose, Frank ("Fundamental Opposition of Plato and Aristotle" in *Wissen, Wollen, Glauben* [Zürich and Stuttgart, 1955], p. 94), attempts to prove that "Plato expresses in his own name the same conception of philosophy which, in the dialogues, is represented by Socrates"; cf. *ibid.*, p. 88. For the debate on them, see Morrow, *Plato's*

variety of speakers: Socrates, Callicles, the Eleatic Stranger, Apollodorus, Thrasymachus, Timaeus—to name only a few. Plato is only mentioned three times, twice by Socrates (*Apology*, 34A1, 38B6) and once by Phaedo (*Phaedo*, 59B10).¹⁰ The problem, then, in interpreting the dialogues is to sift out Plato's meaning from that of his creations. The moral worth of the Platonic or even the historical Socrates testifies to the virtue of Plato as little as the excellence of an Antigone or a Theseus bears witness to the goodness of their creator. Why might not Plato have preferred the position of a Callicles, or Sophocles that of a Creon?¹¹

Relying primarily on the testimony of Aristotle, scholars have

Epistles^a (New York, 1962), pp. 3-16; Cherniss, *Lustrum*, IV (Plato Bibliography, 1959), pp. 24, 88 ff.; Edelstein, "Platonic Anonymity," *A.J.P.*, LXXXIII (1962), pp. 2-5; Merlan, "Form and Content in Plato's Philosophy," *J.H.I.* (1947), pp. 414 ff. However, if the Seventh Letter is genuine, it would seem to prove that Plato's true teachings are not to be sought for in the dialogues at all, but in his so-called oral teaching inaccessible to most men because of their intellectual limitations. His written work, on the other hand, is an attempt to popularize his views, making it as accessible as the intellectual failings of the majority will allow. Cf. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, I (Macmillan Paperback, 1961), pp. 178, 214; Taylor (above, note 1), p. 10. So far as the dialogues are concerned, I find no character in them holding a position beyond the grasp of most men. On this point, see Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy* (Berkeley, 1945), pp. 11, 13. Cf. Edelstein, *ibid.*, p. 3. In the present study, I will not use the authority of the letters, assuming that, at this time, their authenticity is still a matter of doubt.

¹⁰ Edelstein (above, note 9), p. 10, n. 26.

¹¹ Friedländer (above, note 1), p. 167, maintains that Plato had a certain sympathy with the men opposed by Socrates: "If there had not been something of Callicles—the strong man—in himself, he would hardly have been able to portray the former with such overwhelming power that there will always be individuals, especially young people, who are more fascinated by the man Socrates opposed and conquered than by Socrates himself" (cf. E. R. Dodds, *Plato's Gorgias* [Oxford, 1959], pp. 13 f., 387; Kelsen, "Platonic Love," *The American Imago* [April, 1942], p. 93). I do not see why Plato should not have been gifted with the poetic imagination to comprehend and depict a Callicles, even if he had nothing of his creation in his own personality. Cf. Edelstein (above, note 9), p. 10, n. 26. Like most interpreters, Friedländer believes that Plato ultimately opted for his Socrates over his other characters. Such a view can surely not be demonstrated on the evidence of the dialogues alone.

generally accepted the idealism of the Platonic Socrates as an integral part of Plato's own system of philosophy. One has rightly taken issue with the view that Aristotle's twenty years in the Academy allow us to trust his report of what Plato said as distinct from what he meant. However intelligent he was, he still might have misunderstood Plato's real sympathies and a "conscientious critic prefers an author's published exposition even to his own memory or records of the author's conversations."¹² Yet, we have seen that Plato does not speak in his own name in the published dialogues. Which opinions are we to ascribe to him in the light of his silence? It is surely impossible to impute the theory of ideas expounded in the dialogues to Plato on the strength of Aristotle's testimony, if one rules out any authority outside of the dialogues themselves.¹³ In any event, one cannot but agree that "the solution of the riddle must be found without any authoritative guidance. One can only aim at a conjecture, the most likely hypothesis which one can derive from the Platonic work itself."¹⁴ The necessarily hypothetical character of any attempt to get at Plato's own opinions can hardly be emphasized too strongly. One could, of course, question the importance of this attempt: "The only point is whether those doctrines, whoever may have held them, are true or not."¹⁵ Yet, the sensitivity and insight apparent in the dialogues might encourage the endeavor to discover the views of their creator, even apart from the question of the truth or falsity of these views.

¹² Cherniss, *Riddle of the Early Academy* (above, note 9), p. 9; cf. Manasse, "Bücher über Platon," II, *Philosophische Rundschau*, Beiheft 2 (October, 1961), p. 89.

¹³ Cherniss (above, note 12), p. 10, does precisely this, after his warning (p. 9) against treating Aristotle as an authority on Plato's views or intentions.

¹⁴ Edelstein (above, note 9), p. 7. However, on the basis of the Aristotelean report, Edelstein subscribes to the view that the theory of ideas, expounded by the Platonic Socrates, is Plato's own.

¹⁵ Merlan (above, note 9), p. 407, characterizing the view of R. Demos, *The Philosophy of Plato* (New York, 1939). Demos (p. VIII) seems even to deny the possibility of finding Plato's real meaning: "After all, there is no such thing as the meaning of Plato; his thought can be formulated in a variety of meanings, all of them often equally good. Thus any particular formulation is bound to be one sided."

It would no doubt be comforting to the interpreter to have more to go on than the dialogues themselves. However, in view of the present situation, we will act on the assumption that the Letters and the testimony of Plato's philosophical contemporaries are not trustworthy guides. In interpreting Diotima's speech, we will, therefore, not prejudice the issue by assuming that it reflects the opinions of her creator. In the absence of further evidence from the dialogues, we will not assume that Plato preferred the views of his Socrates to those of his Callicles, or his Aristophanes, or any of his interlocutors. Perhaps it is impossible to do more than understand the position of each speaker. If so, nothing is to be gained by striving to square this circle.¹⁶ At any rate, this article attempts to distinguish the views of Diotima from those usually championed by Socrates in the dialogues; it makes no claim to present Plato's own beliefs.

II

Scholars have generally agreed that the absolute beauty described in the *Symposium* (210D6-212A7) is identical with the idea of the Good.¹⁷ According to this interpretation, the ultimate reality can be viewed either as an object of reason (the Good) or as the goal of love (the Beautiful). The present study attempts to show that Diotima rejects the concept of an absolute

¹⁶ Merlan (above, note 9), pp. 424 ff., maintains that Plato never identified himself with any of his interlocutors. Instead, Plato is said to have adhered to a concept of "existential uncertainty" (*ibid.*, p. 425) which precluded the actualization of truth as impersonal, independent knowledge (*ibid.*, p. 428). However, Merlan's interpretation rests in good part on the letters and the "oral teaching." In criticizing Merlan's position, Edelstein (above, note 9), p. 3, has shown that it is refuted by the Letters to which it appeals. Denying that Plato put his real convictions into his published works, they can hardly be used to demonstrate Plato's adherence to a doctrine of "existential uncertainty."

¹⁷ Taylor (above, note 1), pp. 231 f.; F. M. Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae* (Cambridge, 1952), p. 81; Krüger (above, note 7), p. 215, cf. p. 158; Natorp (above, note 8), p. 177; Jaeger (above, note 4), p. 194; R. E. Cushman, *Therapeia* (Chapel Hill, 1958), p. 210, n. 72; Grote (above, note 8), p. 10; Bury (above, note 1), pp. XXXVII ff.; E. Zeller, *Plato and the Older Academy* (London, 1888), pp. 507, 195 ff.; G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's Thought* (Beacon Paperback, 1956), pp. 21, 30; R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Life and Thought* (Boston, 1951), p. 95.

good, although she does regard absolute beauty as the highest object of knowledge. For her, the Good, unlike the Beautiful, has no universal or "eidetic" mode of being; it is always the particular good of a particular being. In analyzing her position, we will deal with the last part of her speech (204C7-212B8) first, since the first part which centers around the myth (203A9-204C6) is meant to illustrate that non-mythical teaching.¹⁸

While answering Socrates' questions about the utility of *eros*, Diotima reveals a crucial difference between the good and the beautiful (204D1-205A8). Since he had claimed that love is love of beauty, she asks him what the lover of beautiful things desires when he wants them. He replies that he wants them to be his own. When she further inquires what a man will obtain by securing attractive things, he is at a loss to answer. Substituting "good" for "beautiful," she alleviates his difficulty, for they both agree that love is a desire for good things or for happiness. Assuming that her substitution implies the identity of the two terms,¹⁹ interpreters have usually overlooked the problem here. If they were identical, why was it necessary to replace one by the other? For both Diotima and Socrates, love's real goal is not the beautiful, but the good.²⁰ Lovers yearn for

¹⁸ Bury (above, note 1), p. XL: "It also serves the purpose of putting into a concrete picture those characteristic features of the love impulse which are subsequently developed in an abstract form"; Kranz (above, note 1), p. 441; A. Nygren, *Eros and Agape* (Philadelphia, 1953), p. 175; Krüger (above, note 7), p. 155; Friedländer, III (above, note 7), p. 22.

¹⁹ H. Koller, *Die Komposition des platonischen Symposiums* (Diss., University of Zürich, 1948), p. 32, finds a "Gleichsetzung" here, although he admits "... für sie (die καλά) ist die Frage gar nicht zu beantworten." Kelsen (above, note 11), p. 75, n. 1: "The answer should run that the possession of beauty gives happiness. In order to gain the answer easier, Diotima asserts it is better to substitute the word "good" for "beautiful" since she obviously presupposes the two to be identical"; cf. C. Ritter, *Platonische Liebe* (Tübingen, 1931), p. 60; Friedländer, III (above, note 7), p. 22; Kranz (above, note 1), p. 442.

²⁰ Cf. *Theaetetus*, 172A1-B6, 177C6-D6; *Republic*, 505D5-9, 505A6-B3; *Philebus*, 20D7-10. See also Krüger (above, note 7), p. 228, n. 54; Stenzel (above, note 7), p. 39; Cushman (above, note 17), p. 205, n. 3. Even Callicles (*Gorgias*, 499E1-500A4) readily agrees that all act to obtain the good things of life. Cf. *Republic* (343B1-344C8, 347E1) where Thrasymachus maintains that the life of the unjust man is better than the just life. See also R. Levinson, *In Defense of Plato* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 145, on the "utilitarianism" of Antiphon.

happiness and this means to be in possession of the good always (205A1-206A13).

In order to clarify the function (*ergon*) of *eros* and the role of beauty, Diotima has recourse to her novel theory of childbirth which eliminates the role usually ascribed to the male; that is, all men (206C1-4) and, indeed, all mortal natures (207D1)—male and female alike—are pregnant, yearning to reproduce both physically and psychically. Where common sense finds masculine initiative resulting in fertilization, Diotima perceives the feminine need to give birth; fathering a child means relieving the pregnancy innate to all mortal creatures. Giving birth in this sense is the job (*ergon*) of love; it is love's way of attaining the good or happiness (206B1-C4). The salient point is that pregnancy does not come about by the agency of an external begetter or male element, since it is innate. Although pregnancy is inborn, the means of relieving it are external. Those things in which or through which mortals can give birth are beautiful. Beauty is defined as that which makes possible the transition from pregnancy to childbirth (206C4-E1). Beauty is, therefore, not loved for its own sake, but as the means by which mortals can give birth (206E2-5).

Those men more pregnant in soul than in body are contrasted with those whose pregnancy is primarily corporeal. Reproducing themselves mainly by physical means, the latter are said to obtain a merely apparent immortality (208E3-5). In order better to grasp the role of beauty in this process, we turn to Diotima's description of the highest type of psychical childbirth, the generation in others of moderation and justice, the most beautiful parts of wisdom (*phronésis*). Those intent on begetting these beauties wander around, seeking the beautiful (*to kalon*) in which they can do this. Their desire to give birth leads them to welcome attractive bodies rather than ugly ones. If the lover happens upon someone lovely both in body and soul, he particularly cherishes this beloved. Taking this beauty in hand, he fathers in his (the beauty's) soul the things which have been on his mind for a long time (209C1-3). Once having given birth to the beauties of virtue in the other's soul, he joins his beloved in rearing their offspring (209C4). Their bond of togetherness (*koinônia*) and friendship through their "children" is more secure than physical bonds, since the fruits of

their intercourse are lovelier and more immortal (209C5-7). Thus the one pregnant in soul generates the fairest part of wisdom in an attractive soul.

Diotima is convinced that everyone would prefer the children reared by her erotic educator over ordinary human offspring (209C7-D1). All envy the fine progeny of Homer, Hesiod, and the other poets, which won immortal fame for them (209D1-4). No one has ever built a temple honoring a man for merely siring children, as they have for Lycurgus and other lawgivers in gratitude for the laws and customs (*nomoi*) engendered by their minds (209D4-E4). These great educators reproduce themselves by giving birth to the values by which those molded by them live and die. In this sense, their love is basically creative or poetic.²¹

Since the engendering of virtue in others is the best way of begetting, all men, presumably, would engage in it, if nothing prevented them. Yet, if all were intent on begetting, there would be no lovely souls to serve as mediums in which to beget. Why would anyone allow himself to be used as a vehicle for the aspirations of others, if he himself were interested solely in finding suitable receptacles to relieve his own psychical pregnancy? In Diotima's account, not a word is said about aiding the beautiful beloved to bring to birth his own fair notions. Instead he is persuaded²² to assist his educator in bearing and rearing "children" not his own. One can only conclude that this passive role is not natural, if all yearn to engender the beauties of moderation and justice in others. However unnatural it is, this passivity must be encouraged by those yearning to give birth in others. In order to gain undying glory by father-

²¹ This poetic character of Diotima's *eros* is perhaps responsible for her use of poetry to illustrate a certain characteristic of love. Just as the conventions of language specialize all kinds of creation or making (*poiēsis*) to one particular sort, poetry, so linguistic custom limits *eros* to physical love (205B8-D1).

²² Levinson (above, note 20), pp. 432-8, rightly defends the Socrates of the *Republic* against Popper's charge that he employed a sophistical, self-interested rhetorik as "persuasion" (K. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, 1 [Harper Torchbook 1963], pp. 140 ff. and n. 10, p. 271). However, Diotima is guilty of this sophistry. Whether Plato himself sided with his Diotima or his Socrates is a question beyond the scope of this article, cf. above, p. 37.

ing the moral values of a civilization, Diotima's educator must do violence to the naturally pregnant, making them forget what she regards as their deepest desire. Her concept of psychical reproduction is little more than indoctrination, however beautiful the rhetoric employed to describe it.²³

Diotima's "Ruhmbegierde" has justly been condemned as sophistical,²⁴ if a sophist is a teacher more enamored of his own fame than of the truth or the well being of his students. This shortcoming is inherent in her concept of love and beauty. The goal of her love is not the beautiful, but the acquisition of happiness by giving birth in or through the beautiful. Lovers are not in love with their beautiful beloved who only seems to attract them; their real object is their own good or happiness. Although Diotima's so-called "lesser mysteries" have been characterized as sophistical, no one—to my knowledge—has ever levelled this charge against the "higher mysteries" in which her speech culminates.²⁵ On the contrary, the nature of beauty and reproduction in the two mysteries is generally regarded as dissimilar.²⁶ The absolute beauty described in the higher mys-

²³ Her *eros* never joins its "beloved" in a mutual love of truth as has been suggested by R. H. S. Crossman, *Plato Today*² (London, 1959), p. 133. In this sense Diotima is guilty of "the Narcissus-like love of self" which Gauss finds in Agathon's speech and Goethe's way of life (H. Gauss, *Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platons*, II, part 2 [Bern, 1958], pp. 100-2). On Gauss' view, see below, note 41.

²⁴ Wilamowitz (above, note 5), p. 173; cf. p. 171 where Wilamowitz correctly perceives the censure implied in Socrates' description of Diotima as a perfect sophist (208C1-2); cf. Crombie (above, note 8), pp. 362 f., who finds Diotima's concept of the soul suggested by certain Protagorean doctrines enunciated in the *Theaetetus*.

²⁵ Although Wilamowitz is convinced that Plato rejected Diotima's lesser mysteries as sophistical (see previous note), he has only praise for the higher mysteries which he regards as "eine der tiefsten Ausserungen Platons über sein eigenes Innenleben" (*ibid.*, p. 174).

²⁶ Hackforth (above, note 8) is the only scholar I know who rejected this view. However, in *Plato's Phaedo* (p. 20), he concedes that the reproduction in the two mysteries might be dissimilar, although he still leans to his earlier interpretation. In general, he tends to view Diotima's attitude as an expression of Plato's temporary lapse into a scepticism opposed to the usual position of his Socrates. The present study endeavors to show that Diotima's views are hostile to those of Socrates, although it makes no claim to state Plato's own thoughts on this matter.

teries is said to be the ultimate desideratum, like the Good of the *Republic*, and not merely a means of giving birth to virtue destined to win immortal fame for the lover. In order to establish the falsity of this argument, we turn to these higher mysteries.

While discussing her lesser mysteries, Diotima spoke about lovers whose psychical pregnancy compelled them to seek out attractive bodies in which to give birth. Spiritual pregnancy leads first of all to physical passion.²⁷ This love is also present in the higher mysteries. If guided aright, the lover will love one lovely body, giving birth to his beautiful speeches in it (210A4-8). After learning to love all fair bodies, he will perceive the need to love beautiful souls more (210A8-C1). After this, he is forced (210C3) to contemplate the beauty in laws and customs, in the various branches of knowledge, and, finally, in absolute beauty itself (210C3-211B7).

Containing no mortality or ugliness of any sort, absolute beauty is the ultimate object of knowledge (210E6-212A2) and, in this sense, it resembles the idea of the Good (*Republic*, 517B7-C5, 518C4-D1, 532A5-B2, 534B8-535A1). However, one crucial difference distinguishes these two ideals; the Good is not only the ultimate object of knowledge, it is also, and primarily, the final goal of love. Diotima never ascribes the latter function to the Beautiful. Men seek the beautiful to obtain the good and not vice-versa. In the highest form of psychical reproduction, the required beauty belongs to those souls receptive to the lover's determination to lay the moral foundation for a civilization. Even the vision of true, universal beauty is only a means to this reproduction (212A2-7). The failing of most interpretations of this passage has been noted: "In none of the commentaries known to me is it clearly pointed out that the immortality here promised does not spring directly from the apprehension of αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν but from the begetting of true virtue. . ."²⁸ If

²⁷ Crombie (above, note 8), p. 184, n. 1.

²⁸ Hackforth, "Immortality in Plato's Symposium" (above, note 8), p. 44. To illustrate his point, Hackforth cites Shorey (above, note 3), pp. 195-6; Gomperz (above, note 3), p. 329. One might also cite Jaeger (above, note 4), p. 193; Levinson (above, note 20), pp. 92, 470, n. 150; Cushman (above, note 17), pp. 216, 210, n. 72; Edelstein (above, note 9), p. 19; J. G. Warry, *Greek Aesthetic Theory* (New York, 1962),

eros is essentially a yearning to give birth to the most beautiful virtues in others, a knowledge of the ultimate means, that is, of absolute beauty is prerequisite for the successful accomplishment of this task. However, this knowledge remains a means and not the goal of love.

One has rightly noted the conspicuous absence of any ideas apart from absolute beauty in Diotima's speech.²⁹ Even if she did recognize the existence of other ideas, these would be subordinate to absolute beauty, her highest idea. In any case, all her ideas are no more than means, since even the idea of beauty is relegated to an ancillary role. In view of the fact that she looks upon the good or happiness not as a means, but as the end in itself, one can only infer that this is not an idea for her. What, then, is the good, if not a universal? I suggest that it remains in her higher mysteries what it was in her lower ones: the particular happiness of the individual, gained most effectively by giving birth to the true beauties of virtue in others. The higher mysteries are more advanced in that they present a more sophisticated elaboration of the beauty making possible this reproduction. Knowledge of absolute beauty is more attractive than beloved bodies and souls, since the latter only become lovely, if the lover knows how to give birth in them properly. Only a comprehension of the ultimate means for doing this, that is, of absolute beauty, will allow him to succeed.³⁰ In the same sense, the idea of beauty is even more attractive than knowledge of it, for no knowledge would exist, if there were no absolute beauty to be known. In that case, reproduction would be a matter of

p. 24; Nygren (above, note 18), p. 174; Kelsen (above, note 11), p. 74; Grote (above, note 8), p. 10, C. Schmelzer, *Platons Symposium* (Berlin, 1882), p. 72.

²⁹ Grote (above, note 8), p. 18: ". . . in *Phaedrus*, *Phaedon*, *Republic* and elsewhere, Plato recognizes many distinct forms or ideas . . . among which Beauty is one, but only one . . . but in the *Symposium*, the form of beauty is presented singly and exclusively—as if the communion with this one form were the sole occupation of the most exalted philosophy." However, Grote's reference to "communion" with this absolute as the end of philosophy shows that he too makes the error discovered by Hackforth in most interpretations of 212A2-7; cf. the reference to Grote in the previous note. The end of Diotima's *eros* is not the communion of contemplation, but reproduction.

³⁰ Cf. Diotima's remark (in the lesser mysteries) that wisdom is concerned with the most beautiful things (204B2-3).

chance or accident; the lover's endeavor to obtain happiness would, at best, be a groping in the dark. However, this in no way alters the fact that—for Diotima—knowledge, even of absolute beauty, is a tool for gaining undying fame.

No subordination to, or reverence for, absolute beauty exists, either in the lower or the higher mysteries. In the latter, the lover is not described as loving beautiful laws or sciences or even the dazzling, super-human attractions of absolute beauty. The word “to love” (*ἐπαν*) indicating desire to reproduce is last applied to loving a body with “only a little bloom,” if it has a likely soul.³¹ The lover is not said to love, but to contemplate (*θεάσασθαι*, 210C3) and to see (*ἴδειν*, 210C4) the beauty in laws and customs and to see the loveliness of the sciences. And it is, indeed, only natural that the beauties loved are those in which the actual engendering takes place, if *eros* is directed to giving birth in beauty and not to obtaining beauty itself.³² Even attractive souls and bodies are not loved for themselves, but for the immortal fame insured by their compliance. Yet, they constitute the actual vehicles in which the reproduction takes place, while knowledge of customs or of absolute beauty is not as directly involved in receiving the lover's child. Thus the latter are only contemplated, while the former are “loved.” *Eros* is essentially creative or reproductive, not contemplative.

The lover achieves his good or his immortality according to his capacity (207C9-D3, 208E2-4). This immortality is not

³¹ 210B8. The requirement for at least “a little bloom” is mentioned after the lover has been led to slacken his excessive love of any one attractive body. Coming where it does, it reveals that the love of corporeal beauty is never condemned as such, as, for example, Socrates censures it in the *Phaedo*; cf. Krüger (above, note 7), p. 185: “Die Geringschätzung körperlicher Schönheit verschläft sich nicht bis zu der Möglichkeit, eine schöne Seele in einem hässlichen Leibe zu lieben; der Einzuweihende bleibt immer der weltliche Mensch, für den dieses Extrem kein ‘Weg’ mehr wäre.” Cf. Taylor's remark (above, note 1), p. 229, note 3, on 210 B 5-7: “It is not meant that this widening of outlook must act unfavorably on personal affection. The thought is that intelligent delight in the beauty of one fair body will lead to a quickened perception of beauty in others.”

³² Whatever Plato's position may have been, Grube's misgivings about a love without “some sort of physical basis” are shared by Diotima (Grube [above, note 17], pp. 114-15; cf. Manasse [above, note 12], p. 101).

an absolute such as the idea of beauty. On the contrary, Diotima strictly delimits the immortality attainable by mortals to that available through generation. She goes so far as to describe pregnancy and reproduction as the only immortal and divine thing in mortality (206C6-8, 206E7-8). This type of immortality is contrasted with that of the truly divine which is eternal with no need of reproduction to make it so.³³ In other words, the truly divine is the idea of beauty (211E3), a means to attain the immortal glory which is the highest goal of psychical reproduction. Whatever helps to lay the foundation for this kind of immortality is felt as attractive; its opposite is regarded as ugly or repellent.³⁴

Although the highest form of giving birth is engendering true virtue in others, certain kinds of reproduction in oneself are prerequisite to this. If one is to influence others, one must first keep alive and well. For Diotima, self-preservation means self-reproduction. No aspect of a man ever remains the same, not even the knowledge of his soul.³⁵ A mortal nature's ability to

³³ 208B2-4. I side with Friedländer (above, note 7), III p. 434, n. 34, who preserves the manuscript reading “*ἀθάνατος*” in 208B4 as does Burnet in his text; cf. Hackforth, “Immortality in Plato’s *Symposium*” (above, note 8), p. 43; Hug-Schöne (above, note 1), p. 124; Grube (above, note 17), p. 149. Like most editions, Bury’s text (above, note 1), pp. 117, LXXVII, accepts Creuzer’s “*ἀθάνατος*” which makes sense, but is unnecessary, if the traditional reading is understood in Friedländer’s way: “... das Unsterbliche freilich hat an dem Immersein auf ganz andere Weise teil, nicht indem es danach strebt, sondern indem es immer ist.” Cf. Natorp (above, note 8), p. 170: “Hier, ist es nicht die zeitlose Ewigkeit, die nur den reinen Denkobjeeten zukommt, sondern die Erhaltung im Werden und Vergehen”; Merlan (above, note 9), pp. 423 f.

³⁴ 206D3-E1; Hug-Schöne (above, note 1), p. 119.

³⁵ 207D2-208B4. It is difficult to see how Taylor (above, note 1), p. 288, n. 1, can maintain that “there is not a word in the *Symposium* to suggest the soul is perishable,” unless he means by soul something apart from the knowledge, opinions, feelings, and habits mentioned by Diotima in this passage. Cf. Kranz (above, note 1), p. 444. Against such a view, Grote (above, note 8), pp. 17-18, correctly remarks “... in the *Symposium*, the soul can only reach immortality in a metaphysical sense by its prolific operation ... by leaving a name and a reputation to survive it” Natorp (above, note 8), p. 171, is even more accurate: “Das Gastmahl kennt überhaupt nur eine Unsterblichkeit durch beständige Selbsterneuerung und Fortzeugung.” Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 491-3, although it is wrong to ascribe this activity to those things which are

remain alive for any time at all is dependent on its capacity to, as it were, give birth to itself, a process which necessarily precedes reproduction through others. As in all reproduction, the lover's familiarity with the beautiful in all its forms will determine his ability to preserve himself.

We are now in a better position to determine whether the absolute beauty of the higher mysteries is no longer a means to immortality or happiness, but constitutes that end itself. Some have, indeed, interpreted the generation of true virtue (212A2-7) as a mystical union of reason (*nous*) with its object, a beatific vision vouchsafed to man insofar as he is an intellectual soul, not subject to the "sad mortality" of his corporeal nature. Yet, Diotima's *eros* is for giving birth in beauty and not for possession of, or union with, it.³⁶ It is true that her rejection of the

immortal by nature as Natorp does (see below, note 36). Like Grube (above, note 17), p. 149, cf. 129-130, Natorp (*ibid.*, pp. 172 f.) correctly sees the discrepancy between this notion of the soul's immortality and the one propounded by Socrates in dialogues such as the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*; cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963), p. 231, n. 62.

³⁶ This is overlooked by Bury (above, note 1), p. XLIV; Cushman (above, note 17), p. 195; Kraatz (above, note 1), p. 447; Hug-Schöne (above, note 1), p. 134; Cornford (above, note 5), p. 77. Bury's views are mentioned with approval by Luce and Bluck in their criticism of Hackforth, cited above, note 8. Bury (*ibid.*, p. XLVI) regards this beatific vision, the "eros of pure νοῦς . . . the passion of reason," as proof that the mysticism of the East was alive in Diotima (*ibid.*, p. XLVIII). A similar interpretation is proposed by Natorp (above, note 8), p. 178, who wrongly ascribes to Diotima a rejection of ". . . jene . . . Verdinglichung der Idee . . . die Aristoteles dem Plato zum Vorwurf macht." Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 399, 411, 423 f. The Platonic idea is described as a "geistigen Zeugungsakt" whose essence is an eternal ". . . Hineinbildung des Gesetzes in das Leben hienieden, in der Durchdringung dieses ganzen irdischen Lebens mit dem Ewigen" (*ibid.*, p. 178). This is why Diotima's *eros*, according to Natorp, is not desire for the beautiful, but for reproduction in the beautiful (*loc. cit.*). In his revision of this earlier view, Natorp (*ilid.*, pp. 471-2) conceives of the idea (*Symposium* 210E6-212A7) as pure activity, the dynamic unity of subject and object, lover and beloved, reason and truth. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1072B20-30, 1074B33-35; *De Anima*, 430A2 f.; Frank (above, note 9), pp. 115-19; W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*² (Oxford paperback, 1962), pp. 346, 165, n. 1, and p. 245 also cited below, note 38; Popper (above, note 22), p. 314, n. 59, section 2. Contrary to Natorp's views, Diotima's *eros* has no desire for union with its object.

love of beauty as such comes in the lesser mysteries (206E2-5). However, this position is nowhere repudiated in the higher mysteries which present a more complete picture of the beauty making generation possible and not a new notion of absolute beauty as an end in itself. It is, therefore, correct to maintain that ". . . it simply will not do to assert that this (*Symposium*, 208A7-B2) is only an assertion about the body and so quite without prejudice to what happens to the divine part of the compound, the $\psi\chi\eta$. Plato cannot have meant us to read into Diotima's words the very opposite of their plain implication."³⁷

Diotima's *eros* does not share the Aristophanic yearning for an ultimate union with its object, since that object is attractive solely as a medium in which the lover may give birth. Originally, as it were, there is a pregnancy within the lover and intercourse with the beloved is merely a means to give birth to the lover's child. Basically sophistical, this *eros* has little of the grandeur leading Aristophanes' love to sacrifice everything for a kind of mystical union with its beloved.³⁸

Although, or perhaps because, Diotima's sophistical *eros* feels no need for union, even with the idea of beauty itself, it does not involve a rejection of the independent existence of the ideas.³⁹ The idea of the beautiful has an existence separate from that of the lover who needs it as a means. To him absolute beauty is no more than a tool, if a most valuable one. In

³⁷ Hackforth, "Immortality in Plato's *Symposium*" (above, note 8), p. 45, cf. p. 44: ". . . the philosopher can no more than the ordinary man become immortal save by vicarious self-perpetuation."

³⁸ Jaeger (above, note 4), p. 189, is therefore wrong, when he describes Diotima's love as a reinterpretation of Aristophanes' love from a new and higher standpoint. He (*ibid.*, p. 190) regards Diotima's reinterpretation of Aristophanes as "very close to Aristotle's definition in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of the higher self love which is the final state of moral perfection" and which "described a man who is truly self loving as the extreme opposite of the selfish man"; cf. Jaeger (above, note 36), p. 245; Diotima's words are said to be "the shortest and best commentary on Aristotle's conception of self-love."

Against the objections of Krüger (above, note 7), p. 313, n. 1, Jaeger is justified in regarding Diotima's *eros* as a form of self-love. However, her self-love contains none of the unselfishness characteristic of the Aristotelian, or even the Aristophanic, *eros* (cf. below, notes 41, 47, 58).

³⁹ Cf. W. D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford, 1951), pp. 21, 34, 210.

this sense, he values his mortal self and its fame over the loftiest objects of knowledge. Diotima's mortality is not as sad for her, as some have supposed.⁴⁰ This would, of course, not be true, if Diotima regarded the good as an idea transcending her individual self. In that case, happiness would mean union with the universal good, if the possession of this absolute is happiness. Since one is most oneself when happy, a man would become what he truly is by subordinating himself to the absolute good.⁴¹ This idealistic train of thought arises from the concept of the good as an ideal, a notion alien to what one has rightly described as Diotima's "Ruhmbegierde."

Not sympathetic to any endeavor for union with the Absolute, Diotima believes that a radical separation of lover and beloved, knower and known is not only necessary but desirable. Rejecting the concept of an absolute good common to all men, Diotima's erotic is an example of ". . . Sophistic theories . . . leading to a possible pluralism of individual private worlds . . . only roughly related to . . . other private worlds."⁴² Her educator is at pains to see that this "possible pluralism" never becomes actual or evident to those in whom he gives birth. He wants to obtain undying renown by engendering the beauties of true virtue which tie men together in societies or civilizations. Tying them together in this way, he makes them forget what he regards as their natural self-interest (above, pp. 40-1). He transforms them into good citizens prepared to regard the common good, which they share with the other members of their community, as their own, individual good. He teaches them to view their own good or happiness as something more akin to an idea than to a personal state of being. Diotima's sophistry would reject this non-sophistical ideal for herself, although in others, she would find

⁴⁰ See above.

⁴¹ Cf. below, note 58; H. Gauss (above, note 23), pp. 100-2, incorrectly ascribes a similar view to Diotima, maintaining that she teaches the need to subordinate all one's faculties to some ethical goal, even if this means atrophy for those elements in one's being interfering with the noble task. In this connection, *Matthew* 5:30 and 18:8 are cited as expressing parallel sentiments, while the "egocentric" wisdom of Goethe is said to exemplify the opposite view (cf. above, note 23). Diotima's concept of love, however, leaves no room for the lover's subordination of himself to any beloved, even to the loftiest ideal.

⁴² R. S. Brumbaugh, *Plato on the One* (New Haven, 1961), p. 224.

it beautiful, that is, conducive to her undying glory.⁴³ The end of her *eros* is not given by something external to the lover such as the idea of the good, but by an innate purposiveness.

No rational insight into an external standard of goodness is needed to make mortal natures desire happiness in the first place. Although their *eros* for reproduction is intent on the same goal as human love (208B2-6), beasts and birds are, indeed, said to aim at it without the aid of the rational calculation available to men.⁴⁴ Even in men, however, reason can only make the lover knowledgeable about those beauties constituting the most efficacious means; the end of all mortal natures—philosophers included—is given by the innate purposiveness or instinct of *eros*.⁴⁵ In the case of non-human creatures and non-philosophical humans, the means as well as the end are given by inherited or conventional modes of behavior.⁴⁶ Although Diotima's philosophers too are aware of their end by an instinctual *eros*, they alone do not feel bound by automatic, customary means of seeking it. In fact, they are free from attachment to any means,

⁴³ In this sense, Diotima would agree with Arendt's suggestion that the idea of the good constitutes a politicizing of the theory of ideas, although she would not go along with Arendt's parallel thesis that the idea of the beautiful is simply an object of contemplation and not a means to reproduction (H. Arendt, *Between Past and Future* [Meridian Paperback, 1963], pp. 47, 112, 120, 125, 130, 132; cf. *The Human Condition* [Doubleday Anchor Paperback, 1958], pp. 202 f.). Even the true virtue generated by insight into absolute beauty is a means to win eternal fame. Thus Bury (above, note 1) p. 121, wrongly asserts that Diotima refers to "ordinary civil virtue" and not true virtue in 208E5-209A8.

⁴⁴ 207B6-7. See Hug-Schöne (above, note 1), pp. 122: "Bei Menschen konnte unter anderm die egoistische Erwägung mitwirken, dass sie im gebrechlichen Alter den Unterstützung der Kinder bedürfen." Cf. Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, VII, 12, 19.

⁴⁵ Dodds (above, note 35), pp. 218-19, suggests that Diotima's concept of *eros* endangers ". . . the notion of the intellect as a self sufficient entity independent of the body." Nevertheless he is convinced that Plato would not have risked jeopardizing the independent status of the intellect by fully integrating "this line of thought with the rest of his philosophy." However Plato may have felt about it, his Diotima subordinates reason to the instinct of *eros*. Cf. Shorey (above, note 3), p. 548 on 207B.

⁴⁶ Those whose pregnancy is primarily corporeal are thus limited to bodily means of reproduction as are beasts and birds; they are incapable of giving birth to the moral values of a civilization.

including absolute beauty itself. In Diotima's scheme of things, this freedom is based on the lover's arrogant conviction that the whole external universe is to be employed solely as a means to his own happiness. Instead of striving to live up to ideals transcending himself, Diotima's erotic feels free to use them in his quest for fame. His radical freedom in regard to means is possible only because his individualism rejects the altruistic passions which it yearns to infuse into others.⁴⁷

III

We turn now to Diotima's mythical presentation of her concept of *eros* (203A9-204C3). Penia has rightly been regarded as a personification of mortality or mortal nature, while Poros corresponds to the divine or immortal aspects of life.⁴⁸ Far from

⁴⁷ Something akin to the freedom here ascribed to Diotima is discerned by Popper (above, note 22), p. 78, in Plato's "spiritual naturalism," a view based on the belief in the "separate" existence of ideas (*ibid.*, p. 74). This position is said to allow for thoughtful and prudent legislation in this world. "In practice everything is left to the wisdom of the great lawgiver, a god-like philosopher . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. 79, 142 f.). Popper is convinced that Plato accepted the consequences of his spiritual naturalism, even to the extent of regarding himself as the divine lawgiver described in his *Laws*. According to Popper, Plato's ambition knew no bounds: "Even when he argues against ambition, we cannot but feel that he is inspired by it" (*ibid.*, p. 155). This is part of Popper's attack on Plato as a totalitarian who found it impossible to combine altruism with individualism, a combination which ". . . has become the basis of our western civilization" and ". . . is the central doctrine of Christianity" (*ibid.*, p. 100-2). In other words, Plato is charged with an inability to conceive of individualism except in terms of hostility to others.

Although Popper believes Plato might have made ". . . a cynical and conscious attempt to employ . . . moral sentiments . . . for his own purposes," he tends to reject this interpretation (*ibid.*, pp. 108-9, 170-1, 198-9). In fact, Popper's view of Plato differs from the present interpretation of Diotima in that he (Popper) feels that Plato sincerely accepted for himself the authoritarian views he imposes on others. For a rebuttal to Popper's accusations, see Levinson (above, note 20), pp. 398 ff., 499-579. On the problem of determining Plato's own views, see above, pp. 33-7.

⁴⁸ Bury (above, note 1), pp. XL-XLI: "Poros is clearly intended as a God (203B) . . . We must conclude therefore that as Poros is the source of the divine side of the nature of Eros, so Penia is the source of the antidi divine side; and from the description of eros as *δαλμων*

manifesting any deference to him, she initiates their intercourse by plotting to take advantage of him. For her, he is not to be revered or respected, but to be employed as a means of remedying her own deficiencies. In his turn, he is unaware of her wiles, intoxicated by a drink available only to Gods. Love is conceived when she takes advantage of this inebriation.

Dictima's myth is easily misunderstood, if one overlooks the paradoxical notion of pregnancy which it illustrates. The myth employs a physical image of intercourse and subsequent pregnancy, although Diotima contends that intercourse is not prerequisite to pregnancy. The lover is innately pregnant and intercourse with the beloved is merely a means to give birth to his child. The relief of this built-in pregnancy is the only divine aspect of mortality. Although all means contributing toward this end are regarded as divine,⁴⁹ the most divine thing is the absolute beauty, making possible all reproduction. Love dies when it is unable to avail itself of these means; it lives and flourishes when they are at its disposal (203D8-E4, 206C6-E1). Thus Penia is presented as a hapless beggar, dependent on the charity of the Gods (203B3-5), until she catches sight of the divine Poros in a condition favorable to her purposes.

Poros personifies all the "poroi" or means required by Penia (mortal nature) in order to solve her "aporia," her need to relieve her inherent pregnancy.⁵⁰ If impeded by an inadequate familiarity with Means (Poros), mortal nature (Penia) will not find a way out of her *aporia*. Instead of generating true moderation and justice, destined to win immortality for herself, she will give birth to mere images unable to do the job. Ignorance of Means will frustrate her *eros*, causing it to die again. The relationship between Poverty and Means is a personification of the countless ways in which mortality seeks to give

combined with the definition of *τὸ δαιμόνιον* as *μεταξὺ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ* (202e), we are justified in identifying the anti-divine side with mortality and regarding *ἡ Πενία* as a personification of *ἡ θνητὴ φύσις*." See also Bury's suggestion that Penia represents something like matter (*ibid.*, p. XLI, n. 1); cf. Kelsen (above, note 11), p. 15; Kranz (above, note 1), p. 441.

⁴⁹ Cf. Krüger's remarks (above, note 7), p. 180, on the "vergötterten Geliebten" which are, however, vitiated by the view that union with the beloved is the goal.

⁵⁰ We will, therefore, translate "Poros" as "Means."

birth. The full articulation of such a myth would be an endless task requiring an account of all degrees of familiarity with Means from that of the lowest beast to the knowledge of the most accomplished erotic.

Poverty's determination to resolve her "aporia" leads her to plot against Means. This plotting is essential to Diotima's sophistical *eros*. In her explanation of the myth, she describes *eros* as a swindler and sophist as well as a philosopher.⁵¹ Love's homeless, needy characteristics are inherited from his mother, while his paternal inheritance allows him to scheme, to be a shrewd hunter; to be a formidable wizard or swindler, a magician and a sophist who philosophizes all his life (203D4-8). Of course, Means, in his divine self-sufficiency, has no need to engage in any of these activities. Poverty schemes to use him, while he can hardly be said to show any initiative.⁵² However, knowledge of the beauty personified by Means is a prerequisite for the birth of love. The paternal contribution provides the external means, although *eros* belongs essentially to his mother, Poverty, whose good or happiness is his innate goal.

In her description of *eros* as intermediary between wisdom and ignorance (204B1-7), Diotima makes evident the prominence of the maternal element in his heredity. The cause of love's intermediary status is his birth (204B5-6). One would now expect her to characterize his paternal inheritance as wisdom and his maternal, as ignorance, since she has made his parents responsible for his being in between these two states. Although she ascribes riches and wisdom to his father, she does

⁵¹ 203D4-8. Cf. *eros* as "δολερός" (205D3). Grote (above, note 8), p. 9, n. 5, p. 11, n. 3, observes how the Socratic genealogy of love in the *Phaedrus* differs from Diotima's, although he does not take note of the fact that she and not Socrates originated the myth in the *Symposium*. "What Socrates says here in the *Symposium* about Eros is altogether at variance with what Socrates says about Eros in *Phaedrus*, wherein we find him speaking with the greatest awe about Eros as a powerful God, son of Aphrodite (*Phaedrus* 242d, 243d, 257a)." Cf. Shorey, *The Unity of Plato's Thought* (Chicago, 1903), p. 19, and Cushman (above, note 17), p. 2C3, n. 47, who regard this disparity as unimportant. For our interpretation of the difference between Socrates and Diotima see Appendix, pp. 57-9.

⁵² Cf. the word ἐπιβουλέουσα applied to the mother (203B7) with the assertion, a few lines later, that "κατὰ δὲ αὐτὸν πατέρα ἐπιβουλός ἔστι τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς" (203D4-5).

not exactly describe Poverty as ignorant, but as in perplexity and “not wise” (204B5-7). *οὐ σοφῆς* (204B5) does not necessarily mean ignorance (*ἀμαθία*) according to Diotima. Earlier, she had warned Socrates about identifying the two (202A2-9), pointing out that right opinion is not wisdom, but not ignorance either. Later (203E5-204B5), philosophy and *eros* are placed in the same intermediate position. Since Poverty is “not wise” and therefore not necessarily “ignorant,” she may be in the same position as *eros* and philosophy. The innate purposiveness allowing her to plot against Means makes it evident that she is, in fact, “not wise” and not simply “ignorant.” Always aware of her end, but not familiar with the proper means, she is never wholly ignorant as she would be, if both means and end were dark to her.⁵³

The scheming characteristic of Poverty’s *eros* is apparent in the sophistical attempt to win eternal glory by deceiving others, rendering them unaware of what Diotima regards as the basic antagonism among men (above, pp. 41, 48). Those pacified by the inculcation of true moderation and justice are the only “beauties” said to be loved (above, p. 44); the loftier attractions of laws, knowledge, and absolute beauty are contemplated, not loved. Neither the objects contemplated nor those loved are desired for themselves. In fact, Diotima’s views leave no room for anything loved owing to its own nature. Diotima’s erotic avails himself of his “beloved” as Poverty employs Means, casting him in a role for which he has no natural need or inclination. Poverty’s plotting and the intoxication of Means constitute a mythical picture of this concept of love.⁵⁴

⁵³ In this sense, Poverty resembles the Poverty of Aristophanes’ *Plutus* (552). Bury (above, note 1), p. XLI, n. 2, p. 103, noticed the parallel between Diotima’s Eros and Aristophanes’ Poverty who is neither a beggar nor wealthy. However, Bury failed to perceive that Eros’ mother, Poverty, is no mere beggar, either, at least when the sight of Means awakens her capacity to relieve her innate pregnancy.

⁵⁴ Bury (above, note 1), p. XLI, does not find any meaning in the intoxication of Means or the guile of Poverty outside of their being “incidental details . . . put in for purposes of literary effect, to fill up and round off the story.” This view is shared by Wilamowitz, *Platon*³, I (Frankfurt am Main, 1948), p. 300; Zeller (above, note 17), p. 194, n. 66; Schmelzer (above, note 28), p. 61. The present interpretation tries to show the importance of these details for Diotima’s concept

Although Diotima's sophistical *eros* might indicate an anti-male bias since it eliminates the male role inducing pregnancy, it can hardly be construed as misogynous. Far from being a slur on mothers by a person denied all appreciation of them, Diotima's depiction of Poverty is obviously intended as praise, if it is regarded in the light of her view of reproduction.⁵⁵ A similar misinterpretation of Diotima's non-mythical teaching underlies the attempt to explain her myth in terms of doctrines found in the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*.⁵⁶ In the *Republic* (437E7-439D8, 572D8-573D5), *eros* is a tyrannical craving, akin to indiscriminate thirst, willing to drink anything regardless of the consequences. *Eros* as such is characterized as a tyrant (*ibid.* 573B6-7), while tyrannical rapacity is regarded as a form of *eros* (*ibid.* 572E5, 573C9, 573D4, 587A13-B1). In the same spirit, *eros* and the pleasures of reproduction are relegated to the part of the soul housing only indiscriminate desires (439D6-8, cf. 436A10-11, 437B7-D4). Representative of these unbounded drives is a thirst (437D2-4) which, in itself, is neither for good or bad drink, but simply for drink (438A1-3, 439A4-7). Such passions are further exemplified by beasts driven to their objects (439B3-5, 439D4-8, 436A5-B1).

In the *Republic*, Socrates is obviously convinced that *eros* is not innately directed toward the good. Unless directed by reason and spiritedness (*thumos*), the lover is driven blindly as beasts are. According to Diotima, on the other hand, all *eros* is by nature aimed at the good, without the guidance of reason and indignation (*thumos*). For her, reason is subservient to *eros* and not vice-versa (above, p. 49). Her rejection of the *Republic's* doctrine of *eros* arises from her conviction that the good is not essentially an idea, a universal, but a state of being of a particular lover.

of love, when the non-mythological meaning to which they point is grasped.

⁵⁵ For the view that Diotima's depiction of Poverty is misogynous, see Kelsen (above, note 11), pp. 15-19. Cf. Wilamowitz (above, note 54), p. 32: "Dass das Weib dem Menschen Platon zeitlebens fremd geblieben ist, spüren wir überall; es ist vielleicht sein schwerster Mangel."

⁵⁶ Professor Ludwig Edelstein suggested this interpretation in his criticism of the present paper. For this suggestion, as for much valuable assistance, I am indebted to him. On this view of the *Timaeus*, see Kelsen (above, note 11), pp. 14-15.

If the good is an ideal transcending those in need of it, their *eros* is essentially Tantalean, always reaching beyond the lover to a happiness which must forever elude him. In that case, the particular, this-worldly existence and glory of the lover is not so dear to him as the ideal whose possession means happiness.⁵⁷ Since his good is a transcendent universal, his life would indeed be a dying to his particular self in order to become alive to his real, "eidetic" happiness.⁵⁸ This position is unmarred by the sophistry characteristic of Diotima's erotic. Its mythological expression is the soul's recollection of, and flight to, a better world, not the plotting of Poverty and the intoxication of Means.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ This is the case with the lover described in the *Republic* (486A-8-B2, 490A8-B7) and in the *Phaedrus* (247C4-248A1, 249B6-253C6, 255A1-257A2, 276E4-277A4) whose engendering of beautiful speeches is in the service of a desire of communion with absolute truth or beauty. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus* (New York, 1952), p. 160, n. 3, p. 164, is therefore wrong when he identifies the teaching of the *Phaedrus* (276E4-277A4) with that of the *Symposium* (209B5 ff., 212A2-7). Cf. above, note 51.

⁵⁸ Zeller (above, note 17), p. 506, has described this position well in his discussion of what he calls the Platonic concept of the relation of individual to universal beauty: "The two elements which intermingle with each other in all beauty are the sensible phenomenon and the Idea—the concrete individuality and the universal import. Plato ascribes no specific value to the former; the immaterial universal is alone, in his opinion, true and essential. The material and the particular can, indeed, lead up to this, but only in such a manner that we immediately turn away from the particular and leave it behind us. Plato must therefore seek the essence of the beautiful in the contents, not in the form; he must ignore his discrimination of it from the true and the good; he must degrade the beautiful phenomenon over against the shapeless concept as a subordinate and unimportant, even disturbing accessory." Cf. Ritter (above, note 19), p. 79.

⁵⁹ The sophistic character of Diotima's *eros* has been misunderstood in this way by Nygren (above, note 18), pp. 179-81, who confuses it with a desire of the soul for "restoration to its original heavenly home." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 167; M. C. D'Arcy, *The Mind and Heart of Love* (Meridian Paperback, 1956), pp. 69 f. In this connection, Nygren (*ibid.*, p. 173) links Diotima's *eros* with the Socratic myth about the recollection of a former state in which the soul possesses a divine perfect knowledge. Cf. E. Frank, "Begriff und Bedeutung des Daimonischen in der griechischen Philosophie," in *Wissen, Wollen, Glauben* (Zürich and Stuttgart, 1955), pp. 60-1, 65. See also C. Kerenyi, *Der Grosse Daimon des Symposium* (Amsterdam and Leipzig, 1942), pp. 21 f.;

According to the *Republic*, *eros* must be supervised by reason's vision of the Good, if it is to be more than an indiscriminate craving. Conceived of in this light, the love of mortal nature (Poverty) is indeterminate and, as such, is akin to the wholly passive Receptacle of the *Timaeus* (50B5-53B7), prior to the beneficent arrangement of its contents by divine reason.⁶⁰ Just as reason and spiritedness are required to channel *eros* into the exclusive direction of the Good, the eternal absolutes and the Demiurge are needed to bring order out of the chaos by nature (53B4) inhabiting the Receptacle.⁶¹ However, the plotting of Poverty can hardly be equated with the eternal passivity of the Receptacle⁶² or with the promiscuous desire of the *Republic*. Both views imply a rejection of Diotima's sophistry.

Nygren, *ibid.*, pp. 163-5. Against this view, Hackforth ("Immortality in Plato's *Symposium*" [above, note 8], p. 45) rightly observes that Diotima's rejection of the soul's immortality is at odds with such a myth. Cf. Grote (above, note 8), p. 17 and above, note 35.

⁶⁰ See above, note 56.

⁶¹ It would be difficult to ascribe a chaotic condition to the Receptacle as such, since, in itself it is devoid of all form, unless lack of form is, in itself, chaos. At any rate the Receptacle is said to play the maternal role in the creation of the world (50D2-4).

⁶² Although apparent in their respective evaluations of the love of reproduction, the gulf separating Diotima's views from those of Timaeus becomes especially noticeable in their concepts of the feminine functions of pregnancy and giving birth (*Timaeus*, 90E1-91D6). These acts are, of course, of decisive importance for Diotima. Far from regarding the desire for those things as a form of the passion for immortality (cf. *Laws*, 721B), as Cornford (*Plato's Cosmology* [London, 1937], pp. 292, 355 f.) has maintained, Timaeus brands it as a "result from the misdeeds through which some human souls were degraded to lower forms" (Zeller [above, note 17], p. 433). Only through reason is human nature said to partake of the divine and the immortal (*ibid.*, 90B1-D7). The need for reproduction arises from the deplorable behavior of certain men whose neglect of learning leads to their rebirth as women or even as beasts. It would be difficult to imagine a position more opposed to Diotima's teaching. On Cornford's reference to the *Laws* (721B), cf. the reply of Hackforth (*Plato's Phaedo* [above, note 8], p. 21, n. 2) to Cherniss' letter.

APPENDIX

Socrates and Diotima

In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates never subscribes to the sophistry advocated by Diotima. Instead he shows himself willing and ever eager to subordinate his actual, individual self to a more rational, universal self.⁶³ Socrates often pictures himself as at the mercy of the truth revealed by the argument; one should follow the best argument (*logos*) even if this means one's death.⁶⁴ In other words, he identified his real being with reason or the ideal realm rather than with his actual self. A man's authentic being is more akin to the truth revealed by the argument than it is to his individuality.⁶⁵ For Socrates, the good is not something different for different men, but a common or political thing, a universal, although it is a question whether he ascribed "separate" existence to these universals.⁶⁶ In this sense, he embodied the true moderation and justice engendered by Diotima in others, although she felt no devotion to these virtues as such (above, pp. 40, 43). Far from using the souls of others in order to obtain glory, Socrates claims to be a "mid-wife," barren and no longer capable of giving birth to ideas of his own (*Theaetetus*, 150C4-D8). It is therefore wrong to ascribe to him the role of Diotima's educator intending to father spiritual children in others.⁶⁷

⁶³ Cf. above, notes 35, 58.

⁶⁴ Edelstein (above, note 9), pp. 16-20; Levinson (above, note 20), p. 174. Cf. *Theaetetus*, 191A3-5.

⁶⁵ Cf. above, note 58.

⁶⁶ For the belief that Socrates did not regard the ideas as existing separately, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1078b30-31, 1086b2-5 and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, ed. by W. D. Ross, I (Oxford, 1958), p. XLII. On the "Socratic Problem," cf. Levinson (above, note 20), pp. 632 ff.; Jaeger (above note 4), pp. 17 ff.; Popper (above, note 22), pp. 307 ff., n. 56; W. C. Greene, *Moira* (Harper Torchbook, 1963), p. 412, n. 30. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 417, n. 39; C. J. de Vogel, "The Present State of the Socratic Problem," *Phronesis*, I (1955), pp. 26-35; Friedländer (above, note 1), pp. 126 ff.

⁶⁷ As does Cornford (above, note 5), p. 75. Cf. Cornford, "Athenian Philosophic Schools," *Cambridge Ancient History*, VI, p. 322. Krüger (above, note 7), p. 175; Jaeger (above, note 4), p. 192; Hug-Schöne (above, note 1), p. XLV; Kelsen (above, note 11), pp. 77 f., ascribes to Socrates what he calls the "will to power" of Diotima's educator. However, he does not observe that Diotima's views are not Socratic.

Diotima casts doubt on Socrates' capacity to learn (204B1, 207C2-4), especially in regard to her higher mysteries (210A1-4). In his turn, he is often incredulous, full of wonder even after he has been told to cease wondering.⁶⁸ In spite of her serious doubts, he claims to be persuaded by her higher mysteries (212B1-2), although he branded the previous part of her speech as the teaching of a perfect sophist.⁶⁹ Surely he did not comprehend the greater mysteries in her sense, if one is to judge by his behavior in the other dialogues. The nobility of his idealism can hardly be equated with her sophistry.

Like most interpreters, Bury regards Diotima's rebukes of Socrates as expressions of Socratic irony or social tact: "Socrates throughout—with his usual irony—depicts himself as a mere tiro in the hand of the Mantineaan mistress; but he is still, in spite of his mock-modesty, the ideal philosopher of Alcibiades' encomium."⁷⁰ Bury does not question Alcibiades' capacity to determine who is a philosopher, as, it seems to me, Diotima would. It would take me too far afield to analyze Alcibiades' speech in any detail here. His being so deeply impressed by Socrates' non-sophistical way indicates, I believe, that Diotima would have disagreed with his ideas about philosophy. His shame before Socrates is surely not in accord with her concept of the lover who treats his "beloved" as Poverty dealt with Means.

It may be true that Socrates was once interested in psychical reproduction in others, as has been suggested by Taylor (above, note 1), p. 324, n. 2; A. Koyre, *Discovering Plato* (Columbia Paperback, 1950), p. 37, n. 7. However, Friedländer (above, note 1), p. 156, rightly observes that the Socratic principle of education in the dialogues is in opposition to those "educators who believe they can put into the soul knowledge that was not there before like sight into blind eyes (*Republic* 518b)." Friedländer's reference to the *Republic* shows that Socrates is made to adhere to his maieutic, even in a dialogue in which he seems more interested in informing his interlocutors than in helping them to give birth to their own ideas.

⁶⁸ 205B3-4, 207C8-9, 208B4-C1. Koller (above, note 19), p. 40. Wilamowitz (above, note 5), p. 173, has sympathized with Socrates' astonishment on the grounds that he would never have abandoned wisdom to "den heraklitischen Strom des Wechsels" as Diotima did (207E5-208B3). Cf. above, note 35.

⁶⁹ 208C1. Cf. Wilamowitz (cited above, note 24) on this passage.

⁷⁰ Bury (above, note 1), p. 124; cf. Taylor (above, note 1), p. 229, n. 1; Schmelzer (above, note 23), p. 72.

She would, perhaps, have regarded him as acting in his own interest, when he abandoned what he felt to be the siren-song of Socratic dialectic.⁷¹ His flight from Socrates brings him closer to her sophistry, although his need to make it in such a cowardly way shows that he lacked her immunity to the "adder's bite" (217E6-218A7). In any case, Socrates is not to be viewed as the embodiment of her *eros*,⁷² although he may be the incarnation of Alcibiades.'

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⁷¹ 216A6-8. Cf. Cicero, *De Finibus*, V, 48-9.

⁷² He is regarded as the embodiment of Diotima's *eros* by Ritter (above, note 19), p. 63; Koller (above, note 19), pp. 28 ff.; Levinson (above, note 20), p. 32; E. Hoffmann, *Platon* (Rowohlt, Deutsche Enzyklopädie), p. 53; Bury (above, note 1), pp. XLVII, LX.

HERODOTUS SPECULATES ABOUT EGYPT.

Herodotus' account of Egyptian geography, brief though it is, bristles with difficulties. More than half a century ago Camille Sourville published a notable monograph in which, on the basis of the internal evidence, he established the strong probability that Herodotus did not arrive in Egypt until late in July and that he had already left by the first of December of the same year.¹ This means he found himself in somewhat the same position as the historians who later wrote about India after passing through a small part of it hurriedly with Alexander's army.² Herodotus, however, had this advantage: Greeks had been living and trading in Egypt for some two hundred years, long enough for a more reliable literature to have grown up than the mendacious account of India by Ctesias on which Alexander's generation had been nurtured.³ Therefore when Herodotus decided to visit Egypt he may have had in mind clearing up a number of specific questions already suggested by what he had read. Unfortunately he did not know the language of the country, so he was forced to rely on expatriate Greeks and Greek-speaking Egyptians for his information, and too often found himself at the mercy of unscrupulous cicerones like those who furnished him with fanciful translations of the inscriptions.⁴ When Herodotus did meet a responsible temple official, as he did in Sais,⁵ communication must have been difficult, depending

¹ Camille Sourville, *La durée et l'étendue du voyage d'Hérodote en Égypte* (Paris, 1910), p. 20 (henceforth Sourville).

² Strabo (II, 1, 6) cites Patrocles approvingly for his remark that . . . *Tοὺς Ἀλεξανδρῷ συστρατεύτας ἐπιδρομάδην ιστορῆσαι ἔκαστα.*

³ On Ctesias' *Indica* see F. Jacoby, "Ktesias," in *R.E.*, XI, especially cols. 2037-40; also T. S. Brown, *A.J.P.*, LXXVI (1955), p. 18, n. 2; pp. 22-33.

⁴ For these inscriptions see II, 125 (supposedly an account of expenditures for feeding workmen building the Great Pyramid); II, 136 (a chatty inscription by Asychis comparing his brick pyramid favorably with the stone ones of his predecessors); II, 141 (an inscription on a stone statue of the pharaoh Sethos, who holds a mouse in his hand and exhorts others to emulate his piety). On their unreliability see Ph.-E. Legrand in the Budé ed. of Herodotus, Vol. II, p. 44, n. 1.

⁵ Herodotus (II, 28) calls him δὲ γραμματιστὴς τῶν ἱρῶν χρημάτων τῆς Ἀθηναῖς. Heinrich Stein, in commenting on this passage (*Herodot*

on the interpreter's integrity, or—worse still—on the official's own pretension to a knowledge of Greek.

Under such circumstances Herodotus inevitably directed his questions in such a way as to suggest the kind of answer he expected, while the guide, hoping to increase his fee by being as complaisant as possible, was no doubt glad to oblige.⁶ Now when Herodotus visited Egypt—let us say not many years before or after 445 B.C.⁷—the leading account of Egyptian geography available to him was that contained in the *Periegesis* of Hecataeus of Miletus.⁸ The disappearance of that work together with

[6th ed., Berlin, 1901]), thinks he must have been a subordinate official, certainly not the *ἱερογραμματεύς* who was one of the highest ranking priests. But Alfred Wiedmann (*Herodots zweites Buch* [Leipzig, 1890], p. 31) regards him as an important official who could have given Herodotus reliable information. He notes sadly that statements attributed to him are so nonsensical as to suggest either that he was completely misunderstood, or else that he was pulling Herodotus' leg.

⁶ E. g. when Herodotus says (II, 118) he asked the priests in Memphis whether or not they thought the Greek account of what happened in Troy was silly, it is clear he hoped for an affirmative reply.

⁷ While Sourdille has convinced most scholars that Herodotus spent only four months in Egypt (p. 20), there is no general agreement on the year of his visit. Eduard Meyer maintains that Herodotus left Thurii and settled down in Athens sometime during the 440-430 decade, and that it was also during this period that he went to Egypt (*Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, I [Halle, 1892], pp. 156 f.). J. Wells accepts this (W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, I [Oxford, 1912], p. 411—henceforth cited as H. and W.), but points out that our evidence is far from conclusive. Jacoby, after an exhaustive examination of the testimony, concludes that Herodotus cannot have gone to Egypt before 448/7, when Amyrtaeus' revolt had been suppressed, and probably not until 445 ("Herodotus," No. 7, *R.-E.*, Suppl. II, col. 267). Sourdille (pp. 1-4) is less definite, though he controverts the older view of Rawlinson and maintains that the visit cannot have taken place during the ill-fated Athenian expedition (i.e., not in the 460-454 period). Legrand (Budé Herod., Introd., pp. 28-9) likes 449 or 448; John L. Myres suggests a number of possibilities with seeming preference for 448 or soon after (*Herodotus, Father of History* [Oxford, 1953], p. 8). Hall follows Jacoby, but deplores the fact that Herodotus chose such an uninteresting time to visit Egypt (*C.A.H.*, VI, pp. 140-1).

⁸ For the fragments of Hecataeus and the *testimonia* about him, see Felix Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, No. 1 (2nd ed., Berlin, 1957)—henceforth cited as *F.Gr.H.* For discussion see also Jacoby, "Hekataios," No. 3, *R.-E.*, VII, cols. 2667-2769; Lionel

the *Genealogies*, a book with which Herodotus must also have been familiar,⁹ leaves us puzzled over the extent of his obligations to the distinguished Ionian logographer.¹⁰ Porphyry, who was unusually sensitive in such matters, charges the Father of History with plagiarism because he borrowed his accounts of the phoenix, the hippopotamus, and the hunting of the crocodile from Hecataeus.¹¹ But in the third century A.D. writers sometimes made up for the lack of any ideas of their own by the erudition which they displayed in citing the opinions of others. In Herodotus' day a historian was not expected to do this. If he said what had already been said, but said it better, it was his book that survived, and understandably so. There were no laws of copyright, and even a celebrated author derived no direct financial profit from his writings. Let us take Thucydides as an example. He mentions one other historian by name once, Hellanicus, and then only to point out that his work was so unsatisfactory that he, Thucydides, felt compelled to write a sketch of the period before the Peloponnesian Wars to make it intelligible to the reader.¹² Yet the Athenian historian probably used Hellanicus for his *archaeologia* without acknowledgment.¹³

Herodotus follows a somewhat different procedure. He names Hecataeus no less than five times in his *History*, and while he refers specifically to his writings only once, he leaves no doubt in our minds what Hecataeus he means by calling him "the

Pearson, *Early Ionic Historians* (Oxford, 1939), Chap. 2—henceforth cited as Pearson. The *Periegesis* (or Περιέστης Γῆς, as it is sometimes called) was almost forgotten until Eratosthenes recognized its importance. He showed that the second half of the *Periegesis* was falsely listed in the Alexandrian library under the name of Nesiotes (see Jacoby, "Hekataios," *R.E.*, VII, cols. 2700 f.; also see comments on T 15a in the *F.Gr.H.*).

⁹ Unfortunately the *Genealogies* lost favor because of the popularity of Hellanicus' work. Of the 339 fragments attributed to Hecataeus only 35 can be claimed for the *Genealogies*.

¹⁰ For discussion see Pearson, pp. 83-90.

¹¹ Porphyry's comment reaches us indirectly by way of Eusebius (*Praep. Evang.*, X, 3, p. 466 B = *F.Gr.H.*, 1 F 324a).

¹² Thuc., I, 97, 2.

¹³ See A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, I (Oxford, 1945), p. §3, n. 1. On Thucydides' use of Hellanicus and other Ionian writers see Pearson (Index under *Thucydides, relation to predecessors*).

prose writer" (*ὁ λογοπούσ*).¹⁴ On the other hand, when he attacks his views—as we learn that he did when we examine the attested fragments of Hecataeus—he avoids giving his name. This mask of anonymity enables him to make very sharp criticisms without resorting to personalities.¹⁵ Modern scholars usually gun down their opponents in the footnotes, but fifth century books were not annotated. Herodotus achieved the same results by addressing his recriminations to "the Greeks" or "the Ionians." Informed readers would make the proper identification, others could safely be left in ignorance.¹⁶

Both Herodotus and Hecataeus were familiar with early Greek philosophical writing. For Hecataeus this is indicated by Heraclitus' ill-natured remark that wide knowledge cannot improve a man's mind, because it had not had that effect on Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, or Hecataeus;¹⁷ for Herodotus it can

¹⁴ Three of these references (*viz.* V, 36; 125; 126) have to do with advice Hecataeus gave his fellow citizens in connection with the Ionian Revolt. Herodotus need not have learned this from reading Hecataeus, as Jacoby clearly sees ("Hekataios," No. 3, *R.-E.*, VII, col. 2669), because this advice was a part of the record of the times. Also, it seems unlikely Hecataeus would go out of his way to remind his readers that he had recommended making use of Apollo's treasures for carrying on the war (V, 36). Book II (c. 143) gives us one detail of Hecataeus' visit to Egypt—to be discussed later—but Book VI (c. 137) contains the only direct citation from his writings (*οἱ λόγοι*). However, Hecataeus is neither blamed nor praised, his opinion on the expulsion of the Pelasgians from Attica is merely contrasted with the account Herodotus heard in Athens. And in this we note the difference from Thucydides. Incidentally, the term *λογοπούσ* is descriptive not abusive (see references in *L.S.J.*), and would probably have been used by Herodotus of himself, just as later Arrian applies the term to both men (*Anab.*, V, 6, 5).

¹⁵ The difficult question of Herodotus' relationship to Hecataeus is discussed at length by Jacoby ("Hekataios," No. 3, *R.-E.*, VII, cols. 2675 ff., and see cols. 2678-9 for Book II particularly); see also Pearson (pp. 81-90). For examples of Herodotus' polemic, see Sourdille (p. 125, n. 1).

¹⁶ Aristotle, writing in the next century, finds it necessary to attack the doctrine of forms held by his master Plato, and by Socrates. He justifies himself in these words (*Nic. Eth.*, I, 6, 1):

καὶ περ προσάντους τῆς τουατῆς ξητήσεως γινομένης δὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν, τὰ εἰδη, δόξεις δ’ ἀν τὸν βέλτιον εἴραι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναφέειν ἄλλως τε καὶ φίλοσόφους δύτας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ δυτοιν φίλοιν δύσιν προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀληθείαν.

Herodotus may have had similar feelings about some of his own predecessors.

¹⁷ See Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorso-*

be inferred from his *History*. One ought not to forget that these philosophers demanded only literacy and intelligence in a reader. There was as yet no technical jargon to discourage the uninitiate. Among the very early thinkers perhaps the most original was Anaximander of Miletus. Like Hecataeus he seems to have played a prominent part in the public life of his city. If we can accept the testimony of Aelian, he led a colonizing expedition to Apollonia on the coast of the Black Sea.¹⁸ This would have to be a refoundation, since Miletus, in conjunction with Phocaea or with Rhodes, established the original colony on this site as Anthea in 609 B.C.¹⁹ Aelian may have good authority for his statement, but it seems more likely that the story is of late manufacture, intended to establish a link between the later philosopher, Diogenes of Apollonia, and the Ionian School.²⁰

kratiker (8th ed., Berlin, 1856), Herakleitos, Mo. 22, B 40 (henceforth D.K.).

¹⁸ Ael., *V.H.*, III, 17 = D.K., 12, A 3. Aelian includes Anaximander in a long and roughly chronological list of philosophers who played an important part in public life.

¹⁹ See J. L. Myres in *C.A.H.*, III, p. 663. Apollonia is said by the unknown author of the *Perip'sus Ponti Euxini* (ed. by Aubrey Diller in *The Tradition of the Minor Greek Geographers* [American Philolog. Assoc., 1952], 15v15-20) to have been founded by the Milesians πρὸ πεντήκοντα ἑτῶν τῆς Κύρου βασιλείας.

²⁰ The doxographers attempted to work out a *stemma* for each philosopher, giving the name of his teacher or teachers as well as his pupils. However the Milesian School (as they called it) came to an end with the destruction of that city in 494 B.C. How then did Diogenes, whose *floruit* was cc. 440-430 (see G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* [Cambridge Univ. Press, 1960], p. 427—henceforth K. and R.) become a convert to their way of thinking? Diogenes Laertius, who never allowed an incongruous date to stand in his way, simply said he had studied under Anaximenes (D.L., IX, 57). Léon Robin states the problem clearly (*La pensée grecque* [1st ed., Paris, 1928], p. 56): “Toutefois, en un temps où l'action du livre ne compte guère, peut-être est-il difficile, sans une permanence, même réduite, de l'école, de comprendre comment a pu réapparaître, un siècle plus tard, chez Hippon et Diogène d'Apollonie, l'orientation philosophique dont elle avait été la source.” One ancient solution may have been to have Anaximander carry his doctrines with him to Apollonia. But there are so many Apollonias (natural enough with Apollo the chief god of Miletus, the great colonizing city)! Even in antiquity there is no clear evidence that Diogenes came from Apollonia on the Black Sea. He is also associated with Phrygia and with an Apollonia in Crete (see K. and R., p. 427).

Be that as it may, there is better evidence for Anaximander's visit to Sparta, where he is said to have predicted an earthquake.²¹ His book, and so far as we know he wrote only one, is given the usual title of *Hēpi φύσεως* (*On Nature*).²² But he also published the earliest map of the world known to have been made by a Greek. And here his connection with Hecataeus is direct, because we have it on excellent authority that Hecataeus improved Anaximander's map, and that the improved map was considered "a wonderful thing."²³ Anaximander conceived of the world as a rather squat cylinder, with an altitude equal to only one third of the diameter. Mankind inhabits the disk that forms the upper end of the cylinder.²⁴ We may reasonably assume that Hecataeus took Anaximander's map with him when he visited Egypt, and it is not unlikely that Herodotus had the improved version with him on his voyage. But this is not all. Anaximander had also developed a theory about the origin of mankind, suggesting that the human race had adapted itself to life on the dry land after an earlier period when the world was covered with water or slime²⁵—and this was a view that might well be tested in Egypt, reputedly the oldest country there was.²⁶ Other philosophers had interested themselves in the relationship between land and water over the surface of the earth. Was the world becoming progressively drier, or would it eventually succumb to another inundation?²⁷ There were also a variety of theories about the sun and the stars, particularly about their

²¹ The relevant passages are: D.L., II, 1, 1 (on the authority of Favorinus) and Cic., *De Div.*, I, 112 (see D.K., 12, A 1; 5a). For discussion see now W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962), p. 75 (henceforth Guthrie).

²² See Guthrie, p. 73; also K. and R., p. 101.

²³ See Agathemerus, I, 1 = D.K., 12, A 6. Agathemerus is following Eratosthenes here. See also Guthrie, pp. 98 f., 102 f. W. G. Forrest may not be too wide of the mark when he speaks of the *Periegesis* as an attempt "to write a text for Anaximander's map" (see Introd. to *Herodotus*, in the *Great Histories* series ed. by H. R. Trevor-Roper [New York, 1963], p. xii).

²⁴ See D.K. 12, A 10, 11. See also Guthrie, pp. 98 f.; K. and R., p. 134.

²⁵ See especially D.K., 12, A 30; 10; Guthrie, p. 102; K. and R., p. 141.

²⁶ See Herod., II, 2, to be discussed later. In the fourth century Aristotle can still write (*Meteor.*, I, 14, 352b 20): . . . οὐδὲ γάρ φαμεν ἀρχαιοτάτους εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων Ἀλγυπτίους . . .

²⁷ Cf. Guthrie, pp. 92 f. with K. and R., p. 140.

relationship with the waters of the earth: The phenomenon of the sun "drawing water" had been observed and commented on.²⁸ Then, too, wind had been thought of as a separate force having an influence on the movements of the heavenly bodies.²⁹

These and other theories Herodotus must have run across in his reading, and they were still in his mind when he sought for confirmation in Memphis, Heliopolis, and Thebes.³⁰ But in view of the fact that Hecataeus had also visited Egypt to set himself straight on these points, and that his conclusions were available to our historiar, have we any right to assume that Herodotus did anything more than rewrite this pioneer work with a few minor corrections? De Sanctis has argued that passages in our text that show a bold critical approach come from Hecataeus, while qualifications and uncertainties reflect "the timid spirit of Herodotus."³¹ In religious matters this is probably true, for Herodotus was a believer, but in other areas he shows an imaginative sweep that is entirely his own. If Hecataeus was the first to see that philosophical theorizing about the world and its formation needed to be documented in detail, Herodotus added an important corollary to the effect that physical theories of this kind are also relevant to man's political history. True, his attempt to relate the history of the Egyptians to the changes that occurred in their environment was a failure, partly because the data was inaccurate and partly because his method was not sufficiently rigorous. But he tried.

Hecataeus had been interested in that tantalizing question: "Who were the first men?" Herodotus repeats a famous story that King Psammetichus had conducted a sociological experiment with two babes, whom he caused to be brought up without hearing the sound of a human voice. Their first articulate cry was 'bekos!'—the Phrygian word for bread—so the Egyptians were forced to admit that the Phrygians were even more ancient than themselves.³² In all likelihood he borrowed this from Hecataeus, and it need not surprise us that "the priests of

²⁸ See Guthrie, p. 67 (refers to Herod., II, 25).

²⁹ See K. and R., pp. 137; 138; 155.

³⁰ See Herod., II, 3. He mentions that the priests in Heliopolis were regarded as the most learned of the Egyptians.

³¹ Gaetano De Sanctis, *Studi di storia della storiografia greca* (Florence, 1951), p. 5 (from article in *Riv. d. Fil.*, LXI [1933], pp. 1-15).

³² Herod., II, 2.

Hephaestus in Memphis" confirmed it.³³ We do not know what conclusion Hecataeus drew from this alleged experiment, but it does not impinge on the area of Ionian physical speculations. However there is one more statement bearing on the antiquity of Egypt with which Hecataeus is associated. When he went to Thebes he informed the priests that his own sixteenth forebear was a god. The priests, in turn, showed him a series of some 345 enormous wooden statues representing as many generations of high priests, not one of whom was the son of a god.³⁴ When Herodotus arrived in Thebes he also visited the same temple and talked with the priests, without however alluding to his own pedigree. Like Hecataeus he saw the wooden statues, each named for a "Piromis the son of Piromis." We are told that 'piromis' in Egyptian may be translated into Greek as *καλὸς κάγαθός* ('gentleman').³⁵ It is unlikely that the priests still remembered Hecataeus' gaffe of some fifty years back, so Herodotus must have come across this little anecdote when he read the *Periegesis* (or the *Genealogies*). Why should the logographer have included this somewhat damaging statement about himself? Surely it had some bearing in his mind on the Egyptian claim to be the most ancient people in the world, and if we could restore its original context Hecataeus would probably cut a better figure than he does now.³⁶ But there is nothing to show

³³ *Ibid.* Herodotus goes out of his way to show there is another version which, "among many other stupidities" (*ἀλλὰ τε μάταια πολλά*), maintains that the children were brought up by women whose tongues had been severed. Therefore he knew about the experiment before he went to Egypt, presumably through Hecataeus. Was the caustic comment his own?

³⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 143.

³⁵ On the meaning of 'piromis' in Egyptian see A. Wiedmann, *Herodots zweites Buch*, pp. 509-10. As Wiedmann suggests, Herodotus may have learned the meaning in Halicarnassus, where Piromis appears as a personal name (see *S.I.G.*², No. 46, lines 19; 32); see also H. and W., commenting on II, 143, 4.

³⁶ C. and Th. Mueller attribute the account of Hecataeus' conversation with the priests to the *Periegesis* (*Περιόδος Γῆς*) (*Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, I [Paris, 1841], pp. 18-19, fr. 276), and most scholars (e.g. Pearson, p. 83) have followed their lead. Sourdille, however (p. 205, n. 1), insists that Herodotus got his information from the priests in Thebes, and Legrand agrees (Budé Herod., Vol. II, p. 22). The chief argument seems to be that the logographer would not have put himself in an unfavorable light. But this is not quite like the

that he appealed to a physical theory to refute a genealogical argument.

However, Hecataeus did have a physical theory about Egypt, for it is almost certain that it was he rather than Herodotus who first called Egypt "a gift of the Nile."³⁷ Now there are a number of passages in Book II of Herodotus' *History* in which it is argued that a major part of Egypt was built up by deposits brought down by the Nile River. These arguments differ widely in character, and further examination will show that while some of them may be attributed to Hecataeus, others were added by Herodotus. We may begin with the statement about the coastal waters. When a plumb line was dropped from a vessel still a day's sail from the land, mud was found on the bottom at a depth of eleven fathoms, clearly the work of the Nile.³⁸ Al-

advice given to rob Apollo (see above, n. 14). Furthermore, Thucydides, and here we have the whole context, makes no effort to conceal his own misadventure (Thuc., IV, 104 i.; V, 26, 5). Then, too, the incident did serve to show that Hecataeus was a member of the nobility (similarly Thucydides is revealed as one of the ten strategi). But need the episode come from the *Periegesis*? There is a curious parallel, perhaps an echo of this occurrence, in Plato's *Timaeus* (21E-22B). Solon is said to have visited Egypt and to have recited the pedigree of the descendants of Deucalion and Pyrrha to the priests in Sais. The priests were amused, and one of them interrupted Solon, exclaiming that the Greeks were mere infants without truly ancient traditions of their own. Plato shares Hecataeus' skeptical attitude toward the Egyptians (e.g. see *Rep.*, IV, 436A; *Leg.*, V, 747C; XII, 953E). He may have read Hecataeus' *Genealogies*, where there was a special section on Deucalion and his descendants (see *F.Gr.H.*, No. 1, frs. 13-16).

³⁷ This is pretty well proved by Arrian's statement (*Anab.*, V, 6, 5): Αἰγυπτόν τε Ἡρόδοτός τε καὶ Ἐκαταῖος οἱ λογοποιοί . . . δῶρόν τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἀμφέτεροι ὥσαύτως ὀνομάζουσιν Herodotus implies that Hecataeus is wrong because for Hecataeus Egypt means only the Delta, while the land built up by the Nile is far more extensive. Herodotus (II, 5) strangely says: Δῆλα γέρο δὴ καὶ μὴ προακούσαντι ιδόντι δέ, δοτος γε σύνεσιν ἔχει, δοτι <ἢ> Αἰγυπτος ἐστιν "Ἐλληνες ναυτίλλονται ἐστὶ Αἰγυπτίοισι ἐπίκτητός τε γῆ καὶ δῶρον τοῦ ποταμοῦ . . . V. Ehrenberg tries to show what Herodotus meant by the ἐπίκτητος γῆ (*Klio*, XVI [1920], pp. 324-7), but finds it necessary to emend the text to save Herodotus from inconsistency. However, as will be shown below, there is reason to believe Herodotus was not always clear about the consequences of his own statements about the Nile. He has not thought the problem through, and no emendation can save him from self-contradiction.

³⁸ Herod., II, 5.

though this is not strictly accurate,³⁹ Greek sea captains must have known that for some distance off the Egyptian coast the ocean was relatively shallow with a muddy bottom. They may even have associated this with the Nile, certainly Hecataeus would have done so. Of the same character is Herodotus' argument that the projection of the shoreline of Egypt beyond that of its neighbors was caused by silt carried out to sea by the river (II, 12); and again, the shape of the coast must have been familiar to Greek seamen.

At this point, however, further testimony is presented beyond the experience of professional sailors. Herodotus (II, 12) tells us that:

shells are found in the mountains, and salt encrustations by which the pyramids have been eroded; also the Egyptian range above Memphis, and there only, is covered with sand.

He goes on to contrast the black friable soil of Egypt, brought down from Ethiopia by the Nile, with the red sandy soil of Libya and the clay and rock of Arabia and Syria. Now conclusions had already been drawn from the presence of shells and marine fossils on high ground by Xenophanes of Colophon,⁴⁰ and perhaps even earlier by Anaximander;⁴¹ accordingly it is the kind of observation we might expect Hecataeus to have made when he visited Egypt. But if Hecataeus had seen shells in the mountains above Memphis how could he have maintained, as modern scholars insist that he did, that only the Delta was "a gift of the Nile?"⁴² Moreover, a new argument has been added, unknown to us in the fragments of the Ionian philosophers: Herodotus points to the destructive effects of the salt on the pyramids, that is *in historical times*. Exactly what he meant is not clear, but he may have believed that the land on which the pyramids stood was still rising at the time they were

³⁹ According to H. and W. (commenting on II, 5, 2) this depth is not found farther than twelve or fifteen miles offshore.

⁴⁰ Xenophanes' dates are in dispute (see K. and R., pp. 163-4; Guthrie, pp. 362-4; L. Woodbury, in *Phoenix*, XV [1961], pp. 134-55), but we may assume he came early enough to have been read by Hecataeus as well as Herodotus. For his inferences from fossils see D.K., 21, A 33, 5; K. and R., p. 177; Guthrie, p. 387.

⁴¹ As K. and R. apparently believe (p. 140).

⁴² E. g. see Pearson, pp. 85-7.

built, an inference drawn in part from his description of the Great Pyramid. He says that Cheops was buried underneath the pyramid on an island formed by introducing a canal from the river (II, 124). Struck by the impossibility of bringing water by canal from the river some thirty-six feet below, Sourdille suggests that when Herodotus wrote this part of his *History*, far from Egypt, he confused the Great Pyramid with some low-lying structure accessible to the Nile.⁴³ This explanation might be acceptable had Herodotus based his account entirely on the works of others, just as Theophrastus may be forgiven for putting banana leaves on the banyan tree, for he had never been in India;⁴⁴ but Herodotus had not merely visited Egypt, he had walked around the Great Pyramid, taken its measurements and speculated on how it was built. Neither he nor the guide who told him this ingenious story had ever seen or even talked with anyone who had seen Cheops' tomb, which had been neglected for centuries. In the *Song of the Harper* (ca. 1300 B.C.) we read:⁴⁵

Generations pass away, and others remain
Since the time of the ancestors.
The gods who lived formerly rest in their
pyramids.

Even earlier in the *Dispute of a Man Weary of Life*, the poet imagines his soul is speaking to him about the divine builders of the pyramids:⁴⁶

Their offering tables are empty, abandoned
like themselves, dead on the (river) bank,
with no one surviving (to maintain their worship).

Herodotus accepted the dragoman's account, but he may have wondered at the present elevation of the mounds at Gizeh. He could not have made an exact estimate because the Nile was in flood when he saw them.

⁴³ Sourdille, p. 12, n. 1.

⁴⁴ On Theophrastus' error see T. S. Brown, *Onesicritus, A Study in Hellenistic Historiography* (Univ. of California Press, 1949), p. 84.

⁴⁵ See J. B. Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* (2nd ed., Princeton Univ. Press, 1955), p. 467 (transl. by M. Lichtheim); see also I. E. S. Edwards, *The Pyramids of Egypt* (Penguin Books, 1947), p. 90.

⁴⁶ On this dialogue see now W. C. Hayes in rev. ed. of *C.A.H.*, I and II, fascicule 3, p. 63 (1961). The translation is based on that of A. Moret (*Le Nil et la civilisation égyptienne* [Paris, 1926], p. 259).

But there is further evidence that Herodotus was thinking along these lines. Here is what he says (II, 13) :

The priests also told me the following important fact about this country: that in the time of King Moeris the part of Egypt below Memphis was inundated whenever the river rose as much as eight cubits. Now Moeris had not yet been dead nine hundred years when I heard this from the priests, but nowadays if the river fails to rise at least fifteen or sixteen cubits it will not overflow the land.

And he adds this interesting reflection :

As I said before, if the country below Memphis (for this is the part that is rising) means to go on increasing in height at the same rate it has in the past, can this have any other effect than that the Egyptians who live here will starve?

From this passage we catch a glimpse of how Herodotus' mind worked. Reasoning from the only data available to him, he must have come to the conclusion that the general level of the Delta had been rising steadily at a rate of between seven and eight cubits every nine hundred years. While accepting these figures on the Nile flood at face value, he fails to see that any rise in the general level of the plain would necessarily be accompanied by a similar rise of the Nile bed.⁴⁷ But once we grasp his meaning we readily understand why he foresaw a time when the Nile could no longer flood the countryside. Instead it would flow through a long gorge, just deep enough to prevent the river reaching the level of the surrounding plain during the period of its highest rise. With this theory in mind let us turn now to his speculations about the Red Sea (II, 11) :

In the land of Arabia not far from Egypt there is a gulf [i.e. the Red Sea] which stretches inland from the so-called Erythraean Sea [i.e. the Indian Ocean] . . . Its length from the innermost point to the open sea requires a voyage of forty days by oar, while its width, where the gulf is broadest, can be crossed by boat in half a day . . . Now I think Egypt was once just such a gulf. For it extended all the way to Ethiopia from the northern sea [i.e. the Mediterranean], while the Arabian Gulf reaches Syria from the southern [i.e. the Indian] ocean, in such a fashion that

⁴⁷ See Legrand (Budé Herod., Vol. II, p. 62).

their inner recesses nearly join one another—being separated only by a narrow strip of land. Now if the Nile should take a notion to divert its stream into the Arabian Gulf, what would prevent its being filled in by that river within 20,000 years? Why, I expect it would be filled in 10,000 years!"

Legrand accuses Herodotus of circular reasoning here, because he speculates on what the Nile might do in the Red Sea, and then uses this as evidence for what it had done in Egypt.⁴⁸ But that is unfair: Herodotus felt that he had independent evidence for the Nile Delta in the figures discussed above. He introduces the Red Sea merely to bring home to the reader by a vivid illustration the magnitude of what the river had accomplished.

And now let us see how the Father of History applied his theory to the Egyptian King List. This is a most disputed subject, to which a variety of answers have been given. The reader is referred to H. T. Wallinga's recent article for a critical and judicious analysis of the earlier literature.⁴⁹ The crux of the matter is what to do with the Pyramid Kings, whom Manetho and modern Egyptologists assign to the Fourth Dynasty in the Old Kingdom, while our manuscripts of Herodotus put them at a very much later date. There are exactly 342 pharaohs, according to Herodotus, from the time when the gods ceased ruling over Egypt down to and including Psammetichus (*ca.* 650 B.C.). Our texts all place Cheops as No. 336. Now Min is introduced as the first pharaoh (II, 99); then Herodotus goes on to say that the priests showed him a list preserved on papyrus of the next 330 kings (II, 100). Of these 330 rulers he names only Queen Nitocris—whose position in the list is not specified—and King Moeris who comes at the very end (II, 101). Beginning with Moeris' successor, Sesostris (II, 102), each pharaoh is mentioned by name, though the regnal years are seldom given. Sethos, No. 341, is the last pharaoh whose name Herodotus owes to the priests in Memphis (II, 142). On the assumption that in this period there were an equal number of high priests and of pharaohs (i.e. 341) Herodotus calculates (somewhat inaccurately) a span of 11,340 years from Min through Sethos (II, 142). Following Petrie's lead, Wallinga

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 73, n. 2.

⁴⁹ H. T. Wallinga, "The Structure of Herodotus II 99-142," in *Mnemosyne*, Series IV, XII (1959), pp. 204-23.

argues that chapters 124-36 in our texts have been misplaced, and that all will be well if we insert them en bloc between chapters 99 and 100.⁵⁰ The supposition is that Herodotus divided the subject matter of Book II into 12 separate headings, each of which he transcribed on a separate papyrus roll. Subsequently someone, perhaps even Herodotus, allowed the roll containing the account of the Pyramid Kings to be copied out of order.⁵¹

Now it will be unnecessary to examine Wallinga's most ingenious arguments in detail if we can show that the received text is more consistent with Herodotus' own views than the proposed revision would be. Herodotus' first pharaoh, Min, whose place in the list is undisputed, ruled 11,340 years before Psammetichus came to the throne (i.e. ca. 12,000 B.C.) and built the city of Memphis (II, 99). In his day all of Egypt *except for the Theban nome* (*πλὴν τοῦ Θηβαϊκοῦ νομοῦ*) was a swamp (II, 4). How then can the pyramid builders have followed Min? Where would Cheops have built the Great Pyramid? Not until the mysterious Moeris excavated his equally mysterious lake would such a possibility exist,⁵² and Moeris is the very last on the papyrus list of 330 kings. How Memphis came to be raised above the swamp in this early period is not clear—either to us or apparently to the historian. His description of the engineering feat that made this possible is vague in the extreme.⁵³ Herodotus

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 216; 222.

⁵² On Moeris and his lake see Herod., II, 101; 149. Elsewhere Herodotus tells us that the land for three days' sail above Lake Moeris is also a "gift of the Nile" (II, 5), a statement unacceptable to Ehrenberg (see n. 37, above). For a recent attempt to save Herodotus' reputation see J. Evans, "Herodotus and the Problem of the 'Lake Moeris,'" *Class. World*, LVI (1963), pp. 275-7.

⁵³ Herodotus says (II, 99)—Budé text:

τὸν Μίνα πρῶτον βασιλεύσαντα Αἰγύπτου οἱ ἱέες ἐλεγον τοῦτο μὲν ἀπογεφυρῶσαι [καὶ] τὴν Μέμφιν· τὸν γὰρ ποταμὸν πάντα ρέειν παρὰ τὸ δρός τὸ ψάμμινον πρὸς Διβῆς; τὸν δὲ Μίνα ἄνωθεν, ὅσον τε ἔκαπον σταδίους ἀπὸ Μέμφιος [τὸν] πρὸς μεσαμβρίης ἀγκῶνα προσχώσαντα τὸ μὲν ἀρχαῖον ρέεθρον ἀποξηρῆναι, τὸν δὲ ποταμὸν ὁχετεῦσαι τὸ μέσον τῶν δρέων ρέειν . . .

Part of the difficulty is with *ἀπογεφυρῶσαι*, which J. W. Blakesley (*Herodotus with a Commentary*, I [London, 1854]) explains as: "to 'dyke off' i. e. by means of a dam to recover land which would be otherwise overflowed, like the *polders* of Holland." Stein finds this unsatis-

seems to have assumed that the Delta was habitable from the time of Moeris on down. Sesostris, the next pharaoh, returned to Egypt after extensive conquests outside the country, by way of Pelusiac Daphne (II, 107) and used his prisoners of war to construct the system of canals (II, 108). Later, in the reign of Proteus (No. 334) Menelaus arrived at the Canopic mouth of the Nile with Helen of Troy (II, 113).⁵⁴ Two reigns later Cheops was able to construct the Great Pyramid, though, as we have seen, the land was still low enough (in accordance with Herodotus' theory, that is) so that a canal could be brought from the Nile to form Cheops' subterranean island (II, 124).

There are still discrepancies, and Wallinga has pointed to the most obvious one in the statement that King Anysis (No. 340) lived 700 years before the rebel Amyrtaeus (II, 140), who was roughly contemporary with Herodotus. Wallinga calculates the date of Anysis' reign as 120C-1150 B.C., or only one generation after Proteus, the Trojan War pharaoh.⁵⁵ Evidently, if we remove the Pyramid Kings (Nos. 336-339) there will be just one

factory, so he posits lacunae, one after ἀπογεφυρῶσαι, and one after καὶ, suggesting we read: ἀπογεφυρῶσαι τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ κτίσαι τὴν Μέμφιν. Ehrenberg finds fault with the 500 stades south of Memphis, and proposes to emend ἑκατόν to πεντακόσιους (*Klio*, XVI, p. 324, n. 6). But the real difficulty, from the point of view of Herodotus, is to explain how Memphis could have been built so early. Aristotle, not being bound by the priests' statements, speculates that Memphis may not even have existed in Homer's day. And Aristotle, despite Ehrenberg's statement to the contrary (*Klio*, XVI, p. 326) appears to have regarded *all Egypt* (καὶ πᾶσα ἡ χώρα τοῦ ποταμοῦ πρόσχωσις οὖσα τοῦ Νείλου) as made by the Nile (*Meteor.*, 351b 28-31).

⁵⁴ There are various ways of calculating Proteus' date (i. e. Herodotus' date for the Trojan War), depending on how II, 145 is interpreted. We read: Πανὶ δὲ τῷ ἐκ Ηγελόπτης (ἐξ ταύτης γάρ καὶ Ἐριέω λέγεται γενέθαι ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων δὲ Πάν) ἀλάσσω ἔτεα ἐπὶ τὸν Τρωικῶν, κατὰ δικράνοια μάλιστα ἐς ἐμέ. Stein (commenting on II 145, 17) assumes that the 800 years begin with Pan, and that Pan was of an age with his half brother Telemachus. Since Telemachus was born just before the Trojan War he would have been in the prime of life some 30 years later. Then, using 440 B.C. for ἐς ἐμέ, he arrives at 1240 for Pan-Telemachus and 1270 for the Trojan War. Wallinga, however, puts Proteus in 1250 B.C., evidently taking the 800 years as the period between the Trojan War and Herodotus—whom he puts at 450 B.C. (*Mnemosyne*, XII [1959], p. 211).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

generation between Proteus and Anysis, represented by Rhampsinitus. But at the same time we shall find ourselves with only six kings to fill the long gap of almost 700 years between Moeris and Psammetichus! ⁵⁶ So the Petrie-Wallinga hypothesis creates as many problems as it solves.

It may be useful to carry this inquiry a little farther into what might be called Herodotus' pseudo-scientific views about Egypt by glancing for a moment at what he has to say about the sources of the Nile and the reasons for the annual flood. He ridicules the view held by Hecataeus that the river flows from an outer sea, because the Ocean stream idea makes the surface of the earth "round, as though it had been turned on a lathe," ⁵⁷ yet he does not hesitate to adopt an equally symmetric theory about the Nile and the Danube. He assumes a parallel course for these great rivers, both flowing from the west, until the Nile heads north towards the Mediterranean opposite the point where the Danube turns south and on to the Black Sea (II, 34). The account of the Nasamonian young men who crossed the Libyan desert and found a great river flowing eastward and containing crocodiles (II, 32), serves to corroborate this bizarre hypothesis. However, Herodotus refuses to credit the report of Phoenician navigators (ostensibly rounding the Cape of Good Hope) that the sun appeared on the right side of the ship (IV, 42). That is, testimony which supports Herodotus' views is accepted as genuine, when it does not do so he refuses to believe it.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Herodotus tells us that when he visited Egypt, Moeris had been dead about 900 years (II, 13), i.e. he died ca. 1340 (or 1350). Psammetichus' reign began in 664, so now we find ourselves with only six rulers to cover a period already far too long for the ten rulers we had originally. See Legrand, Budé Herod., Vol. II, p. 55, n. 1.

⁵⁷ IV, 36; cf. II, 21; IV, 8.

⁵⁸ The Phoenicians would in fact have seen the sun all day long on their right, as they sailed past the Cape from east to west (see note on passage in Budé ed.). What interests us here is that while Herodotus accepts their voyage as proof that Libya is indeed surrounded by water, he feels free at the same time to reject any detail that conflicts with his own *a priori* conclusions. For a skeptical view on this voyage, see J. Oliver Thomson, *History of Ancient Geography* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1948), pp. 71-2. More recently Raymond Mauny (*Tableau géographique de l'ouest africain au moyen âge d'après les sources écrites, la tradition et l'archéologie* [Ifan-Dakar, 1961], p. 22) accepts the voyage as authentic. Strangely enough Thomson appears less skeptical

As for his explanation of the Nile flood (II, 24-5), it may be summarized as follows: 'The Sun is blown south during the winter by the stormy north wind, and this brings it close to the Nile. During the winter, instead of drawing water from all rivers alike the sun draws water exclusively from the Nile, which therefore gets lower and lower. But when the sun leaves Egypt and returns to its usual course the Nile rises. Legrand comments somewhat acidly on this passage:⁵⁰ "... 'l'explication' d'Hérodote, aussi fausse au point de vue scientifique que n'importe lequel de ces systèmes (i.e. the other theories criticized by Herodotus), a de plus ce grave inconvénient, de ne rien expliquer du tout."

But this does not mean that Herodotus was a fool. He lived in a bold period when the weapons of attack were better developed than those for defense. That is why he can sweep aside the arguments of others without realizing that his own assumptions are just as vulnerable. Stubborn facts, such as the antiquity of Memphis, built at a time when the very ground it stood on should, on his own theory, have been under water, are explained away superficially. But Herodotus was also honest. He leaves in the very data most damaging to his thesis. Most important of all, he tries to relate current scientific theories about the world with the history of man. And there he walks with Aristotle.

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about Hanno, whose voyage is not mentioned in Herodotus: "Yet his statements sound like a vague rumour of the result of Hanno's work" (*op. cit.*, p. 74). But Professor Mauny, now preparing a monograph dealing with this subject, has assured me Hanno's voyage never took place. No ancient vessel would have been able to make headway against the winds *sailing down coast*. Herodotus' Phoenicians were going in the opposite direction.

⁵⁰ See Budé Herod., Vol. II, p. 63.

ON PROPERTIUS, I, 7.

The seventh elegy of Propertius' First Book, which like the ninth is addressed to Ponticus, dwells on the contrast between Propertius' absorption in amatory poetry and Ponticus' ambitions as an epic poet. Propertius readily concedes the superior dignity of the epic genus but warns his friend that the time may come—*scil. te quoque si certo puer hic concusserit arcu* (15)—when his mastery of grand epic subjects will be of little avail and when he too may wish to turn to the *mollis versus* of love poetry. But it will be too late; Ponticus will not succeed. The elegy as transmitted concludes with these three couplets (21-6):

tum me non humilem mirabere saepe poetam,
tunc ego Romanis praeferar ingenii;
nec poterunt iuvenes nostro reticere sepulcro:
‘Ardoris nostri magne poeta, iaces.’
tu cave nostra tuo contemnas carmina fastu:
saepe venit magno faenore tardus Amor.

The second of these couplets has been repeatedly suspected of not being in the right place. Several transpositions have been advocated. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, although declaring transposition “not absolutely necessary,” has some residual sympathy with A. W. Baehrens’ decision that the couplet should follow line 14.¹ There it might seem in place, since the two immediately preceding couplets (11-14) read

me laudent doctae solum placuisse puellae,
Pontice, et iniustas saepe tulisse minas;
me legat assidue post haec neglectus amator,
et prosint illi cognita nostra mala.

A. W. Camps in his recent separate edition of Book I,² while not changing the transmitted sequence of the couplets, describes

¹ D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Propertiana* (Cambridge, 1956), p. 23; *Sex. Properti elegiarum libri IV* rec. Aemilius Baehrens (Leipzig, 1880). Another transposition, which would place lines 23 f. after 10, was advocated by Housman (*Journal of Philology*, XVI [1888], p. 2). This suggestion has lately enjoyed less favor and seems indeed far less plausible than Baehrens’ treatment of the couplet (however Baehrens’ own transposition included also the final couplet 25 f.).

² *Propertius Elegies Book I* (Cambridge, 1961), *ad loc.*

the transition from 22 to 23 as “a rather surprising jump in thought after 21-22,” an opinion which his reviewer in *A.J.P.*, Michael C. J. Putnam, rightly calls “a bow to past criticism.”³ Putnam himself tries to establish unity and intrinsic coherence. I believe he is moving in the right direction and succeeds in part, but not fully; for what he says about the development of the argument in the entire elegy is more convincing than his interpretation of 21-4. The repetition of the word *poeta* is surely important; it is also true that Propertius is proceeding from something specific to something more general—i.e. to more general recognition of his worth as poet—but I should place this step (“Erweiterung” as Rothstein⁴ has called it) between *mirabere* and *praeferar*, not as Putnam does between “the . . . ‘you’ of the poet’s address to Ponticus” and *mirabere*. As for the contrast of *praeferar* with *iaces*, I admit it *in theory* but wonder whether it may really make itself felt in this context and whether as we pass from 22 to 23 f. our attention and our sympathies are not engaged by entirely different matters⁵ (about which I shall presently say more). In any case, I agree with Putnam that the transposition must be resisted *ταῦτα σθένει*. Still Baehrens’ proposal has the merit of bringing a real problem into focus; it seems to me one of those textual suggestions which, although not ultimately convincing, may, if thought through, lead us to a better understanding of the movement of thought and feeling in a poem.

As we have observed, Propertius starts from the contrast between his friend’s devotion to grand poetry and his own *amores* (with their dual reference to life and poetry, 1-6). He seeks to justify his own *Blos*, just as in the preceding elegy (I, 6) he defended it against a devotee of the political life, a man set for a respectable career in the service of Rome.⁶ At

³ *A.J.P.*, LXXXIV (1953), p. 197.

⁴ *Die Elegien des Sextus Propertius erklärt von Max Rothstein* (2nd ed., Berlin, 1920), *ad loc.*

⁵ I am afraid we allow our associations to become too subjective if in 21-4 we find a “duel between death and immortality, human and divine” (Putnam, p. 197). Immortality, if at all suggested in this poem, could rather be found in 9-12 than in 21 f. (with their rather restrictive *tum—tunc*), an observation which might please Baehrens and his followers.

⁶ See especially I, 6, 34 *accepti pars eris imperii*. On the sequence

the beginning of I, 7 all advantages are on the side of Ponticus; in particular Propertius concedes to him *ingenium*—a key concept of the literary discussion—, making no claim to it for his own poetic work. He himself “serves” *dolor* instead of *ingenium*, spending his time complaining about his mistress and his hard life.⁷ Yet it is on this life and on such experiences that his *fama* must rest: *hinc cupio nomen carminis ire mei*. Next follow the couplets 11-14 which have been quoted. Lines 11 f., specifying the *laus*, i.e. the *fama* and *nomen* for which Propertius feels he may hope, call for no further comment. Regarding 13 f. we might be inclined to acquiesce in the explanation that Propertius here describes the kind of readers among whom he may count on such fame and praise. But let us note that Propertius uses the word *prosint*: *et prosint illi* (*scil.* to the *neglectus amator*) *cognita nostra mala*. The lovers are not only to read him and praise him but also to benefit from his poetry. What kind of *prodesse* does Propertius here have in mind? Consulting the commentators, we find that Rothstein,⁸ the only one who has considered this question, thinks of “*belehren*” on the part of the poet and “*lernen*” on that of the unhappy lovers. For others too this may be the first explanation to suggest itself; how could we help recalling *aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae* (where Horace defines the *prodesse* in the next line as *idonea dicere vitae*)?⁹ Moreover Propertius himself does offer from time to time a definite piece of advice or instruction as resulting from his own unhappy experiences. We may quote from I, 1 *hoc, moneo, vitate malum; sua quemque moretur cura neque assueto mutet amore locum* (which is followed by a statement that anyone not receptive to his *monita* will find reason to repent) or, from I, 15 *quis ego nunc pereo similes*

of the elegies in Book I cf. now Otto Skutsch, *C.P.*, LVIII (1963), p. 238 (for 16-18 see also my recent article *ibid.*, LVII [1962], pp. 73 ff.)

⁷ Lines 7 f. *nec tantum ingenio quantum servire dolori cogor et aetatis tempora dura queri*. For *ingenium* cf. Horace, *Ep. ad Pisones*, 295, 408-11; Cicero, *Ad Quintum*, II, 9, 3 (about Lucretius); Prop., II, 24, 23 *et al.* (see below, pp. 83-4); Ovid, *Am.*, I, 15, 14 (on Callimachus), *Tristia*, II, 424 (on Ennius). See Eduard Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa* (3rd ed., Berlin, 1915), p. 182, n. 1; C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry* (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 257 f.

⁸ Cf. above, note 4.

⁹ *Ep. ad Pis.*, 333 f.

*moniturus amantes "o nullis tutum credere blanditiis."*¹⁰ This *topos* of "erotic instruction" has been treated fully and illuminatingly by Friedrich Leo and by A. L. Wheeler.¹¹ But I find it rather difficult to refer the words *cognita nostra mala* to such items of instruction or, more generally, to lessons to be learned. What may benefit the lovers seems to be the *mala* themselves and their vivid presentation in the elegies rather than some pieces of wisdom to be distilled from them. However in Book II a piece of advice to the lovers is prefaced by an emphatic statement of its usefulness: *hoc sensi prodesse magis: contemnite amantes.*¹²

The meaning of *prodesse* in I, 7 might elude us if we could not at this point resort to 23 f., the couplet which Baehrens placed subsequent to our verses. Baehrens' proposal was prompted by the correct insight that the *iuvenes* of 23 are identical with the *amator(es)* of 13. The readers envisaged in the earlier couplet will speak the final words of recognition and affection at Propertius' funeral: *Ardoris nostri magne poeta, iaces.* To admit this identity is by no means to adopt the transposition (to which I remain adamantly opposed) but it means that we must try to understand why Propertius reserved the deeply felt confession of admiration on the part of the *iuvenes* and *neglecti amatores* for the later juncture. To this question we shall presently return.

Now what does the line *ardoris nostri magne poeta, iaces* suggest concerning the relationship between Propertius and his readers? Here it would be ludicrous to think of helpful counsel or instruction. The significant word is *nostri*. It is their own love that the *iuvenes* have found confronting them in Propertius' elegies. He has spoken for them, has articulated their experience. This, much rather than a literary appreciation of his fine artistry or an admiration for his genius (possession of which he disclaims), is the reason why when sharing his fate and being like him *neglecti* they cannot turn away from his book (*legat assidue*). Shall we say that they find solace in his poems?

¹⁰ I, 1, 37 f.; 15, 41 f.

¹¹ Friedrich Leo, *Plautinische Forschungen* (2 ed., Berlin, 1912), pp. 131 ff. A. L. Wheeler, "Erotic Teaching in Roman Elegy," *C.P.*, V (1910), pp. 440 ff.; VI (1911), pp. 56 ff.

¹² II, 14, 19. In I, 9, 9; II, 34, 28, 29, 39 the situation is so different that *prodesse* as used in these passages can hardly throw light on I, 7, 14.

We must beware of making the meaning of *prodesse* too specific. The temptation is strong because we in our century are extremely familiar with the effect of poetry to which the word points. In our cultural setting many people are prepared to find, especially in lyric poetry, something like the quintessence of their own experiences. Presenting to us in an ennobling and sublime medium our own emotions and sufferings, spelling out in serene clarity what we feel dimly and oppressively, the poet's words lift us above our struggles, providing relief, consolation, and liberation. This surely is a benefit. Ancient literary theory had never considered poetry from this point of view; no poet prior to Propertius had, so far as we know, consciously envisaged this kind of effect for his work. And to make a contribution to poetic theory is certainly the last thing that Propertius here intends to do. Still, having renounced all aspirations to the glories attending grand poetry yet being anxious to find a place, however modest, and a justification for his own endeavors—which for him are more than a *lusus*, more than *nugae*—, he felt that he could count on a sympathetic response from all lovers whose experience resembled his own and could assert that he was “benefiting” them. We have stated this beneficial effect in our own inevitably modern and somewhat different terms. It is doubtful whether Propertius, even had he wished to be more specific, would have spoken of solace and relief.¹³ But the substratum of the experience is the same and is something common to the human family. For reasons which it would take us too far afield to discuss this particular appeal of poetry has received much more attention in the post-Romantic period than in antiquity. It remains that Propertius in 24 touches on the emotional identification between the readers and the poet and in 14 on its beneficial effect. He did not know that he was making an important discovery and he seems to make it almost by accident, this being the only defense that he could find for his poetry.

However, Propertius is not simply justifying his absorption

¹³ Actually *ardoris nostri* suggests more than solace and the realization *socios habuisse malorum*. However since Propertius does not “analyze” the *prodesse* and solace is at least a component of the experience, reference may here be made to Cic., *Tusc. Disp.*, III, 79: *ne illa quidem firmissima consolatio est, quamquam et usitata est et saepe prodest: “non tibi hoc soli”; prodest haec quidem, ut dixi, etc.*

in erotic poetry. He is justifying it to Ponticus. The *me* at the beginning of the couplets 11 f. and 13 f., and the *mihi, mea (fama), mei (carminis nomen)* in 9 f. hark back to the original opposition between *tibi* and *nos: dum tibi Cadmeae dicuntur, Pontice, Thebae . . . nos ut consuemus nostros agitamus amores. . .* Returning now to Ponticus (15) after the two couplets setting forth his own claims and hopes, he visualizes a situation in which even Ponticus will be compelled to acknowledge the power of Amor and will in his acute distress turn from his epic projects to amatory verses.¹⁴ Then (*tum*), while struggling in vain to find a poetic expression congruous with his new experience, he too will come to a juster estimate of Propertius' poetic rank: *tum me non humilem mirabere saepe poetam. . .* It is still the recognition by his friend which remains Propertius' overriding concern, in fact in this elegy Propertius pays him a special compliment by treating the admiration which Ponticus will some day accord him as the starting point of his rise to fame: *tunc ego Romanis praeferar ingeniis*—“soaring” and “boastful,” as Putnam rightly says, but let us note that even here Propertius lays no claim to *ingenium* but instead thinks of himself as being (under given circumstances) valued more highly than the *ingenia*, i. e. the recognized poets of the grand manner. But the final and highest tribute will indeed be paid to Propertius when after his death the devoted readers, the *iuvenes amatores*, who have found the image of their own experience in his verses, will realize the greatness of their loss.¹⁵ They will not hesitate to call him *magne poeta*, whereas the maximum recognition he may hope for from Ponticus was contained in the words *non humilem poetam*. Thus while it is true that the distich *nec poterunt iuvenes . . .* communicates with 13 f. (*me legat assidue post haec neglectus amator . . .*) and brings the thought there initiated to its climax, the intervening

¹⁴ Cf. Putnam, *loc. cit.*, p. 198 on the “reversal” of the “recognized hierarchy of poetic styles” (or genres).

¹⁵ Rothstein's explanation (*loc. cit.*, above note 4, *ad 21*) is essentially on the right lines; however, just because “der Gedanke sich zum Bilde einer allgemeinen Anerkennung erweitert” it is not necessary to understand *praeferar* as *praeferar a te* (*scil. Ponticus*). Although *praeferar a te* may be all that Propertius is here logically entitled to assert, he moves more freely (cf. Putnam's observation on the “variation in voice” to the passive *praeferar*).

lines in which Propertius has turned the defeat of his friend into his own triumph are essential as giving the tribute to be paid him at his funeral the right antecedents. The *mirari* of his friends, the more general *praeferri*, and finally the words which his special devotees cannot leave unspoken at his funeral are the landmarks of his emergence as *magnus poeta*. Now that he has secured for himself such a status, Propertius is able to finish the poem on a lighter note more in keeping with the informal relationship existing between him and Ponticus: if you cannot get over your disdain for my poetry Amor will some day come to you in the role of Nemesis.

Two perspectives into the future suggest themselves at this point and may be briefly indicated. When the publication of his poems had brought Propertius literary recognition, a better standing, and the favor of the great—or at least of one great man—he could still find pleasure in thinking of his poems as being read by a girl while she waits for her lover (*expectans sola puella virum*¹⁶). But he would no longer draw a line between himself and the Roman *ingenia*. Still mindful of the difference between great poetry and a *mollis liber*, he nevertheless insists on his own kind of *ingenium*. In the first elegy of Book II he gives the word a place of emphasis: *non haec Calliope, non haec mihi cantat Apollo; ingenium nobis sola puella facit.*¹⁷ Book III goes considerably beyond this. At *non ingenio quae situm nomen ab aevo excidet; ingenio stat sine morte decus*, he says with reference to himself in III, 2, borrowing Horatian strains and claims.¹⁸ Now, unlike in II, 1, it is Apollo and Calliope who give his *ingenium* its direction,¹⁹ while Cynthia and other *puellae*, no longer recognized as source of his inspiration and *ingenium*,

¹⁶ III, 3, 19 f. On III, 9, 43 ff.: *haec urant pueros*, etc. cf. Georg Luck, *The Latin Love Elegy* (London, 1959), p. 135 and n. 1; *ibid.*, pp. 134 ff. on Propertius' concern about the response of his readers.

¹⁷ II, 1, 3 f.; see also II, 30, 40 *nam sine te* (Cynthia) *nostrum non valet ingenium*. Cf. P. J. Enk, *Sex. Propertii Elegiarum Liber Secundus* (2 vols., Leiden, 1962), *ad loc.*; Wolf Steidle, *Wiener Studien*, LXXV (1962), p. 123.

¹⁸ III, 2, 23 f. Cf. "Horace and Propertius," *C.P.*, XLIII (1948), pp. 105 ff. For *ingenium* see also IV, 1, 66, 126 which may be taken to represent the final stage of Propertius' self-estimate.

¹⁹ Cf. III, 3 (13 ff. *Phoebus*; 37 ff. *Calliopea*; note also the *mollia prata* to which Phoebus directs him, line 18; cf. *mollem . . . versum*, I, 7, 19; *mollis . . . liber* II, 1, 2).

are instead reminded of what they owe to their poet: *Fortunata
meo si qua est celebraita libello! Carmina erunt formae tot monu-
menta tuae.*²⁰ In the measure in which Propertius' fame grew his attitude to his poetry underwent a change. When he was as conscious of his importance as he shows himself in the first elegies of Book III, a simple and unpretentious human relationship like that alluded to in I, 7 would mean little to him; not being in need of comfort himself, he has no thought for the comfort which unhappy lovers may derive from his poems. The elegies of Book I, written when Propertius was not yet assured of his place, have a certain humane simplicity and sincerity not paralleled by anything in the Books written with greater confidence and at times even *maiore plectro*.

The first elegy of Ovid's Second Book of *Amores* includes the lines (7-10)

Atque aliquis iuvenum quo nunc ego saucius arcu
Agnoscat flammae conscientia signa suae
Miratusque diu "quic" dicat "ab indice doctus
Composuit casus iste poeta meos"?

Here too a *iuvenis* recognizes his *amores* and sufferings in the elegies of the love poet. In fact *agnoscat* and what follows make explicit what Propertius' poetic tact had implied by the one word *nostrī*. Very probably Ovid owes the thought of these lines to Propertius with whom he was connected *iure sodalicii*.²¹ But what in Propertius was admiration and affection has in Ovid become astonishment and surprise, and the idea of a third person operating between the lover and the poet, highly amusing as it is, sacrifices much of the intimate and immediately appealing truth of Propertius' conception. But Ovid is after all only borrowing Propertius' motif, not emulating the ethos of his early elegies. He must be appreciated on his own terms.

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²⁰ III, 2, 15 f.

²¹ *Trist.*, IV, 10, 46. Franco Munari in his edition of the *Amores* (Florence, 1955), *ad loc.*, refers for the preceding lines (5 f. *me legat in sponsi facie non frigida virgo*, etc.) to Prop., III, 3, 19 f.: (*libellus*) *quem legat expectans sola puella virum*. Faint as this echo may seem, I think 7 ff. make it likely that Ovid had Propertius' statement or statements about the prospective readers in mind. Cf. also Ovid, *Am.*, II, 17, 34; III, 12, 16 with Prop., II, 1, 4.

VERGIL, *GEORGICS*, I, 491-2.

Nec fuit indignum superis, bis sanguine nostro
Emathiam et latos Haemi pinguescere campos.

Much has been said and written about the subtle and allusive nature of Vergil's art, and occasionally even in the earliest commentaries the part played by etymology in the allusiveness of particular passages has been pointed out. Yet no completely satisfactory explanation has been given, in this famous reference (whether it be to the battles of Pharsalia and Philippi or to the double engagement at Philippi itself),¹ for the choice of Emathia and the plains of Haemus to signify this; for Emathia, strictly speaking, was a district of West Macedonia, while Haemus was a mountain to the far north of Thrace.

Heyne (London, 1821) explains that Emathia was used by poets also for the whole of Thessaly, while the city of Philippi could, by poetic reasoning, be said to lie under Mount Haemus. Cooper (New York, 1833), although pointing out that the "language of poetry does not always conform to historical or geographical exactness," then proceeds to remove Vergil's geographical inaccuracy by claiming that Emathia and Haemus were also considered as areas extending far beyond their immediate localities. Papillon and Haigh (Oxford, 1892) charge his geography with being "vague and inaccurate," and thus perhaps misleading later writers. Conington asserts that "it is enough for the poet's purpose that both Pharsalia and Philippi are in the Roman province of Macedon"; and Page adds that the remarkable fact that two such battles should have taken place so soon after one another in the same province so struck the Roman poets that they not unfrequently spoke of the two battles as occurring in the same place. In short, whether they blame or defend Vergil for it, whether they interpret the words as a reference to Pharsalia as well or simply to Philippi, all agree with Page that it is only loosely that "Emathia and the broad plains of Haemus can be described as 'twice fattened with Roman blood.'"

¹ See *R.-E.*, s. v. "Philippi," cols. 2227 ff. for a full discussion of this question.

This is indeed true, but it still leaves unanswered the main question, namely, why did he chose these two particular names. Can there not be something more to say? If we bear etymology in mind, to a listener familiar with the Greek tongue a further image would arise, which would illustrate the scene and perhaps intensify the horror of civil war and interneccine strife.

With regard to "Haemi" first, because it is the more obvious, after the mention of "sanguine" it could not fail to evoke the association with the Greek *ἀλεα*,² producing "the plains of Blood." (Certainly the context makes this association much more simple than the etymological cross-reference, which was doubtless no less intentional, between "the plains of Laughter" (*A.*, III, 701) and "the plains of Mourning" (*A.*, VI, 441) pointed out by Jackson Knight.)³ In fact it is but a slight extension of the most obvious and the favorite manner in which Vergil displays his etymological interest, namely that of joining to a Greek proper name an adjective which translates it, e.g. *A.*, III, 516 *pluvias Hyadas*, 703 *arduus Acragas*, 693 *Plemurium undosum* (where Servius notes "verbum de verbo expressit"). Here, however, closer parallels are to be found in expressions where a Greek proper name is translated, not by an adjective, but by a word closely associated with it, e.g. *E.*, VIII, 108 *Hylax latrat*, or 84 *in Daphnide laurum* (a good example of Vergil's ability, by means of word association, to adapt, and improve upon, a Greek original, in this case Theocrit., II, 23: ἐπὶ Δέλφιδι δάφναν, an adaptation here particularly appropriate in a passage concerned with sympathetic magic).

Emathia may add still further to the horror, for, although Probus in his note on this passage associates it with Emathio, the brother of Memnon, Oberhummer and more recent etymologists associate it with *ἄμαθος* or, more strictly, with the Homeric adjective *ἴμαθόεις*; and Vergil appears to have agreed with them. Though there is no Latin "translation" close at hand, the association with "harena" would seem inevitable in the context. For to credit a reader with a sufficient knowledge of

² Paratore (Verona, 1955) in his note on this passage also felt the association of Haemus with *ἀλεα*, but by failing to consider Emathia he missed the full effect.

³ See *Roman Vergil* (London, 1944), pp. 197 ff. for an excellent analysis of Vergil's etymological usage.

Greek etymology to recognize a Latin "translation" is also to credit him with the ability to feel etymological associations even when unaccompanied by such "translations." *Harena* is commonly associated either with the sands of the desert or the sea (and the only other mention of Emathia in Vergil [G., IV, 390] in connection with *portus*, would, if the need of an etymological significance were pressed, fit in with this), or with the arena of contests, particularly gladiatorial contests, and, by extension, with any arena where combatants fought, with the plain of battle; and the mention of *sanguis* or some synonym is, naturally, often coupled with *harena* in this sense.

There is no mention of *harena* to refer to gladiatorial spectacles in Vergil (for indeed no gladiatorial spectacles are mentioned), although there are frequent references to *harena* with regard to the arena for boxing and other games, e.g. A., V, 336, 374, 423; VI, 643. Yet such a reference was quite common in other writers, e.g.:

Cic., *Tusc.*, II, 46: *barbaros in harena videris excipientis gravissimas plagas*

Hor., *Ep.*, I, 6: *ne populum extrema totiens exoret harena*
Ov., *A.A.*, III, 395: *spectentur tepido maculosae sanguine harenæ*

(also Ov., *Am.*, II, 14, 8; *A.A.*, I, 164-5; *Fast.*, III, 813; *Tr.*, II, 282; Prop., IV, 8, 76; Luc., IV, 708; Mart., I, 11, 1; 4, 3; II, 75, 5-8). The Rome of Vergil's day was all too familiar with gladiatorial spectacles. Now they normally provided entertainment for Roman spectators; but such an association here, with nature and the gods as spectators, in the unnatural spectacle of Roman against Roman, father against son, brother against brother, on such a vast scale, would serve only to heighten the horror, and would be a completely natural result of the unnatural and horrendous phenomena just described as accompanying the death of Julius Caesar.

As a plain of battle, *harena* occurs commonly both in Vergil and elsewhere, e.g. A., IV, 620; IX, 589; XII, 106, 276, 741, and especially 340,

... spargit rapida ungula rores
sanguineos mixtaque crux calcatur harena.

Perhaps some evidence of an appreciation of the etymological

significance of Vergil's choice of Emathia may be seen in Manilius' reference to Philippi, where he obviously has Vergil's passage in mind (I, 906-7) :

Vix etiam sicca miles Romanus *arena*
ossa virum lacerosque prius superadstitit artus.

Further overtones may yet have been intended. For *harena* is notoriously thirsty (*G.*, I, 114 *bibula harena*), infertile (*G.*, I, 106 *male pinguis harenæ*; 70 *sterilem harenam*) ; and in fact it was used in a proverb for wasted labor, e.g. *Ov.*, *Her.*, V, 115 *quid harenæ semina mandas?* There would be something horribly appropriate, in an agricultural treatise, in *harenam pinguescere sanguine*.

By this association, therefore, Emathia, whether taken strictly as an allusion to the gladiatorial arena or to a plain of combat generally, and the plains of Haemus reflect yet again Vergil's interest in etymology, and indeed his common structural pattern of "theme and variation" (for what are arenas or battlefields but "plains of blood"?). It is yet another instance of a Vergilian characteristic, which Dryden well noted so long ago in his Dedication of the *Georgics*:

I must confess the critics make it one of Vergil's beauties, that having said what he thought convenient, he always left somewhat for the imagination of his readers to supply; that they might gratify their fancies, by finding more in what he had written than at first they could: and think that they had added to his thought, when it was all there beforehand, and he only saved himself the expense of words.

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REVIEWS.

P. Ouidi Nasonis *Amores, Medicamina Faciei Femineae, Ars Amatoria, Remedia Amoris* edidit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit E. J. Kenney. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961. Pp. xxii + 260. \$3.40.

In 1897 Housman proclaimed: "all Ovid's works, except the amatory poems, are now equipped with a decent apparatus criticus." If the new Oxford text is any criterion, it would be truer to say that only the Amatory Poems now enjoy this privilege.

The edition has been prepared on exemplary principles, and the finished text is the best to date: based on a broad recension, it embraces much compelling conjecture, old and new, whilst the choice made between variants at such places as *Am.* I, 8, 16 (*micare ab* not found in Ovid) attests the editor's uncommon acumen. His judgement, however, merits something less than unconditional praise: he prints, for example (*Ars*, II, 300), *gausapa si sumit, gausapa sumpta proba*; and similar sub-standard products emerge from the crucible of his criticism more often than one would expect. Sooner than give here a long list of contrary opinions without argument, for I aspire to improve his text and not throw stones at it, I have collected my dissentient views in a separate article (*H. S. C. P.*, 1965).

The outstanding excellence of the edition lies in the thoroughness which has gone into the collation of the manuscript evidence and in the skill with which this evidence has been sifted and exhibited. Scrutiny of Kenney's apparatus and articles will show how strongly the winds of change are blowing through the purlieus of Latin textual criticism.

The text of the Amatory Poems goes back to a Carolingian archetype whose progeny falls into two classes: the manuscripts of the one (α) are old and good, but unhappily very few, whilst those of the other (β) are late, bad, and legion. Inasmuch as the β class is an independent witness to the archetype and actually preserves verses lost by α (e.g., *Am.*, I, 13, 11-14), its testimony is invested with paramount importance. But it confronts an editor with a major problem. The β manuscripts contain so much interpolation (that is, unspecified conjecture) and contamination (or horizontal transmission, to use the fashionable term) that no stemmatic classification is possible: any manuscript of the β class may at any moment produce a genuine reading not to be found either in the α class or in the generality of β manuscripts. There is thus no alternative to listing the readings of as many β manuscripts as is practicable. Kenney has spread his net magnificently wide: he has collated some forty β manuscripts and, judiciously taking example by Sedlmayer's edition of the *Heroïdes*, has reported them as follows: the vast majority by ω , small groups by ς , and individuals by an appropriate siglum. Let no one object that we never know where we are with ς , whether it means manuscripts ABC or manuscripts XYZ: we never know where we are with the individual β manu-

script anyway. The twisted threads of its fabric are beyond our power to disentangle and identify, and we should count ourselves lucky if we can distinguish inherited from interpolated readings. In his just repudiation of the over-simplified stemmatology of Paul Maas, Pasquali has unfortunately encouraged a similarly over-simplified concept of the "open recension." Some traditions, like that of the New Testament, are "open" to an almost infinite degree. In the β tradition of Ovid's Amatory Poems, on the other hand, the range of variation is pronouncedly small. Indeed, the matrix of its text is so homogeneous (e.g., *Am.*, I, 15, 41: *adederit a: adusserit w:*, that is β) that even without consulting the testimony of *a* we can reliably infer the existence of a single β hyparchetype. It was close enough to the *a* hyparchetype for Kenney to assign E and K, two of its early descendants, to the wrong class. At *Ars.*, II, 308 (a *locus desperatus*, according to Kenney) the corrupt *a* reading has penetrated into some of the β manuscripts; but when this contamination has been discounted, we are left with the β class concurring in *etquaedamgaudiauccerotes*, which Burman converted into the autograph of Ovid by altering no more than the letter *m*. The editor incurs no blame for imperfections here: it is largely his valuable apparatus (which gives the evidence of all sources at every division of testimony) that enables them to be removed.

In labelling emendations, purists will wish at *Am.*, I, 7, 47 "diducere *ego*" to add "olim *Heinsius*," and to substitute "*Heinsius*" at *Am.*, III, 4, 20 for "*Bentleius*," and "*Bentleius*" at *Ars.*, III, 591 for "*Koch, Madvig*." If a place on the roll of honour is to be found for those who have effected orthographical improvements, let us be fair with the awards. At *Am.*, II, 17, 17 credit for the spelling *Pthio* goes to Schulze, *Orthogr.*, p. xxix, who first enunciated the general principle, not to Knoche, who in his review of Borneque (*Gnomon*, VIII [1932], pp. 518 ff.) merely applied it. Likewise at *Medic.*, 65 "cummi *ego*": as correctly write "*Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*" or even "*Lewis et Shortius*." In *Gnomon*, XXXIII (1961), p. 481 Kenney softly questioned the prevailing custom of employing the apparatus criticus as an identification-parade of emendators. The practice, which leads to such absurdities as (*Am.*, III, 13, 4) "per celebres *typotheta ignotus*" (= *ed. Ald.* 1515), might benefit from a louder enquiry. The purpose of conjectural emendation is to restore words to their author, not fence them off as private property. If a conjecture is correct, it belongs to the author and to the world; and it makes no difference to its correctness whether it was discovered by Richard Bentley or the puniest demi-semi-scholar: the essential acknowledgement, that the reading is conjectural, needs no more than an asterisk in either case. Whoever seeks the why and wherefore of a conjecture will prefer such notes as (*Rem.*, 415) "ut*: et *codd.*, cf. *CR* 4 (1954) 204" to "ut *Heinsius dubitanter, reuocauit Camps.*"

In a score of instances Kerney records as a conjecture a reading subsequently found in a manuscript, e.g., *Am.*, I, 2, 14: "prensi *Markland, B φ, prob. Bentleius*." The superficial might infer that Markland's doubtless correct conjecture (on *Stat., Silv.*, I, 2, 45) has been confirmed, but an evaluation of the tradition suggests rather that *B φ* have themselves resorted to conjecture. Such conjectural

readings might even be indicated, e.g., "prensi *B* φ (*: cf. *Rem.* 235) : pressi *RS* ω." The point is important, since manuscript support is occasionally forthcoming for conjectures which are incorrect. At *Am.*, II, 13, 10 Bentley's specious *portas* (on *Hor.*, *Carm.*, III, 29, 34) offends against Ovid's practice of eschewing rhyme in unrelated words; and *Her.*, XIV, 107 clinches its wrongness. The reading of *FPa* is therefore nothing but a wrong conjecture: it is a fallacy to assume that every emendation which later turns up in a manuscript is thereby certified. At *Ars.*, I, 329 "curruque *ROA* ω: cursuque *L. Müller, LQ*," the variant (a common error) is worth notice, but mention of the scholar serves only to send us on a laborious journey up the garden path, for when finally we arrive at *Phil.*, XI (1856), p. 74, we find no argument impugning the text or establishing the conjecture.

As with conjecture, so with interpretation: the apparatus should not be used to award Oscars. For example, *Am.*, I, 3, 30: "suo est Σ, *interpretatus est Housman*": this is tantalizing; what we need (if indeed we do need it) is either the explanation (*zodiaci signo, quod Veneris domicilium est, sc. Tauro*) or a reference to the article containing it (*C. Q.*, IX [1915], p. 34). More helpful is the observation at *Ars.*, III, 150 "in ἀπὸ κονοῦ intellegendum esse monuit Clausen," though if one is to omit the reference to Clausen's note (on *Pers.*, I, 131, cf. Wilamowitz on *Eur.*, *Her. Fur.*, 237) there is no point in the words *e. m. C.*, since Burman first gave this explanation. Brief exegesis of difficult passages is seldom felicitous, and some of Kenney's attempts, e.g., on *Am.*, I, 6, 23 and *Ars.*, I, 428, are the worse for being wrong. His suggested emendations rarely rise above skittish guesses: the text of *Am.*, I, 15, 18 is paralleled by *Am.*, I, 3, 12; the editor's proposal at *Am.*, II, 11, 9 only restates the corruption; and few will bless with an Amen his Credo at *Ars.*, I, 515. Admirable only where indecision is admirable, the *fortasse recte* device indicates all too often that the task of criticism has been left half-done: at *Ars.*, I, 608, for example, the singular verb is authenticated by such passages as *Am.*, III, 8, 58, *Ars.*, II, 450, and *Her.*, VII, 26. On the credit side of this perfectionist criticism, the many cross-references given by Kenney are worth every millimetre of space they occupy; the practice might have been profitably extended: at *Am.*, II, 5, 42 *casu*, we are apprised of Housman's *uisu*, which looks certain until we chance upon *Met.*, VIII, 84.

The only commentary on these poems in print draws but a solitary notice (p. 97). The genial German might with justice feel slighted. *Ars.*, III, 175 "quae . . . *interpretatus est W. M. Edwards*": nay, *interpretatus est Brandt*"; and Edwards (*C. R.*, III [1953], pp. 142 f.) is to be reprimanded for giving the impression that Brandt did not understand the passage, which he certainly did. Brandt (ed., p. 206) had also raised the question of the spelling of *suscepto* / *succepsto* at *Ars.*, III, 198, here specified as the proposal of Shackleton Bailey (*C. Q.*, IV [1954], p. 166): discussion goes back to Rothstein on Prop., IV, 9, 36, Housman, *J. P.*, XXI (1893), p. 143, and Nettleship, *J. P.*, XIII (1885), p. 80; and a good deal farther. The doctrine of Caper and Velius Longus flickers feebly by the light of Servius on Verg., *Aen.*, I, 144, where *succepī* (as opposed to *suscepī*)

is described as an archaic form, like *parsi* (as opposed to *peperci*). Possibly the *succerto* of Propertius is just such an archaism (Tränkle, *Sprachkunst des Properz*, p. 34): if so, it is unlikely to have been used by Ovid in his elegiacs, *a fortiori* in the context of *Ars*, III, 198. But these alleged subtleties of usage may be no more than the baseless fabrications of pedantic professors, and have infected the manuscript tradition during the Carolingian revival. For the difference between *parsi* and *peperci* Diomedes gives one rule and Donatus (on Ter., *Hec.*, 282) another, whilst the other grammarians more sensibly imply that there was no difference at all. At any rate the form *succipio* is engraved on the so-called *Laudatio Turiae* (*I. L. S.*, 8393, col. I, 26) in a sense plainly violating the Lex Capro-Velia.

In order to lighten the apparatus the editor has removed to an appendix rather more than a thousand minor variants. In deciding what to throw out, he has evinced such a nice discrimination that these pages comprise an almost unblemished record of scribal delirium. Perhaps a dozen inmates should be released from the asylum (including Ovid himself at *Am.*, III, 6, 74), but the remainder's credentials are in good order. However, they scarcely deserve the luxury of a home in the actual edition. Enthusiastic investigators will find, moreover, that the inconvenience of reference back to the text soon leads to a marked deterioration in the eyes, brains, and nerves without any compensatory sensation of positive achievement. Still, although this interesting experiment will hardly be repeated, it was worth doing, and teaches us what a vast ensemble of rubbish litters the average respectable apparatus.

The *Index Nominum* rates a special laudation. Most editors merely list all the words in the text beginning with a capital letter, an unsatisfactory plan for Roman poets, who delight in such circumlocutions as "the Phasian maid" (*Ars*, II, 103) and "the mother crimsoned with her children's blood" (*Ars*, I, 336). Kenney has gone to considerable trouble to catalogue all references to people and places; Achilles, for example, is listed as mentioned not only at *Am.*, I, 9, 33 and the other places where his name occurs, but also wherever he appears in disguise, as at *Am.*, II, 8, 11, where he is styled *Thessalus* (one small slip: the *duo coniuges* of *Am.*, I, 10, 2 are Menelaus and Paris, not Agamemnon and Menelaus). At the risk of being hypercritical of something which conspicuously out-classes its namesakes, I should point out that the index would be even more useful if entries like *Hercules* were furnished with cross-references to surrogates like *Alcides* and *Tirynthius*, and *vice versa*: Housman's index to his *editio minor* of Manilius remains in this respect an ideal model.

One final shot. Unaccustomed as we are to receiving from the Oxford Press anything but the finest craftsmanship, let us hope that, before Kenney edits the *Heroides*, its compositor will recover his former ability to set up attractive pages without getting scores of elegiac couplets sliced between them. Mr. Kenney is to be warmly congratulated on having produced a landmark among critical editions of Ovid, and work of lasting importance to all who study Latin texts.

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LIONEL PEARSON. Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece. Stanford University Press, 1962. Pp. 262. \$5.50.

When I was asked to write the present review, the book had already received some favourable notices (e.g. by R. Westman, *Gnomon*, 1963, p. 742). In general, I can only agree that Professor Pearson has written a very useful and sound book on a subject which is equally important and—difficult. I am not quite sure whether he has realised all the difficulties involved, and I feel I would fail in my duty as a reviewer if I did not ventilate some of my doubts.

At the beginning, Pearson tells us that he is to concentrate on fifth century Athens. The reasons are obvious. If it is difficult to extract maxims of popular morality from literature (as we must), Athenian tragedy and comedy seem the most promising sources. Their popularity is beyond doubt, though it does not follow that the man in the street always accepted, or even understood, the principles expressed on the stage. To his chief sources Pearson adds Herodotus and the first two books of Plato's *Republic*, while otherwise rather surprisingly he excludes almost all fourth century literature, even Xenophon. The trouble is that, whatever source he uses, the concept of popular ethics remains vague. There is no yardstick to measure the popularity of any moral principle, unless it is sufficient to state, as Pearson does, that without a practical problem of behaviour ordinary people will not be interested. Moreover, he believes that—contrary to wide-spread views—we must clearly distinguish between ethics and politics, that there was a private sphere of morality which does not ask for "popular approval or the voice of the state." Perhaps he is right, but I wonder whether we really are in a position to know.

After an introductory "sketch," there follow two substantial chapters dealing with Homer and the archaic age, which in the context of the book provide the foundations of fifth century ethics. Pearson refuses to apply modern standards of historical criticism to Homer because neither did the Greeks, and because there is in his view a strong consistency throughout Homer "in the language used to describe mental processes." One need not share the very differing views of some modern scholars in order to realise that Pearson's interpretation frequently seems to simplify what in truth is a far more complex system of values. He never mentions Adkins' *Merit and Responsibility*; he would probably shrink from what perhaps could be called the over-subtlety and intellectuality of that book, but he might have realised the danger of overlooking differences and changes. His versions into English of some of the Homeric words are, to say the least, misleading (see 'intelligence,' 'infatuation,' etc.).

My own objections are even stronger to the treatment of the following centuries. While I simply refuse to believe that in classical Greek *themis* and *dike* correspond to Roman *fas* and *ius*, I can equally not agree that practically all the ethical ideas of Hesiod, Solon, and Theognis go back to Homer. Pearson seems to have been misled by the fact that the later poets still used Homeric language; but between, say, the moral world of Solon and that of Homer, or

between the Zeus of Hesiod and that of the *Iliad*, are immeasurable differences of ethical consciousness and ethical standards. I can not go into detail; may I point out only one thing (which, of course, is well known), namely that the praise of the *meson*, so typical for post-Homeric ethics, is contrary to Homer's concept of *areté*. Pearson himself realises that in the concept of justice may be "a shift in the meaning of words," and that may be the result of social change. I should have preferred a stronger word than shift, but otherwise I agree. The change in social climate changes the very nature of the ethical concepts.

Homer as the eternal teacher of the Greek mind is a commonplace truth which nobody will question. But in this book the balance does not seem right. For instance, the tradition tells us that Aeschylus called his tragedies "slices from the feast of Homer." Pearson thinks that, as he did not take his themes from the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*, he must have been thinking of thought and style rather than subject matter. But 'Homer' meant to him not only the two epics, and the *Oresteia* certainly was based on a story hinted at in the *Odyssey* and almost certainly treated in full in the *Nostoi* which were equally regarded as Homer's work. Neither style nor thought in Aeschylus are Homeric, but myth was, and that meant subject matter and something else as well.

The four chapters, centred on the concept of justice in fifth century Athens, are the most important and the best part of the book. An imposing number of ancient sources is paraded in a survey which reveals wide knowledge and sound commonsense. Within the period, there is deliberate negligence of chronology. Pearson has his good reasons for that, but some doubt remains throughout whether traditional ethics changed as little as he assumes. His interpretations, among others of Aeschylus, especially the *Oresteia*, of Euripides' *Heracles* and *Alcestis*, of Thucydides, of Sophocles' *Ajax* and *Philoctetes*, are all interesting and illuminating, often masterly if also controversial. To what extent, for example, is it justifiable to speak of popular ethics in the Melian dialogue? Justice and revenge, justice and friendship, justice and self-interest, justice and the state, are the *Leitmotive* of an impressive discussion which also deals with concepts such as *pistis*, *charis*, and *sophrosyne*. In his attitude towards a 'historical' interpretation of literature, especially of drama, Pearson keeps to a sensible middle line. The book with its ample notes provides most useful points and counterpoints in a debate which will still go on for a long time.

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Sex. Propertii Elegiarum Liber Secundus edidit P. J. ENK. Pars Prior, Prolegomena et Textum Continens. Pp. 127. Pars Altera, Commentarium Continens. Pp. 482. Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1962.

This edition is the product of fifty years devoted pleasurable (so the reader is told) to the study of Propertius. It resembles, as closely as may be, the edition of Bk. I which Enk brought out in 1946: it has the virtues of its predecessor, as well as the vices. Enk's is a patient and collective work. He knows everything, or almost everything, that has been written about Propertius; and sets out in copious detail the observations of others along with his own for the convenience and instruction of the reader. His edition is, in the simplest sense of the word, useful.

I have two main criticisms: too often Enk makes the text an occasion for imparting irrelevant information; and he betrays only the most superficial awareness of the influence which Hellenistic poets, and Callimachus especially, had on Propertius.

Each text presents its own difficulties, which a responsible commentator will deal with to the limits of his ability. That is his manifest duty. But he has another duty, too, even harder to discharge: he must interpret—and in length and character his notes should bear some discernible relationship to the important words of his text. Enk's commentary is largely shapeless. Consider, for example, his note on 6, 1: *Non ita complebant Ephyraeae Laios aedes*. Enk distinguishes between the elder and the younger Lais; decides that the younger Lais was born about 400 B. C. and could have been loved by Demosthenes when he was about twenty and she about thirty-six; rejects the hypothesis of still a younger Lais; denies that Apelles could have painted the portrait of either Lais . . . Now all this (and there is more besides which I have not summarized) has little or nothing to do with Propertius, as Enk himself admits at the end: ". . . sed Ovidio, ut Propertio, Lais nil nisi nomen celeberrimae meretricis erat." Why then—the bemused reader may pardonably wonder—this long and elaborate note?

With the success of the *Monobiblos* Propertius was received into the circle of Maecenas, only to discover that a long epic poem was expected of him, a poem he lacked the will or talent to write. "In Monobiblio sermo de Callimacho et Philita non est, sed postquam in Maecenatis societatem assumptus est, auctoritati Octavianii et Maecenatis a se petentium, ut longum carmen de rebus domesticis faceret, opponit exemplum Callimachi. Cum tamen Vergilius Ae neida scribere coepisset inchoans aliquid quod Propertius abnegaverat, Callimachi auctoritas, ad quam poeta provocaverat, tum aliquantum obsoleverat, sed ea excusatione utebatur, quod sibi deesset ingenium ad talia carmina componenda" (I, p. 15). Was Callimachus then nothing more than a convenient excuse to the poet who proudly styled himself the "Roman Callimachus"? Propertius' commitment to Callimachus was neither defensive nor casual; it was serious and lasting. Unlike Virgil, who seems first to have aroused his interest in Callimachus, Propertius ended a proper Callimachean, writing aetiological poetry. Enk's failure to appreciate the significance of Callimachus impairs the quality of much of his

interpretation; for in a number of the poems in Bk. II the esthetic attitudes of Callimachus are expressed or implied. Consider, for example, Enk's interpretation of the adjective *angustus* in the programmatic poems which open and close the book.

1, 39-46: sed neque Phlegraeos Iouis Enceladique tumultus
 intonet angusto pectore Callimachus,
 nec mea conueniunt duro praecordia uersu
 Caesaris in Phrygios condere nomen auos.
 nauita de uentis, de tauris narrat arator,
 enumerat miles vulnera, pastor quis;
 nos contra angusto uersantes proelia lecto:
 qua pote quisque, in ea conterat arte diem.

The poet mentioned his narrow bed in I, 8, 33; and Enk refers to that place. But here the context is Callimachean, and the adjective not merely descriptive. Nor is its repetition casual: no epic poet Propertius, but a love poet; and his love poetry is (the repetition suggests) like the poetry of Callimachus, fastidious and elegant. The same oblique claim is made in 13 A, the most symmetrical poem of this book, which Enk misunderstands and takes as a part of a longer poem.

34, 43-6: incipe iam angusto uersus includere torno,
 inque tuos ignis, dure poeta, ueni.
 tu non Antimacho, non tutior ibis Homero:
 despicit et magnos recta puella deos.

Lathes are narrow; and Enk translates "a narrow lathe." But here again the context is Gallimachean, and the adjective not merely descriptive. A *durus poeta* is one who can resist the blandishments of love and write epic, like Antimachus or Homer. Give that up. Propertius advises; imitate Philitas and Callimachus. The metaphor—*angusto . . . torno*—implies a style, an esthetic of poetry; Propertius may have borrowed it from an epigram by a contemporary Greek poet, Crinagoras of Mytilene: Καλλιμάχου τὸ τορευτὸν ἔπος τόδε,¹ which Enk fails to cite.

I might have noticed briefly the many places where I disagree with Enk: I have chosen instead to confine myself to a very few where I can add something.

II, 12, 5-6
 idem non frustra nentosas addidit alas,
 fecit et humano corde uolare deum.
 6 haut uano Nödeli, Housman, hunc uario Weidgen,
 heu uano Barber

Enk is rather insensitive to rhetoric, and like other commentators he has not noticed the plain evidence for the integrity of this verse: its structure. Scribes blundered, but not so as to set words like *humano* and *deum* in emphatic opposition to each other. Cf. Theoer., *Epigr.*, 13, 6: ἀθανάτων αὐτοὶ πλεῖστοι ἔχοντι βροτοί; Lutat. Cat., *Epigr.*, 2, 4 (Morel, *F.P.L.*, p. 43): mortalis uisus pulchrior esse

¹ *Anth. Pal.*, IX, 545. See C. Dilthey, *De Callimachi Cydippa* (Leipzig, 1868), p. 19.

deo; Cat., 76, 4: *diuum ad fallendos numine abusum homines*; Virg., *Aen.*, XII, 797: *mortalin decuit uiolari uulnere diuum*. Housman ought to have known better, *Sodali Meo M. I. Jackson*, 10: *ne quis forte deis fidere uellet homo*.

II, 12, 17-18

quid tibi iucundum est siccis habitare medullis?
si pudor est, alio traice bella tua.
18 pudor *dett.*, puer *NFPDVVO*.
bella *dett.*, puella *NFPDVVO*, tela *dett.*
tua *dett.*, tuo *NFPDVVO*.

Enk prefers *tela* to *bella*, finding *tela* partially evident in the corrupt *puella*. "Lectio vitiosa orta est, e verborum *puer* et *tela* confusione, cum lectio *puer* (*tela*, *puer* V2) supra postrema verba versus scripta esset." A grotesque error: interlinear *puer*—let his convenient existence be allowed—was somehow combined with *tela* and turned into linear *puella*. Why would a scribe, for no apparent reason, so absurdly corrupt sense and meter? *tela* is a mere conjecture, suggested by 13: *in me tela manent*. Propertius wrote *bella*; for only on that assumption can *puella* be satisfactorily explained. *bella* was corrupted to *uella*—the error is slight and common²—and *pudor* to *puer* because the subject of the poem is (as Shackleton Bailey remarks³) *puer Amor*. Now the verse would read: *si puer est alio traice uella tuo*; and the impulse to make *uella* into *puella* would be irresistible.

II, 18, 5

quid mea si canis aetas candesceret annis,
5 candesceret *Heinsius*, canesceret *N*, caneret *FPDVVO*.

Four poets join *canis* with *candeo* or *candesco* in what seems to be a kind of etymological figure: Lucretius, II, 766-7: *mare . . . uertitur in canos candenti marmore fluctus*; Propertius, cited above; Tibullus, I, 10, 43: *liceatque caput candescere canis*; and the author of the *Ciris*, 320: *candentes praetexat purpura canos*. These passages have some bearing on a passage in Catullus where there is a difficulty, 64, 13-14:

tortaque remigio spumis incanuit unda,
emersere freti candenti e gurgite uultus
13 incanuit *ed. Ald.* 1502, incanduit *codd.*

"Most editors"—so Fordyce avers in his note on 13—"accept the Aldine's correction for *incanduit*, believing that Catullus would not have written *candenti* immediately after *incanduit*." Most editors in fact keep the *MS* reading, believing that Catullus did write *candenti* immediately after *incanduit*. The iteration of a compound verb in its simple form with no change of meaning was a native feature of Latin;⁴ and it was adapted and embellished by the poets. To the examples which I collected in *A.J.P.*, LXXVI (1955), pp. 49-51, I can now

² See Lachmann on *Lucr.*, I, 222.

³ *Propertiana* (Cambridge, 1956), p. 88.

⁴ The earliest example is from the *Twelve Tables*, VIII, 12: *si im occisit, iure caesus esto*, cited by E. Fraenkel, *Studien zur Textgeschichte und Textkritik* (Cologne, 1959), pp. 21-2, with some other examples, among them Cat., 64, 13-14.

add: Plaut., *Aul.*, 202 *intervisam*, 203 *uisam*; ⁵ *Capt.*, 65 *inspectet*, 66 *spectare*; *Merc.*, 681 *disperii*, *perii*; 709 *disperii . . . perii*; *Ter.*, *Heaut.*, 404 *disperii*, *perii*; *Phorm.*, 265 *cognoris . . . noris*; *Paeuu.*, 38 (Ribb.) *adpetit*, 39 *petit*; 410 *intuentur . . . tuendi*; *Cie.*, *Arat.*, 195 *deuitans*, 196 *uitaueris*; *Virg.*, *Buc.*, 3, 31 *depono*, 32 *deponere*, 36 *ponam*; ⁶ *Georg.*, II, 490 *cognoscere*, 493 *nouit*; *Aen.*, VI, 198 *obseruans*, 200 *seruare*; X, 855 *relinquo*, 856 *linguam*; *Hor.*, *Carm.*, II, 12, 27 *eripi*, 28 *rapere*; *Ov.*, *Her.*, VII, 128 *respergi . . . sparsa*; XXI, 109 *perlege*, 110 *legi*; *Met.*, I, 206 *compressit*, 207 *pressus*; IV, 488 *exterrita*, 489 *territus*; VIII, 649 *resecat*, 650 *sectamque*; IX, 504 *componar*, *positaeque*; XI, 784 *decidit . . . cadentem*; XIII, 71 *reliquit*, 72 *linquendus*; *Moretum*, 113 *commiscet . . . mixtumque*. But there is a reason for believing that Catullus did not write *incanduit* here: in every other place where it occurs *incandesco* means "to grow hot," whether literally or figuratively, not "to grow white." And there is a reason too, as I have already implied, for believing that he did write *incuinuit*: this passage will then be like the four I cited above, especially that from Lucretius; for *incanesco* is formed on *canus*.

II, 31, 5-6
hic Phoebus Phoebo uisus mihi pulchrior ipso
marmoreus tacita earmen hiare lyra.

6 Phoebus Phoebo Hoeufft, equidem Phoebo *NFLDPVVVo.*,
equidem Phoebus dett.

⁵ Ritschl's *inuisam*, accepted by Lindsay, violates this idiom.

⁶ I cited other examples of a compound verb recurring in its simple form at an interval of several lines, *ibid.*, p. 51. I did not cite one example from Propertius, I, 1, because it requires some explanation to be recognized as such. In his despair over Cynthia's obduracy the poet appeals to witches, in whom however he has no confidence, 19-22:

at uos, deductae quibus est fallacia lunae
et labor in magicis sacra piare foci,
en agedum dominiae mentem conuertite nostrae,
et facite illa meo palleat ore magis.

Change the mind of my mistress, he writes, and then I would believe your claim to have power over nature, 23-4:

tunc ego crediderim uobis et sidera et amnes
posse Cytaeines ducere carminibus.

It was the business of ancient witches to draw the moon down from the sky and turn rivers back on their sources; many allusions to these magical feats were collected by Housman, *Journ. of Phil.*, XVI (1888), pp. 27-30. Although commentators have noticed that *sidera* refers to *lunam* in 19 (cf. R. J. Getty, *M. Annaei Lucani De Bello Civili Liber I* [Cambridge, 1940], pp. 140-1), they have apparently not noticed that *ducere* refers to *deductae* in 19, that it is equivalent to *deducere*. There is a zeugma here: *ducere* is to be taken with *sidera* and *sistere* or *uertere* understood with *amnes*. The zeugma is harsh, impossibly harsh Housman thought, *ibid.*, p. 29: "There are those who, if we had *amnes et sidera ducere*, would take refuge at the shrine of Zeugma and pretend that *sistere* or *uertere* might be mentally supplied to *amnes*; but as ill luck will have it the order of the words is *sidera et amnes ducere* and retreat in that direction is cut off." But Propertius did not write *sidera et amnes ducere*; he wrote *sidera et amnes posse Cytaeines ducere*, and the two words which intervene between *sidera et amnes* and *ducere* soften the harshness of the zeugma. Propertius put *sidera* first because the thought of the moon was uppermost in his mind; *amnes* is merely conventional.

Enk is inclined to be content with easy solutions. Here is a case in point. He accepts *equidem Phoebus* and rejects Hoeufft's *Phoebus Phoebo* because he is unwilling to give up *equidem*. It is true that *hic equidem Phoebus* is perfectly intelligible; and true also that this very intelligibility condemns *Phoebus*. What reason had a scribe for changing *hic equidem Phoebus*, if that is what Propertius wrote, to *hic equidem Phoebo*, the reading of the principal MSS? Propertius surely wrote, as Hoeufft divined, *hic Phoebus Phoebo . . .* When two words the same or similar stood together, there was a danger one or the other of them would be omitted in copying. An inattentive scribe overlooked *Phoebus*, or while he was copying *Phoebus* his eye strayed ahead to *Phoebo*, so that unawares he merged the two words and wrote *Phoebo* instead of *Phoebus Phoebo*. Errors of the sort occurred in Plaut., *Cas.*, 847: *aeque atque A, atque P*; Virg., *Aen.*, II, 663: *patris patrem MV, patrem P*; X, 753: *Salius Saliumque MRV, Saliumque P*; Ov., *Ex Pont.*, I, 2, 125: *poenae poena B, poena A*; and presumably in Plaut., *Amph.*, 899: *ingeni ingenium* Seyffert, *ingenium* codd.; Luer., II, 1049: *supra superque* Lachmann, *superque* codd.; Liv., XXV, 14, 2: *castra castris* Crevier, *castris* PC. *Phoebus* gone, the gap in the verse was later noticed and supplied. Such interpolations tend to be of two sorts: words suggested by words nearby; ⁷ or neutral words, like *equidem*, that do not much affect the sense. Here are two examples of the latter: Pers., I, 111: *omnes omnes LNW (?)*, *omnes PaXMS, omnes etenim CR*; Colum., X, 193: *Paphie Paphien post Gesnerum Pontedera, Paphien iterum codd.*⁸

II, 31, 5-6

hic Phoebus Phoebo uisus mihi pulchrior ipso
marmoreus tacita carmen hiare lyra.

5-6 post 16 Dousa filius, Otto

Propertius seems to describe two statues of Apollo, one outside the Palatine temple and one inside. But the existence of a statue outside has been doubted. Dousa's transposition would reduce the two statues to one, known to have stood in the *cella* of the temple between statues of the god's mother and sister. In his *Commentarius Criticus* of 1911 Enk approved of Dousa's transposition; now he rejects it, remarking that the poet described what he saw and no Roman reader would have been puzzled. Enk is an industrious bibliographer: it is strange that he missed an important article by H. Last, "The *Tabula Hebana* and Propertius, II, 31," *J.R.S.*, XLIII (1953), pp. 27-9. A fragment of the *Tabula Hebana*, Last points out, mentions a statue of Apollo standing in the portico of the Palatine temple, probably the statue that Propertius saw there.

II, 32, 5-6

cur ita te Herculeum deportant esseda Tibur?
Appia cur totiens te via Lanuuum?
6 Lanuuum Jortin, dicit anum NFLPDV, dicit
anus Vo. V²

⁷ See *A.J.P.*, LXXVI (1955), pp. 55-6; LXXXIV (1963), pp. 416-17.

⁸ Colum., X, 192-3:

tuque tuis, Mauors, Tartesida pange Kalendis,
tuque tuis Paphien [iterum] iam pange Kalendis.

Obviously *iterum* was suggested by the repetitions in 193.

Jortin's emendation restores sense and elegance to the couplet: *Appia* at the beginning of the pentameter is balanced by *Lanuum* at the end, and *deportat* or something of the kind is understood from *deportant* in the hexameter. Enk accepts *Lanuum*, but without justifying it palaeographically. Since the correction does not of itself account for the corruption, readers unused to the ways of scribes may well be puzzled to know how *Lanuum* became *ducit anum*. Housman's explanation is plausible: "la was lost in ia; *uanuum* suggested *via anum*, and *ducit* was added for the sake of the metre."⁹ But would *uanuum* suggest *via anum*? I doubt it. It seems more likely the scribe wrote *Lanum*, his eye slipping from the first to the third *u* of *Lanuum*; and then *Lanum* was changed to the word it at once suggests. This error is common, commoner I should guess in majuscule than in minuscule script: from the MSS. of Virgil's *Bucolics* alone can be gleaned: 4, 14 *formidine*] *formine* R; 4, 31 *uestigia* *uestia* R; 5, 25 *frigidapni*] *frigidapni* R; 5, 40 *humum*] *hum* P; 6, 12 *quae Vari*] *quari* P; 8, 42 *Maenalios*] *malios* P; 8, 54 *corticibus*] *cortibus* P; 10, 22 *insanis*] *inis* R.¹⁰ Hosius and Schuster accept, and Shackleton Bailey commends,¹¹ *anus*, the trivial conjecture of a scribe with wit enough to recognize that whatever Cynthia was, she was no crone.

II, 32, 61-2
quod si tu Graias tuque es imitata Latinas,
semper iudicio libera uiue meo
61 tuque is *Phillimore*, es tuque *Bahrens*

Propertius cannot have written *tuque es imitata*: on this all competent editors are agreed. Enk accepts *Phillimore*'s conjecture as being ingenious and easy. And so it may be; but it can hardly be right. For a reason known to themselves poets after Plautus and Terence, while using other forms of *eo* in the present indicative, regularly avoided the form *is*. Only Lucan used it, and he only once (X, 289): why he did so I cannot tell, and his commentators do not notice the oddity. Propertius seems to have avoided all forms of *eo* in the present indicative:¹² is it credible that in this one place he used the one form avoided by other poets? Most editors accept *Bahrens'* conjecture; but it can hardly be right either. The verse is divided into two *cola* by the repetition of *tu* and the position of the two proper nouns: *quod si tu Graias, tuque . . . Latinas. es*

⁹ See Butler and Barber, *ad loc.*

¹⁰ For a collection of such errors see L. Havet, *Manuel de critique verbale*, pp. 130-2. Enk's printer made one such in II, p. 85, line 27: *libinose*. Misprints are very few, however, and mostly slight. I have noticed the following, all in vcl. II: p. 13, line 27: for *probable* read *probably*; p. 13, line 28: close the parenthesis after *V2*; p. 43, line 19: for *undis* read *urnis*; p. 54, line 6: for *tunicam* read *tunicas*; p. 79, line 14: for *stant* read *stantque*; p. 103, last line: for *excidisset* read *excidisset*; p. 114, line 30: for *Pocride* read *Procride*; p. 134, line 26: delete the comma after *pudicitia*; p. 164, line 9: for *summisque* read *summumque*; p. 370, line 5: for *prino* read *primo*; p. 443, line 15: for *perspicuum* read *perspicum*.

¹¹ *Propertiana*, p. 126.

¹² Postgate conjectured *iaculcns* it for *iaculantis* in IV, 10, 43; and this has been accepted by Barber.

before *tuge* is rhythmically isolated: it cannot be taken with the second colon, because that necessarily begins with *tuge*, or with the first, because that necessarily ends with *Graias*. *tuge* should stand where the MSS have it, immediately after the masculine caesura in the third foot: cf. I, 5, 11; 6, 29; 8, 39; 11, 23; 16, 23; 16, 35; II, 1, 3; 15, 1; 21, 19; 24, 49; 28, 7; III, 5, 1; 11, 27; 20, 5. Since neither conjecture will serve and corruption is certain, the obelus is required. I may remark finally that in editing this book, the longest and most corrupt of the four, Enk only twice felt constrained to employ the obelus.

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JOHNNY CHRISTENSEN. An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy.

Copenhagen, Munksgaard, 1962. Pp. 101. 14 Dkr. (*Scandinavian University Books.*)

The author of this Copenhagen dissertation presupposes that "Stoic philosophy is a coherent and consistent system of thought" (p. 9) and maintains that it is not satisfactorily interpreted "if we do not try to bring out explicitly the function and meaning of the details in relation to the basic schema of Stoic philosophy." The essay proposes to give this basic schema.

As an appendix on the method of interpretation (pp. 77 ff.) makes clear, Christensen presupposes the work of textual and higher criticism, though he is sure that "systematic interpretation" is important also for textual matters. The essay does not "aim at a historical or sociological or psychological treatment" of Stoicism, but at being an aid to those interested in "studying Stoic philosophy as philosophy" (p. 10). Christensen is nonetheless convinced that his presentation is "a reconstruction of the system actually espoused by the Old Stoics" (p. 79). His presentation stands or falls "depending upon whether interpretations [of specific texts], if based on it, do or do not become more articulate and, in some sense, understandable" (p. 79).

The author is so convinced of the unity of Stoicism that he proposes three guiding principles of interpretation (p. 80): 1) "Alleged divergences among the Old Stoics should be treated skeptically." 2) "Prominent Middle and Later Stoics should be taken to have agreed with the original doctrine, seriously and in principle." 3) "Two types of sources . . . should be carefully scrutinized and utilized . . .": a) Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius and b) the reformulation of Platonism by Plotinus and his successors. We are thus led to expect that the system Christensen reconstructs will depend upon and elucidate texts from every period of Stoicism. It is precisely here that it is disappointing.

The structure given to the book can be questioned on the basis of the ancient texts. Christensen begins "in the traditional vein with the doctrine of Principles (*ἀρχαὶ*)," by which he means ontology, and then works his way through the "most important topics (*τόποι*)," i. e. physics, dialectic, and ethics (cf. p. 10). Such a structure is not

traditional, but foreign to Stoicism of every period. The doctrine of *ἀρχαί*, of "primary constituents of the world" (Christensen's translation, p. 11), is not the basic point of departure for Stoic philosophy; rather it is one *τόπος* under the more general division of *ὁ φυσικὸς λόγος*, the third part of Stoic philosophy (cf. S. E., *A. M.*, IX, 11-12; D. L., VII, 134 = *S. V. F.*, II, 299).¹ *ἀρχή* occurs only infrequently in the sense which Christensen consistently ascribes to it; moreover, as Galen makes clear (*In Hipp. De Nat. Hom.*, I, vol. XV, p. 30K = *S. V. F.*, II, 409), such *ἀρχαί* are only able to be discovered by mental analysis (*καθ' ἐπίνοιαν διελεῖν*), i. e. are discernible only by logic.

Moreover, with but one exception (*S. V. F.*, I, 45; II, 37 = D. L., VII, 39), all passages describing the order of the divisions in Stoic philosophy agree in placing *τὸ λογικόν* at the head, while regarding physics as the second or third division (Zeno, *S. V. F.*, I, 46 = D. L., VII, 40; Chrysippus, *S. V. F.*, II, 42 = Plut., *De Stoic. Rep.*, 9, 1035a, *S. V. F.*, II, 44 = S. E., *A. M.*, VII, 22). Both Diogenes Laertius (VII) and Sextus Empiricus (*A. M.*, VII-XI) follow this order in their discussions. One can thus infer that the Stoa regarded a knowledge of dialectic, at a minimum, as a necessary precondition for the understanding of physics and ethics, as Chrysippus demanded in the training of youth (*S. V. F.*, II, 42 = Plut., *De Stoic. Rep.*, 9, 1035a).

Christensen's discussion of Ontology (Section One, pp. 11 ff.) concentrates upon the question "What entities are substances?" (p. 12). His answer, which he says fulfills the conditions set for all three types of substances described by Aristotle, is that there is only one substance, God, or Nature (p. 12) or the world (p. 19). That the Stoa distinguished between *οὐσία* and *κόσμος* (*S. V. F.*, II, 581 = D. L., VII, 142) is not mentioned; passages are not cited that justify his assumption that the Stoa considered *οὐσία* in Aristotle's sense three (the concrete particular) to be the *κόσμος*. The *κόσμος* is rather the *ἰδίως ποιὸν* of *οὐσία* and *οὐσία* is the *πρώτη ύλη* of existent things, out of which the *κόσμος* comes into existence (*S. V. F.*, II, 382 = Galenus, *De Qualitatibus Incorporeis*, 3, 4, vol. XIX, p. 371K; cf. *S. V. F.*, II, 513 = D. L., VII, 138 and *S. V. F.*, II, 581 = D. L., VII, 142). Nor are *φύσις* and *κόσμος* identical for the Stoa, as Christensen's vocabulary suggests. *φύσις* is that *συνέχουσα τὸν κόσμον*, a *κόσμον* that is *φθιτρόν* (D. L., VII, 148). Thus the Stoa carefully distinguished between concepts which Christensen runs together. Christensen seems to be concerned more about Aristotle than the Stoic texts.

Christensen's Section Two (Physics, pp. 23 ff.) discusses "the

¹ Christensen's use of this passage from von Arnim shows how a more careful use of the apparatus might have raised questions for his system. He silently adopts von Arnim's emendation of *σῶματα* to *ἀσώματα*, made on the basis of Suidas, s. v. *ἀρχή*. He does not note that this involves him in difficulties when he identifies *λόγος* ("structure") and *ύλη* ("matter") as the two *ἀρχαί*. For *λόγος* in D. L., VII, 134 is qualified as *τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν*, and God is *σῶμα* (cf. *S. V. F.*, II, 112 = Alex. Aphrod., *De Mixt.*, p. 224, 3 Bruns, and *S. V. F.*, II, 475 = Alex. Aphrod., *op. cit.*, p. 226, 34 ff.).

theory of what goes on inside the one substance," though this is not a Stoic definition of Physics (D. L., VII, 132 and *S. V. F.*, II, 42 = Plut., *De Stoic. Rep.*, 9, 1035a). Proceeding on the basis of the Ontology given, Christensen finds no "wholes" inside the one substance, Nature as a whole (p. 26). *σώματα*, objects, are only a scheme "superimposed by the mind on the continuous manifold of impressions" (p. 26). The world is a tensional field, objects only sub-tensional fields defined in terms of material constituent (extension in three dimensions) and structural constituent (resistance, inertia, *ἀντίτυπια*). But the Stoa did not define *σῶμα* only in terms of extension; they also made use of *ὑλη* and *ποιότης* (*S. V. F.*, II, 315 = Plotinus, VI, 1, 26). And does the Stoa really understand *ἀντίτυπια* under the heading of motion (or its lack)?

Section Three (pp. 39 ff.) discusses Dialectic under three heads: semantics, causation, and the theory of knowledge. Christensen's physical theory influences his account of Stoic semantics, e.g.: "The hierarchy of forms which the Stoic does not believe to exist in the external world, is built up by means of language or reason" (p. 46). Quite apart from the non-Stoic use of form in this sentence, Christensen's discussion of the function of reason takes no account of the *λόγος* in the world and man. He relegates *λόγος σπερματικός* to the realm of "seminal structures" (or "originative fields," p. 36) which are responsible for the "recognizable types" of seminal fields. But he draws no relation between this *λόγος* and the *λόγος* in man, who is by it akin to God (cf. *S. V. F.*, II, 580 = D. L., VII, 135-6 and Epictetus, *passim*).

Again Christensen does not even mention the *φύσει* theory of word-object relationships posited by the Stoa. Instead he maintains that the Stoic world is made up of events (*τυγχάνοντα*), not entities. Stoic dialectic naturally loses all relation to the world of reality. But this disregards those passages which speak of an existent (*ἐπάρχον*) as being the basis of a *φαντασία καταληπτική* (*S. V. F.*, II, 69 = S. E., *A. M.*, VII, 424; cf. *S. V. F.*, II, 97 = S. E., *A. M.*, XI, 183) and the use of *ὑποκείμενον* to denote the first category in Stoicism (cf. *S. V. F.*, II, 369 = Simplicius, *In Arist. Cat.*, f. 164, ed. Bas.; *S. V. F.*, II, 371 = Plot., VI, 1, 25). Christensen disregards the Stoic categories only because he replaces, without ancient authority, the *ὑποκείμενον* of the first category in Simplicius with *ἴδιως ποιόν* (pp. 48-51), thus destroying one of the major contributions of Stoic logic, the arranging of the categories in a meaningful series from general to particular.² He reduces the categories to pure logical meaning-classes without any relation to the physical world. Thereby "Dialectic is not an instrument for finding one's way through the mazes of the hierarchic structure of the world" (p. 48), a statement which Chrysippus would hardly admit (cf. *S. V. F.*, II, 42 = Plut., *De Stoic. Rep.*, 9, 1035a). Rather than finding a unity, Christensen seems to be disrupting what the Stoa unites.

The Fourth Section, Ethics (pp. 62 ff.), is even more disappointing. Christensen first correctly gives Chrysippus' definition of Good-

² Cf. G. Boas, *Rationalism in Greek Philosophy* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 310.

ness as "living consistently (*όμολογονμένως*) or in consistence with Nature" (p. 62). But then he goes on to state that only Nature or God can be good, since it is the only thing that is truly one. He demonstrates this with "a kind of 'proof'" based on Aristotle's definition of the good as that which has actualized all its potentialities. In the case of the Stoic then, according to Christensen, man's ethical task is to direct his behaviour "towards the completion of his nature" (p. 64), a statement for which no ancient Stoic texts are brought in evidence.

The entire section suffers from this sort of proof; the ancient texts give a different view. *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is defined as *τὸ τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν λογικοῦ ὡς λογικοῦ* (*S. V. F.*, III, 76 = *D. L.*, VII, 94). Christensen cites this passage to support the idea of perfecting nature. (p. 63); but this is certainly to misunderstand it. A reading of Epictetus would make clear what is meant. To live *κατὰ φύσιν* means to live *λογικῶς* (*Epict.*, I, 4, 14; II, 8, 14). To live thus means to exercise a sort of choice (*προαιρέσις ποιά*; I, 8, 16; 29, 1) which makes use of *φαντασία* with *ἀκολουθία*. The good is present where *νοῦς*, *ἐπιστήμη*, and *δρόθες λόγος* are found (II, 8, *in toto*, especially 1). In short, ethics is described throughout in terms of Stoic logic and depends upon a knowledge of it (I, 7). To hymn God is, for man, *λογική* (I, 16, 21). Christensen goes far astray in citing the use of *ὅρμη* in ethical theory as evidence of a biological point of departure for Stoic theory (p. 65). This, like such other terms as *ἀκολούθια*, *ἐπιβάλλομαι*, *προστίθημι*, and *εἴλογον* (cf. *Epict.*, I, 4, 19 f.), is also a term of Stoic logic. One might as well argue that Epictetus' call to man to be a *θεατής* of God (I, 6, 19-21) shows that physical sight alone without the use of logic enables man to infer the existence of God from the *πρόνοια* evidenced in the universe.³

In short, Christensen does not accomplish what he set out to do. By imposing an ontological unity on the Stoic texts he actually puts asunder what the Porch joined together. A simple reading of Cleanthes' *Hymn* should have prevented this error.

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Hans-Georg Kolbe. *Die Statthalter Numidiens von Gallien bis Konstantin* (268-320). München, Berlin, C. H. Beck, 1962. Pp. XII + 90. (*Vestigia. Beiträge zur alten Geschichte*, Band 4.)

In 1959 a new series entitled *Vestigia. Beiträge zur alten Geschichte* was inaugurated with the publication of F. G. Maier's *Griechische Mauerbauinschriften*, and the present study by Kolbe

³ Christensen's discussion of "value" (p. 70) silently emends *εἰρατον* in *S. V. F.*, III, 126 = *D. L.*, VII, 105 to *διά*. Christensen then interprets *διὰ μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν* as "through a mediating function," a very unlikely rendering. Perhaps this is a case of "systematic interpretation" muddying the meaning of a text.

continues the fine standard of scholarship set by that first volume. Since the governors of Numidia already had been investigated in part or as a whole (Pallu de Lessert, Lantier, Cagnet, Birley, and Thomasson), Kolbe limits himself to the period from Gallienus to Constantine, and in so doing has had to face some very difficult and at the same time very fascinating problems. In a prosopographical study of this kind the focus of interest should be directed not only upon the dates at which the various governors held office but also—and perhaps more importantly—upon the social, political, and military affairs which brought about their appointments. And in addition one expects to find answers to such questions as the rank, career, and length of time in office of the governors, the rank of the province in relation to the other provinces, and, in the present case, the extent of the governor's authority in civilian and military spheres. Kolbe is generally aware of these problems and has sought to find answers, although the nature of the source material for this age places numerous obstacles in the way of such research.

The division of the book follows the traditional pattern: a short summary of the provincial administration (much too short, I think), the list of the governors in chronological order with all the pertinent *testimonia* for each one, and an interpretation of the *testimonia*. At the end Kolbe has added one section (pp. 63-4) on the *praefecti leg. III Aug.* after Gallienus, a second (pp. 65-71) on the division of Numidia and the *Laterculus Veronensis*, and a third (pp. 72-7) giving his conclusions and summary. Excellent indices make the book a pleasure to use. I confine myself to a few of the more interesting conclusions reached by the author. 1. He sees in Tenagino Probus the earliest known equestrian governor of Numidia (A. D. 268/69), believing he is identical with the *praefect of Egypt* of the same name (A. D. 269/70). 2. Acilius Clarus (c. A. D. 280) is attested as the only known senatorial governor after Gallienus, and this in itself poses a problem. Kolbe suggests that he may have been an equestrian when he received the appointment and then was adlected into the senatorial order while still in Numidia. Although there is no real evidence to support this claim, it is a reasonable suggestion and worth serious consideration. 3. In A. D. 303 Numidia was divided into *Cirtensis* and *Miliciana*, but was united again in A. D. 314. Thus the *Laterculus Veronensis* for the African area, which shows the province divided in two parts, should date between A. D. 303 and 314. When Kolbe compared this conclusion with that of Jones (in *J. R. S.*, XLIV [1954], pp. 21 ff.) he concluded that the list should have been compiled between A. D. 312 and 314, with the proviso that it is a homogeneous document. 4. Of all the eighteen *praesides Numidiae* only one honorary inscription is known, and no full *cursus honorum* has been found for any of them. Kolbe thinks this lack of honorary *tituli* is not accidental but rather a result of the growing impoverishment of the provinces, for fewer and fewer persons could be found with the necessary money to erect such monuments. This is certainly a possibility. Hence, all that one may say about the previous career of Numidian *praesides* is that they are predominantly *viri militares*. 5. In the first two and a quarter centuries of the Principate it is very often possible to establish a hierarchy of rank among the various provincial com-

mands, but after the period of the military anarchy our records are insufficient to draw any such detailed comparisons as were possible in the preceding period. It even appears questionable, says Kolbe, whether such stable relations of rank really existed after the period of the military anarchy. He bases this remark on the fact that Tenagino Probus governed Numidia first and then Egypt, while a few years later Aurelius Diogenes held both governorships in the reverse order. Here again we have a point worth further investigation. Comparison with the known careers of governors in other provinces of the same age would be highly instructive. 6. The length of the Numidian command after Gallienus was probably one to two years, but strict accuracy here again is not possible. 7. The separation of civilian from military authority in Numidia apparently did not take place until the reign of Constantine. This hinges largely on the belief that Valerius Florus, governor in A. D. 303, seems to have exercised some authority in military questions. These seven examples will serve to indicate the nature of the materials handled by the author, and for his accuracy, interpretation of the sources, reasonable deductions, and intelligent use of modern works he is to be highly commended. Anyone working in Roman provincial administration of the late Principate will neglect this little book at his peril.

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GEORGES MEAUTIS. *Pindare le Dorien*. Neuchâtel, Éditions de la Baconnière, 1962. Pp. 474.

No preface or introduction explains what this book aims to do or how it plans to do it, nor yet to whom it addresses itself. A reading of it suggests that it is addressed to a reasonably intelligent general audience. It might be described as a companion to the reading of Pindar. The reader should have Puech's Budé edition, on which the book is based, at hand.

Each ode is given separate treatment and the order is roughly chronological but groups of odes associated with victors from specific states such as Aegina, Cyrene, Argos are kept together. This permits a more effective presentation of the historical background against which the odes are discussed.

The exposition is lucid and readable. The historical background is well filled in and effectively related to the interpretation. From the nature of the poetry and the character of the audience addressed it follows that much of the exposition is devoted to elucidating the mythical material Pindar uses. The more purely literary aspects of the poetry such as the use of symbols, echoes, and cyclic form or ring composition are well explained and illustrated, although these matters are dealt with when they arise in the individual odes, and are never treated in systematic or general terms. This has its advantages if the book is used as it was obviously meant to be, as a commentary on individual poems, but it means that it cannot be

consulted in a more general way as an approach to Pindar. This sacrifice is not great since the author has no new theories or approaches to offer. Also in keeping with the presumable purpose of the book is the absence of an index and the disregard of meter. In view of this it seems a little surprising that so much attention is paid to detailed *explication de texte* involving detailed argument as to the precise meaning of individual Greek words.

If this is a popular book, one may well wonder how well it will serve popular needs. Is it really feasible to engage in a twenty-page discussion and exposition of the first Olympian without a text or translation at hand? As indicated above, the book clearly presupposes that one has Puech at hand. And yet there is hardly a page on which the author does not quibble with Puech's translation. For a scholarly book this is to be expected, for a popular book it seems uncalled for. Not infrequently Meautis offers his own translation of passages with which he is especially concerned but for the most part he paraphrases.

In only one case does Meautis offer a full translation of an ode. This is the second Olympian, which he regards as the most beautiful of Pindar's odes. From one who is so critical of another's translation we would expect a very careful piece of work. "Et quand se lève le jour, fils du soleil, nous ne savons pas si nous le terminerons en un stable bonheur" seems to me an inexact paraphrase of lines 35-6. Again in line 41 the whole phrase *παλιντράπελον ἀλλαχρόνω* is completely disregarded. So also in line 44 the important adjective *παλαιφατον* is not rendered. In line 60 the difficult phrase *βαθεῖαν ὑπέχων μέριμναν ἀγροτέραν* is rendered, "Elle domine le souci sauvage et profond." *Domine* is not a satisfactory translation of *ὑπέχων*, which would presumably be more fairly reflected by *supporte*. On page 73, however, Meautis proposes the emendation *ἀπέχων* for *ὑπέχων*. In this case it would seem that *écarte* would be a more exact translation than *domine*. In lines 68-9 (*ἀπονέστερον . . . βιοτον*) "une vie moins pénible que la nôtre" adds a term of comparison which was not certainly intended by Pindar. Fortunately the standard of accuracy is usually higher than this.

The title, *Pindare le Dorien*, suggests a certain point of view on the part of the author and this is well borne out, e.g., in the defense of the Thebans against Herodotus in chapter 20. Pindar is pictured as Dorian not only by sympathy, but also by birth. It is stretching a point a bit to make a Dorian out of a Theban but one might let that pass. Meautis presses matters a bit too far when he tries to make the Dorians the Greek creators of myth par excellence. Before the Dorians there were the Achaeans. He also gives the Dorians the palm in music over the Athenians in spite of the fact, which he mentions, that Pindar went to Athens to study music, and in spite of the fact that Alcman and Terpander, whom he cites as examples, were, in the one case probably and in the other certainly not Dorians. But this chauvinistic kind of argument is petty and unworthy of a book on a great poet. It is also a possible obfuscation since it can obscure what may be more important about Pindar, namely that it was the heroic ideal of a rapidly passing age that he found most appealing, no matter whether he found it exemplified in Sparta or Orchomenos or Ceos or Athens or even in Thessaly.

This kind of *parti pris* penetrates the whole book. Pindar is presented as a knight in shining armor. In discussing the thirteenth Olympian he pictures Pindar, and probably quite justly, as filled with distaste at having to write an ode for a vulgar and commercial Corinthian. Although he had accepted the commission to compose the ode for Xenophon, who had achieved the unexampled feat of winning both Stade and Pentathlon at Olympia, he did so with distaste and tongue in cheek. And still in this very ode Pindar bids for a future commission, but Meautis seems not to regard this as in any way a thing of questionable taste.

The last chapter of the book deals briefly with the fragments. Unfortunately the book was completed too early to take into consideration the new Oxyrhynchus fragment which gives us a great deal more of the famous νόμος βασιλέως poem and makes it even more enigmatic.

The book is a paper-back and rather attractive in format but is blemished by careless proof-reading, especially of the Greek. Most of the errors will not be very troublesome but *Olympique* for *Néméenne* in the heading of chapter 39 and in the *Table des Matières* could be confusing

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RICHARD KUHNS. *The House, the City, and the Judge. The Growth of Moral Awareness in the Oresteia.* New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1962. Pp. xi + 164. \$5.00.

The author tells us, on the first page of Chapter I, that the *Oresteia* is "the action of a man coming to moral awareness. It is, most inclusively, the representation of what it is to know the true nature of gods and heroes." Such language, from a teacher of philosophy, prompts us to ask on what plane of reality he supposes that gods and heroes exist or have a "true nature" that one can expect to know or understand. It is easy to fall into the habit of speaking of literary or mythical figures as though they actually existed in historical time, but Kuhns' language is especially puzzling because it is not always clear whether he distinguishes gods and heroes as presented and interpreted by the poet from gods and heroes in primitive versions of the myth nor is it clear whether he thinks of Aeschylus as sharing his own ideas of social change and religious development. One begins to wonder, sometimes, whether he is discussing the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus or some kind of ideal or "real" *Oresteia* which is a "true" document of social development.

Many of his assumptions are borrowed from Jane Harrison's works and his general attitude towards Greek literature and Greek religion might be described as "neo-Harrisonist." Not content with seeing the reflection of primitive ideas and conflicts in the subject matter of Greek literature, he seems to expect the mature work of the fifth century actually to represent them—whether consciously or subconsciously remains obscure. Even those of us who incline to regard Jane Harrison's books as largely outmoded would readily

admit how much we learnt from them. They taught us to remember always the different levels in Greek religious thought and practice and the primitive background of its later stages. They made us keenly aware of the contrast between chthonic and Olympian cults and of the chances of conflict between family obligations and the claims of the *polis*, but we grew weary of searching vainly in classical literature for sure evidence that these were actually live issues in fifth century Athens; we could not convince ourselves that these patterns of primitive conflict were to be found in literature at every turn and that they provided the explanation of everything.

Kuhns expects us to take for granted that the Prometheus trilogy showed the development of Zeus from a tyrannical to a benevolent god and, quite casually, he tells us that "like Apollo, Zeus and Hermes are gods who have become civilized" (p. 50). He concludes that Orestes comes to moral awareness, believing that he is like the Zeus of the Prometheus trilogy. He also wants the Orestes of Aeschylus to conform to what he considers the true pattern of a hero—like Prometheus or Ixion or Asclepius, who defied a god (as though Orestes disobeyed Apollo) or like Oedipus who refused to accept the word of a god (as though Orestes did not trust Apollo). He imagines him as steeling himself to kill Clytaemnestra only because Apollo commanded it (despite what he says in the *Chœphoroe*) and refuses to credit Agamemnon with any feeling of anguish when forced to kill Iphigenia (despite the opening chorus of the *Agamemnon*). He wants Orestes to be the pioneer in the social revolution that puts the state above the family—forgetting, it seems, that Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter only because the fleet could not otherwise sail for Troy and he would be branded as a traitor if he refused. It is hardly adequate to speak of Iphigenia as "sacrificed for an evil cause" (p. 32); Agamemnon's dilemma, when called upon to put his obligations as a father below his obligations as a king, is just as cruel and real as that which Orestes faced. Kuhns fails to remind us that it was Artemis who demanded the life of Iphigenia, and seems determined that these terrible acts which gods and goddesses demand of men must be either right or wrong—as though tragedy did not abound with situations where a man faces the alternative of deeds which are both wrong. Thus of Apollo he says: "There is no doubt that what he commands (i. e. of Orestes) is wrong. It remains for the trial to demonstrate that it is not as serious as the act committed by Clytaemnestra, and that Orestes can be declared not responsible for it" (p. 55). Would Orestes have been acting rightly if he had allowed Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus to remain in power? His treatment of Electra is equally false to the text; he seems to be thinking at times rather of the Sophoclean version of her character; in the *Oresteia* her concern for justice is constantly emphasized. Does it need argument to show that Aeschylus means us to take her concern as sincere, and that of Clytaemnestra as hypocritical?

What is meant, then, by saying that the *Oresteia* shows a "growth of moral awareness"? According to Kuhns Apollo, in commanding Orestes to defy the Erinyes, represents the male principle in contrast to the female, and Athena, with her finer sense of statesmanship, represents a compromise between the two; thus Apolline

morality is supposed to be a half-way stage to Athenian political morality, and the "well-being of the *polis* requires that political morality override the ancestral and that the latter, though it cannot and ought not be extirpated, be at least controlled by the statesman who must see to it that the ways of the family do not frustrate the ways of the city" (p. 66). Does this mean we must believe that Eteocles in the *Septem* and Creon in Sophocles' *Antigone* are successfully vindicating the demands of political morality against the demands of the family—even if such an interpretation reduces the plays to nonsense? even though it is clear from the text of Sophocles that, in Creon's view, law must override morality? Apparently Kuhns will not grant that Athenians of the fifth century recognized a distinction between law or custom and morality, or between political expediency and justice. And he is happy to believe that "all is well" at the end of the *Eumenides*, that "the city has been properly organized and its rulers ordained."

That conclusion is only one of the strange things in this book. Parallel with the distinction between family and political morality Kuhns wants us to make a distinction between local and panhellenic thinking—Orestes is supposed to be less narrow in his outlook because of his exile, because he has travelled. This might conceivably be true of a "real" Orestes, but Aeschylus gives no hint that it is true of his Orestes.

The book closes with a chapter on "Dramatic and moral meaning of Catharsis," and here too the author does not confine himself to what Aristotle may have meant, but wants to improve and refine the notion of *catharsis* in such a way that it will be properly illustrated in the *Oresteia*.

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G. L. HUXLEY. Early Sparta. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. 164; 1 map. \$5.25.

In eighty-four pages of text Huxley offers a reconstruction of early Spartan history as a continuous chain of interlinked events, from the mid-eighth century down to the death of Cleomenes in 490; the account is buttressed by 680 notes. As an intellectual exercise the work deserves high marks, for the author has assembled virtually everything which might be termed evidence and has interwoven it with skillful inference. Although this process results in a fragmented prose style and divagations, Huxley's meaning is generally quite clear.

As history, however, this essay cannot be recommended highly. The serious student of Spartan development, that intriguing and ill-lit thread of Greek history, will have to take account of Huxley's suggestions on various problems, especially in the reign of Cleomenes. The author also deserves praise for his evaluation of the archaeological evidence, which is neatly applied, for instance, on the fall of Asine (p. 21). Yet these virtues do not compensate for

fundamental defects in method, which crucially weaken the general value of his results.

The root of the difficulty is the laudable desire to restore as detailed an account as possible. If pushed too far, as it is here, the tendency leads an author to save every last scrap of potential evidence and thereby to employ canonical standards of historical criticism only on the most superficial level to remove the obviously impossible. Once a student assumes this attitude—and Huxley is not alone in adopting it recently—he can rescue and make use of the most improbable material. Here, for example, a pure guess by Isocrates (n. 42) is approved because it is reasonable; an utterly unsupported statement by Velleius Paterculus (p. 28) is skillfully upheld; in the text one finds that the tale of the Argive heroine Tele-silla "would be agreeable" (p. 84), and only in the notes is it properly dismissed as "romantic."

The ancient author who gives us the most "information" about many aspects of early Spartan expansion as well as of the Messenian wars in Pausanias. This is so, I fear, because Pausanias lived after the great wave of Hellenistic elaboration of early Greek history; certainly where we can test him, as in parts of the Messenian wars, his comments are heavily indebted to very unreliable sources, such as the third-century epic poet Rhianus (see Jacoby on Rhianus and also on Deinias, *F. Gr. H.*). Yet, late though Pausanias may be, he is Huxley's chief guide far too often; the reader must not be misled on this point by Huxley's words of caution on pp. 19 and 34. When Pausanias conflicts with Ephorus or Herodotus, the latter (though far earlier) commonly yield or must be adjusted. One can only observe that Ephorus, despite his rhetorical perversions, did search out valid evidence in Tyrtaeus *et al.*, and that Herodotus lies even closer to the era of Cleomenes. Yet, since Herodotus places Pheidon too late for Huxley, his text may be corrupt, whereas any emendation of Pausanias on the matter is firmly rejected (pp. 28-9).

To assess fully the argument which results would involve comment on too many events here. Brief, but very indicative, illustrations of his effort to rescue all references are his suggestion that there were two Battles of the Fetters (p. 22), this to save Pausanias; and his justification of Pausanias' statement that Aristomenes planned to go to Sardis (p. 92). A longer illustration is his reconstruction of a mission by Charmidas to settle discord in Crete (pp. 27-8). A mass of materials, some archaeological, some historical, is assembled to illustrate the mission; and Huxley concludes, "If he were a less shadowy figure, he would occupy a distinguished place in the history of democratic origins." In reality we know Charmidas only from Pausanias, III, 2, 7; the whole tissue is a gossamer which scarcely creates any shadow.

As in the Charmidas story, Huxley is deft in combining irrelevant materials and improbabilities to create certainties. Thus he postulates a connection of Philistines and Dorians on feeble grounds and then builds upon this connection (pp. 14-15, 18, 73); for conjectures, see his interpretation of Rylands Papyrus 18 (p. 70) with regard to Cythera. On the other hand, I would regard as faulty generalizations his argument that the loss of external markets led to Spartan austerity and militarism (p. 73), his inference that


Dorieus' western adventures had official support (p. 79), or the unproved assertion that the change in the *rhetra* came after Hysiae (p. 54). Incomplete resolution of problems also appears, as in his reconstruction of a helot (and Messenian) revolt just after 500; as drawn from Pausanias, this revolt covers ten years and was critical, but as drawn from Plato it becomes brief and not serious (pp. 87-94).

Perhaps the most disturbing result of Huxley's approach to early Spartan history is a failure to distinguish clearly in his analysis the major problems from the minor. Charmidas receives over a page; the co-existence of two kings is dismissed in a few lines (p. 17). Neither *perioikoi* nor helots receive much more attention (p. 25); the Peloponnesian league just appears (p. 82). Matter which even Huxley thinks doubtful appears in the text (e. g., p. 66), while fundamental issues are at times buried in the notes (e. g., nn. 64, 159).

Regretfully, then, one must conclude that earnest industry and real intellectual ability have been overbalanced by a faulty application of sound critical methods. Perhaps we can never know early Spartan history in as deep detail as Huxley would like to have us know it; but half a century ago Beloch put the issue squarely, "Scheinwissen ist sehr viel schlimmer als Nichtwissen."

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THE EDICT OF GRATIAN ON THE REMUNERATION OF TEACHERS.

Cod. Theod., XIII, 3, 11¹:

IMPPP. VALENS, GR(ATI)ANUS ET VAL(ENTINI)ANUS AAA.
ANTONIO P(RAEFFECTO) P(RAETORI)O GALLIARUM.

Per omnem dioecesim commissam magnificentiae tuae frequentissimis in civitatibus, quae pollut et eminent claritudine, praceptorum optimi quique erudiendae praesideant iuventuti: rhetores loquimur et grammaticos Atticae Romanaeque doctrinae. Quorum oratoribus viginti quattuor annonarum e fisco emolumenta donentur, grammaticis Latino vel Graeco duodecim annonarum deductior paulo numerus ex more praestetur, ut singulis urbibus, quae metropoles nuncupantur, nobilium professorum electio celebretur nec vero iudicemus, liberum ut sit cuique civitati suos doctores et magistros placito sibi iuvare compendio. Trevirorum vel clarissimae civitati uberioris aliquid putavimus deferendum, rhetori ut triginta, item viginti grammatico Latino, Graeco etiam, si qui dignus repperiri potuerit, duodecim praebeantur annonae.

This celebrated Edict, issued from Trèves on the 23rd May, 376 A. D. by the young emperor Gratian, is of particular interest to students of Roman education, not only because it defines the remuneration which specified grades of teacher are to receive, but also because it affects our view of the respective responsibilities, at this time, of individual cities and the State. Yet, since the great commentary of Gothofredus on the Theodosian

¹ *Theodosiani Libri XVI*, ed. Th. Mommsen and P. M. Meyer (Berlin^a, 1902).

Code,² remarkably little seems to have been done by way of detailed interpretation of the Edict, and even the standard modern text of Mommsen-Meyer (printed above) is, as I hope to show, faulty. It is natural that we should ask ourselves: what are the geographical limits within which its provisions are intended to apply? Next, how should we classify the cities which are here envisaged? Trèves, of course, as the seat of the court and capital of the West, stands in a class by itself; but are the *metropoles* identical with the *frequentissimae civitates* or not? Then again, what exactly were these *annonae*, and on what time-basis were they calculated and paid over? Most important, does the Edict imply, as many have thought, that the allocations are to be made by the cities themselves from their own resources, the emperor merely regulating the various figures, or does it mean that the State itself will provide the *annonae*, as the expression *e fisco* would naturally suggest? Supposing that these disbursements were to be made from State resources, did they take the place of the existing municipal salaries, or were they merely a supplement to them? What, in fact, is the general effect of the Edict on the fortunes of teachers likely to have been? These are the main questions to which the answers must be found, if we are to appreciate at all properly the significance of this important piece of educational legislation.

In the first place, the extent of the geographical area which the Edict was intended to cover does not appear to have been properly investigated. Not all writers who mention the Edict commit themselves to defining its scope, but those who do so are not agreed in their explanations. The older view was that it applied to the provinces of Gaul itself as a whole;³ the most recent view is that it extended "throughout the Gallic prefecture."⁴ The opening phrase *per omnem dioecesim . . .* is taken

² Jacobus Gothofredus, *Codex Theodosianus cum perp. comm.*, ed. J. D. Ritter (Leipzig, 1736-1745); see Vol. V, pp. 46 ff.

³ Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, trans. W. P. Dickson (London, 1886), II, p. 89, n. 1; Camille Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, VIII (Paris, 1926), p. 248, n. 6 ("relative à la Gaule"); C. Barbagallo, *Lo stato e l'istruzione pubblica nell'impero romano* (Catania, 1911), pp. 298-303; T. J. Haarhoff, *Schools of Gaul* (Oxford, 1920, rpd. Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 1958), pp. 113-14.

⁴ A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire 284-602* (Oxford, 1964),

by Clyde Pharr to mean "throughout *every* diocese committed to Your Magnificence" (my italics), and this is certainly a possible rendering of the Latin.⁵ In that case, the Edict would refer to a very much wider area than Gaul itself. From the time of Constantine, according to Zosimus (II, 33) the Gallic prefecture had included not only all the Gallic provinces, but also Britain and Spain. The Prefect himself resided at Trèves, and, in the words of Gibbon, "his authority was obeyed from the wall of Antoninus to the foot of Mount Atlas."⁶ Yet whether the Edict was designed to be as far-reaching as this is open to very serious doubt. To the best of my knowledge, there is no other example in the Code in which the singular *omnis* is attached to a word denoting a specific area in the sense of 'every.' When a number of regions are designated, plurals are used; so we have *per omnes provincias dioeceses tuae* (I, 5, 12), *per omnes provincias* (VI, 31, 1), *per omnes civitates* (XI, 20, 3), *per omnes regiones urbis* (VIII, 7, 22), *per singulas provincias* (I, 10, 7; VI, 29, 2; VI, 29, 8), *per singulas civitates* (XIII, 4, 2), *per singulas quasque provincias* (XI, 3, 1; cf. I, 29, 1), *per universas civitates* (XI, 10, 2).⁷ The expression *omnis dioecesis* does not otherwise occur, but what does occur is *cunctas per dioeceses sibi creditas* (*Const. Sirm.*, 2 *sub fin.*, addressed to the Praetorian Prefect Hadrianus in 405). The singular *omnis* with a word denoting an area means 'the whole of' that area, as in *per omnem Orientem* (X, 19, 7), *per omnem Italiam* (XI, 13, 1). It seems to me, therefore, that the opening words of Gratian's Edict mean "throughout *the whole of* the diocese," and this makes a vast deal of difference. But in this case the Edict cannot refer to the whole of Gaul, as has been so often thought from Gothofredus onwards, for, from early in the fourth century, as we know from the Verona Province-List, Gaul consisted not of one diocese but of two.⁸ The dividing

II, p. 998. (This valuable work came to hand just as the present article was nearing completion, but I add full references to it.)

⁵ Clyde Pharr, *The Theodosian Code . . . A Translation* (Princeton, 1952), p. 389.

⁶ *Decline and Fall*, ch. xvii; cf. Jullian, VIII, pp. 19 ff. and notes.

⁷ I select only a few of the numerous references which illustrate this rule.

⁸ The "Laterculus Veronensis" is printed in Seeck's edition of the

line ran along the Loire Valley, through Lyon (which was just within the northern diocese), and eastward along the upper Rhone; the province of the Graian and Pennine Alps was also included in the northern sector.⁸ The northern diocese, named *Dioecesis Galliarum* in the List, contained originally eight, and eventually, before the end of the fourth century, ten provinces. The southern diocese, administered by a vicarius at Vienne, is here entitled *Biennensis*, but, owing evidently to confusion with the province of that name, this title appears to have been dropped, and the diocese was called sometimes the *Quinque Provinciae*, and sometimes (by the subdivision of Narbonensis and Aquitanica) the *Septem Provinciae*; the latter appellation finally prevailed.⁹ Now it is true that in the *Notitia Dignitatum* (*ca.* 400 A. D.), the vicarius of the southern diocese is listed as controlling not only his own diocese, but the northern diocese as well (the *Dioecesis Galliarum* of the Verona List), still retaining the title of *vicarius Septem Provinciarum*, even though he now had all the seventeen provinces in his charge.¹⁰ But what writers on the Edict have evidently failed to realise is that this was a *later* development, which only took place after the capital of the West had been transferred from Trèves to Arles, and this was certainly considerably later than 376 A. D.¹¹ The Edict of Gratian is not addressed to the vicarius of a double-diocese but to the Prefect himself, and refers to "the whole of the diocese entrusted to *you*." Who in fact was directly responsible for the administration of the northern diocese before the above-mentioned rearrangement took place? The answer is that the Prefect administered it himself from Trèves. This diocese was an example of what German scholars call his

Notitia Dignitatum, pp. 247 ff., and discussed by J. B. Bury in *J. R. S.*, XIII (1923), pp. 127-51, and A. H. M. Jones in *J. R. S.*, XLIV (1954), pp. 21-9, who dates it 312/314 A. D. (cf. *The Later Roman Empire*, III, p. 381).

⁸ See Map I in Jones, IV (portfolio vol.), which, however, erroneously excludes the Alpes Graiae from the dioceses of Gaul. Cf. I, p. 47.

⁹ See Jones, III, Appendix iii, especially p. 382; also C. Jullian, VIII, p. 20, n. 1.

¹⁰ *C. I. L.*, VI, 1678, cited by Bury, *loc. cit.*, p. 138, n. 3, gives the title as *vicarius per Gallias Septem Provinciarum* (5th cent.).

¹¹ Bury, p. 138 places the change "in the early years of the fifth century," other scholars just before the end of the fourth.

"Immediatbezirk,"¹² and Camille Jullian has pointed out that this is why we do not find any name of a vicarius who is specifically entrusted with the northern diocese.¹³ This view of the division of responsibility has been generally accepted by the leading authorities,¹⁴ but if it is applied to the Edict of Gratian it has the very important consequence that the Edict did *not* refer to Gaul as a whole, but only to certain cities in the northern diocese. This is of particular interest because, apart from the *Maeniana* at Autun,¹⁵ much less is known about the schools in this area than is known about those in Aquitania and Narbonensis.

The question of the general principles upon which the selection of individual cities was to be made has caused some uncertainty, because the Edict begins by directing attention to the *frequentissimae civitates, quae pollent et eminent claritudine*, but later specifies those *quae metropoles nuncupantur*. Gothofredus took the view that the most populous and famous cities were meant, whether or not they happened to be provincial capitals. He had thus to assume that the term "metropolis" was used in the sense of a great tribal capital. In support, he referred to the well-known rescript of Antoninus Pius (concerning the granting of exemptions to teachers) in which the jurist Modestinus had interpreted the expression *ai μέγισται πόλεις* as meaning *μητροπόλεις τῶν ἔθνῶν*.¹⁶ Now it is certainly true that, at an earlier period, the term "metropolis" was applied to the tribal capital, whether great or small,¹⁷ and it is not inconceivable that this usage may have survived in common parlance, for in Gaul tribal loyalties died hard. But the Edict is an official document, and in the time of Gratian the word was a status-term conferred usually upon provincial capitals

¹² Cf. *R.-E.*, s. v. *dioecesis* (lists of the dioceses are here given); O. Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt*, II (Anhang) (Berlin, 1901), pp. 498-9.

¹³ Jullian, VIII, p. 21, n. 1.

¹⁴ Cf. J.-R. Palanque, *Essai sur la préfecture du prétoire du Bas-Empire* (Paris, 1933), Appendix B, pp. 119-20; A. H. M. Jones, I, pp. 373-4.

¹⁵ Cf. Eumenius, *Pro Instaurandis Scholis*.

¹⁶ *Dig.*, XXVII, 1, 6, 2.

¹⁷ Cf. Strabo, IV, 1, 11 (the original village of Vienne); IV, 1, 12 (Nîmes); IV, 2, 3; 3, 5.

(though not necessarily perhaps upon all of these) and only occasionally as a special honour, upon other great cities.¹⁸ It was not, officially, a general term for any and every tribal capital, however important. The development of ecclesiastical jurisdiction already accentuated the distinctive meaning of "provincial capital" in that the bishops whose seats were at the provincial capitals acquired, as "metropolitans" a higher authority than those in other cities.¹⁹ Gratian himself, in 378, approved of this prerogative.²⁰ As the ecclesiastical organisation followed the civil organisation so closely, we must deduce that, in Gratian's time, "metropolis" meant officially "provincial capital." Similarly, in the *Notitia Galliarum*, which dates from a period not very much later than the Edict,²¹ the provincial capital is placed at the head of each provincial city-list, and, with one exception, is designated "metropolis." Mommsen, in his brief note on the Edict,²² said that it referred to "all the capitals of the then subsisting seventeen Gallic provinces," and this has been the view (though more cautiously expressed) of more recent authorities.²³ Nevertheless, there is still a difficulty even here, for the following reasons. First, if the Edict was to be restricted to provincial capitals, why did it not say so in the beginning? Secondly, although provincial capitals were often the pre-eminent cities of their locality, there might also be other important cities within their provinces (a fact which sometimes led to ecclesiastical disputes),²⁴ and it

¹⁸ See Julian, IV, p. 420; VIII, p. 305.

¹⁹ Cf. Jones, II, pp. 880 ff.

²⁰ Vienna Corpus, XXXV, p. 58 (a letter of Gratian to Aquilinus): *omnis eius causae dictio ad metropolitani in eadem provincia episcopi deducatur examen, vel, si ipse metropolitanus est, Romani* (cited by Julian, VIII, p. 306, n. 2).

²¹ S. Mazzarino, *Stilicone* (Rome, 1942), pp. 187 ff. dates it between 383 and 398 A. D. The best edition of the *Not. Gall.* is that of Mommsen in *Mon. Germ. Hist.*, IX (Berlin, 1892), pp. 552 ff.

²² See note 3 above.

²³ Julian, VIII, p. 248, n. 6 "relative . . . semble-t-il, aux villes métropolitaines"; Jones, II, p. 998, "in the most populous cities, by which are apparently meant the provincial *metropoleis*."

²⁴ Cf. Mommsen, pp. 553-4, and Jones, II, p. 882, on the dispute between Arles and Vienne, as a result of which there were eventually two metropolitans in the same province.

may seem rather unreasonable that these should have been excluded.^{24a} It is, however, I think, possible to reconcile these different opinions, which have been based upon an unsatisfactory, and indeed illogical, text.

It will be seen that the clause beginning *ut singulis urbibus* . . . is very loosely attached to what precedes; and Gothofredus was, at any rate initially, puzzled to account for its apparent lack of cohesion.²⁵ Indeed, it is, as it stands, rather otiose, for, having been told already that the object of the Edict is to provide the "best available teachers" in the largest cities, we do not expect to be told again that it is designed to ensure the election of "distinguished professors" in the *metropoleis*. But there is a much more serious objection. The ratings of the *annonae* contain a manifest absurdity, for how can a "grammarian" who is to receive twelve *annonae* be said to be guaranteed "a *slightly* reduced number" (*deductior paulo numerus*) than a rhetorician who receives twenty-four? Gothofredus was evidently perplexed about this *paulo*, and in his brief textual notes proposed to alter *duodecim* to *duodeviginti*.²⁶ This would be arbitrary, but equally arbitrary is the suggestion in the Mommsen-Krueger *apparatus* that *viginti quattuor* should be altered to *viginti*; and even so, twelve is not "slightly less" than twenty. The true solution has, I think, escaped notice. What has happened here is that the text has been wrongly punctuated. There should be a full stop after *duodecim annonarum*, for the words *emolumenta donentur* are perfectly easily supplied from earlier in the sentence. The words *deductior paulo numerus* . . . introduce us to a new point, and the sentence means: "A slightly reduced number should be awarded, as is customary, so that the election of distinguished professors may be celebrated in the individual cities which are termed *metropoleis*."

Now this cannot mean that a lower rate is to be paid to teachers appointed in each 'metropolis,' for the provincial capitals designated by this status-term could hardly fail to be

^{24a} Cf. the alternatives in *Cod. Theod.*, XV, 1, 14 *metropoles vel splendissimas civitates*; *Dig.*, I, 16, 7 *celebrem civitatem vel provinciae caput*.

²⁵ P. 46, textual note (k), "neque enim haec superioribus cohaerere videntur."

²⁶ P. 46, textual note (i).

eminentes claritudine, and consequently the rates given must have applied to them. When the Edict says that teachers appointed are to receive "a slightly reduced number" of *annonae* than the figures just given, it means that the rates prescribed are the nominal salaries, but that a small *deduction* (say, of one or two *annonae*) is to be made from each teacher's salary for a particular purpose. The purpose would be to establish a sort of reserve fund, and the application of this fund is clarified by the use of the word *celebretur*. It was evidently the custom (*ex moore*) that teachers should contribute these small amounts in order that a *celebration*—an official banquet· presumably—might be held at the provincial capitals, to signalise the appointment of distinguished teachers.²⁷ What could be more characteristic of ancient academic life than this? From the time of the old Greek gymnasia, we read of feasts for scholars and staff on occasions of special commemoration.²⁸ Plutarch, too, in the Ninth Symposiac, describes how, on the festival of the Muses at Athens, the philosopher Ammonius, who was then the supreme magistrate of the city, after holding an examination of the students in "grammar," rhetoric, geometry, and music, invited the most famous professors of the city to a public banquet.²⁹ Who can doubt that, in the convivial society of Gaul, the appointment of specially selected teachers at so high a level would have been made the occasion for a local celebration?

It is now possible to draw up a list of the cities which would have been the centres for such events. They are the metropolitan cities of the northern diocese. Now these, according to the *Notitia Galliarum*, were (apart from Trèves itself) as follows: Reims (Belgica II); Mainz (Germania I); Cologne (Germania II); Lyon (Lugdunensis I); Rouen (Lugdunensis II); Tours (Lugdunensis III); Sens (Lugdunensis Senonia);

²⁷ I would not therefore accept Clyde Pharr's translation: "the selection shall be duly made," although *celebrare* does quite often mean "publicise" or "formalise." For *nobilium* cf. Suet, *De Gram.*, 10: *nobilis grammaticus Latinus*.

²⁸ See Erich Ziebarth, *Aus dem griechischen Schulwesen* (Leipzig/Berlin, 1909), pp. 131 ff. (including official installations).

²⁹ I owe the reference to J. W. H. Walden, *The Universities of Ancient Greece* (New York/London, 1912), p. 133.

and Besançon (Sequania). The capital of the province of Alpes Graiae et Pœninae, Moutiers-en-Tarantaise (Darantasia), should perhaps be disregarded, as it is not qualified by the term 'metropolis.'³⁰ This was the position at a period rather later than the Edict; but it is very unlikely that the subdivision of Lugdunensis I and II into four provinces had in fact taken place before ca. 385 A.D.,³¹ and if this was so, then Sens and (probably) Tours would not have reached metropolitan status. (After the fourfold subdivision, Rouen, not Tours, became the "metropolis" of Lugdunensis II, and is therefore likely to have been the capital of the original province of that name.) Thus, apart from Trèves itself, we are left with a very select list of six cities; four of them (Lyon, Reims, Mainz, and Cologne) were the administrative centres of consular provinces, and the other two (Besançon and Rouen) were in charge of a *praeses*.³² It would seem, therefore, that appointments in these cities were regarded as conferring particular distinction, and were honoured accordingly.

It is now necessary to turn back to the beginning of the Edict, where it is laid down that appointments are to be made in those *civitates* which possess a high density of population (*frequētissimae*), wealth (*quae pollent*), and outstanding prestige (*eminent claritudine*). We have seen that it is unlikely that the *metropoleis* were the only *civitates* which were felt to fulfil these qualifications. To take an instance from the southern diocese: Ausonius, in his *Ordo Urbium Nobilium*, selects four famous cities of the south for special mention, but only two of them (Narbonne and Bordeaux) were *metropoleis*, whereas the other two (Arles and Toulouse), though quite equally celebrated, were not. The *Notitia Galliarum* does not help us here, for the order in which it places the cities, other than the capitals, does not necessarily correspond to their relative importance; for instance,

³⁰ See Mommsen, pp. 554 and 557-8; there is no mention of this capital in Ammianus Marcellinus, XV, 11, 12. (The omission of "metropolis" before "civitas Vesontiensium" in Mommsen, p. 595, is evidently a typographical error, in view of p. 554.)

³¹ This is the date proposed by Jullian, VIII, p. 21, n. 4; cf. Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 138, n. 1.

³² Cf. Jones, III, p. 382. Besançon and Rouen had also a much smaller city-area than the other four *metropoleis*.

in the province of Viennensis, both Arles and Marseilles are placed at the end of the list.³³ How then are we to identify, even approximately, the cities which fulfilled the high standard of qualification required? As to the relative importance of cities, their size will give some indication, and archaeology provides valuable information on the extent of the periphery of city-walls.³⁴ But the question of density of population is more problematic; it is sometimes possible to make a rough estimate based on the city-area,³⁵ but in the fourth century, after the repeated barbarian invasions, it is often difficult to establish how much of the built-up area lay in ruins.³⁶ And in any case, even if the population of the city could be assessed, it would still be insufficient, for the word *civitas* means not only the city itself but the tribal area as well³⁷ and we have no means of assessing the rural population, which had increased at the expense of the cities. But there is, fortunately, one contemporary literary source which is of immediate relevance.

In the fifteenth book of his *History*, Ammianus Marcellinus takes the opportunity, after describing the elevation of Julian and his journey to Gaul, to insert an account of that country, and in the course of this excursus he gives valuable information (XV, 11, 7 ff.) on the most important cities of the various provinces. The cities which he selects from the northern diocese are *urbes splendidae Galliarum*, and in the opinion of Mommsen he was following an official list, adding some observations of his own.³⁸ Though writing of the events of 355, he speaks as

³³ Mommsen, p. 603.

³⁴ A. Grenier's standard work, *Manuel d'archéologie gallo-romaine*, I (Paris, 1931) must at all points be consulted on city-measurements and areas. See also Olwen Brogan, *Roman Gaul* (London, 1953), pp. 111-19.

³⁵ Jullian, VIII, p. 217, n. 2, reckons a density of 500 persons per hectare. F. Lot's detailed work, *Recherches sur la population et la superficie des cités remontant à la période gallo-romaine* (Paris, 1945/1953) is mainly concerned with the southern diocese.

³⁶ Jullian, VIII, pp. 214 ff. gives a rather depressing picture of the state of the cities at this period; but see also A. Grenier in *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, ed. Tenney Frank (Baltimore, 1937), III, pp. 613 ff.

³⁷ Cf. O. Brogan, pp. 66-7, and the remarks of R. P. Duncan-Jones, "City Population in Roman Africa," *J. R. S.*, LIII (1963), pp. 85-6.

³⁸ "Ammians Geographica," in *Hermes*, XVI (1881), pp. 602 ff.

though what he says is still true at the time of publication. He was in the habit of publishing his work (by recitation) piecemeal, and there is a clear indication that he wrote Book XV soon after 383.³⁹ But as Ammianus shows no knowledge of Lugdunensis III and IV (Senonia), it would seem unlikely that he was writing later than 385; in any case, his account is near as we can hope to get to an authoritative contemporary statement.

These, then, in Ammianus' view, are the most noteworthy cities. In Germania II, not only Cologne (which he described in XV, 8, 19 as *ampli nominis urbem*), but also Tongres; these he refers to as *civitatibus amplis et copiosis*. In Germania I, not only Mainz, but also Worms, Spires, and Strasbourg. In Belgica I, not only Trèves, but Metz. In Belgica II, not only Reims, but also Amiens, which he describes as *urbs inter alias eminentis* (and here Gratian himself had been proclaimed Augustus); he also mentions Châlons-sur-Marne (Catalauni). In Sequania, not only Besançon, but also Basel-Augst (Augusta Rauricorum); these two are *aliis potiores oppidis multis*. In Lugdunensis I, not only Lyon, but also Chalons-sur-Saône (Cabillon), Sens, Autun, and Bourges (the last-named is placed by the *Notitia* in Aquitania I). In Lugdunensis II, not only Rouen, but also Tours, Evreux, and Troyes. Finally, the Alpes Graiae et Poeninae have no important city, but can only show ruins of the once-great city of Avenches. Here we have in all just over twenty cities; that is, approximately one third of the full number listed in the *Notitia*. Even so, with places of such varying degrees of size and importance, it is impossible to decide at what minimum point a *civitas* ceased to be regarded as "most populous" and "eminent in renown." Certainly, Amiens (a flourishing commercial centre, on the direct route to Britain), Autun,⁴⁰ and Metz would have borne comparison with the four larger *metropoleis* of Reims,⁴¹ Cologne,⁴² Mainz, and Lyon, and

³⁹ Cf. Schanz-Hosius, *Gesch. d. röm. Literatur*, IV, 1, pp. 95 ff.; Amm. Marc., XIV, 6, 19 refers to the threatened famine of 383 as recent.

⁴⁰ On Autun and the Aeduan territory (under Constantine), see the discussion of population-figures in S. Mazzarino, *Aspetti sociali del quarto secolo* (Rome, 1951), pp. 261 ff. and cf. Jones, II, pp. 1040-1.

⁴¹ Reims had a very high population-density in the early Empire, according to Strabo, IV, 3, 5; it was of military importance in the 4th century (cf. Jullian, VII, p. 101 and n. 4); it also had an academic

it may well be that a few others of the cities mentioned by Ammianus would have been felt to satisfy the requirements of the Edict.⁴³

Next we must consider the source of the payment of the proposed salaries. There has been a rather surprising amount of support for the view of Gothofredus that the source was the individual municipal treasury.⁴⁴ But his explanation that the word "fiscus" here refers to local resources (*reditus civitatum*, as he paraphrases it) is not at all tenable. Whilst it is true that the provisions which formed the *annonae* were exacted from the provincials themselves, the administration and distribution of them, as, or in lieu of, salaries was, as we shall see, an imperial matter. Mommsen in his note said that they were paid from State funds; T. J. Haarhoff was of the same opinion,⁴⁵ and this opinion is entirely upheld by the detailed discussions of many groups of salary-payments in the recent work of A. H. M. Jones.⁴⁶ Moreover, the Edict makes a discrimination in favour of Trèves, and there is, to the best of my knowledge, no other example of the intervention of the Emperor to insist that one

tradition (Fronto, p. 271 N. called it the *Athens of the North—illae vestrae Athenae*).

⁴² Cologne had suffered heavily in the invasion of 355, but there may have been considerable reconstruction (here and elsewhere) under Julian; cf. Libanius, XVIII, 46 and Grenier, *Econ. Survey*, III, p. 616.

⁴³ I append a few figures regarding relative size of city-areas, but only Grenier's *Manuel* and Lot's work are accessible to me (cf. especially Grenier, pp. 356 and 420, and Lot, II, p. 9): Trèves, 285 hectares; Autun, 200 h. (originally); Lyon, 140 h. (but barely half-occupied in the 4th century according to Grenier, I, 331); Mainz, 120 h.; Cologne, 100 h. (originally); Metz, 70 h.; Reims, 60/65 h.; Sens, differing estimates, 25/38 h.; Bourges, differing estimates, 26/40 h.; Strasbourg, 19 h. (fortress area); Rouen, differing estimates, 14/19 h.; Chalons-sur-Saône, 15 h.; Tours, 6/7 h.; Evreux, 6/9 h. Grenier, pp. 368-9, thinks that Worms was an important civil centre, and that Spires had a large civil population.

⁴⁴ So G. Boissier, *La fin du paganisme* (Paris, 1891), I, p. 198; Bloch in Lavis, *Histoire de France* (Paris, 1900), I, 2, p. 392; S. Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire* (London, 1905), pp. 335-6; C. Barbagallo, *op. cit.*, p. 298; Jullian, VIII, pp. 248-9 and notes; Walden, *op. cit.*, p. 172; H.-I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* (Paris, 1955), pp. 403 and 562.

⁴⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 113 ff.

⁴⁶ On the Edict itself, Jones, II, p. 998.

city shall pay its teachers more than another from its own resources.

As is well known, payment in kind was a very common, though not exclusive, feature of fourth-century economy; the *annona* was primarily a grain ration, though, particularly in the case of the *annona militaris*, it often included much else, such as wine, oil, or salted pork. Frequently associated with *annonae* as a provision-allowance are *capita* (*capitus*), or units of provender for animals. The remuneration of those in the immediate service of the State, court officials, civil administrators from the highest rank down to the humblest clerk, and the officers and men of the Army was made in a carefully graded series of units of *annonae*. The treasury which was directly responsible for the administration of the system throughout each Prefecture was the *arca praefecturae*,⁴⁷ and the Prefect was thus not only the chief civil paymaster, but, as has been recently said, a sort of Quartermaster-General as well.⁴⁸ References to *annonas* in the Theodosian Code make it quite clear that they are a State, and not a municipal, issue. A constitution of 326 (*Cod. Theod.*, VIII, 5, 3) refers to provincial governors, accountants, and other officials as those *quibus res publica et annonas et alimenta pecoribus subministrat*. Another of 385 (VIII, 7, 17) speaks of those . . . *qui nec milittiam sustinent neque e fisco ulla consequuntur annonas*. In VII, 1, 11, dated 372 from Trèves, we read of the *praebitio fiscalis annonae* to young supernumeraries of the Army. The provisions themselves were held in the public granaries, under the supervision of the *praefecti horreorum*, and there is good evidence to show that in the fourth century they were calculated on a daily basis. In VII, 4, 1 (of 325) we read: *tribunos sive praepositos . . . annonas per dies singulos scribitionis indicio sibi debitas in horreis derelinquere non oportet . . . constituimus igitur derelictae annonae fisco compendium vindicari*. Under Julian, a court barber, when asked by the Emperor what his income was, replied that he had *vicenas diurnas annonas, totidemque pabula iumentorum, quae vulgo dictitant capita, et annum stipendum*

⁴⁷ Cf. Daremberg-Saglio, *s. v. arca praefecturae*, and see now Jones, I, pp. 448 ff. and II, pp. 626 ff.

⁴⁸ Jones, I, p. 371.

grave, and much else.⁴⁸ A constitution dated from Trèves (VII, 4, 17) in 377, the year after the Edict, laid down that if provisions were left unclaimed beyond a year they would be forfeited to the fisc:

fortissimi ac devotissimi milites, familiae quoque, sed et ceteri quibuscumque praediti dignitatibus annonas et capitum *singulis diebus* aut certe competenti tempore, id est priusquam annus elabatur, de horreis consequantur, aut si perceptionem suam . . . voluerint protelare . . . fisci nostri commodis vindicetur.

It was not uncommon for Army personnel, and also members of the Civil Service and teachers (as we shall see from the example of Libanius) to commute their *annonae*, in whole or part, into cash, at a rate fixed by the Prefect or in accordance with current market prices. Naturally, the commutation value varied considerably according to the harvests.⁵⁰ We do not know the commutation-rate at the time of the Edict, or indeed before 445 A.D., when a single *annona* over a yearly period was reckoned at four *solidi*.⁵¹ In the time of Justinian we find a whole range of State salaries calculated in *annonae* and now paid in cash at the rate of five *solidi* per annum for one *annona* and four *solidi* per annum for one *capitus* (*Cod. Iust.*, I, 27—Africa). Included here are the salaries of teachers—*grammaticis hominibus duobus ad annonas X et ad capit. V ad solidos LXX* (I, 27, 42), the figures being the combined payment of the two. In 533/4 at Rome, Cassiodorus, in a speech to the Senate, instructed that the *annonae* of teachers (again State-paid) should be made over (in cash) on an annual basis, one instalment each six months.⁵²

Some further evidence of the payment of teachers in kind during the fourth century may be drawn from the Eastern half of the Empire, notably from Libanius. Such imperial payments may not have been so exactly graded as in Gratian's Edict, and personal solicitation played a considerable part in

⁴⁸ Amm. Marc., XXII, 4, 9.

⁵⁰ On commutation (*adseratio*), see now Jones, I, pp. 460-1; II, 629-30 (Army); 566 (Civil).

⁵¹ Nov. Valent., 18, 3.

⁵² Variae, IX, 21; cf. Barbagallo, pp. 345 ff.

securing them, but they were well known at Constantinople and Antioch, and probably elsewhere. Those who were honoured by such a grant were said “to eat the Emperor’s bread,” and the expression “imperial sustenance” (*βασιλικὴ τροφή*) became standard. Thus, when Libanius made his first successful début as an independent orator at Constantinople, outshining his officially-appointed opponents, he proved that it was *οὐδὲν ἐλάττωμα εἰς τὸν στέφανον τὸ μὴ τῶν βασιλέως ἔσθιεν*, even though his rivals had *τροφὴ παρ’ ἐκείνου πολλῆ*, whereas he himself was dependent at that time upon his fees.⁵³ Soon, Libanius was himself appointed to a very lucrative imperial post at Constantinople. When, after an intervening period of five years at Nicomedia, he transferred in 354, on a plea of ill-health, to his native Antioch, first as a private teacher and then as an officially-appointed *rhetor*, he continued for some time to draw his salary from Constantinople, from which he had not yet been officially released.⁵⁴ This he calls his “imperial sustenance,” and when this was withdrawn (after some bitter arguments with the authorities) he at least felt established securely at Antioch (*οὐχ ἡγθέσθη τῆς ἐκ βασιλέως τροφῆς ἐπ’ ἄλλους μεταστάσης*).⁵⁵ Shortly afterwards, he obtained a new *βασιλικὴ τροφή*, but even this remained precarious and was withdrawn in 359/60 by the Praetorian Prefect Helpidius, a Christian who was hostile to him. In 362, when Salutius was Prefect, he recovered it, and arrangements were made for it to be paid half at Antioch and half by the governor of Phoenicia.⁵⁶ His letters show that this “imperial sustenance” consisted of grain, and in 363 he writes jestingly to his friend Gaianus, governor of Phoenicia, saying: “you can now laugh to yourself at being able to assess the value of my wheat and barley.”⁵⁷ This means that Libanius was able to commute at least part of his

⁵³ *Orat.* I, 37 (I, i, p. 102, 4, Foerster).

⁵⁴ The most detailed account of Libanius’ emoluments is that of P. Petit, *Libanius et la vie municipale à Antioche au IV^e siècle après J.-C.* (Paris, 1955), Appendix III, pp. 409-10. I follow Petit here, but see below for some reservations.

⁵⁵ *Epp.* 572 (X, p. 538 F.).

⁵⁶ *Epp.* 740 (X, p. 667 F.). But Petit, p. 409 *sub fin.*, wrongly says “la moitié de Constantinople”—*ἐνταῦθα* must mean Antioch.

⁵⁷ *Epp.* 800 (X, p. 721 F.).

τροφή into cash, and he does in fact, in the same letter, acknowledge the receipt of both gold and grain. Such commutation required at that time official sanction, as we know from a further letter, in which he writes on behalf of a colleague who had been honoured with "imperial sustenance," asking for permission for it to be taken over in money.⁵⁸ Thus we see that there had been for a considerable period in the East, for distinguished teachers, a system which was closely parallel to the *annonae*-system which we meet again in Gratian's Edict.⁵⁹

But although the evidence both of the *Code* and of Libanius clearly points to the fact that the *annonae* were a State payment, the clause *nec vero iudicemus . . . placito sibi iuvare compendio*, on which the view of Gothofredus and others has been based, may still be felt to require explanation. In the first place, this clause should not be accepted as merely running on from the previous sentence; there should be at least a semi-colon after *celebretur*. Secondly, the reading *iudicemus* is almost certainly a mistake, due to the fact that scribes, who had wrongly punctuated the immediately-preceding passage, and had assumed that *ut singulis urbibus* made a fresh start, evidently thought that this *ut* was still the controlling factor, and consequently wrote a subjunctive. Surely, then, the correct reading is *iudicamus*. As to the meaning, Gothofredus, aware that the cities were often unreliable in the matter of payment, took the point to be that they were to pay from their own resources what the Edict said they should pay, and not simply please themselves; that is, he regarded *compendio* as meaning the municipal salary. But *compendio* in this context, together with *annonae* and *e fisco*, is far more likely to mean the "amount" of the

⁵⁸ Epp. 132.

⁵⁹ The actual *quantity* of a single *annona* is difficult to determine, as it might vary from time to time. But if it was intended to represent the basic needs of one individual per day (*ἡμερήσιον*, as Gothofredus and T. J. Haarhoff say), then, in so far as its grain-content was concerned, we might compare the Greek dry measure, the *χοῖνιξ*, which, according to (e.g.) Diog. Laert., VIII, 18, was *ἡμερησία τροφή*. The *choenix* (absurdly translated "bushel" by the Loeb editor) was 1/48 of a *medimnus*, and was rated in the 4th cent. as rather more than two *sextarii* (Epiphanius, *De mens.*, p. 101 H.). Thus a single *annona* would give well above 60 *sextarii*, or at least four *modii*, a month (16 *sextarii* to the *modius*).

State award, and similar contexts show that the word was thus used in both official and common parlance.⁶⁰ The *caveat* is introduced merely to warn the Praetorian Prefect that he must not allow the cities to decide the rates, but must insist that the stated figures are observed. But, it may be said, does not even the suggestion that cities might conceivably try to stipulate the amounts themselves imply that they had some part in the proceedings? It does, but in order to explain this, we must seek to understand the procedure now involved.

As a general rule throughout the imperial period, if we except the State-endowed chairs at Rome, Athens, and (eventually) Constantinople, it was not the Emperor or imperial officials, but the city-councillors who appointed the teaching staff.⁶¹ Certainly, the Emperor might nominate a candidate, or he might, like Julian, require that appointments should be subject to his ratification.⁶² Also, undoubtedly, influence might be brought to bear by high officials such as provincial governors, in favour of particular nominees. But the general machinery of appointment rested with the cities themselves. They had long had the legal right to vote their own salaries to their own staff, and, if they failed to pay an adequate sum, they might be instructed by the Emperor to meet their obligations.⁶³ They were also exhorted from time to time to ensure that they selected teachers of the requisite character and ability.⁶⁴ When, therefore, the award of State-*annonae* became available to the higher grades of teacher in certain cities, the councils were still left with the selection of personnel—at any rate so far as the official procedure was concerned. They were now, however, stating in their terms of appointment a salary which was not municipal, but imperial. Therefore, the Emperor instructed the Prefect to see that the official rates were strictly observed; it was through the Prefect that the *annonae* were issued, and, if the city councils tried to manipulate the amounts, the Prefect would refuse to ratify their decision.

⁶⁰ See Symmachus, cited below; *Cod. Theod.*, VII, 4, 1 (*annonae compendium*) *et al.*

⁶¹ On the whole question, see Walden, *op. cit.*, chapter viii.

⁶² *Cod. Theod.*, XIII, 3, 5.

⁶³ *Dig.*, I, 9, 4; *Cod. Theod.*, XIII, 3, 1.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Cod. Iust.*, X, 52, 7; *Cod. Theod.*, XIII, 3, 6.

We have some evidence of the operation of this system in a letter of Symmachus.⁶⁵ It concerns Rome, not Gaul, but it dates from the years immediately following Gratian's Edict, and is addressed to Hesperius (the son of Ausonius) who was at that time (376-380) Praefectus Praetorio of Italy. Writing on behalf of the philosopher Priscianus, Symmachus points out that he had been appointed by the Senate as an acceptable teacher and voted a salary, but some difficulty had arisen over the payment of his *annuae*, and this Hesperius is asked to rectify:

Priscianus frater meus cum primis philosophorum litteratura et honestate censendus senatu auctore salarii emolumenta consequitur. super eius *annonis* dicitur orta esse dubitatio, cui si nihil talis *compendii* optimatum voluntas ante tribuisse, eruditio tua fructum ferre deberet.

This, then, was a State salary,⁶⁶ voted by the Senate, but referred to the Prefect for implementation in view of doubt. But usually, we may deduce, it would not be necessary to trouble the Prefect, and the system would work on the lines laid down. In the East, however, where there is no evidence of a corresponding Edict, the councils appear to have been required not merely to pass a special decree recommending the imperial award but also to submit it to higher authority for ratification. So Libanius, writing in 388 on behalf of the rhetorician Eusebius, says:⁶⁷

Eusebius, my pupil, being requested by the council in its decrees to follow in the footsteps of his ancestors and to train rhetoricians, consented; and, having embarked on the arduous task and proved himself eminently worthy, he was honoured yet again by decrees requesting that he be awarded imperial distinctions.

The honours in question would be the *βασιλικὴ τροφή*, for *τιμὴ* is a word which Libanius uses elsewhere in this connection.⁶⁸

The question now arises whether those teachers who benefited under the Edict continued to draw also the municipal remunera-

⁶⁵ Symmachus, *Epp.*, I, 79 (p. 34 Seeck).

⁶⁶ Cf. Jones, II, p. 707.

⁶⁷ *Epp.* 907 (XI, p. 55 F.).

⁶⁸ Cf. *Epp.* 740, and 132 (*τιμῆς . . . τῆς βασικῆς τροφῆς*).

tion to which they had been previously entitled. Mommsen asserts that the State award was "over and above their municipal salaries"; but it would be unwise, in my opinion, to accept this statement without qualification. Certainly, as a matter of general principle, the award of *annonae* in the various branches of the imperial service did not necessarily preclude the receipt of other emoluments. The court barber, as we have seen, received not only twenty daily *annonae*, but also *annuum salarium grave* and many other perquisites. There is also some evidence that members of the various bureaux (*officiales*) received a small additional payment.⁶⁹ On the other hand, *annonae* are sometimes referred to as a form of salary in themselves; for instance, in the reign of Alexander Severus, if his biographer is to be trusted, the chief court physician was granted a *salarium*, whereas the remaining court physicians received *annonae*, that is, in lieu of salary.⁷⁰ Such evidence as we have regarding teachers is inconclusive. In the case of Priscianus cited above, it is quite clear that the *annonae* are in fact the only remuneration, for the words *annonae* and *salarium* are equated. Libanius at Constantinople appears to have enjoyed the benefit of the produce of some local land in addition to his "salary" but it may have been imperial land.⁷¹ The question of his emoluments at Antioch is complex, and can only be briefly dealt with here. It has been argued,⁷² on the basis of the thirty-first oration, that Libanius received a municipal salary as well as his "imperial sustenance." But that speech, delivered *ca.* 355 on behalf of his impoverished assistants, really shows that it was only by a personal appeal that he could hope to extract anything from the city at that time.⁷³ It certainly does not entitle us to claim that Libanius' municipal salary was such that it was merely *supplemented* by his "imperial sustenance." It is quite likely to have been the other way round,

⁶⁹ Cf. Daremberg-Saglio, *s. v. salarium*. They also had their fees.

⁷⁰ Lampridius, *Alex. Sev.*, 42, 3.

⁷¹ *Orat.*, I, 80 (I, i, p. 123 F.); Petit, *op. cit.*, p. 409, says that *Epp.* 454 also refers to the same grant, but I cannot see how he deduces that Libanius had two "indemnities," one imperial, the other municipal.

⁷² Petit, *loc. cit.*

⁷³ In XXXI, 46 (III, 145, 15 F.) he says that if he had made an appeal on his own behalf it would be granted.

that is, that his *βασιλικὴ τροφή* was a more important source of income to him than anything he may have received from time to time from the city.⁷⁴

But individual cases would have to be multiplied to prove a rule one way or the other, and the best way to approach the matter is to consider the number of units of *annonae* involved. They were awarded on a carefully graded scheme. An ordinary soldier received one *annona* (and one *capitus*); an Army instructor (at an earlier period) received two.⁷⁵ The number of units increased with the soldier's length of service,⁷⁶ but we should notice that the author of the anonymous treatise *De Rebus Bellicis* (which has been dated between 368 and 375 A. D.) recommends (c. 5) that when soldiers, after serving for some years, have reached the rate of *five annonae*, they should be honourably discharged,⁷⁷ "lest their regular enjoyment of this amount should prove a burden to the State." Yet this is less than half of the number of *annonae* offered by the Edict to a "grammarian," and a mere fraction of the number granted to a rhetorician. Similarly, in Justinian's Code, we find that the salaries of a number of the military staff range from one and a half to five *annonae* (with *capitus*).⁷⁸ Likewise, in the Theodosian Code, there appears to be nothing higher than the six *annonae* allocated to the military accountants of the palatine and field-army troops.⁷⁹ But the numbers in Gratian's Edict range from twelve to thirty, and it is small wonder, therefore, that Otto Seeck regarded the amount as *satis splendidum*,⁸⁰ and that it has been recently described as "perhaps exceptionally high."⁸¹ It does not seem likely that the municipalities, tax-ridden as they were, would have been inclined to pay out from

⁷⁴ F. Schemmel, "Der Sophist Libanius als Schuler und Lehrer," *N. J. klass. Alt.*, XX (1907), p. 64, regarded Libanius as State-paid, and considered that his emoluments from his "imperial sustenance" may have been about the same as those of the rhetoricians of Trèves.

⁷⁵ Vegetius, *Epit. Rei Militaris*, I, 13.

⁷⁶ Cf. Seeck, *Unterfang*, II, p. 255 (Seeck reckons the *annona* yearly).

⁷⁷ See E. A. Thompson, *A Roman Reformer and Inventor* (Oxford, 1952), p. 2; cf. Seeck, II (Anhang), p. 478.

⁷⁸ *Cod. Iust.*, I, 27, 2, 20-34, tabulated by Jones, II, p. 599; cf. p. 634.

⁷⁹ *Cod. Theod.*, VIII, 1, 10.

⁸⁰ Symmachus, *Introd.*, p. lxxix.

⁸¹ Jones, II, p. 1061.

their own resources a further substantial and regular amount to teachers who were already so handsomely rewarded by the State, and who, in addition, earned students' fees, and were exempt from a wide range of civic duties. At least, any such contribution would have been the exception rather than the rule.

Scholars have generally assumed, and, I think, with good reason, that the Edict as we have it owed much to the influence of Ausonius.⁸² Gratian was only a youth of seventeen at the time; he had the highest regard for Ausonius, who had been his personal tutor for several years, and in an academic matter like this he would be almost certain to accept the guidance of a man who had so long and distinguished a teaching career, and who was so closely in touch with the *savants* of the time. Moreover, not much before the date of the Edict Ausonius held the office of Quaestor Sacri Palatii at Trèves, and would thus be in close touch with matters of policy. Two years later (378) he himself was appointed Prefect of the Gauls;⁸³ both he and members of his family rose under Gratian to the very pinnacles of administrative power, and his own career culminated three years after the Edict in the bestowal of the consulship (*si fortuna volet, fiet de rhetore consul!*). Nevertheless, we should not too readily assume that this Edict was entirely an innovation.

The words *ex more* which occur in it seem to have passed quite unobserved; but the fact that some "deduction" had been customary shows that a previous salary-scale must have been already in operation. On the other hand, the tone of the words in which a special privilege is granted to Trèves ("we have considered that something more generous should be bestowed upon the very renowned city of Trèves") suggests that here we may have something new. In fact, the Edict as a whole, which was hardly likely to be merely repetitive, may represent a new salary-scale. How long such State payments had been in existence, or by whom they were originated, the evidence does not permit us to decide. But at least it now becomes possible to see what was the general policy which lay behind the Edict. It applies, as has been argued above, only to the northern diocese, and even though one might have expected that

⁸² Cf. e. g., Seeck, *loc. cit.* above; R.-E., s. v. Gratianus.

⁸³ Cf. Sister M. J. Byrne, *Prolegomena to an Edition of the Works of D. M. Ausonius* (New York, 1916), p. 15.

Ausonius would have liked to see such imperial recognition extended to his own city of Bordeaux, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no evidence to prove that *annonae* had been granted to teachers in the southern diocese.⁸⁴ Evidently, then, the Edict was part of a move to enhance the academic standing of the diocese of which Trèves was itself the capital and of which the Praetorian Prefect was the immediate civil administrator. If it succeeded in attracting, by the prospect of higher status and remuneration, some of the best teachers from other parts of Gaul, it would emphasize a shift in the academic balance. Whether or not this was so, it would certainly create a new factor in what has been termed "social mobility" of teachers,⁸⁵ in that it could not fail to encourage the able and the ambitious to seek to transfer from the smaller townships to the large cities. As to the schools themselves, the policy did not, as was once thought, create new establishments, distinct from the municipal schools;⁸⁶ rather, it enhanced the status of some of those already existing,⁸⁷ and honoured with a touch of the imperial purple these nascent Universities of the northern diocese.

The Edict itself bears all the marks of that hierarchical society from which it sprang. It did not descend below the important cities; the teachers in the smaller towns were left with only municipal status. It did not include any private teacher, but only those officially appointed. It did not descend below the level of the "grammarian"—but, of course, the primary teacher had rarely gained anything from imperial enactments. It is even possible that there was a strictly limited number of teachers who might benefit in each selected city, for such fixed "establishments" were common in the imperial service. One may observe that the Edict sets a high standard, and the words *optimi quique praesideant* and *nobilium professorum* suggest that these

⁸⁴ Ausonius, *Praef.*, I, 24, refers to his teaching at Bordeaux as *municipalem operam*.

⁸⁵ M. K. Hopkins, "Social Mobility in the Later Roman Empire," *C. Q.*, N. S., XI (1961), p. 247, notes the movements of professors.

⁸⁶ V. M. O. Denk, *Geschi. d. gallo-fränkischen Unterrichts und Bildungswesens* (Mainz, 1892), p. 122; cf. Haarhoff, p. 114.

⁸⁷ So Ausonius, *Grat. Lat.*, 7, refers to the school at Besançon, and that at Lyon, as *municipalem scholam* in the time of Maximin.

awards were intended for an élite.⁸⁸ It is unlikely that the provisions were intended to include assistant teachers, although this does not preclude the possibility that recommended assistants may have been granted their *annonae* at a lower, but here unspecified, rate.⁸⁹ As regards the subjects taught, it is noticeable that, whereas the Latin and the Greek "grammarian" in the other cities are to receive equal rates of pay, there is a curious anomaly about the position of Greek at Trèves. Not only is there a doubt about the possibility of finding a suitable candidate, but, even if appointed, he is not granted, as is the rhetorician, and the Latin "grammarian," a rate higher than the corresponding teachers elsewhere. This would seem to point not so much to a shortage of teachers in the subject as to a feeling at Trèves that there was unlikely to be any Greek teacher available who was comparable in distinction to the Latinists.⁹⁰

One of the most striking features of the Edict is the remarkably high premium placed upon teachers (or "professors," if we like to use the term) of rhetoric. We have no previous standards of comparison between rhetoricians and "grammarians" as regards salary, but we may, to some extent, deduce the relative esteem which they had enjoyed from a comparison of their fees. Juvenal tells us (what we might have expected) that the "grammarian's" fee in his days was less than that of the rhetorician;⁹¹ but in the Edict of Diocletian, the "grammarian" is not very far behind, for he is awarded 200 denarii per pupil per month whereas the rhetorician obtains 250.⁹² But this ratio of 5:4 in favour of the rhetorician is considerably different from the position in Gratian's salary-scale, which maintains a ratio of 2:1, except at Trèves, where the ratio (for

⁸⁸ But I do not think that the use of the singular, *rhetori, grammatico*, necessarily means that only one teacher in each category is envisaged.

⁸⁹ The Eusebius (xxii) of Libanius, *Epp.* 907 (quoted above), referred to as recommended for imperial honour, was an assistant of whom Libanius thought very highly.

⁹⁰ On the subject of Greek, cf. Julian, VIII, pp. 255-9 ("Le prestige du grec"); Marrou, *op. cit.*, p. 355 says "Le grec se meurt en Occident," but (pp. 410 ff.) shows that there were still some circles in which it was valued.

⁹¹ *Sat.*, VII, 217, *minus est autem quam rhetoris aera.*

⁹² *C.I.L.*, III, 809.

Latin) is 3:2. This does not so much represent a lessening of appreciation of the work of the "grammarian" as an increase in the valuation of rhetoric. Rhetoric had innumerable connections with the law, administration, and public life generally, and it was still on the upgrade. Of course, Gaul had for centuries enjoyed a high reputation for its orators and rhetoricians. Even in Strabo's time, Roman parents were sending their sons to be taught at Marseilles.⁹³ In the select list of *illustres professores* whose biographies were included in the lost portion of Suetonius' essay *De Rhetoribus*, two came from Gaul (one from Arles, the other from Toulouse).⁹⁴ Tacitus makes at least two of the interlocutors in his *Dialogue* men who hailed from Gaul⁹⁵ and Juvenal says that it was Gallic eloquence which first aroused interest in rhetoric in Britain.⁹⁶ In the fourth century, we know something of the status of rhetoric at Bordeaux, Toulouse, Narbonne, and elsewhere from the *Professores* of Ausonius; and from the appointment of Eumenius the school at Autun gained a new lease of life. By the time of Gratian, Trèves also seems to have had a high rhetorical reputation, for Ausonius hails the Moselle as "equal in honour with Rome in eloquence,"⁹⁷ and says that the leading members of the municipal councils in that area had acquired an oratorical ability which "raised them to old Quintilian's renown."⁹⁸ Naturally, we must always take the panegyrical Ausonius with a pinch of salt, but he evidently thought quite as highly of Trèves as he did of Bordeaux. Nor was it only rhetoric which was well represented there; two of his friends at Trèves were Ursulus and Harmonius, the "grammarians," and he speaks of them in language every bit as complimentary as that in which he praises elsewhere his old friends at Bordeaux.⁹⁹ Finally, to complete the picture, we must add that, through the tuition of Ausonius,

⁹³ Strabo, IV, 1, 5 (p. 181).

⁹⁴ P. 36 in Brugnoli's Teubner edition (Leipzig, 1960).

⁹⁵ Aper, Secundus, and perhaps Maternus; see further, Haarhoff, p. 34.

⁹⁶ *Sat.*, XV, 111; cf. Mayor's exhaustive note *ad loc.*

⁹⁷ *Mosella*, 383.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 399 ff. Jullian, VIII, p. 264, n. 4 doubts whether the reference is actually to the school at Trèves, but see the remarks of Haarhoff, p. 48.

⁹⁹ Cf. *Epist.*, XIII, 26 ff. with *Prof.*, XX, 7 ff.

the emperor Gratian was by now himself highly skilled in the art of declamation.¹⁰⁰ Thus, thanks to the interest of a young ruler and his old tutor, rhetoricians acquired further laurels and stood as high as ever they did in imperial esteem; and the "grammarians," too, after so many vicissitudes, enjoyed a more fitting reward.

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¹⁰⁰ *Epit. de Caes.*, 47, 4; Ausonius, *Grat. Act.*, 15; Amm. Marc., XXXI, 10, 18; cf. A. Alföldi, *A Conflict of Ideas in the Late Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1952), p. 119.

THE ACCENTUATION OF GREEK LOANS IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN LATIN.*

The seemingly capricious ways in which Greek loanwords were stressed in Latin have puzzled and distressed classical scholars for a long time.** Why, for example, should words like *κάμηλος*, *καμάρα* appear as *camēlus*, *camēra*, with the stress placed, not as in Greek, but, as required by the three-syllable law, according to the quantity of the penultimate syllable, while at the same time words like *εἴδωλον*, *κιθάρα* may be stressed on the syllable which bears the accent in Greek, *ídolum*, *cithára*, in apparent defiance of that rule? (The forms *idōlum*, *cithāra* occur also; see the next paragraph and p. 157, below.) There is, to be sure, a third type of loans where everything seems to be in order, for example, *γένεσις*—*génēsis*, *ἀποθήκη*—*apothéca*, but this neatness prevails only because there is simply no occasion for conflict in terms of either Greek or Latin prosodic rules.¹

We have two sources which tell us that stress placements as

* This article is dedicated to the memory of JOSHUA WHATMOUGH (1897-1964), teacher and friend.

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¹ I employ the terms prosodic and prosodies with reference to all non-segmental phonological phenomena of language, such as pitch (intonation), stress, syllabification, quantity, pauses, etc. Where such a feature serves the purpose of meaningful distinction it is called a prosodeme (-eme being the suffix customarily employed by linguists to indicate a class of phenomena having a distinctive function: phoneme—a distinctive class of sounds, morpheme—a distinctive class of forms, etc.). In Classical Latin, for example, every vowel has to be either long or short: the word **cārus* does not exist; if it did, it would mean something other than *cārus*, as is true of the pair *mōdō* and *mōdō* (that Plautus, and others, scans the first sometimes as *mōdō* is another story), and, though on another level, *filiā* and *filiā*. A distinctive quantity is thus superimposed on every vowel (hence linguists often speak of suprasegmentals), and quantity is therefore a prosodeme. But stress in Classical Latin is based upon, hence predictable from, vocalic (or syllabic) quantity, and it therefore does not serve a function of distinctiveness in its own right; consequently it is a non-prosodic prosody.

in *bútyrum*, *pompīlus* actually occurred, despite the Greek originals *βούτυρον*, *πομπίλος*, and the proper classical loans *butyrum*, *pompilus*: (a) such words do occasionally appear in classical metrical poetry in a position that scans *butyrum*, *pompilus*, that is, *bútyrum*, *pompīlus*, a circumstance which obliges Latin lexicographers to list such items as *butýrum*, *pompílus* (cf. my remarks below, p. 150, where it is argued that such words were borrowed by a non-classical dialect of Latin but somehow came into metrical poetry with what to the purist must have seemed wrong quantities, which were derived from the stress pattern instead of, as is the case in Classical Latin, determining the stress placement); (b) Romance derivatives, like Italian *búrro*, *pompílo* require the etyma *bútyrum*, *pompīlus*, rather than *butýrum*, *pómpilus*, which would have resulted most likely in **bútiro*, **pómpilo* (cf. below, under II, p. 157). (My manner of providing some Latin words with the macron and others with a stress mark is explained below, p. 146.)

Various attempts have been made to account in some systematic fashion for the apparent disarray. I shall permit myself not to cite the bibliography in detail, especially since I prefer to set out on new paths. But on the whole the discussions have taken two principal directions. (1) Different times of borrowing were made responsible for the different treatment accorded Greek words upon their acceptance in Latin, in such a way that, it is contended, loans made during the period of Classical Latin were subject to the three-syllable law on quantity and stress then in force in Latin; this would account for the pairs *κάμηλος*—*camēlus*, *καμάρα*—*caméra*. But words borrowed during the period of Vulgar Latin, at a time when vocalic and syllabic quantities were no longer rigidly observed or known, retained the accent where it was in Greek, the requirement of the three-syllable law no longer being in force; this would account for the pairs *εἴδωλον*—*ídolum*, *κιθάρα*—*cithára*. (2) It was said that "learned loans" had to be distinguished from "popular loans," with the first tending to observe a retention of the Greek quantities (*κάμηλος*—*camēlus*) and the second of the Greek place of accent (*εἴδωλον*—*ídulum*). This theory has a social implication in that it assigns either certain words or certain speakers (the distinction is not always sharply drawn; presumably one should infer that the two go together) to a

higher or lower social stratum and linguistic behavior, and it further implies that "popular" loans are due to speakers necessarily ignorant of "good" (Classical) Latin, else these errors against the classical rules would not have been committed.

I shall discuss these views critically, and suggest a new one, under the following four headings. (A) Both theories, it seems to me, suffer from internal inconsistencies in that they are not based upon, and do not sufficiently explain, the recorded evidence. (B) Both suffer also from the neglect to examine the precise nature and function of what in Greek and Latin is loosely termed "accent": it is doubtful procedure simply to transfer a nomenclature from one linguistic structure to the other with the implied but unsupported assumption that "accent" is phonetically and phonemically the same or the equivalent phenomenon in Greek and Latin. (C) Both disregard certain basic traits of the history of Latin, seeing it as a progress from Old Latin through Classical Latin to Vulgar Latin, a sequence which I deny on both linguistic and non-linguistic grounds. (D) In conclusion, I shall establish several classes of loan types from Greek to illustrate the various ways in which the Greek prosodies of accentuation and vocalic (and syllabic) quantity are adopted by, and adapted to, the Latin prosodic system.

(A)

The chronological of the two theories cannot, I think, hold true because, no matter at what post-classical date one fixes the breakdown of classical latinity, the evidence does not bear out the proposed sequence of borrowing periods. One could cite quite a number of words of Greek origin which undoubtedly came into Latin at a date sufficiently early to have obeyed the classical quantity-stress law but which in fact bear a stress, in disregard of Latin quantity, on the same syllable as does Greek. (This is reflected in another chronological view held by some, that the words disobeying Latin quantity were borrowed from Greek, not in postclassical, but in preclassical times.) Examples are numerous, and a glance at Class II, p. 157, below, will provide illustrations.

The theory of popular versus learned loans is not satisfactory as it stands now (though the basic notion of social dialects is

sound) because the argumentation is really circular. For if one calls the type *εἰδωλον*—*idolum* “popular” and the type *κάμηλος*—*camēlus* “learned,” the criterion of distinction is entirely linguistic: neither in these nor in other examples I have seen could one point to any non-linguistic token of “learnedness” and “popularity” inherent in the words or their presumed users; it will be virtually impossible for observers to come to an agreement on most words as to whether they are learned or popular, except on the basis of some kind of difference in their linguistic (phonological, morphological) shapes. But if that is so, a turn-about statement that “explains” the different shapes on the evidence of the labels bestowed upon the words precisely because of those shapes provides neither additional information nor explanation.

(B)

Next, the question of Greek and Latin “accent.” I cannot possibly undertake here a full discussion of the Greek and Latin prosodies involved, especially since, as I shall presently explain, I could not talk about the prosody of accentuation in detachment from all the other prosodies, and this is not the place to talk about all of them; it is, in any event, not necessary to my argument that I do so. But it has become clear to me (as it has to others, if perhaps by a different procedure) that Greek accentuation is entirely different in nature and phonological function from that of Latin (which is the reason why, in this article, I am using “accentuation” in a neutral sense for both languages, but “accent” for Greek and “stress” for Latin). It is furthermore evident that an additional distinction needs to be made between two kinds of Latin, Spoken Latin (SL) and Written Latin (WL), a dichotomy in which prosodic differences of accentuation play a decisive and significant rôle. (For some details on SL and WL see pp. 146 ff., below.)

In arriving at the conclusion on the essential disparity of Greek and Latin accentuation I have come to believe rather strongly that, on this question, one may disregard much of the testimony of the ancient grammarians, who described Latin in terms of Greek, copied Greek models, then copied one another over the centuries, and rarely bothered to look squarely at the facts. This attitude is particularly disastrous in matters of prosody,

so elusive and so easily misunderstood and misheard, and so easily misdescribed without a thorough linguistic analysis that requires considerably more than giving an impressionistic account of what an observer hears, or thinks he hears, or cannot but hear falsely, or thinks he ought to hear. Roman grammarians, when analysing their own language, acted much as did the early describers of the newly discovered American Indian languages who learnedly sought, and happily found, in these structurally altogether foreign, non-Indo-European tongues all the appurtenances and paraphernalia of Latin grammar, and tidily classified them in Latin terminology—with the result that all of it had to be done over in the past few decades. (Of course, the enthusiasm with which some thereupon hustled to revamp Latin as though it were Nahuatl was equally misdirected.) So it does not make much sense for a contemporary linguist to ransack the ancients for hints and crumbs: there are things about Latin which we know better than they did, or which, at least, we have learned to discuss more accurately and scientifically than they could.²

² Charles W. L. Johnson, "The *accentus* of the Ancient Latin Grammarians," *T. A. P. A.*, XXXV (1904), pp. 65-76, has collected ancient theories and terminology on accentus, *προσῳδία*, grauis, acutus, circumflexus, etc. I quite disagree with the view exemplified by W. Corssen, *Ueber Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung der lateinischen Sprache* (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1868-70), which is old but, for many, not obsolete: "... the Latin grammarians would never have employed the translations of Greek terminology like *accentus*, *vocalatio*, *tenores* with respect to their native language, had not that musicality of the terms been characteristic also of the Latin language" (II, p. 797) (my translation). J. P. Postgate, "Accent in Latin," *C. P.*, III (1908), pp. 98-100, complains bitterly that ". . . the vanity of the supposition that we, Americans, Englishmen, or Germans, know better how Latin was pronounced than Cicero and Varro . . . is only matched by its fatuity" (p. 98). This betokens a touching but uncritical loyalty, based on the misconception that the native speaking-knowledge of a language suffices for knowing how to describe it scientifically. It does not even suffice, as most would agree nowadays, for teaching others how to speak it. It turns out, in any event, that Postgate is actually worried that, "... if first-hand evidence [as transmitted by the ancient grammarians] is not to be believed, the whole edifice of philological researches tumbles to the ground" (p. 98). It does of course not, not even if we disregard *everything* that the grammarians tell us; and besides, if the edifice is really so ramshackle as to collapse in the winds of criticism, it may

I am certain that the prosodies of a given language not only are pieces of the larger phonological system of the whole language, but also form a self-contained subsystem in which, to use a phrase Antoine Meillet employed with regard to the structure of a language in general, *tout se tient*. I have examined this contention for Latin, and I have published an article on it for French.³ Accordingly, one must discuss in context, not separately, quantity, stress, syllabation, and any other non-segmental feature of a dialect. After applying this principle to Latin, and after considering also the requirements of metrics, and after studying the Latin prosodies diachronically and comparatively—on all this I shall be able to report before long, I hope, in a work on Latin phonology—I cannot but conclude that every kind of Latin we know of had, not the pitch accentuation which most scholars agree in assigning to Greek, but one of stress. There is, furthermore, no shred of evidence (excepting again the grammarians' terminology) that Latin had any prosodic phenomenon that corresponded to the accentual triplets of Greek usually signaled by acute, grave, and circumflex accent marks (which Greek orthography in any event did not know in pre-Alexandrian times); a Latin syllable either was, or was not, stressed, and there was but one kind of stress.

not merit the props of deference. W. M. Lindsay, *The Latin Language* (Oxford, 1894, reprinted 1963), caustically concludes that the essential heterogeneity of Greek and Latin accentuation is "disproved by nothing except the silence of the grammarians" (p. 151), and then explains why the Roman grammarians did not do otherwise (pp. 151-2). A. Campbell, "The Indo-European Accent." *Transact. Philol. Soc.*, 1936, pp. 1-42, finds that in matters of accentuation "the grammarians are rendered almost worthless by a desire to provide their language with a system similar to that of Greek" (p. 14). In a recent work which views Latin accentuation in the light of structural analysis and historical evolution, Helmut Lüdtke, *Die strukturelle Entwicklung des romanischen Vokalismus* (Bonn, 1956), says without mincing words: "The Latin grammarians were not just bad phoneticians, they were no phoneticians at all; they were not even good phonologists, but continuously confused phonological and orthographical evidence; besides, they of course lacked the diachronic perspective, and on top of all that they allowed themselves—gravest error of all—to be enticed by the example of Greek grammarians to make statements which with respect to the Latin language were utterly senseless" (p. 124) (my translation).

³ Ernst Pulgram, "Prosodic Systems: French," *Lingua* [in press].

It is possible, however, that in the recitation of metrical poetry (which employed Greek metres exclusively, apart from the early defunct Saturnian line), or in the declamation of stately prose (I am thinking especially of metrical *clausulae*), or in the affected utterance of a foppish speaker (Catullus' Arrius comes to mind here) some special effort was made to give speech a peculiarly Hellenic timbre. And certainly when Greek words were spoken, not as partly or fully adapted loans, but as foreign vocables, then Greek pronunciation may have prevailed. But such conceit, or learnedness, or orthodoxy in favor of Greek could not but conflict with kindred attitudes likely to be cherished by the same speaker in regard to Latin.⁴

Yet in terms of genuine Latin accentuation, it cannot be reasonably doubted that the prosody characteristic for Latin is stress, which falls on a given syllable of every word, excluding clitics. Naturally, the rise in articulatory energy does not exclude a concomitant variation in pitch, but it does not demand it. Nor does Greek pitch accentuation on a given syllable exclude an accompanying component of stress.

In fact, the conditions of borrowing into Latin seem to require that a Greek syllable bearing an acute or a circumflex accent,

⁴ I shall cite here Quintilian who, when speaking of the *place* of stress in Latin, knows of course what he is talking about, and whose opinion is therefore pertinent in this context, but who, when calling a syllable "acute" points clearly to his dependence on Greek models as regards the phonological *nature* of Latin stress (I, 5, 58-9): "Inde Olympo et tyranno [=Ολυμπος, τύραννος] εicutam syllabam medium dederunt, quia duabus longis insequentibus primam breuem acui noster sermo non patitur . . . Nunc recentiores instituerunt Graecas declinationes potius dare, quod tamen ipsum non semper fieri potest. Mihi autem placet Latinam rationem sequi, quoisque patitur decor . . . In ceteris, quae potuerunt utroque modo non indecenter efferri, qui Graecam figuram sequi malet, non Latine quidem sed tamen citra reprehensionem loquetur." Terms like *decor*, *indecenter*, *reprehensionem* betray the involvement of preference and style, that is, of social rather than purely linguistic judgments, so that not even Quintilian was willing to commit himself on a hard and fast rule. I may add here, however, that although it is difficult to fix exactly the time at which a word ceases to be foreign and becomes a more or less naturalized loan (when did "bureau" stop being French and start being English?—or is it not English yet?), I have taken care to choose as my examples only lemmata which most would classify as "Latin" no matter what their provenance.

with whatever acoustic reality either implied (on the assumption that the grave accent merely marked the absence of accentual prosody, and in a certain orthography is therefore found on all syllables not having either of the other two), was also somehow pronounced more energetically, that is, presumably, louder. It is possible to regard the equation *κάμηλος—camēlus* as demonstrating that the Latin borrower paid attention only to the long vowel in the penultimate syllable, which of course he then was obliged to stress. The question as to whether the speaker of Latin even heard the accentuation of the first syllable of *κάμηλος* cannot be answered on this evidence alone. Quite possibly he could not; for it is known that the proper perception and identification of a linguistically significant pitch by a linguistically untrained person whose own idiom does not operate with pitch, is a difficult if not impossible accomplishment. (As speakers of English we do not recognize the functioning of, indeed often do not even hear, the tones of Chinese or Thai.) But in the equation *εἴδωλον—idolum* the speaker of Latin had no reason at all to stress the first rather than the second syllable, and in disregard of the quantity of the penultimate at that, *unless* he heard something in the Greek word that he could interpret as being matchable by a stress in his own language. It is not at all far-fetched to assume such a stress component in Classical Greek accentuation, in particular since eventually Greek in all its forms relinquished prosodemic pitch in favor of prosodic stress, which Modern Greek uses now. (The accent marks of Modern Greek are orthographic fossils.) And some say, not unreasonably and not without good evidence, that this shift came about, or at least had already made a start, as early as the second or even the third century B.C. (That the custom of providing Greek spelling with accent marks originated, as alluded to, in post-Alexandrian times, is a sure indication that without them many speakers would no longer have been able to read Classical Greek properly, let alone speak it. Demosthenes needed the accents no more than Cicero needed a macron.) There is, then, excellent reason to believe that the element of stress was present in Greek at the time of even the very early loans by Latin, for it is naive to assume that the change from pitch to stress occurred with any suddenness: linguistic change never does; and it would be foolish to imagine that stress in

spoken: but it must have been restricted to certain formal or solemn occasions. My terminology is meant to avoid two connotations especially that have attached themselves to the terms "Vulgar Latin" and "Classical Latin." One, that there is involved a chronological sequence, with VL being the corrupt successor of CL—although it is certain that with the political and cultural decline of the Roman Empire there came about also a growing inability of ever more users of Latin to adhere to the classical standard; two, that there is involved a social differentiation, with VL being the idiom of the lower and CL that of the higher classes—although it is certain that learning and using the standard language of literature was an endeavor more within reach of, and of usefulness to, the higher, educated rather than the lower, semi-literate and illiterate classes. I do want to suggest, instead, that SL and WL were coexistent dialects of Latin, employed by Romans in different contexts and for different purposes. One could possibly think of them as two styles, the first running from colloquial to vulgar, the other being formal and solemn, much as we employ different styles of English at different occasions. What makes me reluctant to speak of them as "styles" is their being linguistically rather more distant from one another than the term "style" would normally lead one to infer—most blatantly so in the domain of prosodies, with SL having a prosodeme of stress and no prosody of quantity, and WL having a prosodeme of quantity to which a prosody of stress is predictably attached. WL has perhaps the meaning of what in German is similarly called *Schriftsprache*, a variety of German that is spoken by numerous persons, either in addition to or, sometimes, to the exclusion of another kind of German, say, a local dialect, or a colloquial *Umgangssprache*. The dichotomy in the case of Latin became ever more aggravated in the course of time since practitioners of WL did not permit themselves, or others, to deviate from the strict standards and rules that *urbanitas* and the *grammaticus* ordained, while SL, free of similar constraints, kept evolving and increased the distance between itself and WL continuously. Indeed, the "history of Latin" is that of SL; WL has no history (except that it enjoyed periods of greater and of lesser competence and artistry among its users). If Chaucerian or Shakespearean English had acquired prestige, immutability, and

endurance similar to those of WL, we should be obliged to use it as the Romans used WL, while in our daily lives we should no doubt speak a contemporary form of English. (As it is, English orthography still does, though pronunciation and grammar do not, tie us to an obsolete linguistic past.) It is in the nature of language, as of all human cultural behavior, to change in time; immobility may be, for good cause, agreeable or desirable, but it is withal an enforced condition.

The schematic sketches that accompany my publications on SL and WL which I have cited show the divergence of the two dialects as occurring at a very early date of the known history of Latin, perhaps coinciding with the origin of Latin literary activity. The nascent concern with endeavors beyond the rude requirements of a small state of peasants and soldiers brought the Romans in touch with Greek culture and led them to a desire to busy themselves with what some of them no doubt called "the finer things in life," especially the arts and literature. But in most of these ambitions the Romans never got very far beyond an imitation of the Greeks in form and essence. This applies to their architecture (though they built bigger things than ever did the Greeks), their sculpture (though they developed to a hitherto unknown proficiency the art of portraiture), and their literature (in which even geniuses like Plautus, Vergil, Horace, Catullus, and great historians like Livy and Tacitus, with all their native talents, and even though some transposed their subject matter into an Italian ambience—the historians could hardly do otherwise—preserved Greek form and Greek essence). And when the Romans, having begun to use Latin as a vehicle of literary expression, commenced to occupy themselves with the nature, the structure, and the aesthetics of their language, both as authors and as grammarians, they did so entirely in terms of the Greek language. At the time when a standard Latin language started to be institutionalized, that is, when it diverged from its SL congener, it received from Greek not only the aesthetic and prestigious impetus so to establish itself, but also, I believe, some linguistic traits, especially in prosodic usage; at least, the beginning demise of certain traits, which actually disappeared in early SL (whence the similarities, sometimes incomprehendingly remarked upon by philologists, of Old Latin with much later "Vulgar Latin"),

was halted and even reversed. Notable among these features was, I now think, prosodemic (vocalic and syllabic) quantity, together with its inevitable prosodic satellites, e.g., non-prosodemic stress. But details on this I shall have to discuss at another occasion (see the footnote of acknowledgments, p. 138). It is, in any event, certain that the emerging classical language quickly gathered overtones of social and intellectual superiority, its mastery becoming a prominent criterion of social eminence, expected of the socially high and the socially ambitious. This both strengthened the dialect's conservatism and aided its entrenchment. Such an evolution is particularly understandable in a society like the Roman that was based upon an ancient cleavage of plebeians and patricians, of *uulcus* and *patres*—a concept so ingrained in the Roman way of life that many authorities, both ancient and modern, have sought to reduce what in historical times presents itself as an essentially social bisection, to prehistoric racial or ethnic origins. But it would be wrong to let this sociological circumstance lead us to associate an exclusively social dichotomy with SL and WL. Many Romans of both major social levels were bidialectal at any period of Latin history, understanding or speaking both SL and WL (though of course the involvement of either class was not always the same percentually or in terms of proficiency), using one or the other dialect as the occasion demanded.

There is not much that can be added to the vast amount of phonological, morphological, syntactical, and lexical description and comparison of SL and WL that industrious philologists and linguists have collected; and since the record is the same for all students, the view of each on the relationship between SL and WL, or VL and CL, has little influence on the gathering of the material. But in that enterprise insufficient attention has been given to the prosodies, especially as they were not treated coherently and connectedly, as a subsystem in themselves. My concern with the accentuation of Greek loans in Latin has been a part of research on the prosodies of Latin, and what I say on accentuation is part of the evidence I have assembled; but the views on Latin prosodies in general which have emerged provide in turn a theoretical foundation for my views on Greek loan accentuation. If I venture to suggest, therefore, that one may organize the seeming variety of such accentual transfers

into two major classes, depending on whether the borrowing from Greek was done, not earlier or later, not by the common people or by the learned, but by the SL or the WL dialect, the accentual patterning of the loanwords I shall present according to this classification is not the only evidence that led me to a SL radically different in prosodies from WL, but it fits with the rest and therefore reinforces the larger theory.

If a Greek word, then, came into Latin by way of WL, it retained its original syllabic quantities regardless of the effect upon accentuation; if by way of SL, it retained the original place of accentuation (though Greek accent, whatever its phonetic nature, was replaced by Latin stress) regardless of the original quantities. Of course, since the two dialects were not closed off one against the other, Greek borrowings could pass between them. As a consequence, a Greek loan may come to be used in SL with a stress pattern due to a WL history of borrowing, for once the Greek term had been naturalized in WL, where it was provided with a stress, albeit one whose place depended on the quantity of the penultimate syllable, that stress could retain its place in SL even after it had been divorced from quantity—an evolution that affected not only Greek loans but the entire vocabulary. Similarly, a Greek loanword that came first into the SL dialect may well have acquired its WL quantities, upon being borrowed by WL from SL, on the basis of its stress placement in SL, and in this sense an *idōlum* or a *butyrum* is at least imaginable; yet it is more likely that in such instances the user of WL, in deference to what he thought he owed to his personal style and to the WL dialect, may have reverted to the Greek original and reimported the word all over with what seemed proper regard for the prosodic requirements of WL—much as a peculiarly fastidious or socially anxious speaker of English may attempt to pronounce a long since naturalized “fiancée,” or “hors d’œuvres,” in a manner more French than even good English usage actually demands. There will be loans, then, whose true borrowing history will not in its entirety emerge from their accentuation; yet it will nonetheless be possible to classify that accentuation according to dialectal criteria.

Finally, I must also mention the possibility that Latin borrowed a word from the kind of Greek which no longer had a

pitch but a stress accentuation—a shift which, as I mentioned before, some scholars date as being discoverable in the third or second century B.C. This circumstance, however, does not change anything in my scheme. If SL borrows from that kind of Greek, it merely means that the new prosody of Greek is all the more clearly detectable by the SL borrower because it now corresponds entirely, and not only partly (that is, as an accompaniment to pitch), to his; and Greek quantity still does not interfere—all the more since it seems that this pitchless but stressed kind of Greek was also afflicted by a loss of prosodemic quantity distinctions. This shows itself in Greek spellings which, as early as the third century B.C., have η and ω in stressed syllables in the place of ϵ and \circ , and, vice versa, the short for the long vowels in unstressed position, pointing to the rise of prosodic (but no longer prosodemic) quantity determined by the condition of stress of a given syllable.⁶ But if WL is the borrowing dialect, it is concerned with only syllabic quantity in any event, and whether Greek accentuation is one of pitch or of stress does not matter. Moreover, in view of the orthodoxy of WL in such things, and since, as I remarked, quantity may have been abandoned together with pitch, the borrowing may at any rate hark back to the Classical Greek form (note what I just said about WL taking over Greek loans from SL), which not only remains accessible in literature but no doubt also among speakers of Greek (one is tempted to say "WG"), especially since, as we have seen, a linguistic phenomenon, especially a prestigious one (as surely Greek pitch was to many), is not replaced by another overnight and disappears from usage altogether.

⁶ Cf. Aage Kabell, *Metrische Studien II. Antiker Form sich nähernd* (Uppsala, 1960), pp. 12-13. In fact, this had been noted seventy years earlier by Paul Kretschmer, "Der Uebergang von der musikalischen zur expiratorischen Betonung im Griechischen," *Kuhns Zeitschrift*, XXX (1890), pp. 591-600, who connected quite properly the loss of prosodemic quantity with the loss of prosodemic pitch: "It is a fact, then, that vulgar pronunciation caused the fusion of long and short vowels as early as the 2nd century B.C. But with the neutralization of quantitative distinction also one of the most important conditions for the original accentuation was eliminated" (p. 599) (my translation).

(D)

Without pretense of exhaustiveness I shall now set up a number of typical classes of Greek loans. The major division will of course identify them as belonging to either SL or WL; but there will also be subdivisions based on the internal behavior of words, and it will be convenient to make separate categories for local and personal (divine, heroic) names. And when all is said and done, it will not be startling to discover that WL loans appear in greater variety and greater number than SL loans: the cultural relationship of Greece and Rome (*Graecia capta ferum uictorem cepit*) and the social conditions in Rome rather presage such a result.

O *Latin quantity ← Greek quantity*
Latin stress ← Greek accent
SL, WL

In this class of words, the quantity requirements of WL and the stress requirements of SL are both met, and it is impossible to decide, on this prosodic aspect alone, which of the two dialects actually borrowed the word. Hence I number this category 0 (zero).

γένεσις	génésis	κόλαφος	cóläphus
κάλαμος	cálamus	βάλσαμον	bálsämmum
φιλόσοφος	philósóphus	φαρέτ-ρα	pharét-ra ^(a)
θάλαμος	thálāmus	καθέδρα	cathéd-ra ^(a)
κρόταλον	crótālum	ποδάγ-ρα	podág-ra ^(b)
διαβήτης	diabétes	‿λογος	‿lögus
ἀποθήκη	apothéca	‿πολις	‿pölis
κάλυξ	cályx	‿ια	‿ia ^(a)
φαρμακοπώλης	pharmacopóla	‿εία	‿íá
κρηπίδα	*crepída ^(a)	‿είδης	‿ídes

- (a) I am listing this hypothetical form because one would expect it in Latin. The actually occurring *crepida* owes its quantity and stress to the analogy of words ending in *-idus* (*lepidus, tepidus, rapidus*).
- (b) I am listing, for WL, the form in which muta cum liquida does make position (hence my indication of syllable division), so that the syllable with the short vowel is scanned long and bears the stress. For SL no problem arises. See the same lemmata under IA, note (b), below.

- (c) Latin forms derived from Greek *-ia* occurring as *-ia* are probably due to analogy and confusion with *-ēia*—*ia*.

Oa Local names.

<i>Δρέπανα</i>	Drépāna
<i>Δρέπανο</i>	Drépānum
<i>Δρέπανε</i>	Drépāne

- (a) The stress marks are not part of normal Italian orthography.
 (b) See also *Móλασσα* under IBa, note (c), below.

Ob Personal names.

<i>Πάρις</i>	Páris	<i>Αἰνείας</i>	Aenēas
<i>Νέστωρ</i>	Néstor	<i>Κλυταιμνήστρα</i>	Clytaemnēstra
<i>*Ἀρτεμις</i>	Ártēmis	<i>Τηλέγονος</i>	Telégōnus
<i>*Ἀφροδίτη</i>	Aphrodítē	<i>Τηλέμαχος</i>	Telémachus
<i>*Ἀθήνη</i>	Athénā	<i>Εὐρύαλος</i>	Eurýalus ^(a)
<i>Εὐκλείδης</i>	Euclídes		

- (a) Despite their formal intransparency, chances are that most of these names, especially the divine and heroic, came first into WL, owing to their literary provenance. See under IA_b, below.

IA Latin quantity ← Greek quantity

Latin stress ↔ Greek accent (non-final)

WL

<i>γραφίον</i>	graphiūm	<i>θέατρον</i>	theātrum
<i>διάδημα</i>	diadēma	<i>σύστημα</i>	systēma
<i>καμάρα</i>	caméra	<i>παράσιτος</i> ^(a)	parasitus
<i>κάμινος</i> ^(a)	caminus	<i>φαρέτρα</i>	pharē-tra ^(b)
<i>κατάληψις</i>	catalēpsis	<i>-ia</i> ^(a)	<i>-ia</i>
<i>βραχίων</i> ^(a)	brac(e)hiūm	<i>-īdης</i> ^(a)	<i>-ides</i>
<i>κροκόδειλος</i>	crocodilūs		
<i>πολύπος</i>	polypus		

- (a) If the quantity of the Greek iota were not known from other sources, the Latin treatment of it in WL loans would in fact deliver a clue.
 (b) Under a strictly WL treatment, the syllable preceding muta cum liquida may or may not be long by position, hence may have the quantity of the vowel and does or does

not bear the stress accordingly; the same treatment applies to *podagra*, *cathēdra*, etc.: see under 0, note (b), above.⁷

IIA₁ Local names.

<i>Διπάρη</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Lipāra} \\ \text{Lipāre} \\ \text{Lipārae} \end{array} \right\}$	It. Lípari ^(a)
<i>Διπάρι</i>		
<i>Διπάραι</i>		
<i>Ἄρδεα</i>	Árdēa	“ Árdea
<i>Προχύτη</i>	Prochīta	“ Prócida
<i>Εὐρύνηλος</i>	Euryálus	
<i>Εὔξεινος</i>	Euxínūm	
<i>Στρογγύλη</i>	Strongýle	It. Strómboi
<i>Κέρκυρα</i>	Corcýra	“ Corcíra
<i>Ἀλερία</i>	Alería	“ Aléria
<i>Βαΐα</i>	Baiae	“ Báia
<i>Κυκλάδης</i>	Cyclādes	“ Cícladi
<i>*Ἀβδηρα</i>	Abdēra	

(a) These islands may well have had a pre-Greek name with stress on the first syllable, as in Latin and Italian; but the long final eta demanded an acute on the penultimate.

IIA₂ Local names.^(a)

<i>*Ἀλλιφαι</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Alliphae} \\ \text{Aliphae} \\ \text{Allefae} \end{array} \right\}$	It. Álife
<i>*Ἀλεξάνδρεια</i>	Alexandriā	“ Alessándria
<i>Karávnη</i>	Catāna	“ Catánia
<i>Kelt. Eburóuices</i>	Eburouīces	Fr. Evreux
?	Londinīum	Eng. Lóndon
?	Aegātes	It. Egadi
<i>*Ηπειρος</i>	Epírus	It. Épiro
<i>*Αναπος</i>	Anāpus	“ Ánapo
<i>Níkata</i>	Nícaēa	“ Nizza (Nice)
<i>Mónoukos</i>	Monōecus	“ Mónaco
<i>Etr. cecina</i>	Cæcīna	“ Cécina
?	Leuriācum	Germ. Lorch
?	Pisāurum	It. Pésaro
?	Puteōli	“ Pozzuóli

(a) This group has a special interest because the modern

⁷ The quantitative ambivalence of a syllable before muta cum liquida is shown by the occurrence, in the same line, of the following pairs: *uōlūcri—uōlūcris* (Ov., *Met.*, XIII, 607; *nigris—nigrō* (Hor., *Od.*, I, 32, 12); *pātr̄is—pātr̄em* (Verg., *Aen.*, II, 663).

Italian form of the names accords in accentuation not with Latin but with some pre-Latin (Greek or other) originals. This shows clearly that, in this category, the Latin accentuation is due to the requirements of WL, while the coexistent SL form endured throughout history in the local speech. Therein, by the way, lies a not inconsiderable confirmation of my view on the coexistence of WL and SL from very early times.

IAb Personal names.^(a)

Ἐλένη	Helēna	Θάλεια	Thalīa
Μενέλαος	Menelāus	Ιφιγένεια	Iphigenīa
Εύριδίκη	Euridice	Ανδρομάχη	Andromāche
Σωκράτης	Socrātes	Ξενοφάνης	Xenophānes
Ομηρος	Homērus	Αἰσχύλος	Aeschylus
Εὐδήμος	Eudēmus	Εὐριπίδης	Euripiđes

(a) It is not surprising that most names, but especially those of the mythological, heroic, and artistic spheres, enter by way of WL rather than SL. See also under Ob, above. In what way numerous names that do not occur in Latin metric poetry were stressed it is difficult to say. See IIb, below.

IB Latin quantity ↔ Greek quantity

Latin stress (by position) ↔ Greek accent
WL

In this category I am listing words in which the syllable bearing the Latin stress is long by position (regardless of how it was measured in Greek) but where the stress does not fall on the same syllable as in Greek.

κυπάρισσος	cup(a)rēssus	ἄβυσσος	abýssus
βάπτισμα	baptísmma	τάλαντον	taléntum
φάντασμα	phantásma	πρόγραμμα	prógrámma
διάλεκτος	dialéctus	πάρεδρος	parēd-ros ^(a)

(a) This word belongs here if muta cum liquida form position; if they do not—see under II, below. See also under O, note (b), IA, note (b), above.

IBa Local names.^(a)

Τάρας, ῥαντος	Taréntum	It. Táranto
Υδροῦς, Ὑδροντος	Hydréntum	“ Ótranto
Σιποῦς, Σίποντος	Sipónatum	“ *Síponto, ^(b) ; Sipónito

Σολοῦς, Σόλουντος	Solus, -untis	"	Sólunto
Μύλασσα	Mylássa ^(a)		
Kelt. Baiocasses	Baiocásses	Fr. Bayeux	
" Trícasses	Trícásses	Fr. Troyes	
?	Lepántum	It. Lépanto	

- (a) This entire group of names is interesting for reasons similar to those under IA_a; that is, while WL reflexes behave as expected, there must have existed a continued usage that retained the place of the Greek accent and ignored Latin quantity (by position), with the result that modern place names are accentually heirs to pre-Latin forms.
- (b) I am citing this hypothetical form, which one would expect; the actual *Sípento* is no doubt due to analogy of the numerous endings in *-ponto*, *-ponte* (from Latin *-pon-tum*, *-pontem*).
- (c) There exists also an alternate form *Μύλασα* which, since the second syllable cannot be long by position, appears in Latin as *Mylása* and belongs to 0_a, above.

IBb Personal names.

Πάτροκλος	Patrók-lus ^(a)		
Ἀλέξανδρος	Alexánder	Κλέαρχος	Cleárchus
Εὐμόλπος	Eumólpos	Ξάνθιππος	Xanthíppus
Ἀκάστος	Acástus	Φίλιππος	Philíppus

- (a) Thus, if the short *o* is in a syllable long by position; if there is no position, the result is *Pátro-clus* and belongs under II, below. See also under ICb, below.

IC Latin quantity ← Greek quantity

Latin stress ↔ Greek accent (final)

WL

If a Greek word (of more than one syllable) has the accent on the final syllable, it cannot upon being borrowed into Latin have the stress on the same syllable; instead, the stress is put wherever the syllable quantity of the penultimate requires.

ταπεινός	tapīnus	μηχανή	machīna
ἐπιστολή	epistōla	ὁβολός	obōlus
βασιλική	basilica	συναγωγή	synagōga
ὑπερβολή	hyperbōle	διαλογιστής	dialogista

ICa Local names.

Αττική	Attīca	Χαλκηδών	Chalcēdon
Αργολίς	Argōlis	Κολοφών	Colōphon

ICb Personal names.

Πατροκλῆς	Patrō-clus ^(a)	Ἐρμῆς	Hērmes
Πηλεύς	Pelēus	Σοφοκλῆς	Sophōcles
Ξενόφων	Xenōphon	Ἀχιλλεῦς	Achilléles

(a) See also under IBb, note (a), above, and IIb, below.

II Latin quantity ↔ Greek quantity

Latin stress ← Greek accent

SL

Since the words under this category belong to SL, and since the Romance languages are derived from it rather than from WL, I shall wherever possible add a Romance derivative which unmistakably betrays the accentuation of its Latin source (which may itself not be attested, in which case it has the customary asterisk in front of it). Many of the words here listed occur also in a WL form, that is, were borrowed by WL also, hence could be listed under I, above.

ἄγκυρα	áncora	It. áncora
καριόφινιλλον	*cariófillum	" garófano
έδωλον	ídolum	" ídolo
ἔρημος	éremus	" éremo
χολέρα	coléra	" coléra ^(a)
σίναπι	sínapē	" sénape
ἔγκαυστον	éncaustum ^(a)	Old Fr. enque Eng. ink
ἀκήδεια	acédia	It. accédia
βουντύρον	bútyrum	" burro
σέλινον	*sélinum	" sédano
κιθάρα	cithára	" chitárra
βλάσφημος	blásphemus	" biásimo
πτιωσάνη	* (p) tisána	" tisána
πομπίλος	pompílus	" pompílo
-ία	-ía	" -ía

(a) It. *coléra* means "cholera," but the derivative from WL, *cóllerā*, means "anger."

(b) WL *encaustum* has given the Italian derivative *inchióstro*.

IIa Local names.

Here belong the presumable SL forms of the modern names listed under IAa₂, all of which, and others like them, are ultimately derived from non-Latin origins, with WL showing a divergent development. There must be many others that did not result in modern forms; but if a name is recorded only in Latin prose and quantitative poetry, without ever occurring in pre-Latin or Romance, or in Latin accentual poetry, it is impossible to decide whether it had a separate SL accentual shape.

IIb Personal names.

The harvest here is bound to be meagre, for exactly the same reasons as just stated under IIa, above. Moreover, while local names remain attached with notorious tenacity to the same enduring feature of landscape or river or town over the centuries, bearers of personal names perish: Abraham Lincoln has the "same" name as Abraham the father of Isaac in quite a different sense from *Épîro* having the same name as "Ηπεῖρος."

Iákw̄bos	Iécobus	It. Giácopo
Πάτροκλος	Pátroclus ^(a)	
Θρασύβουλος	*Thrasýbulus	" Trasibulo ^(b)

(a) See also under IBb and ICb, above.

(b) If the Italian form of the name is actually a late direct borrowing from Greek, which is true of many of classical antiquity, then the hypothetical SL form is unjustified. It. *Trasibùlo*, from WL *Thrasybûlus*, also exists. Similarly, Italian has both *sclérosi* and *scleròsi* (and the dispute over which is "better" is as endless as it is fruitless) from either SL *sclérosis* or a WL *sclerósis*, on the basis of Greek *σκλήρωσις*—unless *sclérosi* is a late direct borrowing again. There are many such doublets in Italian.

ERNST PULGRAM.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

THE DATE OF THE ATHENIAN GOLD COINAGE.

τῷ προτέρῳ ἔτει ἐπὶ Ἀντιγένους Ἐλλάνικός φησι χρυσοῦν νόμισμα
κοπῆναι· καὶ Φιλόχορος ὅμοίως τὸ ἐκ τῶν χρυσῶν Νικᾶν.
Ἐλλάνικός Bentley ἀλλὰ νικᾶ V

With this likely emendation the Venetus scholion to line 720 of Aristophanes' *Frogs* provides the information that Hellanicus said that Athens minted gold coinage in the archonship of Antigenes (407/6), which was the year prior to the production of the play.¹ Philochoros added that the gold for the coins came from the statues of Nike.² W. S. Ferguson, however, has argued that the Athenian coinage of gold took place in 406/5, the archonship of Kallias,³ and his view has been seconded by E. S. G. Robinson.⁴ Since two such eminent scholars have challenged the accuracy of Hellanicus (or of the scholion), it is important to re-examine the arguments for their position.

This paper attempts to show that the inscription upon which Ferguson mainly relied, *I. G.*, I², 255a, cannot be used to disprove Hellanicus' statement and to offer a reasonable explanation of the stele of which that inscription forms a part. The success or failure of the second part (which is, by nature, speculative and not capable of formal proof) has no bearing on the negative arguments in the first half.

¹ *F. Gr. H.* 323a F 26; the hypothesis to the play gives its date. This scholion should not be construed to mean that the Atticographers were unaware that gold continued to be minted after the first year (cf. *I. G.*, II², 1686, face A, line 13). They may have seen fit to list the minting of gold only once, when it began. The author wishes to thank A. E. Raubitschek for profitable criticism of earlier drafts of part I of this paper and A. M. Woodward and B. D. Meritt for information on particular points.

² *F. Gr. H.* 328 F 141; on the Nikai cf. D. B. Thompson, "The Golden Nikai Reconsidered," *Hesperia*, XIII (1944), pp. 173-209.

³ *The Treasurers of Athena* (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), pp. 8-15, 87-95. This work is hereafter cited as *Treasurers*.

⁴ "Some Problems in the Later Fifth Century Coinage of Athens," *Museum Notes*, IX (1960), pp. 11-12.

I

Four large fragments are preserved of the stele which contains *I. G.*, I², 255a.⁵ The top of the stele is preserved in part, but the original back is not. The stone is engraved in three parts (*I. G.*, I², 254, 255, and 255a), with uninscribed areas before 254 (0.06 m.), between 254 and 255 (0.08 m.), between 255 and 255a (0.10 m.), and after 255a (0.07 m.). *I. G.*, I², 255 lacks most of the formulaic opening of fifth century treasure records:

τάδε *hoi* ταμίαι τῶν λιερόν χρεμάτον τῆς Ἀθεναίας δέενα καὶ .
χονάρχοντες, *hois* δέενα ἐγραμμάτευε, παρέδοσαν τοῖς ταμίαις
hois δέενα ἐγραμμάτευε, παραδεχσάμενοι παρὰ τὸν προτέρον ταμίον,
hois δέενα ἐγραμμάτευε.

It lacks all of this up to *παραδεχσάμενοι*.

In first questioning Hellanicus' date, Ferguson employed the following restoration of *I. G.*, I², 255a:⁶

ΣΤΟΙΧ. 59/60

[<i>hoi</i> ἐν τῷ ἐπὶ Ἀλεξανδρίᾳ ἀρχεύτος ἐνιαυτῷ ᾧ] ρχσαντες ταμίαι: [Καλλι[.....]] [-----]: Φίλιππος Φιλεσίο [Προβ[ελίσι]-] 325 [ος -----] εὺς: Μενέστρατος [Μενεσ[τράτο.]] [----- 'Ελε] νσίγιος: Ἀντιφῶν [Αντιφ[.....]] [----- <i>hois</i> ----- Εὐ] θίο Δευκονοιεὺς [ἐγρα[μμάτευε], [παρέδοσαν τὰ τῆς θεοῦ χοέματα ἡελλενοταμ]ίας Χαριάδει Χαρίο [Ἄγ[ρυ].ἔθεν] [καὶ συνάρχοσι, φσεφισαμένο -ο δέμο ἐπὶ Κ]αλλίο ἀρχοντος, ἐπὶ [τῆς, βο[λές ἡει] 330 [----- πρότος ἐ] γραμμάτευεν ≡ ἐκ τῷ [Προγέ[ο ἀφελό]-] [μενοι. κατελέφθε στέφανος χρυσός, σταθμ]ὸν τούτο: ΔΔΔΗ-ΙΙΙ v

From this inscription he drew the conclusion that during the archonship of Kallias a decree was voted which made all the *anathemata* in the chambers of the Parthenon (the Pronaos, the Hekatomedon, and the Parthenon) and the golden Nikai

⁵ Cf. *I. G.*, I, 139-40. *I. G.*, I², 255a = *I. G.*, I², 255, lines 323-31; for the bibliography of this inscription cf. *S. E. G.*, X, 191.

⁶ *Treasurers*, p. 13.

available to the Hellenotamiae for minting.⁷ Hence, he argued, gold coinage was not minted until this decree was passed. This is certainly not a necessary inference. One might conclude from the Philochoros citation that only the Nikai were employed for minting in 407/6. They were probably eight in number, and the gold portions of each weighed two talents.⁸ The gold available from these statues, then, was sixteen talents. In comparison, the dedications in the chambers of the Parthenon were not great; they weighed only *ca.* one talent.⁹ It is certainly not unreasonable to suppose that the Athenians decided originally to dispose of the Nikai, which the city itself had constructed, and only later decided to consume the dedications, most of which were the gifts of private individuals.

After Ferguson had offered this restoration, it was discovered that the inscription could contain, at the most, only forty-six letters per line, and some new readings were made.¹⁰ A new restoration, therefore, became necessary. Before attempting to determine the contents of the missing portions of the inscription, however, we must insist that a mere restoration, unless it is an absolutely necessary one, cannot outweigh the tradition of the Attidographers. *I. G.*, I², 255a clearly records the transfer of something either to the tamiae or to the [Helleno]tamiae. Omitting the names of the treasurers who prepared the inscription, the following is possible:

ΣΤΟΙΧ. 46

323 [----- *hoi* χονά] ρχσαντες ταμιαι -----
 327 [----- *hois* -----] αθία Δευκονοιεὺς ἐγρα[μμάτε *v*] -
 [νε παρέδοσαν ήελλενοταμ]ίας Χαριάδει Χαρίο 'Αγ[ρυλέθ *v*] -
 [εν καὶ χοννάρχοσιν, ἐπὶ Κ]αλλίο ἄρχοντος, ἐπὶ τῆς βο[λῆς ήε]-
 330 [----- ε]γραμμάτεν -----

The date refers, then, to the transfer, not to a decree. The Eleusinian epistatai of 408/7 also date one of their transactions by the archon and the prytany secretary.¹¹ The empty spaces

⁷ *Treasurers*, pp. 87-95.

⁸ Cf. Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-89.

⁹ *I. G.*, I², 232-90.

¹⁰ Cf. A. C. Johnson, *A. J. P.*, LIII (1932), pp. 274-8; W. B. Dinsmoor and W. S. Ferguson, "The Last Inventory of the Pronaos of the Parthenon," *A. J. A.*, XXXVII (1933), pp. 52-3.

¹¹ *I. G.*, I², 313, lines 174-83; cf. B. D. Meritt, "Notes on Attic Inscriptions," *A. J. P.*, LXIX (1948), pp. 69-71.

at the end of lines 327 and 328 are no obstacle since they occur very frequently in fifth century inventories.¹² It is also perfectly possible to restore the whole inscription with forty-five letters per line since we do not know either the left or the right margin. With the restoration which we have suggested there is no room for any mention of the decree upon which Ferguson relied.

Dinsmoor, on the other hand, has offered this restoration, which does mention the decree:¹³

ΣΤΟΙΧ. 46

323 [τὰ τές θεῶν ἀργυρᾶ hoi χσυνά]ρχσαντες ταμίαι-----
 327 [-----hois -----]αθίο Δευκονοιεὺς ἐγρα[μμάτευ]-
 [ev παρέδοσαν ιελλενοταρμ]ίσις Χαριάδει Χαρίο 'Αγ[ριλεεῖ]
 [καθάπερ ἐφοέφιστο ἐπὶ K]αλλίο ἀρχοντος ἐπὶ τές βο[λές hε]-
 330 [ι -----έ]γραμμάτευεν -----

If we accept this text, we must assume a scribal error in the omission of *καὶ χσυνάρχοσιν* and, moreover, we are simply manufacturing "evidence" to overthrow ancient testimony. Even if this were the correct restoration, it would still not prove that Athens did not mint gold in 407/6 since, as we have seen, the intention in that year may have been to use only the Nikai for this purpose, and worsening conditions may have compelled the use of the dedications in the following year. Nor should one overlook the possibility, suggested by Dinsmoor,¹⁴ that the alleged decree concerned only silver *anathemata*. It might have been necessary to use them because of the lack of silver which necessitated the coinage of gold, although it was still possible to spare the dedications of gold because of the availability of the Nikai.

Finally, an examination of the scheme which Ferguson and Dinsmoor have evolved to account for the strange features of the stele will show that their account is extremely unsatisfactory.

¹² Cf. A. M. Woodward, "Some More Fragments of Attic Treasure-Records of the Fifth Century," *J. H. S.*, XLVIII (1928), p. 161; Woodward, "Financial Documents from the Athenian Agora," *Hesperia*, XXXII (1963), pp. 163-4; B. D. Meritt, "Greek Inscriptions," *Hesperia*, XXX (1961), pp. 238-9.

¹³ William Bell Dinsmoor, "The Tribal Cycles of the Treasurers of Athena," *H. S. C. P.*, Supp. I [*Athenian Studies presented to William Scott Ferguson*] (1940), p. 169.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 168.

According to their reconstruction the inventories on this stele are those of 409/8 (*I.G.*, I², 254), 408/7 (255), and 405/4 (255a).¹⁵ Although the treasurers of Athena served annual terms, the four boards of treasurers of a Panathenaic penteteris co-operated with each other (*hai τέτταρες ἀρχαί, hai ἐδίδοσαν τὸν λόγον ἐκ Παναθηναίων εἰς Παναθηναῖα*). The first of the boards invariably chose a large stele which would accommodate at least four inventories.¹⁶ Ferguson says that the treasurers of 410/09 failed to do this since their inventory is not found on this stele.¹⁷ He also says that the treasurers of 408/7 left room at the beginning of their inventory (*I.G.*, I², 255) for the usual formula to be inscribed by their successors.¹⁸ Inexplicably they failed to fulfil this task. The treasurers of 407/6 and 406/5 made no inventory. "They probably had no obligation in the matter. After July, 406 B.C., the contents of the Pronaos were kept in their place, not because they belonged thereafter to the competence of the Tamiae, but simply because the Hellenotamiae were unready to remove them."¹⁹ The treasurers of 405/4 returned to this stone to record the ultimate fate of the silver dedications without making a complete list of them.

If, however, the contents of the chambers of the Parthenon passed to the competence of the Hellenotamiae at the end of the Panathenaic term of the treasurers of 407/6, as this reconstruction supposes, and the treasurers of Athena were no longer responsible, why did not the treasurers of 407/6 note the fact, and how can the treasurers of 405/4 claim that *they* transferred the *anathemata* to the Hellenotamiae? Moreover, to support

¹⁵ *Treasurers*, pp. 8-15; Dinsmoor, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-7.

¹⁶ Cf. the tables, *Treasurers*, pp. 54, 68-9; Tablet 3b, p. 69, is actually part of Tablet 3, as Woodward says, *J.H.S.*, XLVIII (1928), p. 166. For their Parthenon inventory the treasurers of 414/3 used the reverse of a stele whose obverse had been employed by the treasurers of the penteteris 434/3-431/0 (*I.G.*, I², 276-9). As it happened, only three inventories could be fitted on this reverse. If, however, the occurrence of two boards of treasurers in 411/0 because of the revolution and subsequent expulsion of the Four Hundred had not required five inventories, the fourth might have conveniently been inscribed on the lateral face of the stele, as *I.G.*, I², 298 of this year.

¹⁷ *Treasurers*, pp. 71-2.

¹⁸ *Treasurers*, pp. 72-3.

¹⁹ *Treasurers*, pp. 73-4.

the date of 406/5 for the first issue of gold coinage, it is necessary to assume that *all* the dedications and the golden Nikai were made available to the Hellenotamiae by one vote. The treasurers of Athena, however, saw fit to inscribe inventories of the contents of the Hekatomedon in 406/5 and 405/4²⁰ and of the contents of the Parthenon in one or more years after the dedications began to be removed.²¹ It is difficult to see how the treasurers of 407/6 and 406/5 failed to inscribe their other inventory, that of the Pronaos.

There are too many anomalies in this reconstruction of the history of the stele to be convincing.

It will be necessary to postpone consideration of the position of these inventories in the tribal cycle of secretaries of the treasurers of Athena to the second part of this paper. It will, however, be convenient to consider here the possible reason for Hellanicus' mistake which has been offered by Ferguson. On his hypothesis, the decree of the archonship of Kallias was voted during the first weeks of that year when the treasurers of 407/6 were still in office.²² They had time to implement it partially by turning over some Nikai to the Hellenotamiae. "Hellanikos very probably found, or said, that the golden Nikae were consigned to the melting pot on action of the *demos* by the Tamiae of Antigenes' archonship."²³ That Hellanicus, a contemporary, should have known this obscure fact without knowing the more important facts of the date of the decree and the date of the actual minting is scarcely credible. Even assuming that he obtained all his information from documents, he failed to discover the decree and must, presumably, have come upon a record of the transfer of the Nikai, which will have been prepared by the treasurers of Athena. If so, this record must have failed to list the date of the transfer and of

²⁰ *I. G.*, II^a, 1382-3; cf. Allen B. West and A. M. Woodward, "Studies in Attic Treasure-Records, II," *J. H. S.*, LVIII (1938), pp. 73-8.

²¹ Cf. *I. G.*, I^a, 292b.

²² *Treasurers*, pp. 86-9.

²³ *Treasurers*, p. 89. If Hellanicus had actually listed the first minting of gold under the archonship of Kallias, it would have been a simple matter for the Hellenistic scholars, from whom the scholion must descend, to find it. They found the date of the bronze coinage under Kallias in one of the Atthidographers (cf. the Venetus scholion to the *Frogs*, line 725 = *F. Gr. H.* 323 F 141b).

the decree and, accordingly, differed from *I. G.*, I², 255a, from *I. G.*, II², 1686, which does date the transfer of Nikai,²⁴ and from all the fifth century accounts of loans prepared by the treasurers of Athena (and the logistai), which date loans to the Hellenotamiae precisely to the day (except in the first half of *I. G.*, I², 304A, of 410/09, where they are dated to the prytany).²⁵

I. G., I², 255a is the sole piece of evidence adduced to show that the first Athenian gold issue took place in 406/5. We have seen that the inscription can be restored in more than one way, with or without any reference to a decree of 406/5, and that such a decree need not eliminate the possibility of an earlier issue.

II

As we have seen, *I. G.*, I², 255a probably records a transfer of something from the treasurers of Athena either to the tamiae or to the [Helleno]tamiae in the archonship of Kallias. The treasurers who prepared this inscription, then, may have been those who served from 28 Hekatombaion, 407 to 28 Hekatombaion, 406 (the Panathenaic term) or those who served from 28 Hekatombaion, 406 to 28 Hekatombaion, 405. The recipients are surely the Hellenotamiae. Chariades was a treasurer of Athena and the Other Gods in 404/3,²⁶ and that would likely have been a violation of the ban against iteration of offices, if he had previously been a treasurer of Athena (or of Athena and the Other Gods). If this inscription recorded the regular transfer at the end of the Panathenaic term from one group of treasurers to another, no date would have been required and the full contents of the chamber would have been listed. Finally, there is clearly a difference between the fate of the silver dedications in the Pronaos and the disposal of the gold crown, which would be unlikely in a normal annual transfer.

Two marks of punctuation are used in this inscription, namely, three dots (;) and a deeply cut rectangle (□) in line 330. Having examined the stone many times, I can report that the latter is definitely not an erasure. It is paralleled in

²⁴ Face A, line 13.

²⁵ Cf. *I. G.*, I², 293-309, 324.

²⁶ Woodward, *Hesperia*, XXXII (1963), pp. 144-55.

two other inscriptions of this period, also prepared by the treasurers of Athena, *I. G.*, I², 289 and 369-390a.²⁷ The three dots occur in 255a between the names of the treasurers and also between [σταθμὸν τούτο] and its numeral. In fifth century inventories this sign usually separates words from numerals and occurs *within* entries, e.g.:

[-----ΔΔΓΗΗΗ: φιάλαι ἀργυροί[ρ]ατι: ΓΙΙ: σταθμὸν τούτον:
ΜΗΗ: σ[τέφανος---]²⁸

In the other two inscriptions in which it occurs the rectangular sign (□) is used to separate entries from each other, and in one of them both the rectangle and the three dots appear, e.g.:

[-----ἀπόπτυγμα, π]ερόνα δύο, πόδες δύο: ΧΗΗΗΗΔΔΔΓΗΗ□ χέρι δύο
[εχσιά -----]²⁹

The rectangle seems to be a stronger stop than the three dots and is probably used in 255a to separate the phrase *ἐκ τῷ προνέῳ* from the rest of the inventory. This would permit us to insert in the first half of the inscription a reference to the silver *anathemata*, which is certainly desirable. Omitting the names of the treasurers, we have the following *sense*:³⁰

ΣΤΟΙΧ. 46

- 323 [τὰ ἀργυρᾶ τῆς θεᾶς ήσαν χσυνά]ρχσαντες ταμίαι -----
 327 [----- ήσαν -----]αθίο Λευκονοιεὺς ἔγρα[μμάτε ν]-
 [νε παρέδοσαν ήελλενοταρη]ίας Χαριάδει Χαρίο Αγ[ρυλέθ ν]-
 [εν καὶ χσυνάρχοσιν, ἐπὶ Κ]αλλίο ἄρχοντος, ἐπὶ τῆς βο[λές ήε]-
 330 [ι-----έ]γραμμάτενεν □ ἐκ τῷ προνέῳ μένε]-
 [ι στέφανος χρυσῶς, σταθμὸν τούτο: ΔΔΔΓΗΗΗ vacat]

²⁷ Cf. A. M. Woodward, "The Golden Nikai of Athena," *Apch. 'Εφ.* (1937), part A, pp. 159-60.

²⁸ *I. G.*, I², 242, line 117; cf. E. L. Hicks, *The Collection of Ancient Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum*, I (Oxford, 1874), pl. XXV.

²⁹ *I. G.*, I², 369, lines 11-12.

³⁰ The estimation of the number of letters per line in this inventory is necessarily subject to some guesswork (cf. Dinsmoor and Ferguson, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-3). Perhaps the following calculation may supply the correct answer. The alpha of [σταθμόν] in *I. G.*, I², 255, line 321 is the thirty-fourth of fifty-three letters. Directly below this, in line 323 of 255a, is the final letter of [χσυνά]ρχσαντες. If that inscription contained forty-five letters per line, this sigma should be the twenty-ninth letter (34: 53 :: 29: 45). If the reconstruction of this stele offered in part II is correct, we should have a reference in 255a to the silver *anathemata* listed in 255, e.g.:

[ταῦτα τὰ ἀργυρᾶ ήσαν χσυνά]ρχσαντες ταμίαι -----

The exact words to be restored in lines 323 and 330 are a mystery, but the contrast should be between what was transferred to the Hellenotamiae and what was retained by the treasurers of Athena; *ἐκ τὸ προφέ[ο]* will mean that the crown has been removed from the Pronaos to the Hekatomedon and will henceforth be listed in the inventories of that chamber, which now begin to contain such rubrics as *ἀπὸ τὸ νεώ τὸ ἀρχαῖο*, *ἐκ τὸ Παρθενῶνος*, and *ἐκ τὸ Ὀπισθοδόμο*.³¹ Once all the silver had been removed from the Pronaos, it would be only reasonable to take the gold crown from that chamber. This seems to be the most reasonable interpretation of the letters preserved on the stone and does not depend on the supplements in lines 323 and 330, but relies on what should be considered the *necessary* restoration of *[καὶ χοννάρχοσιν]* in line 329.

Still how can we overcome the many difficulties involved in the history of the stele itself? The following scheme is offered because of its simplicity: the obverse of the stele contained the inventories of 410/09 and 409/8, but is now lost; the reverse contains those of 408/7 (*I. G.*, I², 254) and 407/6 (255-255a). This scheme eliminates the failure of the treasurers of 410/09 to choose a stele sufficiently large for four inventories. No board of treasurers will have failed to make an inventory, and those who prepared 255 will have returned to sign their names. At the beginning of their term the treasurers of 407/6 agreed to have their inventory inscribed in advance, except for the names of their successors and their own names. Near the end of their term, in the first weeks of the archonship of Kallias, it became necessary to dispose of all but one of the dedications in the Pronaos. It was impossible, therefore, simply to insert the missing names at the beginning of the inventory. A postscript was required, detailing the retention of the gold crown and the transfer to the Hellenotamiae of the silver *anathemata*. It was, of course, unnecessary to list them a second time. The treasurers presumably considered it an important occasion and decided to list all their names. Perhaps the separation of the two parts of the inventory and the use of a different stoichedon pattern in the second half was intended for emphasis. The

³¹ Cf. *I. G.*, II², 1370-1428 *passim*.

postscript in the first Quota List, inscribed on the lateral face; is not hard to believe, although it came as a surprise.³²

The only obstacle to this scheme is the apparent facts that the "chairman" of the treasurers of Athena in 408/7, according to the Erechtheum building accounts,³³ was Aresaichmos Agrelethen and that the "chairman" in *I. G.*, I², 254, which we would assign to that year was Phi---. By "chairman" is meant the individual nameč in the phrase δεῖνα καὶ χονάρχοντες. If there could be only one "chairman" in any given year, then our reconstruction cannot stand. If, however, there could be more than one "chairman" in a year, or if Aresaichmos was not really the "chairman" of the *entire* board of treasurers, this reconstruction will solve many of the riddles of this stele.

Two points seem involved here. First, if the "chairman" died in office, was he listed as "chairman" when the treasurers inscribed their inventories at the end of their term? Probably not. There are several inscriptions which list the treasurers of Athena or the treasurers of the Other Gods and are sufficiently well preserved to enable us to be certain how many names were originally inscribed. The number of treasurers originally listed in these inscriptions varies, and it seems possible that someone had died in office and been omitted from the inscription.³⁴ There is more evidence on this question. The treasurers of Athena of 419/8 included the following in the introduction to their Parthenon inventory:³⁵

τάδε οἱ ταμίαι——— [παρέδοσαν τοῖς ταμίαισι, ἡοῖς Φορ]-
130 μίον Κυδαθεναὶ ἐγραμμάτευε, Χαρίνοι· Αλεξιμάχο [Π]έλεκι <καὶ
χονάρχοσι>, παραδεχσάμενοι παρὰ [τὸν
προτέρου ταμῶν]

³² Cf. B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, II (Princeton, 1949), List 1, Postscript.

³³ Fragments XIII, col. 1, lines 63-5 and XVII, col. 1, lines 27-9, col. 2, lines 24-6, edited by L. D. Caskey, *apud* J. M. Paton, *The Erechtheum* (Cambridge, Mass., 1927).

³⁴ Cf. *I. G.*, I², 255a (six treasurers), 310 (five), 355 (seven), 358 (eight), 359 (ten), and 370 (ten, nine, and ten, in three different years); cf. also B. D. Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents of the Fifth Century* (Ann Arbor, 1932), pp. 35-40.

³⁵ *I. G.*, I², 283, lines 129-30. This inscription contains the same scribal error to which we objected in Dinsmoor's restoration of *I. G.*, I², 255a. Of course, such errors do occur, but it is a mistake to posit them unnecessarily.

When, however, the treasurers of 418/7 came to inscribe their own inventories, they listed Pythodoros Halaieus as "chairman" and Phormion Kydathenaieus as secretary.³⁶

The treasurers of 415/4, the last year of the penteteris, prepared their Pronaos inventory with the following heading:³⁷

[τάδε *hoi tamiai*]αι τὸν λιερῶν χρεμάτον τῆς Ἀθηναίας Δεοχά[ρες
.....¹⁰..... καὶ χοννάρ]-
[χοντες, *hois T*]ελέας Τελενίκο Περγασέθεν ἐγραμμάτευε, π[αρέδοσαν
τοῖς ταμίαις *vacat*]
[vacat] vacat Μελε[σ]ίᾳ[ι]
.....⁶... καὶ χοννάρχοσι, πα]-
195 [ραδεχσάμενοι π]αρὰ τὸν προτέρον ταμιῶν

Twenty-nine blank spaces are preserved in the third line of the inventory. They are not the result of an erasure. They are clearly intentional, and such a vacant area is found in the Hekatomedon inventory of this year (five blank spaces preserved in the second line):³⁸

146 [τάδε *hoi tamiai tōn hieρōn χρεμάτον τῆς Ἀθηναίας Δεοχάρες*
.....¹⁰..... καὶ χονν]άρχο[ντ]-
[ες, *hois Teleas Teleiniko Περγασέθεν ἐγραμμάτευε, παρέδοσαν*
τοῖς ταμίαις *vacat*] vacat
[vacat Μελεσίαι ..⁸... καὶ
χοννάρχοσι, παραδε]χσάμε[ν]-
[οι παρὰ τὸν προτέρον ταμιῶν]

The treasurers left room for the name of either the secretary or the "chairman" of their successors, but no one filled in the blank space. Both these inventories were the last of four to be inscribed on the reverse of a pair of stelai whose obverse faces had already been filled.³⁹ They were not used again and, accordingly, differ from *I.G.*, I², 255, since its stele was re-employed for the engraving of 255a.

Melesias is clearly the "chairman," not the secretary. If he

³⁶ *I.G.*, I², 244, lines 134-6; 268, lines 102-3.

³⁷ *I.G.*, I², 247, lines 192-5. I read the left bar of the dotted alpha on the stone.

³⁸ *I.G.*, I², 271, lines 146-9; cf. Hicks, *op. cit.*, pl. XXVIII. I have restored this heading to agree with that of *I.G.*, I², 247. It is the *preserved* blank spaces which really matter.

³⁹ Cf. *I.G.*, I, 121-8 (= *I.G.*, I², 236-9 and 244-7) and Hicks, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-62 (= *I.G.*, I², 264-71).

had been secretary, we might expect *hoīs* to precede his name. The point is shown more clearly by the inventory of the Pronaos prepared by the treasurers of 411/0, also the last year of the penteteris, and also on the reverse of a stele whose obverse had been used.⁴⁰ It begins:

265 [τάδε *hoīi ταμίαι τὸν ἡιερόν*] ὅγ χρεμάτον τῆς Ἀθεναίας Ἀμεινάδ[ες
----- καὶ χσυνάρχοντες, *hoīs*]
[-----]ς ἐ[γ]ραμμάτενε, ταρέδοσαν τοῖς
ταμίαις *vacat* [*vacat*]
[-----]Μαραθονίοι καὶ χσυνάρχοσιν

There are three blank spaces at the end of the second line. Certainly, it is the name of the secretary which has been omitted here.

When the treasurers of 414/3 prepared their inventories, they listed Teisamenos Paianieus as "chairman" and Polymedes Ateneus as secretary. We have, then, two cases in which the "chairman" probably died and was replaced by a new "chairman." Even if Melesias was the secretary, the replacement of a secretary would increase the likelihood of the replacement of a "chairman."

Further evidence is provided by an inscription of 426/5 which concerns a pair of golden Nikai and begins as follows:⁴¹

ΣΤΟΙΧ. 18

[τὸ Νίκ]α τὸ χρυ[σᾶ ἔστεσ]-
[αν] Ἀθεναῖοι ἐπ[ὶ τῆς βο]-
[λ.]εῖς ἡὲς Μεγαλ[είδες Δ]-
[εν]κονολεὺς πρ[ότος ἐγ]-
5 ραμμάτενε, Ἀθε[ραῖοι]
δὲ ὄρ[χ]οντος Εἰ[θύνο ...]
[....τ]ες θεῶς ε[.....]
[....]λι. δες Ἀ[ακαγεὺς]
[καὶ χ]συνάρχον[τες ...]

The stone is badly weathered and difficult to read. After examining it for several days, I decided upon ΛΙ.ΔΕΞΑΝ in line 8. The stone must have been much easier to read in

⁴⁰ *I. G.*, I², 253, lines 265-7; cf. Woodward, *J. H. S.*, XLVIII (1928), p. 166. Kallistratos Marathonios appears as "chairman" in 410/09 in *I. G.*, I², 304A, lines 2-3.

⁴¹ *I. G.*, I², 368, lines 1-9, with new readings and restorations. It seems preferable to assume crowding in line 8 rather than an irregular spelling of the demotic.

the past since several previous editors saw many more letters in all parts of it than I.⁴² Lebas gives the fullest reading of line 8: ΕΚ.ΛΙΓΙΕΣΑΝ.⁴³ The correct reading would, therefore, seem to be:

ε Κ[α]λλι<ά>δες Ἀν[ακατεύσ]

Whatever the correct reading, the traces which still remain will not permit the name to be either [Χαρ]μαντ[δες], who appears as "chairman" of the treasurers of Athena in their Hekatomedon inventory for 427/6, or Androkles Phlyeus, who appears as chairman of the treasurers of Athena for 426/5 in the logistai inscription.⁴⁴

This Nikai inscription is very likely one prepared by the treasurers of Athena, and not by the epistatai of the statues or by anyone else. All four pre-Eukleidean inscriptions of this type contain no mention of salaries, wages, purchases, or receipts,⁴⁵ which are frequent in building records prepared by epistatai. These four contain only the weights of the gold parts of the statues, and two even mention *anathemata* of gold and silver.⁴⁶ Such records are those of tamiae, not epistatai. During the fourth century the treasurers of Athena and the Other Gods inventoried the single golden Nike which survived the Peloponnesian War,⁴⁷ and as early as 405/4 they transferred some golden Nikai to the Hellenotamiae.⁴⁸ When the treasurers of Athena were later separated from the treasurers of the Other Gods, care of the Nike belonged to the former.⁴⁹ During the fifth century the money of Athena Nike was stewarded by the treasurers of Athena,⁵⁰ and they also inventoried several gold

⁴² Cf. *I. G.*, I, 176 and bibliography cited there.

⁴³ *Voyage archéologique en Grèce et en Asie Mineure*, I (Paris, 1853), no. 184.

⁴⁴ *I. G.*, I², 263, line 49; 324, lines 2 and 14.

⁴⁵ *I. G.*, I², 368, 369-90a; *I. G.*, II², 1502; *S. E. G.*, X, 215.

⁴⁶ *I. G.*, I², 369-90a; *I. G.*, II², 1502.

⁴⁷ Cf. Woodward, 'Αρχ. Ἐφ. (1937), part A, pp. 163-8. They also inventoried the Nike constructed in the fourth century (cf. Woodward, *ibid.*).

⁴⁸ *I. G.*, II², 1686, face A, line 13.

⁴⁹ Woodward, 'Αρχ. Ἐφ. (1937), part A, pp. 165-8.

⁵⁰ Cf. *I. G.*, I², 298, 301, 304B, 324, *passim*; 304A, line 5.

crowns belonging to that goddess.⁵¹ Completion of the construction of several golden Nikai is ordered by the Second Kallias Decree, which is largely concerned with the treasurers of Athena and matters within their competence.⁵² The epistatai who supervised the construction of the statues are mentioned in two Nikai inscriptions, but in the *body* of the inscriptions, not in the heading.⁵³ It is highly probable, therefore, that the treasurers of Athena prepared such inscriptions and that their names should be restored in the heading of the document under discussion, e.g.:

5 ----- 'Αθε[ραιοις]
δὲ ἄρ[χ]οντος Εἰ[θύνω τα]-
[μίαι τ]ῆς θεῶ ἵσ[αν κοίδ]-
ε Κ[α]λλι<ά>δες 'Αν[ακαλεῖς]
[καὶ χ]ρυσάρχον[τες ...]

Seven lines follow, in which only a few letters can be read. Next we have a description of the parts of a statue. Space is available, therefore, for the names of the treasurers.

It is possible that this inscription was engraved *during* the term of the treasurers, not at its end, since it is not a *traditio*. This is clear from the small number of Nikai inscriptions in comparison with the large number of *traditiones* of the contents of the Pronaos, the Hekatompedon, and the Parthenon. Although they cover the same period, 434/3-405/4, only four Nikai inscriptions have survived, compared with at least twenty for each chamber of the Parthenon.⁵⁴ It is likely that it was originally intended to record the statues on stone only once, when they were dedicated. Thus, we have [ἔστεον] 'Αθεναῖοι, where the emphasis is on something done by the Athenians, not by the treasurers. Later, when the Nikai were being melted down, they were listed on stone again,⁵⁵ and annual records were

⁵¹ *I. G.*, I², 263-75, item 5; 280-8, items 47 and 49.

⁵² *A. T. L.*, II, D2.

⁵³ *I. G.*, I², 369, lines 6-8; *I. G.*, II², 1424-1689, lines 31-8 (cf. Woodward, 'ApX. 'Eph. [1937], part A, p. 167).

⁵⁴ *I. G.*, I², 232-92b; *I. G.*, II², 1382-3. Mr. Woodward states, *per ep.*, that the stone containing *I. G.*, I², 280-3 is opisthographic; we may, therefore, add another four inventories of the Parthenon to our list.

⁵⁵ Cf. *I. G.*, I², 369-90a; *I. G.*, II², 1502 and 1686, face A, line 13.

kept thereafter.⁵⁶ It would not have been necessary, therefore, for the treasurers of Athena during whose term a statue was completed to wait until the end of their term to prepare a record of it. KalliaDES, accordingly, may be another "chairman" who died in office. Whatever the explanation, we have, then, three cases of two "chairmen" of the treasurers of Athena for a single year.

The possibility that Aresaichmos was not "chairman" of the full board of treasurers in 408/7 arises in this way. Athens underwent a financial re-organization in 411/0, which included an increase in the number of Hellenotamiae,⁵⁷ and probably the elimination of the kolakretai,⁵⁸ a moratorium on interest on loans made by the treasurers of Athena,⁵⁹ and a division of duties among the Hellenotamiae. A. Andrewes has pointed out that the regular practice hitherto in the accounts of loans prepared by the treasurers of Athena had been to name only one Hellenotamias per year (presumably the "chairman"), with the rest grouped under *kai συνάρχοσι*.⁶⁰ In 410/09 and later years he finds that in a given year the Hellenotamias named as "chairman" along with his colleagues (*kai συνάρχοσιν*) changes throughout the year. Since the treasurers no longer state the purpose of most loans, Andrewes infers that different Hellenotamiae were assigned to different tasks and that it was, accordingly, no longer necessary to note the purpose of a loan.⁶¹ We might label these named individuals "chairmen" of subcommittees or understand that the permanent "chairmanship" had been abandoned.

Aresaichmos Agrylethen, then, may have died in office and been replaced by Phi---, or he may simply have been the leader of those treasurers who regularly contributed to the building of the Erechtheum, if this division of labor applied to the treasurers of Athena as well as to the Hellenotamiae.

Dinsmoor, however, reported a reading in *I.G.*, I², 254, line 282, which casts doubt on the assignment of this inventory to

⁵⁶ Cf. Woodward, 'Αρχ. Εφ. (1937), part A, pp. 163-8.

⁵⁷ Cf. Meritt, *A.F.D.*, pp. 94-103.

⁵⁸ Cf. *A.T.L.*, III (Princeton, 1950), pp. 359-66.

⁵⁹ This is my inference from the absence of the exact date of loans in the first half of *I.G.*, I², 304A.

⁶⁰ "The Generals in the Hellespont," *J.H.S.*, LXXIII (1953), p. 5.

⁶¹ Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 30, 2, seems to support this division of tasks.

408/7. "The assignment of *I. G.*, I², 254, to 409/8 B.C. seems to be confirmed, furthermore, by the traces of the name of the chairman of the succeeding Treasurers to whom the treasures were handed over, the name having ten letters with faint traces of what seem to be P and E for the second and third, so that the restoration 'Αραιάχωι' is perfectly possible . . . while the deme in question is Agryle."⁶² No other editor has reported these traces, and I was unable to confirm or reject them in my examination of the stone. Professor Meritt, however, states, *per ep.*, that his squeezes show traces of the name, but he is unable to say definitely what the letters are. If it should be established that these traces are certainly rho and epsilon, there would be a strong case against the reconstruction of the stele which we have offered. On the other hand, if these letters are merely possible, but not certain, we are confronted with a choice between some of the anomalies of the Ferguson-Dinsmoor reconstruction and a coincidence of "chairmen" from Agryle in both 408/7 and 407/6, if Aresaichmos was "chairman" of the entire board of treasurers. If, however, he was only the leader of a portion of the full group, no striking coincidence exists. It should be stressed, moreover, that the number of letters in the name in line 282 may well be nine instead of ten, if ε[γραμμάτευ] there is spelled with nu-movable, as σ[νάρχοστι] must be to fill the required fifty-three spaces.⁶³

Finally, if *I. G.*, I², 254 and 255a are dated to 409/8 and 405/4, respectively, they fit the tribal cycle of secretaries of the treasurers of Athena and the Other Gods which Ferguson and Dinsmoor project from the fourth into the fifth century.⁶⁴ The earliest evidence for this cycle, however, is from 402/1.⁶⁵ It is perfectly possible that the cycle was inherited from the treasurers of the Other Gods, when they were merged with the treasurers of Athena, or that at that time (or after the expulsion of the Thirty) the cycle was initiated with the phyle to supply the secretary chosen initially by lot.

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⁶² *Apud* Paton, *op. cit.*, p. 649, n. 1.

⁶³ An uninscribed space at the end of both line 281 and line 282 would produce the same result.

⁶⁴ *Treasurers*, pp. 8-15; Dinsmoor, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-7.

⁶⁵ Cf. *Treasurers*, pp. 8-15.

OCCULTATIO IN CICERO'S SPEECHES.

Quintilian was the first teacher of rhetoric to insist on the importance of moral excellence in an orator.¹ But even he admitted that, in certain circumstances, the advocate might be obliged to abandon the most rigid standards of honesty.² Cicero, a more practical orator living in a more competitive age, advocated in his rhetorical writings not so much the abstract qualities of honesty and uprightness, as those which may ingratiate the orator to his audience: culture, knowledge of the law and of history, memory (which ensures ease of delivery and speed in repartee), wit and humour.³ In his own practice he was willing to defend the most disreputable client (e.g. Annius Milo) if by doing so he could in some way promote his own political career or ideals. Suppression and distortion of evidence is thus to be expected in his speeches, as it is in oratory of all ages. It is not the purpose of this study to assess the total extent of Cicero's misrepresentation, but to examine the incidence of a figure of thought which is used as a medium for presenting evidence in such a way that it may be accepted by the audience in spite of its doubtful veracity or value.

The best ancient discussion of *occultatio*⁴ is in the treatise *Ad Herennium*, IV, 37 (p. 329 Marx), which it will be useful to quote in full:

Occultatio est cum dicimus nos praeterire aut non scire
aut nolle dicere id quod nunc maxime dicimus, hoc modo:
"Nam de pueritia quidem tua, quam tu omnium intem-

¹ XII, 1 *passim*. But the definition of an orator as *uir bonus dicendi peritus*, attributed to the Elder Cato, implies a similar attitude.

² *Ibid.*, 36 ff.

³ *Brutus*, 322; *De Oratore*, I, 5, 17-18.

⁴ The earliest discussion is in *Rhet. ad Alexandrum*, 21, where it is called *ειρώνεια*. Later synonyms are *παράλεψις*, *ἀντίφραστις*, *παρασιώπησις*, *praeteritio*, *omissio*. For other discussions see especially Hermogenes, Spengel, *Rethores Graeci* (Leipzig, 1853-6), II, p. 430; Aquila, Halm, *Rethores Latini Minores* (Leipzig, 1863), p. 24. Modern discussions are found in G. Gebauer, *De Praeteritionis Formis apud Oratores Atticos* (Zwickau, 1874); R. Elliott, *Transition in the Attic Orators* (Wisconsin, 1919), pp. 124 ff.; R. Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer* (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 501-3.

perantiae addixisti, dicerem, si hoc tempus idoneum putarem; nunc consulto relinquo. et illud praetereo, quod te tribuni rei militaris infrequentem tradiderunt. deinde quod iniuriarum satis fecisti L. Labeoni nihil ad hanc rem pertinere puto. horum nihil dico; revertor ad illud de quo iudicium est." item: "Non dico te ab sociis pecunias cepisse; non sum in eo occupatus quod ciuitates, regna, domos omnium depeculatus es; furtæ, rapinas omnes tuas omitto." haec utilis est exornatio si aut ad rem quam non pertineat aliis ostendere, quod occulte admonuisse prodest aut longum est aut ignobile, aut planum non potest fieri, aut facile potest reprehendi; ut utilius sit occulte fecisse suspicionem quam eiusmodi intendisse orationem quae redarguatur.

Occultatio is thus used to present material which would, if critically examined by an alert jury, be found false or refutable. It enables a statement to be made and mentally noted by the jury in the speaker's favour; but because he seems to regard it as unnecessary for his argument or irrelevant, they do not examine it too closely. By this means weak arguments and false evidence could be introduced with confidence under the pretence of omitting them.

Of the four categories of material listed by the *auctor* as being suitable for presentation through the medium of *occultatio*, viz. *longum*, *ignobile*, *planum non potest fieri*, and *facile potest reprehendi*, it is proposed to examine individually only the instances which belong to the last two categories, since an assessment of the tedium or the shameful ness of any subject involves too high a degree of subjectivity to be useful.

But before examining individual examples of *occultatio* in Cicero's speeches, account will have to be taken of the instances in which he fulfils his stated intention to omit. For the purpose of distinguishing between *occultatio* and genuine omission, the latter will henceforth be denoted by the word *reticentia*.⁵ The commonest formulae of *reticentia* are *multa (alia, cetera, longinquæ) praetereo (praetermitto)*; *nihil (non, ne), dicam de . . . ; ut alia omittam; quid commemorem . . . ?* In each case the orator gives no details whatever of the subject

⁵ The best word for our purpose. Used by Cicero himself (*De Or.*, III, 53, 205; *Orator*, 40, 138), it avoids the dramatic abruptness of *praecisio* (*Ad Her.*, IV, 30) which is true *aposiopesis*.

which he proposes to omit, and passes on to the next topic. *Reticentia*, when couched in sufficiently strong terms, can create rhetorical effect by suggesting the availability of a great mass of relevant evidence upon which the speaker does not intend to draw. The important distinction is that no attempt is made to introduce evidence.

The following is a list of passages, in chronological order,⁶ in which *occultatio* occurs in the speeches of Cicero: *Quinct.*, 70; *Rosc. Am.*, 53, 75, 90, 97, 106-7, 134. *Div. Caec.*, 29. *Verr.*, II, 1, 32-3, 49, 157; 2, 107, 150, 183; 3, 106, 115, 178, 200; 4, 116, 135; 5, 11, 20, 21. *Imp. Pomp.*, 54, 60; *Cluent.*, 99-100, 188; *Leg. Ag.*, I, 21; *Cat.*, I, 3, 14; III, 18; *Mur.*, 69; *Sull.*, 73, 75; *Flacc.*, 7, 16, 34, 79, 79-80; *Dom.*, 8, 23, 42, 75, 125; *Sest.*, 27, 29, 56, 109; *Vat.*, 21, 30; *Cael.*, 27, 53-4; *Balb.*, 43, 55; *Prov. Cons.*, 3-4, 6, 8 (two separate instances); *Pis.*, 3, 17, 23, 38, 50, 75, 80, 90; *Planc.*, 25, 93; *Scaur.*, 18; *Rab. Post.*, 33-4; *Lig.*, 20, 24; *Deiot.*, 15, 23; *Phil.*, I, 34; II, 39, 47, 53, 63, 70, 107, 111; V, 25, 31; VI, 9, 13; VII, 15; X, 4; XI, 35.

The passages in which *reticentia* occurs are as follows: *Quinct.*, 13, 70, 85; *Rosc. Am.*, 94; *Tull.*, 49; *Verr.*, II, 1, 43, 44, 62, 103, 137; 2, 1, 180; 3, 6, 59, 104, 206; 4, 59, 97, 105, 136; 5, 34; *Font.*, 12; *Caecina*, 95, 97; *Imp. Pomp.*, 26; *Clu.*, 8, 59, 151, 181; *Leg. Ag.*, I, 14; II, 78, 90; *Rab. Perd.*, 20; *Mur.*, 33; *Sull.*, 22, 39, 70; *Dom.*, 32, 97; *Sest.*, 13, 29; 32, 52, 104; *Balb.*, 17, 43; *Prov. Cons.*, 8; *Pis.*, 11, 47; *Planc.*, 74; *Phil.*, I, 3; II, 38; V, 35; VII, 24; XIII, 10; XIII, 3, 30, 42.

(Anaphoric repetitions of the verb⁷ have not been regarded as separate instances of *occultatio*, but have been counted separately in the figures for vocabulary and grammar which will be examined shortly.)

The above lists show 90 passages containing *occultatio*, compared with 58 containing *reticentia*. This is in itself a rather startling indication of the frequency of *occultatio*. But, taking the end of the *Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo* as the halfway

⁶ The above order follows the known facts of Cicero's life, and is likely to be at fault only with regard to speeches which were delivered in the same year, e. g. *Cael.*, *Balb.*, and *Prov. Cons.*

⁷ E. g. *Cluent.*, 188; *Verr.*, II, 3, 59, 106, 200; *Imp. Pomp.*, 54; *Flacc.*, 7, 79; *Pis.*, 90.

point in the chronological Teubner text arrangement of the speeches (Vol. II, p. 247), 33 instances of *reticentia* occur up to that point, and 25 after it. With *occultatio*, however, the divergence is much greater, and in the opposite direction, 29 of the passages occurring before (a number comparable with that for *reticentia*), compared with 61 after the halfway point (over twice as many as for *reticentia*). Against those who argue that *occultatio* is especially suited to violent invective, and that its uneven occurrence is to be explained by the presence of the *In Pisonem* and the *Philippics* among his later works, it is pertinent to point out that much of the *Verrines* and the *Catinianarians* show the same degree of forcefulness in other respects, but not the same partiality for *occultatio* as the later speeches. The figures can therefore only indicate the growth with advancing years of Cicero's confidence in his ability to win over his audiences, and hence to impose greater and greater demands on their credulity.

In spite of a superficial similarity in the formulae employed to introduce them, closer examination reveals that the orator was aware that the different purposes of *occultatio* and *reticentia* required different modes of expression. In regard to grammatical forms, the most striking difference is that Cicero uses the subjunctive mood in *occultatio* in only six passages until after the *Pro Plancio*, after which there are 19 examples. There are 19 examples in *reticentia*, 10 before and 9 after the halfway point. This is a further indication of the orator's growing confidence in his ability to beguile his audience: when an orator says *ut omittam cetera* he is virtually asking the audience's indulgence for the omission he is about to make, so that he might seem to be risking ridicule if he includes evidence after asking permission to leave it out; and Cicero found the confidence to do this only in his last speeches, gaining thereby the advantage of the urbanity conferred by the subjunctive. Rightly feeling that *occultatio* primarily required boldness of expression, Cicero preferred the present indicative for most of his life: he used it 84 times in all for *occultatio*, compared with only 14 instances of the future indicative. The same degree of preference is not found in *reticentia*, which is expressed 35 times in the present indicative, compared with 12 times in the future

indicative. The present indicative enhances the illusion of honesty which is a necessary protection for the dissembler.

There is also a noticeable divergence in the orator's vocabulary for the two forms of transition. The commonest formulae used to express them, taken together, are:

<i>mittere</i>	41	examples (3 subjunctive, 1 future)
<i>omittere</i>	31	" (2 future)
<i>ut omittam</i>	25	"
<i>praeterire</i>	21	" (3 future, 1 subjunctive)
<i>non dico, dicam</i>	13	"
<i>praetermittio</i>	10	"
<i>praetermittam</i>	10	"
<i>non quaero</i>	8	"

Other formulae include *quid commemorem?* (6 examples), *relinquo* (5 examples), *non disputabo*, *missum facio*, *non queror*, *non libet dicere*, *neglegam*, *tacebo*, *lateant*, *sileatur*, *nolo commemorando renovare*. But *mittere* is used 29 times in *occultatio*, compared with 12 times in *reticentia*; *omitto*, *omittam*, and *ut omittam* are used 37 times in *occultatio* compared with 19 times in *reticentia*; and *non dico* and *non dicam* are used 10 and 3 times respectively. *Mittere* and *omittere* are thus the predominant words for introducing *occultatio*. *Praeterire* and *praetermittere*, on the other hand, are used 13 and 10 times respectively in *reticentia* compared with 8 and 10 times respectively in *occultatio*. These verbs are thus not subject to the same degree of preference for use in *occultatio* as *mittere*, *omittere*, and *non dicere*; indeed, *praeterire* is used more for *reticentia* than for *occultatio*.

When Cicero uses *reticentia*, he frequently gives reasons for the omission. These include the need for brevity⁸ or strict relevance,⁹ the absence of positive proof,¹⁰ the distasteful¹¹ or painful¹² nature of the subject, its incredibility,¹³ or the fact that it is already well known.¹⁴ When using *occultatio*, however, he usually seems to have felt that to waste time in

⁸ *Verr.*, II, 1, 103; *Dom.*, 32.

⁹ *Verr.*, II, 2, 104; *Phil.*, II, 70. ¹² *Sull.*, 92; *Dom.*, 97.

¹⁰ *Prov. Cons.*, 6; *Pis.*, 11.

¹³ *Verr.*, II, 2, 180.

¹¹ *Phil.*, II, 47.

¹⁴ *Pro Caec.*, 97; *Phil.*, XIII, 30.

explanations would impair its effectiveness, since speed in delivering the material was essential for ensuring its acceptance. On 6 occasions, however, he gives the shamefulness of the matter as his reason,¹⁵ and twice admits that what he is introducing in *occultatio* cannot be proved,¹⁶ or is not strictly relevant,¹⁷ or that there is ample evidence without it.¹⁸ He thus explicitly follows the doctrine laid down in the *Ad Herennium* in all but the last case—*facile potest reprehendi*. This exception is scarcely surprising.

Before concluding this section of the study, it is necessary to draw attention to a third form of transition which seems to occupy an intermediate position between *occultatio* and *reticentia*. It is that in which the verb of transition introduces not a full statement but a simple noun object. But here a distinction must be made. If the noun has a neutral significance, the transition will be *reticentia*: *ut omittam leges* in *Client.*, 151 should be so regarded. But if the noun has favourable or unfavourable connotations its effect will be to influence the audience's view of what is being said. A good example of this is *Sest.*, 54: *omitto gratulationes, epulas, partitionem aerarii, beneficia, spem, promissa, praedam, laetitiam paucorum in luctu omnium*. Here the connotations of the nouns are either pleasant or unpleasant according to the different standpoints of the speaker and the actors in his narrative, and they convey what are virtually actions coloured by the speaker's opinion. It may perhaps be argued that this differs from *occultatio* only in degree, but it has been thought preferable nevertheless to record its occurrences separately.¹⁹ There are 22 examples of it, of which 7 are in the present indicative, 9 in the future, and 6 in the subjunctive. In 9 examples the verb is *non dicere* (all in the future tense), in 8 *omittere*, in 6 *praeterire*. Since the subject raised was usually a controversial one (sometimes it was a person about whom differing views were held, e.g. Gabinius

¹⁵ *Quinc.*, 70; *Verr.*, I, 1, 32-3; *Olu.*, 99-100; *Lig.*, 24; *Phil.*, II, 39, 63.

¹⁶ *Flaco.*, 7; *Prov. Cons.*, 6.

¹⁷ *Balb.*, 55; *Phil.*, II, 70.

¹⁸ *Rosc. Am.*, 106-7; *Phil.*, V, 25.

¹⁹ This intermediate form seems to correspond with ὑποσιώπησις as defined by Schol. Dem., 1, 2 (see R. Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer* [Leipzig, 1885], p. 501).

in *Sest.*, 32), it must have elicited some momentary reaction from the audience, especially as the context, or facts which were already known, made the orator's view on the subject clear. One form which it took was a variety of the figure of thought known as *correctio*,²⁰ examples of which are to be found in *Planc.*, 78, *Phil.*, XII, 9, 24; XIII, 12; and the following in *Deiot.*, 2: *crudelem Castorem, ne dicam sceleratum et impium*. A moderate word is used at first, but the orator adds other stronger words which he might have used. Having heard these, the audience is at liberty to apply them if they consider them appropriate. Though by no means without interest, the effect of this intermediate form upon the audience can have been little more than momentary, so that further discussion of it seems unnecessary.

The rest of this study will be devoted to an examination of the subject-matter introduced by Cicero in *occultatio*. As has been stated,²¹ two kinds will be considered, corresponding to the last two categories listed by the *auctor*, *planum non potest fieri* and *facile potest reprehendi*.

Dealing first with the category *planum non potest fieri*, the general allegations in *Verr.*, II, 1, 62 are even admitted by the orator to be not susceptible of positive proof (... *quae negari poterunt*). In *Cael.*, 53 and *Sull.*, 75 he uses *occultatio* to cover up statements which assume the good character of his clients without proof, and provide him with unsupported *argumenta ex vita*. In *Rosc. Amer.*, 75, his client's good character is argued through the medium of a *locus communis* in *occultatio*: the Hippocratic theory of the effect of environment on character is invoked in favour of the young Roscius. Cicero replaces Herodotus' version of this theory,²² the idea of robust, warlike character being engendered in a rude, rustic environment, with the perhaps less convincing correlation between honesty and country life. But the appeal of such an argument to Romans, who loved to recall the exploits of such men as Cincinnatus,

²⁰ Strictly speaking, *correctio* involves the withdrawal of a word and its replacement by a more suitable word (see *op. cit.*, p. 496 and *Ad Her.*, IV, 36). Here we have an inverted form of it, more subtle but achieving a similar effect.

²¹ P. 176, above.

²² IX, 122.

must have been considerable in spite of being immaterial as evidence. In this category also belong arguments from probability, two of which are couched in *occultatio* by Cicero.²³ The fact that more examples of this kind of argument are not found protected by *occultatio* serves as a reminder of its time-honoured position in ancient oratory, deriving as it does from the earliest rhetorical teachings.

More interesting and important, however, are the many passages which come under the category of *quod facile potest reprehendi*, since the discussion of these, which will occupy the remainder of this study, raises the question of Cicero's reliability as a historical source. We are once more concerned with two types of subject-matter, the one consisting of faulty argument, through which the speaker's logical faculty might be impugned, and the other consisting of faulty information, which might leave him open to the charge of ignorance; while in either case he might incur the charge of dishonesty.

In the speech *De Imperio Gnaei Pompei* there are two passages in *occultatio* which might have been rejected because of their weakness as historical argument. In ch. 54, Athens, Carthage, and Rhodes are mentioned (*non dico (ciuitatem) Atheniensium . . .*) as examples of cities whose navies were capable, in their heyday, of policing areas of the sea beyond their own immediate neighbourhood. In earlier chapters he has recounted pathetically the treatment which Roman citizens had suffered at the hands of pirates.²⁴ The irony of the situation which Pompey had had to face can hardly have escaped some of his audience, for the increase in the activities of pirates was the direct result of Rome's policy of weakening other maritime states. In particular, her destruction of Corinth in 146 B. C., and the decline of Rhodes, which she had deliberately promoted,²⁵ had turned the Aegean into a *mare nostrum* for Cilician pirates. Cicero certainly appreciated the usefulness of historical examples in speeches,²⁶ as did his Attic predecessors;²⁷

²³ *Deiot.*, 15, 23.

²⁴ 31-3.

²⁵ See Jonkers, *Social and Economic Commentary on Cicero De Imperio Gnaei Pompei* (Leiden, 1959), pp. 21-2, p. 47.

²⁶ *Brutus*, 322; *De Oratore*, I, 5, 18.

²⁷ See especially Perelman, *The Historical Example in the Attic Orators* (Univ. of Jerusalem, 1961).

he also seems to have appreciated the care with which they should be introduced when they are not entirely apposite.

Ch. 60 contains a long *occultatio*, in which Cicero lists some instances of the conferment of extraordinary military commands upon generals in the past as historical precedents for Pompey's command against Mithridates. He admits that only emergencies had justified such breaches of the constitution: *maiores nostros semper in pace consuetudini, in bello utilitati paruisse*; but the aristocrats in his audience cannot have failed, if the argument had been stressed more strongly, to have protested. For it was a repetition of the careers of Marius and Sulla, and of the events which led to the consulship of Pompey and Crassus in 70 B.C. (when there was no longer a national emergency) that they most feared as the likely result of giving Pompey further extraordinary commands. It was for this reason that they had opposed the Lex Gabinia. Elsewhere in this speech²⁸ Cicero pursues the theme of expediency and, while showing his anxiety not to offend the leaders of the *optimates*, does not do full justice to their arguments. No doubt Peterssen is right in suggesting that Cicero foresaw that Pompey would not behave as Marius and Sulla had done;²⁹ but in the year 66 B.C. memories of recent violations of the constitution were more potent in forming the opinions of most statesmen than any subtle divinations as to the likely course of Pompey's career. The popular assembly, to whom the speech was addressed, was solidly in favour of Pompey's appointment, and would not have been disposed to criticise Cicero's adduction of precedents for it. The *occultatio* was probably used in order to ensure a minimum of dissent on the part of the *optimates* in the audience.

The next example, once more one of unsound argument, is in another political speech, this time addressed to the senate, the first speech *De Lege Agraria*. In ch. 21 he speaks (*non queror . . .*) of the diminution of revenues which would be the result of the sale of Roman land abroad. He describes this revenue as *caput patrimonii publici, pulcherrimam populi Romani possessionem*. But Hardy has shown³⁰ that only Egypt can be shown with certainty to have been within the scope of

²⁸ 50, 61.

²⁹ *Cicero: A Biography* (Univ. of California Press, 1920), p. 188.

³⁰ *Some Problems in Roman History* (Oxford, 1924), pp. 75 ff.

the Rullan Law, leaving the richest province, Asia, unaffected. Cicero is thus exaggerating, giving as he does the impression that the revenues would be crippled beyond recovery if Rullus' proposal were implemented.

Another suspect argument is found in *occultatio* in *Pro Flacco*, 16. Here Cicero claims that the superior stability of the Roman constitution over those of most Greek cities lies in the restraint which it places upon the powers of its public assemblies. He then says: *itaque, ut hanc Graeciam, quae iam diu suis consiliis perculta et afflita est, omittam, illa uetus, quae quondam opibus imperio gloria floruit, hoc uno malo concidit libertate immoderata ac licentia contionum.* Apart from the utterly unreal picture given of *illa uetus Graecia*, which Cicero seems to regard as a single country whose fortunes fluctuated uniformly, the democracy of 5th century Athens was more extreme than that of the later leagues, and yet Athens attained a higher level of prosperity then than any other city on the Greek mainland subsequently achieved. Nor would every member of his audience have agreed with the implied criticism of the Achaean and Aetolian leagues (the words *iam diu* allow a considerable latitude of time, and seem to include the whole period subsequent to the classical age): it is indeed likely that many of them were acquainted with the constitutional discussions in Polybius' history, and accepted his view that the Achaean constitution was superior to the Athenian.³¹ (Cicero was certainly *enversant* with Polybius' views, and seems in general to have accepted them.³²) It is also an exaggeration to attribute the fall of Greece to one cause (... *hoc uno malo concidit* . . .), especially as elsewhere³³ Cicero suggests a different cause, the social and moral corruption resulting from the maritime character of some of her greatest cities.

In the short, trenchant speech *De Provinciis Consularibus*, the main argument begins with a discussion of the allocation of the provinces of Syria and Macedonia to the consuls for 58 B.C., A. Gabinius and L. Calpurnius Piso respectively. The allocation was made on the initiative of P. Clodius Pulcher,

³¹ II, 38; VI, 43.

³² See Von Fritz, *The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity* (Columbia Univ. Press, 1954), pp. 142 ff.

³³ *De Republica*, II, 7-8.

whose purpose in arranging it was to gain their acquiescence in his legislative programme as tribune of the people acting for the Triumvirs. Cicero had opposed the allocation, and claimed that it was opposed by the majority of senators (. . . *uobis inuitis et oppressis* . . .). He goes on to say³⁴ that Gabinius and Piso had behaved illegally and brutally even during their consulship, and he uses *occultatio* to convey accusations which are vague and unspecific: *mitto, quod . . . non ante attigerint quam hunc ordinem condemnarint, quam auctoritatem uestram e ciuitate exterminarint, quam fidem publicam, quam perpetuam populi Romani salutem, quam me ac meos omnis foedissime crudelissimeque uexarint.* (The particular, personal instance of their cruelty which concludes is given extra significance by the weighty general charges which precede it, and fits into the *occultatio* because Cicero has just said:³⁵ *sed ego in hac sententia dicenda non parebo dolori meo, non iracundiae seruam.*) Further vague accusations, which are also probably groundless, appear in *occultatio* in ch. 6, when Cicero describes the administration of Piso in Byzantium. Normally a Roman governor had no jurisdiction in a free city (which Byzantium was), but Piso had been granted special powers by the terms of the Lex Clodia.³⁶ The *caedis* referred to are specified in *In Pisonem*, 83-4, but the reference to the unhappy virgins is too vague to constitute a specific charge; and it is unreasonable to blame Piso personally for such incidents.³⁷

The invective *In Pisonem*, like Cicero's finest invective, the *Second Philippic*, is rich in *occultatio*. It has been shown to embody the rhetorical precept that general arguments may be made to apply to particular cases,³⁸ but this procedure leads to misrepresentation. Cicero misrepresents both Piso's Epicureanism³⁹ and his governorship of Macedonia. Some incidents in

³⁴ 3.

³⁵ 2.

³⁶ See the edition of Butler and Cary (Oxford, 1924), p. 51 and appendices, especially p. 86.

³⁷ See Nisbet's edition of *In Pisonem* (Oxford, 1961), p. 175.

³⁸ See De Lacy, "Cicero's Invective against Piso," *T. A. P. A.*, 1941, pp. 48-58.

³⁹ See M. N. P. Packer, *Cicero's Presentation of Epicurean Ethics* (Diss., Columbia Univ. Press, 1938), 127 pp.

the latter are couched in *osculatio*. The list of Piso's crimes in ch. 38 is vague and unspecific. In ch. 50, speaking of Piso's unconstitutional actions, he says: *mitto exire de provincia, educere exercitum, bellum sua sponte gerere, in regnum iniussu populi Romani aut senatus accedere, quae cum plurimae leges ueteres, tum lex Cornelia maiestatis, Iulia de pecuniis repetundis planissime uetat*. In an appendix to his edition of this speech, Nisbet has made a strong case for the overall efficiency of Piso's administration of Macedonia,⁴⁰ and of this particular incident it may well be the case that an expedition had to be staged at short notice, and that Piso's action in setting out before obtaining permission, although illegal, was in Rome's best interests. Cicero knew that Macedonia's neighbours were constantly threatening her borders, and that these were ill-defined;⁴¹ and no advantage would seem to have accrued to Piso (who was not a lover of war and an Epicurean at one and the same time) from his alleged precipitancy, other than a strategic one.

In ch. 75 he says: *omitto nihil istum uersum pertinuisse ad illum; non fuisse meum, quem quantum potuisse multis saepe orationibus scriptisque decorassem, hunc uno uiolare uersu*. Piso has said that Cicero alienated Pompey through his verse *Cedant arma togae*, and Cicero has explained that a metaphor, not a personal allusion, was intended (chs. 73-4), i. e. that war should now (in 62-61 B.C.) give way to peace, not that Pompey should surrender his military command in favour of Cicero's civilian authority. Cicero may possibly have originally intended the verse to be interpreted in this manner, but we know from his letters⁴² that he was keenly disappointed with Pompey's cool reception of the news of his suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and that Pompey knew of his disappointment.⁴³ It is therefore quite possible that Pompey, whose ability at detecting metaphors in poetry was perhaps not very great, did find cause for offence in this verse, and that Cicero's defence of it is consequently to no purpose; it may even be disingenuous.

In ch. 79 he discusses his political differences with Caesar which led to his exile. He ends this section with the sentence: *si tantum ille in me esse uno roboris et uirtutis putavit ut,*

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 172-80.

⁴² *Ad Att.*, I, 13; 14.

⁴¹ *Pis.*, 38.

⁴³ *Ad Fam.*, V, 7.

quae ipse gesserat, conciderent, si ego restituisse, cur ego non ignoscam, si anteposuit suam salutem meae? sed praeterita mitto. Apart from the irony contained in it, this sentiment seems insincere, especially when compared with the well-known remark that Cicero made about Caesar less than two years earlier, a few days after his return from exile: *quem inimicum mihi fuisse non dico, tacuisse, cum diceretur esse inimicus, scio.*⁴⁴ His earlier letters also display dismay at Caesar's progress⁴⁵ and occasional bitterness towards him.⁴⁶

Piso's alleged transgressions of the law while governing Macedonia are enumerated in *occultatio* in ch. 90. The accusations are vague as before, and are mostly exaggerated with the aid of superlatives and strong words. When he says *mitto numerum nauium* he may not have known the number; and he admits elsewhere that the corn was necessary.⁴⁷ De Lacy has shown inconsistencies within the speech, and with passages from other speeches, which suggest that Cicero did not know much about Piso.

Like the speeches *Pro Marcello* and *Pro Rege Deiotaro*, the *Pro Ligario*, one of Cicero's most persuasive speeches, was made before Caesar, who, as dictator, presided as sole judge of the case. In all three speeches Cicero has frequent recourse to flattery, not confining it to the introductions and conclusions according to rhetorical precept. This is one of the many examples of Cicero's talent for adapting conventional practice to special circumstances, appreciating as he did that the precepts were devised on the assumption that the case was to be heard by a jury of the defendant's peers. In ch. 20, *occultatio* is used to pass on from a passage of flattery to the facts of the case under trial. The introduction of the speech does not contain the conventional ingredients, and the insertion of the first passage of flattery at ch. 18, in the middle of the proof, might be accepted more readily if the speaker showed that he was aware of its lack of strict relevance. The argument that accompanies the flattery is also of doubtful value. Ch. 17

⁴⁴ *Post Red. in Sen.*, 32.

⁴⁵ *Ad Att.*, II, 21, 1 (59 B.C.).

⁴⁶ *Ad Att.*, II, 19; 21, 3; 24, 3 (59 B.C.); *Ad Fam.*, I, 7, 10 (56 B.C.).

⁴⁷ 40. See Nisbet, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

begins with a discussion of the *status definitius* whether Ligarius had committed a *scelus* in fighting on the Pompeian side at Thapsus. Cicero argues that, even assuming that Ligarius was a willing opponent of Caesar, both sides thought that theirs was the just cause: the outcome alone, by showing which side the gods favoured, had decided which was right. When Ligarius chose the wrong side, he committed an *error*, not a *scelus*, a fact of which Caesar had shown his awareness when he pardoned Ligarius along with many other Pompeians. Cicero then praises Caesar's clemency, which justifies the trust placed in him by the gods.

This is not strictly relevant to Cicero's case, which rests chiefly on the contention that Ligarius was persuaded against his will to remain in Africa and join the Pompeian cause there. It is also, as Cicero admits when he dismisses it (ch. 20), the *communis causa* of a situation which might face any citizen during a civil war, and in this respect comes under the category of material *quod planum non potest fieri*. But Cicero may well have other reasons for not wanting Caesar to examine the argument too closely, bold as it is even in its present form. Towards the end of it (ch. 19) Cicero suggests that Caesar regarded the war as a *civile discidium* (which implies a situation brought about through no human fault), rather than having been occasioned by *hostile odium*. This is different from the personal motives ascribed to Caesar in ch. 13, which the dictator himself professed.⁴⁸ It is certain that Caesar would not have accepted as his opinion that both sides had the good of the republic at heart (*utrisque cupientibus rem publicam saluam*), that both sides had a certain degree of justice on their side (. . . erat aliquid in utraque parte, *quod probari posset*), or even that the justice of his cause was proved by the favour that the gods conferred upon it: Caesar was a confirmed atheist,⁴⁹ and nowhere in his writings subscribes to the view that the gods actively aided him, or that his victory was brought about through their will. Cicero's argument is thus a good example of *occultatio* of material *quod facile potest reprehendi*.

Cicero's *Second Philippic* contains much invective and con-

⁴⁸ *Bellum Ciuale*, I, 3, 7.

⁴⁹ See G. Walter, *Caesar*, Book II (London, 1953), pp. 76, 197.

troversial material, and a proportionally high incidence of *occultatio*, seven examples in all. Cicero's confident, heady narrative of Antony's misdeeds and vices represents as fact much that was, to say the least, disputable, and conceals the extent of Antony's popularity with the people and the army, and of his influence in the senate. *Occultatio* is the chosen vehicle of some of Cicero's misrepresentations in this speech, but the first example of the figure, in ch. 39, may owe its presence to a personal reason. Antony had made fun of Cicero's behaviour in Pompey's camp before the battle of Pharsalus, when the orator was never seen without a worried expression. Cicero replies to Antony's jest with the serious assertion that no good citizen could have viewed the imminent destruction of the flower of the Roman aristocracy with anything other than dismay. Cicero had urged Pompey to make peaceful overtures to Caesar in order to avert this disaster. It is likely that Cicero behaved as he did for the reasons he gives; but many of his audience, especially the more soldierly among them, must have felt that, on the eve of Pharsalus, the time for negotiation was long past, and that Cicero, the "civilian" to whom war was personally distasteful, was behaving in keeping with his own timid nature rather than from any high-minded patriotic motives. Hence Cicero's use of *occultatio* to persuade the audience to accept his point of view without recalling their own feelings at the time under discussion. It shows a remarkable understanding on his part of the limits of his popularity.

In ch. 53, Cicero argues that Antony, as tribune in 49 B.C., provided Caesar with an excuse for commencing hostilities against the state. Cicero says:

tu . . . princeps C. Caesari omnia perturbare cupienti causam belli contra patriam ferendi dedisti. quid enim aliud ille dicebat, quam causam sui dementissimi consili et facti adferebat, nisi quod intercessio neglecta, ius tribunicium sublatum, circumscriptus a senatu esset Antonius? omitto quam haec falsa, quam levia, praesertim cum omnino nulla causa iusta cuiquam esse possit contra patriam arma capiendi. sed nihil de Caesare: tibi certe confitendum est causam perniciosissimi belli in persona tua constitisse.

There were several old Caesarians in his audience, but even non-partisan senators would not have considered themselves unduly

cynical if they found the sentiment in *occultatio* naïve, or, if they remembered how Cicero himself behaved during the days immediately following Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon,⁵⁰ dishonest. Moreover, Antony's part in precipitating the war is greatly exaggerated by Cicero. Antony became Caesar's leading tribune only after the departure of Curio from Rome; and Curio did not leave Rome to join Caesar in Gaul until his proposal, that both Caesar and Pompey should disband their armies, had been defeated, mainly through the opposition of Marcellus and Cato. On Curio's departure, a rumour spread by anti-Caesarians that Caesar was marching on the capital gave Marcellus, who was consul, the excuse to call upon Pompey to mobilise two legions.⁵¹ Thus when Antony took Curio's place the time for conciliation was past; and it was Caesar's enemies who had hastened the commencement of hostilities.

The *occultatio* at ch. 70 follows one of the most violent and exaggerated of Cicero's attacks on Antony's private life. Antony bought, or rather acquired, Pompey's house after Pharsalus, and Cicero's central theme is the audacity of a man who could bring himself to take possession of the property of one of Rome's greatest soldiers and patriots. He further represents Antony as having turned the great man's house into a den of licence and immorality—Antony, who ought to feel shame even at entering that *sanctissimum limen*, which had seen nothing . . . *nisi pudicum*, . . . *nisi ex optimo more et sanctissima disciplina*. In the following *occultatio*: *sed omitto ea peccata quae non sunt earum partium propria, quibus tu rem publicam uexauisti*, Cicero admits that this part of Antony's life is not strictly relevant to a discussion of his political activities. But there is also reason to believe that Cicero's description of Antony's excesses at this time may be exaggerated. Plutarch,⁵² while mentioning his purchase of Pompey's house, also mentions that Antony married soon after Pharsalus, and that his wife Fulvia, who is known from other sources to have been a

⁵⁰ See Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939), pp. 137-8. Cicero vacillated for a time, not knowing which side to join.

⁵¹ See Rice Holmes, *The Roman Republic*, II (Oxford, 1923), pp. 253-4.

⁵² *Life of Antony*, 10.

strong-minded woman,⁵³ restrained his natural tendency to lead a profligate life.

Occultatio is much less frequent in the remaining *Philippics*. In ch. 15 of the seventh speech, Cicero uses it as a vehicle for the reintroduction, in general terms, of some of the charges he has made against Antony. The validity of some of these depends largely upon the political standpoint from which they are viewed. In *Philippic XI*, 35, Cicero gives his own reason why he must pass over his praise of Cassius: *maximam eius et singularem laudem praetermitto; cuius enim praedicatio nondum omnibus grata est, hanc memoriae potius quam uocis testimonio conservemus*. But he has said a good deal in his praise already.

The statements in the other examples of *occultatio* in Cicero's speeches are not open to question to the same degree as those that have been discussed. Many must be accepted in the absence of other sources, though the partisan tone of some suggests exaggeration. A number, on the other hand, are most probably true; sometimes even important evidence is placed in *occultatio*,⁵⁴ while there are examples in which Cicero alleges that he has an abundance of evidence, so that he has no need of the statement he has just made.⁵⁵ But it will be readily understood that a detailed discussion of these examples would serve no useful purpose because of the imponderability of much of the subject-matter.

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that Cicero follows rhetorical precept on many of the occasions when he employs *occultatio*, frequently using it to disguise general or exaggerated statements or arguments, historical examples which are not strictly relevant or appropriate, and evidence which cannot be proved or is liable to break down on examination. But he shows skill and discretion in using it, sometimes conveying valid arguments and true statements through the medium of *occultatio*, creating in the process the impression of having an abundance of evidence on which to draw. He shows, more especially by his choice of tenses and moods, but also by his choice of vocabu-

⁵³ For a reasoned judgment of Fulvia, to whose virtues the sources do not always do justice, see Münzer, *R.-E.*, VII, cols. 283 ff.

⁵⁴ E. g. *Div. Caec.*, 29.

⁵⁵ E. g. *Verr.*, III, 100; *Phil.*, V, 25.

lary, that *occultatio* and *reticentia* require different formulae for their presentation. *Occultatio* is but one of many figures of thought that Cicero uses with consummate mastery; but it differs from most of the others in that it seeks to beguile the intellect rather than the emotions. It endeavours to create the impression of an overwhelming amount of argument or evidence available to the speaker, which must on purely logical grounds incline the jury in his favour. It has been shown that Cicero found *occultatio* especially useful in speeches in which his case was not intrinsically strong, but that he also used it for a variety of other purposes, and with greater frequency as experience and growing prestige gave him greater confidence.⁵⁶

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⁵⁶ I wish to thank my colleague, Miss N. P. Miller, for reading this article, correcting errors, and offering suggestions for its improvement. Any faults which remain are exclusively my own.

REVIEWS.

WOLFGANG KUNKEL. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung der römischen Kriminalverfahrens in vorsullanischer Zeit. München, C. H. Beck'schen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1962. Pp. 149. (*Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, *Abhandlungen*, N. F., Heft 56.)

In an address delivered at Zürich on May 8, 1852, Theodor Mommsen referred in passing to "das ganz schlechte und zum Theil wirklich niedrächtige römische Criminalrecht" ("Die Bedeutung des römischen Rechts," *Gesammelte Schriften*, III [1907], p. 595). This low esteem of the Roman criminal law was one which he maintained right down to, and including, the writing of his last great work, *Römische Strafrecht*, which appeared in 1899, almost half a century later. He might have hoped that this lengthy volume, which complemented his earlier *Staatsrecht*, would have been enthusiastically received by his contemporaries. Notices and summaries of it were given in scholarly journals, but only two critical reviews appeared (see James Leigh Strachan-Davidson, *Problems of the Roman Criminal Law*, I [Oxford, 1912], p. vi). The reason may have been that many felt that he had tried "to stretch the institutions of the state, in their governing and repressive functions, on a Procrustean bed of regularity" (J. S. Reid, "On Some Questions of Roman Public Law," *J. R. S.*, I [1911], p. 96). Nevertheless, since that time, despite the numerous reservations made with respect to particular details, Mommsen's dogmatic reconstruction has been almost universally accepted. With the appearance, however, of this monograph by Wolfgang Kunkel on the evolution of Roman criminal procedure before the time of Sulla, it seems that Roman criminal law is at last arising from the torturous bed on which it has been laid and is assuming a more comfortable position.

As Kunkel notes in his introductory chapter, Mommsen interpreted the evolution of this law down to the end of the Republic in terms of three distinct developments: trial by magistrate, trial by magistrate and comitia, trial by jury. According to Mommsen, the magistrate's criminal jurisdiction was a natural corollary to his *imperium*, the supreme authority he had inherited from the kings. These primitive monarchs had exercised the right of criminal condemnation both at home and in the field. The early Roman magistrate, however, could only exercise this jurisdiction with respect to capital offenses in the field. At Rome a sentence of death (and later of scourging) was automatically submitted to the comitia for review. The citizen's right of appeal thus established the second type of procedure. A third type, which Mommsen regarded as a break with the past and a borrowing from civil procedure, was introduced in the second century before Christ. In the *quaestiones per-*

petuae, the praetors were only the presiding officers, whereas the verdicts were rendered by the juries.

In recent decades these assumptions have been subjected to serious questioning. In 1944, Alfred Heuss, after considering various problems connected with the *imperium*, one being the difficulty of imagining that the early magistrates possessed such an absolute power, reached the conclusion that it might serve as the basis for a logical or theoretical reconstruction of Roman criminal law but that it was not historically proved ("Zur Entwicklung des Imperiums der römischen Oberbeamten," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Römische Abteilung*, LXIV [1944], pp. 57-133). Some time before this Kurt Latte had argued that the *quaestores parricidii* associated with trials before the comitia were probably not the same as the *quaestores aerarii*, whom Mommsen had taken to be assistants to the consul in criminal as well as in fiscal matters ("The Origin of the Roman Quaestorship," *T. A. P. A.*, LXVII [1936], pp. 24-33). C. H. Brecht subsequently maintained that there must have been two different types of comitial procedure, one conducted by quaestors, aediles, and tribunes of the people, in which there was no previous condemnation since these offices were without the *imperium*, and another which was a real appeal from a condemnation by a consul, or the *pontifex maximus*, or the *duoviri perduellionis* ("Zum römischen Komitialverfahren," *Zeitschr. d. Savigny-Stiftung*, LIX [1939], pp. 261-314). Still more recently Jochen Bleichen, a pupil of Brecht, has gone still further and argued that there never was a magisterial-comitial process in the sense envisaged by Mommsen, that is, a confirmation or rejection by the assembled people of a previous condemnation by a magistrate with the direct or delegated *imperium* ("Ursprung und Bedeutung der Provocation," *Zeitschr. d. Savigny-Stiftung*, LXXVI [1959], pp. 324-77).

After carefully reviewing these earlier studies, and refining them where necessary, Kunkel goes on to take the next logical step. He not only rejects Mommsen's concept of the *imperium* as the "Kernstück" of Roman law from the time of the kings on, and the concept of the comitia as a court of second instance, but he argues that the special commissions set up to investigate and punish different crimes in the last centuries of the Republic and the *quaestiones perpetuae*, which were an outgrowth of these commissions, were not a break with Roman tradition as Mommsen maintained, nor a borrowing from Greece as Hitzig believed, but that they were a natural development from an earlier system of trial by jury in a court presided over by the praetor or by a *quaesitor* appointed by him.

Kunkel approaches the problem of the evolution of Roman criminal procedure in a series of closely reasoned but somewhat independent essays. He takes up such matters as the meaning of *provocatio*, the praetor as judge in criminal cases, the juridical functions of the *tresviri capiteles*, and the private prosecution of capital offenses according to the laws of the Twelve Tables. In a final chapter he recapitulates his findings under twelve different headings. These may be summarized as follows:

1. The common opinion that the comitia was the criminal court at Rome before the creation of the *quaestiones perpetuae* cannot be sustained. From all appearances, ordinary crimes were never brought before the comitia. The comitrial procedure was only used for crimes of a political character, such as treason, abuse of office, and perhaps, in early times, serious breaches of sacral law. The only common comitrial trials of private individuals were those conducted by the aediles, and here also the crimes were against the common good, such as usury, failure to pay for grazing land, and flagrant violations of public morality.

2. The normal criminal process, that is, the prosecution for murder and other capital offenses committed against individuals and not against the community as such, was that carried out before a jury (*quaestio, concilium iudicium*). It was based on the principle of private accusation. The ordinary president of this ancient type of court was the praetor. The *quaestiones* of the Late Republic are thus in line with early Roman tradition.

3. The right of the citizen to appeal to the comitia from a sentence of the magistrate (death or, later, scourging) was limited to purely coercive activity on the part of the magistrate. A citizen never had the right to appeal a penalty imposed by a jury before which he had had the opportunity of defending himself. Provocation was not a legal device which compelled the magistrate to bring the matter before the comitia but a simple protest to abuse of authority by the magistrate.

4. The criminal law of the Twelve Tables was based on a principle of private revenge limited by law and sanctioned by a juridical decision.

5. The capital procedure of the Twelve Tables was that of private accusation. This was preceded by a *legis actio*, probably a *legis actio sacramento*. The oath was followed by the investigation, the *quaerere* before a jury. If the jury voted a conviction, the guilty party was handed over to the plaintiff for private punishment.

6. The origin of the *iudicium publicum* is to be traced to the extraordinary commissions which from the turn of the third century were used with ever increasing frequency, and to the police courts which at the very latest began at this time to be used to preserve order in the state. Special commissions (*quaestiones extraordinariae*) were set up as early as the late fourth century to investigate and punish political crimes. These were first established by *senatus-consulta* but later through *plebiscita*. These commissions, which were also used to punish notable crimes such as those of the Bacchants in 186 B. C., gradually suppressed the cumbersome comitrial procedure.

7. The older *iudicia publica* were of a genuinely juridical character, and it is wrong to maintain that the *quaestiones extraordinariae* were nothing more than an investigation and "judication" of the magistrate. In these special commissions as in the praetor's court, and likely that of the *tresviri capitales* except where the guilt was manifest, the sentence was not passed by the magistrate but by his council.

8. The *iudicium publicum* probably developed into a procedure with an *actio popularis* in the sphere of common crimes.

9. The *quaestiones perpetuae* should more likely be dated to judicial reform of Gracchus in 122 B. C., which placed knights upon the juries, than to the *quaestio repetundarum* set up by the *Lex Calpurnia* in 149 B. C. The creation of the knights as jurors opened up the way for a whole system of *quaestiones*.

10. Sulla's judicial reforms consolidated this system.

11. The *tresviri capitales* probably retained their juridical activity down to the time of the Empire, when their functions were taken over by the more efficient *praefecti urbi* and *vigilum*.

12. At the beginning of the second century before Christ non-Romans were apparently being tried before a *concilium* drawn up by a Roman magistrate. In Cicero's Verrine orations this is taken as a standard procedure. A further development of it may be seen in the Fourth Edict of Cyrene issued by Augustus.

Because of the fragmentary and dubious state of evidence for early Roman criminal procedures, there will always be matters for controversy. Nonetheless it may be said that Kunkel's thesis marks the near conclusion of a veritable Copernican revolution in the dogmatic reconstruction of Roman law. Only time and further studies will eventually show whether or not his reconstruction will stand. Though there are some difficulties with it, he certainly clears up the numerous anomalies present in Mommsen's *Strafrecht*. His revolution could have perhaps been advanced a few degrees further if he had taken into account two further principles of Mommsen's thought. The first of these is that with the abolishment of the kingdom the sacral and secular powers possessed by the king were forever separated and that as a consequence there could no longer be a juridical prosecution of a religious crime (see *Römisches Staatsrecht*, II, 1 [Dritte Auflage, Leipzig, 1887], pp. 50-1; "Der Religions-frevell nach römischen Recht," *Gesammelte Schriften*, III, pp. 390-2; *Römische Strafrecht* [Leipzig, 1899], p. 575). Kunkel simply takes it for granted that religious offenses in antiquity could be juridically prosecuted by the secular arm as they were during the Middle Ages, but since Mommsen's principle has caused so much controversy, especially with regard to the later persecutions of the Christians, it might well have been explicitly treated. He might also have taken into account the *iudicium domesticum* in which the *paterfamilias* brought to trial one of his dependents before a *concilium* made up of relatives and friends. For Mommsen "die Hauszucht" could be described as *coercitio* or *disciplina* but not as a *judicium domesticum*, an expression used by the elder Seneca (*Controversiae*, II, 3, 18) which he regarded as being simply paradoxical (*Strafrecht*, p. 17). Nevertheless, failure to use a *concilium* in serious matters could lead to public prosecution. As a consequence this exercise of the *patris potestas* may be considered an integral part of Roman criminal procedure (see Rudolf Düll, "Iudicium domesticum, abdicatio und apocryxis," *Zeitschr. d. Savigny-Stiftung*, LXIII [1943], pp. 54-116).

Mommsen's conviction with respect to the malicious character of

Roman criminal law was no doubt largely due to his own liberal views. *Nulla poena sine lege* or its counterpart *nullum crimen sine lege* is not a principle of Roman criminal law but of eighteenth-century Rationalism. Mommsen was too great an historian to apply this principle to Roman laws themselves, but he did attempt to apply it to Roman criminal procedures. If a procedure was not established by law, then he simply refused to recognize it as being in any sense juridical. Kunkel's monograph, and the Copernican revolution which it is bringing to a close, should bring us around again to a better appreciation of the real spirit of Roman criminal as well as Roman civil law which, as Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz has beautifully observed, is radically opposed to our own: "Non un sistema planimetrico, ove ogni regola si trovi sullo stesso piano delle altre ed una sola sia la misura del lecito e dell'illecito; ma un sistema solare, entro il quale i vari mondi giuridici si muovono ciascuno nella propria orbita come i cieli danteschi che l'uno all'altro raggio non ingombra" (*Storia del diritto Romano* [ediz. 17, Napoli, 1957], p. 169).

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FILIPPO CASSOLA. I gruppi politici romani nel III secolo a. C.
Trieste, Istituto di Storia Antica, 1962. Pp. 438.

Although the title of this book is a little misleading, since it says comparatively little about Roman politics in the early part of the third century B. C. and a lot about them in the last half of the fourth and first half of the second, it is a first class piece of work. If it overlaps its ostensible limits on both sides it is with the perfectly laudable aim of drawing a picture that is correct in its historical context and perspective.

The book deals with a comparatively neglected period of Roman history. Thanks to the prosopographical labours of Münzer, Gelzer, Scullard, Syme, Broughton, Taylor, and others, a good deal is now known about the political life of the Roman Republic after 200 B. C.; but the period before 200 B. C. has not engaged scholars' attention to anything like the same degree, not even Münzer's, for all his lucid learning and painstaking punctiliousness. Perhaps students have been daunted by the barely historical, and in many cases semi-mythical, character of the surviving evidence. The obvious difficulties have not, however, deterred Cassola. Ranging over the information at our disposal with easy mastery and fascinating penetration, he expounds in detail the interplay of political forces in the Middle Republic and presents us with an overall picture of the developments that is so fresh and original that it is safe to say that his work will take its place alongside those good old standbys, Beloch and De Sanctis, as indispensable for all serious students of the period.

His thesis briefly is that political rivalries were fought out within

the body of an upper class, patricio-plebeian élite, who enjoyed an absolute monopoly of political activity: from the beginning of the third century B. C. on, it is unrealistic to think in terms of a conflict between patricians and plebeians. But it is no less wide of the mark to postulate opposition between "the people" on the one side and "the nobles" on the other. Not that non-nobles were completely ignored. On the contrary, members of the governing establishment might, and did, take up the cause of one or other of various interests within the Roman citizen body. Two groups were particularly influential: that of the small farmers and that of the commercial traders. Both of these were imperialist in their different ways: the small farmers sought to expand territorially in Italy, especially Northern Italy; the commercially minded group, on the other hand, preferred to exercise hegemony by means of *clientela* (p. 395) and were largely indifferent to annexations of territory: what they wanted was control of trade, not only in Southern Italy but also overseas as well. These two groups, it is true, were not the only ones to make their presence felt in Roman political struggles (see, e. g., pp. 194, 202, 419, 423); but they were the ones that most markedly affected Roman foreign policy and as a consequence the military life of the Roman state. So Cassola directs his attention chiefly to them (p. 171). According to him, the Roman statesmen who espoused the causes of these two groups can be identified; and he arrives at conclusions which are invariably acute and sometimes startling. The "commercial" faction can already be discerned as early as the Samnite Wars in the persons of such worthies as Papirius Cursor and Publius Philo, and later it included not only the patrician Claudi and Metelli, but above all the Cornelii Scipiones. The "small farmer" faction also was already in existence during the earlier period, Decius Mys and Curius Dentatus being illustrious representatives of it; but its heyday belongs to the late third century B. C. when it found such illustrious leaders as Flamininus, Claudius Marcellus, and above all the Fabii. The "commercial" group tended to get the better of the rivalry, since their policies led to the protracted but undoubtedly successful Samnite, Pyrrhic, and First Punic Wars. The Second Punic War was also due to them and, despite its disastrous beginning, it too ultimately stood them in good stead: for the immense prestige with which their leader Scipio Africanus emerged from it enabled them to embark on a programme of eastern expansion in the second century B. C. Against these mercantilists the "small farmers" always had difficulty in making headway. If, in the last third of the third century B. C., they managed to become for a while unusually prominent in politics, it was chiefly due to the reform of the *Comitia Centuriata* ca. 230 B. C., which revitalized the fortunes of their "party." Theirs, however, was a shortlived renascence. In the early second century they did indeed produce Cato the Censor, but in general the policies that prevailed then were those of the Scipios and Flamininus. But these latter families had lost contact with the grass roots and no longer shared a community of outlook with their fellow citizens, a state of affairs which led to the Gracchan explosion later in the century (pp. 401 f.).

Clearly this is a new and vigorous look at the political life of

Republican Rome, and it is impossible not to be impressed by it. Presumably it will take some time for scholars to arrive at a consensus concerning the essential rightness or otherwise of the picture Cassola has drawn; for the moment one is somewhat dazzled by the brilliance of the interpretation. It is obvious that it contains much of lasting value. That, however, is not to say that the book is entirely free of questionable assertions and hypotheses.

Most readers will probably accept as inevitable some over-statement of the main thesis; proponents of new views almost invariably display some bias, and Cassola himself frankly admits (pp. 63, 314) that the existence of his two main groups, especially in the earlier period, is to be inferred rather than demonstrated. Some of his readers may wonder whether the wars with Samnium, a trading and economic backwater, were the result of mercantilist expansion; others, remembering the Allia in 390 B. C. and Arretium in 284 B. C., may reflect that in the 220's B. C. the Romans were more probably searching for security than for small farms in Cisalpine Gaul; and yet others will doubt whether Cassola's picture of politics as usual during the darkest days of the Second Punic War can possibly be entirely true. Nor will everyone concede that the "struggle between the orders" was quite as dead in the third century as Cassola insists: in 215 B. C. election of two plebeian consuls was disallowed (Livy, XXIII, 31, 13), and even Cassola admits (p. 10) that it was not until 172 B. C. that the idea of both the consuls being plebeian was tolerated. While on the subject of plebeians, it might be mentioned that Cassola (p. 403) does not seem to take sufficient account of the well documented instances of tribunician obstructionism before the Gracchi.

Besides general criticism of this kind, cavils against details are certain to be raised. Cassola's conviction that Flamininus and Fabius Maximus were of the same political persuasion (pp. 268 f.) runs flatly counter to the evidence of Cicero (*Fabius C. Flaminio tribuno pl. quoad potuit restituit: De Sen.*, 11) and of Livy (who makes Fabius call Flamininus a madman: XXII, 39, 6); Cassola does not ignore, but equally does not explain away, the implications of these passages (pp. 300, 343). And what he has to say about Metilius does not strengthen his case. A Metilius is said to have opposed Fabius; a Metilius is also said to have got political backing from Flamininus. Cassola invites us (pp. 361 f.) to believe that this must mean that there were two Metili, of whom one is to be regarded as otherwise completely unknown; it is unlikely that many scholars will respond to the invitation. Cassola's belief (p. 334) that Valerius Laevinus was one of those who led the opposition to Claudius Marcellus in 210 B. C. also hardly coincides with the ancient evidence. Livy (XXVI, 29, 7 f.) and Plutarch (*Marc.*, 23, 2) both state that Laevinus advocated rejection of the Sicilian imprecations against Marcellus. To support his view that Fabius Maximus did not use his influence in the college of augurs to get magistrates unseated and replaced by himself, Cassola argues (pp. 335 f.) that it was the witnessing augur and not the entire college that decided whether omens had vitiated an election. Yet Livy (XXIII, 31, 13) and Plutarch (*Marc.*, 4, 2; 12, 1) imply otherwise. Again, what is

Cassola's evidence for saying (pp. 128, 148) that Maenius and Publilius Philo were enemies? Livy (IX, 26, 20 f.) makes them both alike the object of aristocratic hostility.

On certain episodes more than one interpretation is admittedly possible. But to the present reviewer Cassola seems unduly gullible in accepting (p. 146) Livy's account of the events of 342 B. C. and rather rash in suggesting (p. 183) that, although a majority of both *populus* and *nobilitas* wanted peace in 219 B. C., a handful of war-mongering mercantilists got their way; that some of the five ambassadors to Carthage, and in particular Aemilius Paulus (p. 377), were quite conciliatory, is hardly probable. To say this, however, is not to deny the great value of Cassola's discussion (pp. 245-58) of the outbreak of the Second Punic War.

Cassola's methodology is not above reproach. To support his own case he occasionally adduces an admittedly apocryphal story, on the ground that the tale would never have been invented had it not accorded with soundly based tradition (so, e. g., on p. 377); on other occasions, however, this line of reasoning is sternly rejected (pp. 362, 423). And this is not the only example of inconsistency. Both Flamininus and Fabius Maximus were elected into office by the people (217 B. C.), they therefore were friends (p. 297); Fabius Maximus and Minucius Rufus were also both elected into office by the people (likewise 217 B. C.), they however were enemies (p. 262). Nor is circular argument altogether absent: Claudio Marcellus and Fulvius Flaccus are opponents of a mercantilist policy, therefore they frown on any leniency for the south (p. 333); Manlius Torquatus, on the other hand, shows leniency toward Syracuse, therefore he must be a member of the commercially minded group (p. 323). Furthermore Cassola is too ready to assume that in a year of great political excitement the two consuls were more likely to be rivals than friends (p. 19); that if a consul named someone as dictator it was because the nominee was his friend, not because he was the best man available (pp. 331, 334); that the official presiding over an election on the whole had little influence on its outcome (p. 14: against which, note Livy, XXVII, 4-5); and that men followed the instructions of their superiors out of friendship rather than out of obedience (p. 381). Sometimes, too, Cassola does not bear in mind his own warnings about the fluidity of political "parties" and the variety of political allegiance within the same *gens* (pp. 412, 414, 421): both his "small farmer" group and his "commercial" group appear rather unchanging, both as to purpose and to personnel.

It is inevitable that a reviewer of such a book as this will stress points of difference rather than of agreement with its author, and it would be grossly unfair if in the present instance this conveyed an impression of overall disapproval. Nothing could be further from the wish of the present reviewer. He holds Cassola's book in the highest esteem. Its cautious approach to prosopography (p. 22) supplies a needed corrective to the audacious speculations of Münzer and reinforces a warning issued some years ago by H. M. Last (in *Gnomon*, XXII [1946], p. 361). In some particulars Cassola is already supported by the independent researches of others: e. g. in his rejection (pp. 330 f.) of the notion that the Fulvii and

Claudii formed a political faction (see J. E. A. Crake in *Phoenix*, XVII [1963], pp. 123-30). The eager and searching light he throws on many matters brings us much nearer to the truth. One example must suffice. His account of the activity of the *legio Campana* (pp. 171-8) should put an end to the oft-repeated tale that Sabelians seized cities by first getting their defenders drunk and then treacherously slaying them, a tale, by the way, which Alfius' account of the capture of Messana should always have given good reason to impugn (see Festus, p. 150 L.).

In sum, Cassola's is work of the highest scholarship. Books dealing with Roman political life before 200 B.C. are rare in any event; books of the quality of this one are rarer still. It will be heartily welcomed and avidly pondered wherever the history of Rome continues to be an object of purposeful investigation.

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JEAN-MARIE JACQUES. Ménandre (tome 1^e): Le *Dyscolos*, texte établi et traduit. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1963. Pp. 1-124 (64-124 doubled). (*Collection des Universités de France publié sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé.*)

The most enthusiastic admirer of Menander could not ask for a more appreciative introduction to the dramatist than he will find here in the pages that treat of the play itself (pp. 7-44). The discussion of date, theme, and construction is admirable. The plot, especially the provision of a wife for Gorgias in the fifth act, is ably defended. Finally the art of Menander in depicting individual characters is emphasized. The conclusion is reached that Menander, young though he was, produced in the *Dyscolos* a work that shows no sign of immaturity and that his *Misanthrope* is worthy of a place side by side even with the masterpiece of Molière. Since this verdict rests on sympathetic study with citation of opposing views and consideration of scholarly work in the field, it is very welcome.

I take exception only to the statement (p. 41) that the acts of Chaireas the parasite belie his words. A careful reading of his words will show that he promised only to use the greatest caution in arranging a marriage (64-8) and that when he promised to speak to Cnemon the next day (132) he was going further than before. He had not promised to be eloquent, bold, or speedy in getting a wife for Sostratus. He had made a clear distinction between his uninhibited success with hetaeras and his care to avoid matrimonial misalliances for his patrons. He was, therefore, true to his principles when he took leave of Sostratus rather than encourage him to marry in haste. On page 28 the author seems to have failed to note that Pataecus in *Perikeiromene* (448) could not think of arranging a marriage for Moschion until he was recognized as a son. Hence

the proposal is a surprise for Moschion and audience alike. On page 76, note 1, he supposes that the actor who went off as Chaireas would enter as Cnemon six lines later (153). But since Jacques rightly removes Pyrrhias at line 144, there is no difficulty in giving to the protagonist the parts of Pan, Pyrrhias, Cnemon, the Girl, and Pyrrhias again. Lucius Ambivius in the prologue of the *Self-Punisher* mentions *servos currēns* and *iratus senex* as strenuous parts that the old actor was expected to take upon himself. So here Cnemon and Pyrrhias are played by the actor who spoke the prologue.

Discussion of the text (pp. 45-59) includes all matters related to the Bodmer papyrus. The section on orthography includes scribal errors, but not a complete list, as the editor warns us. He sometimes warns us that the mistake cited depends on conjecture, but does so in only a few cases of the many where editors disagree. Nothing is said of omissions not due to haplography, though there are a number of omitted words and at least one emendation (223) that assumes such an omission within a word. But an editor must stop somewhere if he is to get his book out at all. It is very convenient to find all double points of the papyrus printed in the text as well as all the evidence for speakers of lines. Double points, apart from mistakes, do not always indicate a change of speaker. Even more welcome is it to have a division of the apparatus devoted to citation of imitative passages from Aelian, Libanius, and others.

The editor has left a very few corrupt lines unemended and often leaves gaps where others provide a supplement. Points under doubtful letters are not used, but relevant information is given in the apparatus. The sense of any gaps is supplied in the translation. Notes on the translation cite many passages, especially from Latin comedy, by way of illustration or explanation. Space seems to be strictly rationed, so that I miss references to epic and tragedy. For Homer I note line 639, *ἰστὸν θεοῖ*, where *Odyssey*, XXIV, 351 is relevant: *θεοῖ ἐστὲ* (Laertes, viewing retribution as evidence for the existence of gods). For the relation of house-location to sociability (446) note *Iliad*, VI, 14 f., and for the grudging of salt (570) *Odyssey*, XVII, 455 (compare in Latin *Persa*, 267). The standard of accuracy in printing is high. An unitalicized word in the title of a work cited (p. 72, n. 2) is as much as I have found. The omission of numbers for twelve pages between 59 and 68 is a bother, and room might have been made for another line number (750) on page 109.

The translation is excellent, as far as an alien may judge, but there are some things that I would have different: "Yes, and you hurt when you do it," not *Oui, et il t'en cuira!* (510); "Not I, not even a snail," not *Toi? pas même un escargot!* (475); "Happy man," not *Mon cher monsieur . . .* (701 f.); "What could you expect?" not *Qu'est-ce que nous attendions?* (672 f., compare the Oxford dictionary, s. v. *μέλλω* 1 f.). *Notre homme se fâme* at 945 is not so good as V. Martin's *Quelle inertie!* The remark of Getas, to suit his mood, must suggest that Cnemon is lazy, lacking in spirit (so Vellacott), or out of training. Getas is unfair, insulting, and ruthless. I now suggest: "The man's a slacker." Jacques gives

a new twist to *φιλανθρωπεύσομαι* (573) by interpreting it as a bit of humor *qui dépossède Pan de sa divinité*. I suggest that Sostratus is promising benefactions that will provide conveniences, such as benches, for the public, or perhaps ornamental marble basins. These would incidentally belong to Pan and increase his prestige. Plutarch tells us that Solon's father had diminished his wealth by benefactions (*Solon*, 2, 1). Such *philanthropia* would include gifts to a temple or shrine, I suppose.

There are new readings that improve the text. In the citation on page 89, Aelian, *Epistle* 15, Jacques' *<μισθ>πόνηρος* is first-rate. For *Dyscolos* I note ἐνθαδ]ὶ (89), ἀλλὰ ν[ν β]οῖ (149, but long for the space), τ[ὴν οὐδρίαν] (200), ἐπιψε]ὲ (245), προθυμοῦ (905), and others. Some points of disagreement need not be mentioned, since I have discussed them elsewhere. There is a new proposal at line 943, emendation of στονδὴ γὰρ ἦ to στονδὴ παρῆν. This sentence introduces Sicon's grandiloquent account of the drinking party. In line 630 Jacques rightly notes Sicon's tragic tone. The stop after first dipody is impressive in line 943 as in 379 and 639. It seems to me meiosis rather than grandiloquence to speak of a drinking party as a libation. In any case the libation was future, not present, at the point where Sicon begins his relation. For this kind of beginning there is the best possible model in Demosthenes' ἐσπέρα μὲν γὰρ ἦ (On the Crown, 169). The bustle before a feast was still a notable feature in my childhood in the country. Children got little attention, but needed none, since they were fascinated by the excitement. For Latin comedy note from Menander *festinamus* at *Stichus*, 676 and from Diphilus *festinant* at *Casina*, 763 and 792. In the latter play the master joins in as at *Samia*, 4 ὑπερεσπουδακώς.

Jacques, commenting on lines 440 f., cites *Samia*, 6 ff., where Demeas gives orders from the pantry, as evidence that *omnia parare famulos iubet matrona potius quam servus*. I can see no logic in this. In Latin comedy such orders are always given by men, whether old master, young master, parasite, head slave, or cook. Demeas explains why he was giving the orders himself. The inference is that he was doing something unusual. He had to be where he was not expected to be because the plot required him to overhear and misunderstand the old woman's remark. There may have been a play in which a wife gave such orders, but Demeas' concubine in *Samia* does not. What is more, she herself receives orders from Parmeno the slave (86-8). As far as the evidence goes, Greeks no more expected their wives to prepare a special meal than they trusted them to go to market for sea-food.

It is Sicon who speaks at *Dyscolos* 434-7, then Getas 437 f., and Sicon again 438-41. His plurals in these last lines do not prove that anyone else but Getas and Cnemon is on stage. He uses plural imperatives to Simike (622-4), and Cnemon uses plurals to Sostratus (173-6). Anthrax, a cook in the Menandrian *Aulularia*, gives such orders (398-402). There is a striking case of a matron who has to order a feast in the Menandrian *Stichus*, when her husband returns after a long absence. She leaves it to a slave to give particular orders to the servants, merely saying (396): *iube famulos rem divinam mi apparent*. The original Greek, I suppose, mentioned

the basket as in *Samia*, 7. Before the cook arrives on stage (434) to take charge, it is Getas who orders Plangon and Parthenis to do their part in the ritual.

Menander makes short work of getting these mutes off the stage, if they were ever on it. Getas could have called to them offstage as he entered. Menander presumably did not show the majority of the feasters when they left the shrine during the act (776 f.). There were enough to alarm Getas earlier for fear that nothing of the sheep would be left for him (563-6). But his three thousand is an exaggeration. There must have been at least a score or two. I do not insist that Menander showed no feasters at all arriving, but only that he got any representatives of the party out of sight very promptly. The matron, if shown at all, goes before the entrance of Getas (430), and the two who are named go as soon as they get their orders. The text tells us nothing of any other mutes. Getas entered when the matron found him offstage, while Sicon's alarm clock was the piping of Parthenis.

Jacques follows Ritchie and others in giving the matron a speaking part in Act 3, beginning with the command to Plangon (430): *τροπεύν θάττον*. By translating this *dépêche-toi* "hurry up" he leaves the question undecided whether Plangon is ordered to "move at once" or "move faster." Against the latter is the fact that it is old women who are urged to move faster in Latin comedy. They always protest. No doubt their efforts were funny. See *Mercator*, 671 *quin is ocius* and *Eunuchus*, 912 *move te oro ocius*. Furthermore, no one supposes that *βάδιζε ραχύ* (638) and *θάττον βάδιζε* (596) mean "walk fast" or "walk faster." They mean "go at once," and so Plangon is told to start at once. The question who gives the order does not matter here. The later order to Parthenis shows that we are dealing with *rem divinam*. The ritual begins precisely when Plangon obeys the order to move. The basket with sacrificial knife must be conveyed to the altar. To carry the basket is Plangon's function as daughter of the family, and she leads the procession. See *Acharnians*, 257.

The order to her serves to let the audience know just what stage in the action has been reached. Menander, unlike Plautus and Aristophanes, does not show feasting or drinking on stage. The feasting visible to Cnemon when he speaks lines 447 f. is not visible to the audience. So at line 147 Sostratus can see Cnemon coming while he is still offstage. The party that ends the *Dyscolos* is described by messengers, but not the earlier feast except for Cnemon's remark. There are offstage feasts in *Samia* and *Epitrepontes* and two offstage lunches in *Perikeiromene* (55, 295). At the beginning of an act it is convenient to let the audience know at the earliest possible moment the time elapsed in the interval. At the beginning of Act 4, Sicon's mention of libations (623) shows that the feast is over except for some drinking. At the end of the act most of the feasters have dispersed to the fields (776 f.). When an act begins with the return of a character who had business offstage between acts, as in the second and fifth acts of *Dyscolos*, no further indication of time is needed. I suggest that the order to Plangon has a dramatic purpose, namely to mark the beginning of

the ritual that would permit Sicon to butcher the sheep and cook the meat.

Far from solving any problems, the giving of lines to Sostratus' mother keeps her on stage at a point where Menander is interested only in indicating the arrival of the feasters with the greatest possible economy of speech and action. She is probably not on stage when addressed later by Sostratus (867). She may have appeared briefly at the beginning of Act 3, but Menander gave her no lines.

There seems to be no good reason for following V. Martin in printing the second singular pronoun as an enclitic in lines 138 and 596 instead of following J. Martin (138) and Lloyd-Jones (596). In the former case *kakòv δὲ οὲ* shows an oblique case of *οὐ δὲ* used as a term to address a character, known or unknown, to whom attention is suddenly turned. Chaireas is so addressed in line 144 by Sostratus. Compare *Wasps*, 905, *Lysistrata*, 506, and Lucian in *Anabiountes*, 1, 5. Lucian has *καὶ σὺ δέ 'and you here.'* At *Wasps*, 452 Philocleon says only *ἄνες με καὶ σὺ καὶ σύ*, but Lucian probably knew some Attic model for his locution. In *Runaways*, 32 the master who begins a sentence with *σὺ δέ* is still uncertain of the identity of his runaway slave. In this form of address there is no need to suppose an antithesis any more than at *Epitrepontes*, 131, where *σὺ γὰρ* would have served as well. I find a third case of this idiom in *Dyscolos* at line 913, where Cnemon uses it to address the insistent Getas, whom apparently he does not recognize. In spite of the punctuation in the papyrus we should not give *δηλονότι* to Cnemon, who nowhere answers a question obligingly, let alone flippantly. Let Getas answer his own question: "Do you live here? Of course you do." For Cnemon just awake and still confused there was no "of course" about it. Such importunity is just right for Getas in this scene.

A warning is needed against taking an interpretation from another play and inserting it in *Dyscolos* without regard to the context. To explain *πάντες ἔχομεν* (612), addressed by Sostratus to Gorgias as they enter after Sostratus has persuaded Gorgias and Daos to leave their work to join in the sacrifice to Pan, a parallel is cited from *Hibeh Papyri*, I (1906), no. 6, p. 29 (Page, *Greek Literary Papyri*, I, 63, line 24), *ἔχομεν ἄπαντα*. In each case an exclamation of protest follows from a slave. In *Dyscolos* the protest is against Sostratus' too generous hospitality. In the other play the slave says, "How rude you are!" There is nothing obviously rude in the remark "We have everything," as Page translates it. The rudeness must be idiomatic in the Greek. The phrase puts an end to further communication. When Sostratus says, "We have everything," he is not assuring Gorgias that plenty of food will be provided at the feast. That surely would go without saying. He is brusquely putting an end to further demur on the part of Gorgias. Hence I translate, "That's final" or perhaps *c'est entendu*. His brusqueness is part of his insistent friendship and is recognized as such by all concerned. The end of a one-sided communication is marked by *πάντες ἔξεις* (*λόγον*) at Aesch., *Agam.*, 582; Ar., *Birds*, 1460; and Gerytades, fr. 149, 7 in Athenaeus, 551 B; and Menander, *Samia*, 172. At *Samia*, 166 Demeas has said to Chrysis, "You have

everything of yours." At line 172 he means, "That's the whole story." To end a two-sided communication logic requires a plural πάντ' ἔχομεν. This is rude when it cuts off a kind offer, but not when it cuts off a protest against kindness.

The insertion in *Dyscolos*, 223 of a raw lump of Philemon, fr. 4 προσῆκον ἦν ignores the evidence of Demetrius, *On Style*, 193 and of others that Menander's style was especially vivacious, adapted to dramatic delivery, not to smooth reading. To say no more of the violence to paleographic probability than I have already (*A.J.P.*, LXXXII [1961], p. 96; *T.A.P.*, XCI [1960], p. 155; *A.J.P.*, LXXXIV [1963], pp. 41 and 202 f.), note that in this passage of Menander we have one of his special effects that are produced by assonance, rhythm, and other means. I have analyzed a number of such passages in my article "Menander and the *Helen* of Euripides," *H.S.C.P.*, LXVIII (1964), on pages 108-16. The damping effect of inserting a rollicking dipody from Philemon in the middle of a tirade delivered by an indignant and virtuous slave, who is biting off his words, is all the more deplorable since Bingen's προκειμένη adds to the effect instead of detracting from it. See page 112 of my article in *Harvard Studies*. There is no comment by Jacques on such effects in *Dyscolos*.

Latin comedy provides support of my proposal (*A.J.P.*, LXXXIV [1963], p. 201) to read in line 837 οὐκ ἔχων βούλει δοκεῖν [*τρυφᾶν*. A youth who would decline an offered bride is criticized at *Heauton*, 1063: *Heia, ut elegans est!* "Well, well! How particular he is!" So Gorgias is accused of putting on superior airs unbecoming to a poor man. The phrase δοκεῖν *τρυφᾶν* suggests lordliness and soft living, since it was used of the house of Codrus in Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, fr. 7, where the Loeb translation has "They were thought to be luxurious and to have become soft."

In the same review (p. 205) I suggested for line 763, despaired of by Jacques, ἐντεκεῖν <*τέκνυ*>, ως δίκαιον ἔστι. πί[μπλ]η, Σώστρατε. Certainly the marriage formula should contain a reference to the begetting of children, as in line 842. If anything is omitted, it must be the dowry. The phrase ως δίκαιον ἔστι is perhaps a distant echo of Homer's θέμις (*Il.*, IX, 134) and Plato's παλαιὸς νόμος (*Laws*, I, 636 B) for sexual intercourse. The rustic's injunction to the bridegroom, "Make her swell," merely underlines the usual Greek conception of marital relations as a kind of plowing, sowing, and growth. Note what Amphitryon says to his wife in Plautus (681): *Et quom te gravidam et quom te pulchre plenam aspicio gaudeo.* Was the Greek χαίρε σ' ὅρῳ πλησθεῖσαν οὕτω παγκάλως? Probably not, but Euripides has πλήσσας νηδύν of Poseidon and Alope (fr. 107 Nauck).

Finally, is there any connection between *comburamus diem* at *Menaechmi*, 152 and *katakáw* (60)? The door is a more likely object of the verb, but we see that time also is combustible. In favor of οὗτοι σφόδρ' ε[ἰς αὐτὴν δρῶν] ἔρω (638 f.) is the etymological derivation of ἔρω from ἔστρω found in Agathon, fr. 29 Nauck: ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ ἔστρων γίγνετ' ἀνθρώποις ἔρων.

To sum up, the Budé Menander gives the most accurate and convenient account of the evidence for text and interpretation that I

have seen. It also provides a full and intelligent appreciation of Menander's dramatic effect. The notes are very helpful. In most of the passages where I prefer some other solution to that found here it should be noted that the majority of editors agree with Jacques rather than with me. There are many good things in the book that I have not mentioned. It is good to know that the Bodmer papyrus contains a fragment of *Aspis*, to which belongs the fragment hitherto known as *Ccmedia Florentina*, and that an enlarged *Samia*, *Sicyonianis*, and *Misoumenos* are to come.¹

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ORAZIO BIANCO. Terenzio. Problemi e aspetti dell'originalità. Roma, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1962. Pp. xi + 247. 2800 Lire. (*Nuovi Saggi*, 41.)

During the past twenty years we have seen a strong revival of interest in Roman comedy among Italian scholars. Important books have been written by Arnaldi, Barbieri, della Corte, de Lorenzi, Paratore, and others,¹ and we now have a new and significant work on Terence by Orazio Bianco, possibly the most complete synthesis of Terentian scholarship to appear in recent years. It is especially welcome inasmuch as the authors mentioned above have devoted far more attention to Plautus than to the younger dramatist.

The author arranges his material in five (unnumbered) chapters: "Prolegomeni" (pp. 1-14), "Gli ideali artistici di Terenzio" (pp. 15-28), "Terenzio nella tradizione della commedia romana" (pp. 29-61), "La composizione delle commedie" (pp. 63-194), and "Terenzio poeta" (pp. 195-233). The book ends with a (too brief?) "Indice delle cose" (p. 235), from "aequom" and "allocuzione al pubblico" to "χορός" and "Zweitägigkeit," and a full "Indice dei passi citati" (pp. 237-47); the citations from Terence comprise about two-thirds of the index, but those from Donatus, Menander, and Plautus are also numerous. It is unfortunate that Bianco did not add a bibliography or at least an index of modern writers.

¹ For *The Sicyonian* see now *Recherches de Papyrologie*, III (1964), pp. 103-76.

¹ F. Arnaldi, *Da Plauto a Terenzio* (Napoli, 1946-47; 2 vols.), reviewed by G. E. Duckworth in this Journal, LXX (1949), pp. 221-4 and LXXII (1951), pp. 328-31; A. Barbieri, *La vis comica in Terenzio* (Milano, 1951); F. della Corte, *Da Sarsina a Roma* (Genova, 1952), reviewed by P. MacKendrick in this Journal, LXXV (1954), pp. 420-1; A. de Lorenzi, *Orcologria ed evoluzione plautina* (Napoli, 1952), reviewed by P. MacKendrick in this Journal, LXXVI (1955), pp. 445-6; R. Perna, *L'originalità di Plauto* (Bari, 1955); G. Rambelli, *Comica Graeco-Latina* (Pavia, 1957); E. Paratore, *Storia del teatro latino* (Milano, 1957), reviewed by P. MacKendrick in this Journal, LXXIX (1958), pp. 423-7; A. Traina, *Comoedia: antologia della palliata* (Padova, 1960), reviewed by P. MacKendrick in this Journal, LXXXIII (1962), pp. 330-1; E. Paratore, *Plauto* (Firenze, 1962), reviewed by G. E. Duckworth in this Journal, LXXXV (1964), pp. 99-100; G. Monaco, *Teatro di Plauto. I. Il Curculio* (Roma, 1963).

Since his 233 pages of text contain more than 600 footnotes, with references to about 120 scholars, many of them the authors of several books or articles cited, the constant repetition of "op. cit." and "art. cit." is less than helpful.²

In his opening chapter Bianco stresses and compares the esthetic approach of Croce and the "höhere Kritik" of Jachmann; according to Croce, the plays are to be considered as "opere di poesia," but Jachmann and his followers (Drexler, Kuiper, Knoche) look upon Terence as spoiling the poetic beauty and dramatic perfection of the Greek originals. Bianco criticizes Jachmann for his hostility towards Terence and for confusing philological research and esthetic appreciation, but insists (against Croce) that the analytical approach is a necessary preliminary to the evaluation of the comedies (pp. 4, 8; cf. 195 f.), and he censures "i filologi anglosassoni" for their complete indifference to the derivation of structural elements and comic motifs from the Greek models and for their resultant inability to reach a judgment of value.³ This is unjust; many British and American scholars may place little confidence in results based on supposed flaws and inconsistencies (often imaginary), but their unwillingness to accept the preconceived theory of the analysts (rightly condemned by Bianco) that what is good in Roman comedy derives from the Greek plays, what is bad is the work of Terence (or Plautus), does not preclude a desire to find out, from Donatus and all other possible sources, the innovations introduced by Terence into his comedies.⁴ This is of course necessary in any effort to assess the poet's originality, and Bianco uses the same evidence and the same method in his later analyses of the plays, when he attempts to define Terences' originality and the nature of his inspiration—the chief purpose of his book (cf. pp. 13 f.).

The second chapter (on "the artistic ideals of Terence") presents the dramatist's conception of life and man in general, his preference for comedy of character, and his interest in the psychological delineation of his personages. We find the usual comments about his unconventional treatment of character, e.g., Bacchis, the *bona meretrix* of the *Heceyra* (cf. her own comments in 756 and 834), and his dislike of the traditional *anagnorisis*. Terence's use of *contaminatio* is a proof of his originality; cf. p. 27: his procedure

² The references and quotations seem very accurate. I have noted one serious blunder. In *The Nature of Roman Comedy* (Princeton, 1952), p. 103, I wrote as follows: "In the plays of Plautus the average amount of monologue is seventeen per cent of the total number of verses, in those of Terence only twelve." Bianco on p. 57, n. 89, misinterprets this statement and attributes to Plautus a fantastic seventy ("set-tanta") per cent of monologues.

³ Cf. p. 9, n. 24. He cites, as typical of this approach, G. E. Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy*, and W. Beare, *The Roman Stage* (2nd ed., London, 1955). His criticism is essentially that of M. Barchiesi, "Problematica e poesia in Plauto," *Maia*, IX (1957), pp. 163-203; see especially pp. 183 ff., where the work of Prescott, Duckworth, Hough, and others is termed "high criticism," as distinct from the "höhere Kritik" of the German scholars.

⁴ Cf. the many references to Donatus in Duckworth, *op. cit.*; see Index under Donatus, p. 475; cf. also Beare, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-98.

was not a mechanical introduction of passages from a second Greek original, but a reworking of the material which resulted in a complete alteration of the first model. In the third chapter ("Terence in the tradition of Roman comedy") Bianco discusses a number of dramatic features in which Menander, Plautus, and Terence are to be compared: (1) the prologue, especially Terence's suppression of the traditional *argumentum* and his use of literary polemic; Bianco disagrees with Leo's theory (accepted by Jachmann) that Caecilius Statius invented the polemic prologue and maintains that Terence was the first dramatist to use the prologue for the discussion of literary problems; his arguments are in part *ex silentio*, but that based on *And.* 1-7 (p. 42) seems sound; (2) metrical structure, and Terence's lack of the polymetric richness of Plautus; (3) the violation of the dramatic illusion in Menander and Plautus, avoided by Terence as a result of his desire for greater dignity and realism; (4) Terence's use of monologue, and his frequent change to dialogue to strengthen the dramatic illusion; this explains the introduction of the (sometimes too mechanical) protatice character.

The fourth chapter, the major portion of the book and the most significant, is devoted to a detailed analysis, often scene by scene, of the six comedies. We find here a thorough summary and criticism of the most important scholarly views on the many problems concerning the structure, content, and originality of the plays. Bianco's analyses range from nine pages on the *Phormio* to thirty-six pages on the *Eunuchus*. I select his discussions of the *Eunuchus* and the *Adelphoe* for brief comment.

The central problem of the *Eunuchus* is the introduction of the soldier and the parasite from the *Colax*; this is not an addition but a substitution for two characters which were necessary to Menander's *Eunuchus*, Phaedria's rival and his slave. The more amusing and colorful Thraso and Gnatho make possible the delightful attack on the house of Thais (IV, 7). Norwood likewise thinks that the two characters were introduced for this purpose, but he considers the scene "a wretched fiasco"; he speaks of "the dramatic badness of the whole Thraso element" and calls the underplot "distinctly Plautine."⁵ Leo believed that IV, 7 came from the *Eunuchus* of Menander, while Jachmann favored the *Colax*; Bianco divides the scene into two parts: 771-87, which is Terentian (the reference to Pyrrhus in 783 proves that this portion cannot come from the *Colax* or any other Menandrian comedy), and 788-816, which could be from Menander's *Eunuchus* but the substitution of soldier and parasite for the original rival and slave produces a new organic unity. Likewise, the concluding scenes (1025 ff.) come from the Greek *Eunuchus* with Thraso and Gnatho cleverly interwoven. The final arrangement, with Thraso contributing to Thais' expenses, is not, in

⁵ G. Norwood, *The Art of Terence* (Oxford, 1923), pp. 65-7. Bianco (p. 7) refers to Norwood's exaggerated ideas of Terence's originality but fails to criticize his views on the individual plays; this seems especially unfortunate in the case both of the *Eunuchus*, of which Norwood disapproves for its Plautine features, and of the *Hecyra*, upon which he bestows exorbitant praise (p. 90: "the purest and most perfect example of classical high comedy . . . from any age or any nation").

Bianco's opinion, too unlike the beginning of the play, when Phaedria agrees to withdraw temporarily in favor of the soldier, Thais is motivated in part by "un personale, egoistico interesse" (p. 162).⁶ Antipho in III, 4 and 5, according to Ihne and Jachmann, must have come from some other Greek original; Terence could not have invented such a character! Bianco disagrees and looks upon Antipho as a Terentian creation.

The author likewise discusses the problem of *contaminatio* in the *Adelphoe* and limits the Diphilus-insertion to 155-96. Sannio's monologue (196-208) is Terence's addition to fit the Diphilus passage into the Menandrian context (209 ff.). Sannio is the name of Menander's *leno*.⁷ Drexler is wrong in criticizing II, 4 as a repetition of II, 2; Bianco rightly points out that it is a necessary development of the earlier scene. The troublesome reference to the possible freedom of the *meretrix* (*quae liberast*, 194)⁸ he interprets (with Nencini and Kauer) as an empty threat. Gustarelli's theory that the Menandrian original ended with Demea's monologue in V, 4 is impossible; if Terence had added the five scenes which follow, Donatus would certainly have so informed us. Bianco admits, however, that Terence may have expanded the final act to portray more vividly Micio's objections, and suggests that 924-45 may be Terence's invention.

The author in his final chapter sums up his findings on the dramatist's originality as developed in his analyses of the comedies; e.g., in introducing Antipho into the *Eunuchus* Terence has shown himself as a "grande poeta, di rara forza e sapienza drammatica" (p. 205). Examining the Greek fragments and especially the *γνῶμαι* of Menander, he finds that Terence's *sententiae* are more Roman and idiomatic. Terence's world is also Roman and thus differs in many respects from that of Menander; e.g., the fundamental reason for his omission of the dramatic monologue (see above) is his renunciation of life dominated by Tyche. The chapter ends on the theme of *humanitas* as distinct from the Greek *φιλανθρωπία*. Following Traina and others,⁹ Bianco stresses Terence's *humanitas* and concludes as follows (p. 233): "Nella storia dell'occidente è Terenzio che da poeta ha fatto per primo sentire la voce dell'umanità".

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⁶ This differs from Norwood's estimate (*op. cit.*, p. 58); "She dominates the action throughout—wise, gracious, affectionate, and resourceful."

⁷ Cf. 210, 220, 240, 276; in the Diphilus-scene he is addressed merely as *leno* (184, 187, 196).

⁸ P. 182, line 4 from end, *read 193-94, not 193-84.*

⁹ Including Norwood, whom he does not cite in this connection; see above, note 5.

Plutarque. Dialogue sur les oracles de la Pythie. Édition, introduction et commentaire de ROBERT FLACELIÈRE. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1962. Pp. 83; 1 map. NF 8. ("Erasme." Collection de Textes Grecs Commentés, publiée sous la direction de Robert Flacelière.)

Twenty-five years ago Robert Flacelière published a text and translation of Plutarch's *De Pythiae Oraculis* with introduction and notes (*Annales de l'Université de Lyon: Lettres*, 3d ser., fasc. 4, 1937). I found it a good book in the review which I wrote for *A.J.P.* [1939], pp. 260-2). Now Flacelière has published the text only, with very few changes, in the *Collection "Erasme"* of Greek texts edited with commentary à l'usage de l'Enseignement Supérieur. The text is provided with a 25-page Introduction, a minimal critical apparatus, and brief notes.

The Introduction, much shorter than in the earlier édition, is divided into six sections: I. Plutarque (a brief account of the author); II. Delphes (a summary sketch of Delphic history, followed by remarks on the role of oracle and sanctuary in Plutarch's dialogue); III. Les Personnages (on the five main participants, of whom Theon is Plutarch himself); IV. La Théorie de l'Inspiration Prophétique (Plutarch, himself a Delphic priest, rejected theories of demonic intermediaries, of earth-exhaled *pneuma*, and of the Pythia's mediumship; the oracular voice was the Pythia's, whom Apollo enlightened with the proper visions); V. La Langue et le Style, and VI. Le Texte, are both brief, but sufficiently informative for the university student.

Flacelière holds to a conservative position in respect to the Delphic oracle. That is, his views on mantic procedure, methods, authenticity and content of responses are those which most scholars have held (e.g., Farnell, Parke), and not those of Amandry, Delcourt, and Crahay. For example (p. 73, note), he says, "La tâche de 'mettre en forme' les réponses de la Pythie était confiée normalement aux fonctionnaires de l'oracle appelés 'prophètes.'" Yet, as Amandry shows, there is almost nothing to support this widely held view. In all records of responses the Pythia speaks the response as quoted, that is, already *en forme* (whether genuine or not makes little difference: everyone agreed that the Pythia spoke the oracles). There is no convincing evidence that priests (prophets) either told her what to say or (the usual modern view) put her incoherent words into verse or finished prose. In the passage on which Flacelière makes his comment (407B), Plutarch reports a theory about the verse oracles of old times, no longer spoken in his time: some men said that ποιητικοί τύπες ἄνδρες ἐκδεχόμενοι τὰς φωνάς sat about the *chrêtérion* and put the responses into verse and rhythm. These versifiers, however, were not Delphic prophets but *Onomakritoī*, *Prodikoi*, and *Kinaithônes*. And it was just a theory that Plutarch had heard. Strabo (IX, 3, 5, p. 419) is much the same: the Pythia, he says, speaks both *emmetra* and *ametra*, and the *ametra* are put into verse by poets in the service of the *hieron*; he says "poets," not "prophets," and in his time no verse oracles were produced at all.

This is a dialogue of prime importance, along with the other two

Delphic dialogues, for the study of the Delphic oracle. Plutarch tells us almost nothing positive about the operation of the oracle in his time; negatively we learn from him that no verse oracles were spoken (or hardly ever), that no *pneuma* came up from a fissure in the earth, that responses like those in Herodotus' history were no longer made. Plutarch assumed (and most scholars have assumed with him) that a great change had occurred before his time, and it puzzled him. But was there any change in the manner or matter of Delphic oracles? Probably not. Nearly all verse oracles are suspect, and the famous predictions of the future, whether clear or obscure in expression, and the cleverly worded ambiguous responses, which everyone considers typical Delphic oracles—all these are likely to be legendary or otherwise inauthentic; the Croesus and Oedipus oracles are on the same footing. It is not a question of forgery, which implies an intent to deceive; the sources were legends, poetry, oraclemongers' collections, "Cnomakritoī." As far as we can tell from oracles recorded in inscriptions and contemporary historians, the Pythia either sanctioned laws or projects submitted to her, or she prescribed religious acts—cult foundations or sacrifices—exactly the sort of business which Plato would leave to the Delphic oracle in his ideal republic. The certainly genuine oracles are neither predictive nor ambiguous, and this is as true of the fifth century B. C. as of the second A. D. Plutarch believed the old stories. There were no Delphic oracular archives for him to consult; his *exempla* are all literary. The three dialogues deserve thorough and careful study; for we can learn much from them about the actual Delphic oracle, if not exactly what Plutarch intended us to learn. And there is much in his words to show that the earlier Delphic oracle was not as he thought it.

An edition of this dialogue thus invites remarks on the author and his text rather than on the editor and his edition, which is sound and serviceable. I am still troubled by καὶ τοῦτο σοι in 403C, followed by infinitives; if the text is right, it means an awkward switch from direct to indirect statement in a short quotation. And Flacelière stands by his ἀποφάνων ἀν μόνην to fill a supposed lacuna in 406A, explaining it in a note as equivalent to εἰ ἀποφάνους. But ἀν with the participle always replaces an apodosis (or the potential optative in a main clause), never a protasis. The participle in the nominative, moreover, offers difficulties if it is taken as a substitute for a second-person verb form, since the verb is ἀπολεῖται. If right, the participle surely requires the definite article as subject of the third-person verb, which otherwise has no subject. But perhaps μόνην alone should be supplied; the subject of ἀπολεῖται is then λέγειν understood from τοῦ λέγοντος to govern μαντικὴν μόνην γεγονέναι Σίβυλλαν, κτλ.

Flacelière says (p. 28, note) that Lykoreia was "ville légendaire du Parnasse," and cites Schober's *Phokis* in support. In that case Philinos' friends ascended Parnassos that day to the Corycian Cave and to a legendary town (394F). Plutarch, Pausanias, and Strabo make it plain enough that there was a settlement called Lykoreia near the Corycian Cave, probably on or beside the Parnassian plateau.

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GUALTIERO CALBOLI. Studi grammaticali. Bologna, Nicola Zanichelli, Editore, 1962. Pp. xii + 258. 3500 Lire. (*Studi pubblicati dall'Istituto di Filologia Classica*, XI.)

The present series of four studies was suggested and directed by Giovanni Battista Pighi, whose brief but enthusiastic (and well-deserved) endorsement appears on the page after the table of contents. Each study is an outgrowth of earlier work by Calboli on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.

The first and largest section is devoted to the construction illustrated by *dicitur eo tempore matrem Pausaniae vixisse*, or, more exactly, to the two types of passive indirect statement commonly known as the "impersonal" and the "personal," their origin, relative age, and relative value. The opinion of some scholars that the type *dicitur matrem vixisse* grew out of the type with impersonal passive verb and accusative object leads Calboli to a discussion of this latter type, and thence to a detailed account of H. Zimmer's well-known theory regarding the origin of the Italic and Celtic passive system, and of the subsequent work of those who have sought to correct, criticize, or reject the theory. Even if the article had no other value, it would be an essential part of the bibliography for any future work on the morphology and syntax of passive verbal forms with *r*-endings, for Calboli has critically examined the essential material not only by Italian scholars, but by German, French, and American as well, among the last of whom Edith F. Clafin (*Lang.*, V [1929], pp. 232-50; XIV [1938], pp. 1-9) receives particular attention and favor. Calboli rejects the view of those who take the impersonal passive plus accusative object to be an early and inherited type in Latin: examples like *fit orationem* (*Peregr. Aetheriae*, 25, 3) and *ne baptizetur eos* (*Praeavulgate, Acta Apost.*, 10, 47) are too late, while the early passages are capable of being otherwise explained: *vitam vivitur* (*Enn., Scaen.*, 234) with accusative of inner object; *quae mentibitur* (*Plaut., M. G.*, 254) with *mentibitur* best taken as a deponent having *Philocomasium* as subject and *quae* as object; the type *me veretur* is closely similar to the accusative construction with *paenitet*, *piget*, *pudet*, *taedet*. Just as he favors the view that the personal rather than the impersonal passive construction was the earlier, so he takes the rare gerundive construction *agitandumst vigilias* (*Plaut., Trin.*, 869) not to be earlier than the normal *agittandae sunt vigiliae*. In his treatment of gerundive and other passive constructions, apart from a reference to Brugmann, *Gdr.*, II², 3, pp. 665 f., noticed on p. 60, he pays only scant attention to the special character of the neuter noun, which because of the identity of its nominative and accusative endings does not show itself to be clearly subject or object; whether *bibitur aqua* or *bibitur aquam* was the original construction, the type of *bibitur vinum* must have been largely responsible for the development of the other, and the type of *σκεπτέον τὸ χρῆμα* would be no less important for the problem of the Greek syntax of the verbal adjective of necessity. Calboli's disbelief in the antiquity of the impersonal 3 sing. in *-tur* with accusative objects leads him to deny also the notion that *dicitur matrem vixisse* represents an older type than the "personal" passive

construction (*mater vixisse dicitur*), and this denial is in fact explicitly stated on p. 92. The actual source of the impersonal passive construction is, he believes, simply the active type of *oratio obliqua*, with conversion of the active *dicit*, *dicunt*, etc., to the impersonal passive *dicitur* (pp. 96-7). This implies a stage late enough for the normal *oratio obliqua* with active *verbum dicendi* to have been already fully developed, so that it does not matter, for Calboli's purposes, whether he accepts the old view of the origin of *oratio obliqua* (*dico te venire* after *iubeo te venire*) or the better view of E. Adelaide Hahn (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXXI [1950], pp. 117-29), which he appears not to know, or at least does not cite. Near the end of the article Calboli discusses the difference in value of the two types of *oratio obliqua* with passive verbs: the "impersonal" type emphasizes the fact of the allegation being made, and hence is especially characteristic of proverbial utterances, while the "personal" type directs the hearer's attention rather to the subject about whom the allegation is made. In general the argument throughout the long first article is careful, well documented, and marked by sound judgment. Certainly one should be reluctant to quarrel with Calboli for his unwillingness to regard *fit orationem* as representing an ancient and prominent construction, if one thinks of the rarity of examples either early or late, and the possibility of special explanation for the early instances. There are certain larger questions to which we have no right to expect an answer here, for they fall outside Latin itself and would require an amount of argument far beyond the scope of the present group of studies: what was the original relation between middle and passive meanings in the IE medio-passive voice, what was the relation between the *r*-forms which are prominent in Latin, Irish, and several other languages, especially in the peripheral area, and the medio-passive system of, for example, Greek or Gothic, with no trace of *r*, and to what extent and in what way forms with *ɛ* value like that of *man sagt, on dit*, with agent undesignated, may have been the source of passive constructions. Among the interesting topics discussed by Calboli which have a connection with these questions are Pisani's study of feminine *r*-stems contrasting with masculine *r*-less stems (*δάμαρ*: L. *dominus*, pp. 73-5) and the syntax of the verb with *casus agens* and *casus patiens* in certain Caucasian languages and its possible implications for Indo-European linguistics through sub-stratum influences (see pp. 75-7, 91, and especially 92, where Calboli shows a wholesome skepticism).

The second article, which is much shorter than the first, deals with the jussive use of the Latin infinitive. After some preliminary discussion of the views of others who have sought to explain the origin of the usage, but which Calboli finds unsatisfactory, the argument turns to the infinitive in the passage *concedere, quae sit turpitudo consecutura in Rhet. ad Her.*, III, 5, 9 (*turrido* appears by error for *turpítulo*). Important in the present connection is the fact that the *Rhet. ad Her.* is a technical treatise, and Calboli points to similar uses in the agricultural treatises of Cato and Varro and in the *Mulomedicina* of Chiro. The jussive use of the infinitive, then, was a feature of colloquial Latin, attested in certain classes of inscrip-

tions (see n. 18, p. 125), and favored in situations where there is no need to specify the person for whom the instruction is intended. It spread into the style of technical literature, but into higher literature only at a fairly late period. The presence of *appoggi di contesto*, such as gerundives of obligation, was favorable to the use of infinitives with jussive value, and in fact Val. Flacc., III, 413 *tu socios adhibere sacris* is declared to be the earliest example of such an infinitive in artistic literature not accompanied by such a support.

The third article, devoted to the problem of the Latin future infinitive and its relation to the future participle in *-tūrus*, contains, as one would expect, a discussion of the famous theory of Postgate, and Calboli, like his predecessors, recognizes a weakness in the fact that Postgate in deriving *facturum* < *factusom* < *factu esom* was forced to find his infinitive of the verb 'to be' in Oscan, not Latin. Brugmann had the merit of seeing a close relationship between neuter formations in *-tūrum* and feminines in *-tūra*, and Calboli, even though he points (p. 132, n. 10) to the absence in Latin of formations in *-tūrum* having clearly substantive value, nevertheless in essence accepts Brugmann's theory of the formation in *-tūrum*, as developed by Ronconi. For the origin of the formation itself, in an etymological sense, he ventures no solution, but he clearly affirms the priority of the type of *credo inimicos meos hoc dicturum* over *credo inimicos meos hoc dicturos*. To the notion that the type with *dicturum* represents a secondary fossilization replacing the inflected type, after the analogy of the simple present and perfect active infinitives, he is opposed, and he is equally opposed to those who see a close relationship between *credo inimicos meos hoc dicturum* and the type with uninflected perfect passive participle in *-tūm*: the few examples of the latter are either very late or subject to special explanation. The possible assistance of neuter noun subject in the transition from the uninflected to the inflected type of future infinitive is, curiously, not mentioned.

The last article, entitled *La tendenza grammaticale dell' Auctor ad Herenium*, will have to be summarized briefly in the space of this review. The earlier portion is largely devoted to the question of whether the sources of Roman rhetorical theory were predominantly Alexandrian or Pergamene, that is, Stoic, and to argument against what the author considers to be an undue emphasis by Barwick on the Stoic background. This argument centers in part around the technical terminology of rhetoric and includes, among other matters, an attack on Barwick's theory that *τέχνη* in the sense of Latin *ars* was a term unknown to grammatical theory in the Alexandrian tradition (p. 168) and on his theory that Quintilian's passage (I, 4, 20) on the parts of speech constitutes valid evidence for Remnius Palaemon having been the first to introduce into Rome the Alexandrian system whereby *προσηγορία* = *vocabulum* = *appellatio* was subordinated to *ὄνομα* = *nomen* (p. 172). After presenting the evidence for the tradition that the Alexandrians were supporters of *ἀναλογία*, the Pergamenes of *ἀνωμαλία*, Calboli enters into a discussion of the implications of these terms for Latin usage and of the position of several Roman writers, and in particular the *Auctor*

ad Herennium, toward the tendencies represented by them. Two interesting usages which may be associated with the principle of *ἀναλογία* are the eventual elimination of deponent verbs and the curious *patribus familiis* in Cic., *S. Rose.*, 48, and *Verr.*, III, 183 (not IV, 183). Calboli (pp. 187-8) evidently regards these forms as a feature of Cicero's youthful style and not, with most editors, as instances of later corruption through over-extension of grammatical concord; for discussion of the question see Neue-Wagener, I, p. 14. So far as *ἀναλογία* in general is concerned, Sisenna and Caesar were both adherents of it, but the two were in sharp contrast with regard to neologisms, for Sisenna coined them with striking freedom, while Caesar shunned them *tamquam scopulum*. The *Auctor ad Herennium*, like Cicero, admitted neologisms, but with moderation; Calboli, pp. 229-31, gives some probable instances, mostly technical terms in *-t/si* coined in imitation of Greek models, but he recognizes the impossibility of proving that the *Auctor* was really the first to use a word which is first known to us through his work. In regard to Atticism and Asianism the *Auctor* takes a middle position; he shows, in fact, evidence of adherence to the Rhodian school, through his references to Rhodes, through certain traits of style, and through his fondness for ditrochaic clausulae.

On p. 153, lines 1 and 8, for *πρώσωπα* read *πρόσωπα*. On p. 171, third line from bottom, for *φωνῆς* read *φωνῆ*. On p. 190, line 11, for *revirdescens* read *revirescent*.

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EDUARD FRAENKEL. Beobachtungen zu Aristophanes. Rome, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1962. Pp. 223.

As the title suggests, this book consists largely of "observations" on specific passages in Aristophanes, although the last two of the ten chapters are of a more general nature. The first eight chapters range in length from five to forty pages, and here Professor Fraenkel discusses passages from all of the comedies except *Vesp.*, *Nub.*, *Eccl.*, one chapter per play. The discussions too vary in length from short notes to essays of several pages. Though concerned for the most part with textual criticism, they cover a wide area: word-formation, idiomatic usages and word order, formal elements in the structure of the plays, unrecognized parodies of tragic passages, metrical problems, attributions of lines and the notation of change of speaker in ancient texts. (A brief but useful "Sachregister" indicates the general topics covered; it is supplemented by an *index locorum* and a rather spare *index verborum*.) Fraenkel brings to these discussions not only his vast learning and intimate acquaintance with all aspects of the Greek language, but also a fine feeling for the spirit of Aristophanic comedy, with its joyful incongruities and illogical frivolities. In his textual criticism he is cautious in emending and makes every attempt to explain the MSS before resorting to emendation. The readings of the Ravennas prove to be the most often acceptable, though he is aware of the danger of

overestimating its value (see pp. 46-8) and does prefer the Venetus, for example, at *Frogs* 888 (see pp. 140-2). Not infrequently the author's discussions take him considerably beyond Aristophanes, as for example the examination, starting from *Birds* 446, of the usage of ἔσται ταῦτα and ταῦτα ποιήσω in the answer to a request (pp. 77-89). The former phrase is shown to be the more solemn, while the latter (or variants of it like ποιήσω οὐτως) belongs rather to everyday parlance and hence is more common in Comedy. Fraenkel carries his researches on to Plato, and demonstrates his tendency to use the more solemn phrase in his later dialogues.

On *Birds* 571 ff. (pp. 92-4, and read XOP for KOP on p. 92), Fraenkel is not thoroughly convincing in adducing *Frogs* 1030-6 (parallel in the form of sentence structure to *Av.* 571 ff.) in order to assign vs. 576 to Peithetaerus rather than to the Hoopoe (so MSS) or to Euelpides (Bentley, followed by the Oxford edd. and Coulon). The line ὁ Ζεὺς δ' ἡμῖν οὐ βροντήσας πέμπει [MSS πέμψει]. πτερόεντα κεραυνόν; certainly seems to contain an ironical undermining of the argument of the preceding lines, and hence is fittingly put in the mouth of an *εἴρων* like Euelpides (the Hoopoe is still possible, but it is Euelpides' function to undercut with his down-to-earth practicality the soaring visions of Peithetaerus). Fraenkel's parallel, in fact, could itself be turned to support this interpretation, for immediately following the lines which he cites from the *Frogs* there occurs a similar ironical interruption by Dionysus to Aeschylus' serious and loftily inspired discourse (1036b ff.).

On *Thesm.* 134 f. Fraenkel (pp. 114-15) would read ὁ νεανίσκ· γῆτις εἰ, a very slight emendation for the MSS ὁ νεανίσκ· εἰ τις εἰ, suggesting that Aristophanes is again playing upon the problematical sexual identity of Agathon with a deliberate *contradictio in adiecto*, taken up in the contradictions in dress in 136 ff. It is, however, perhaps possible to defend ὁ νεανίσκ· (the correction of the MSS accepted by Coulon) εἰ τις εἰ as a parody of the Euripidean—Agathonian double-talk and subtlety which so delight Mnesilochus (130 ff.). On *Thesm.* 482-8 and 504-12 (pp. 126-7), Fraenkel notes in the language of Mnesilochus impersonating a simple old woman a deliberate attempt to imitate the style of lower-class, everyday speech. He calls attention especially to the repetitive, "primitiven Anknüpfungen der Sätze" like καὶ εἴτα . . . εἴτα . . . ὁ δὲ ἀνὴρ . . . καθ' ὁ μέν, and cites abundant parallels from other Aristophanic comedies. To this list might be added the bit of ἥθοποιΐα of a simple man in Lysias, I, 19 ff. and especially I, 23-4. Note too the characteristic use of the historical present both here and in the Aristophanes passages.

On *Plut.* 689 Fraenkel (pp. 154-60) makes a convincing emendation of an old crux. Drawing upon the scholia and other parallels, he suggests τὴν χεῖρ· ἐνείπει for the impossible ὑφῆπει of the MSS, the meaning being that the old woman stretches out her hand and *puts it in* the rim of the vessel when she hears the noise and fears theft. The scholiast's ἐκτείνει indicates that he understood the passage, though he missed the nuance of Aristophanes' verb. Fraenkel cites a passage from Dionysius Chaleus on the *kottabos* which almost certainly confirms his reading. His entire treatment of the passage

is a brilliant piece of reconstruction and reveals indeed the hand of a master.

In the ninth essay, "Der Aufbau der Frösche," Fraenkel has now severely modified the views or the reworking of the play which he put forth "in einer sehr jugendlichen Arbeit," as he calls it, nearly fifty years before. He now maintains the structural and dramatic unity of the play; and he accepts the reversals and apparent inconsistencies as part of the spirit of Aristophanic comedy. There are a number of fine observations on the means Aristophanes uses to maintain suspense and hold the attention of the audience. Fraenkel makes some persuasive remarks on the preliminary debate in 895-1098, one of the starting points for those who deny a unitary conception to the play. Aristophanes kept this *agon*, disturbing as it may seem structurally, Fraenkel argues, first because it is one of the most traditional parts of Old Comedy and doubtless one of the most popular and second because it enabled him to set out in short compass the essential differences between the two tragedians and thus provide the "theoretical" basis for the specific technical criticisms that follow. Its presence here is consistent too with the alternation of seriousness and solemnity which pervades the play and is especially prominent in the parodos (see p. 182). The whole essay is distinguished for its combination of balanced scholarly judgment and learning with an enthusiastic sense of the lyrical and poetic qualities of Aristophanes. The reader who has followed Fraenkel through the mazes of his philological reasoning in the first eight chapters may well feel that a balance has, in Aristophanic fashion, been restored in a passage like the following, where Fraenkel hints at the importance of the Frog chorus and, consequently, the reasons behind the title of the play:

Hier entfaltet sich aus der derbkomischen Situation eine so zarte, glanzvolle und suggestive Foesie, dass man fast glauben könnte, Aristophanes habe ein Stadium seiner Praeexistenz in einem der Sümpfe Attikas unter den verschiedenen Wasserpflanzen, die er so gut kennt, in der Gesellschaft jener ewig hüpfenden, ewig vergnügten und jederzeit in leichtem Grössenwahn sich aufblähenden Geschöpfe durchlebt (p. 183).

Fraenkel expands on this lyrical aspect of Aristophanes—an element too often neglected in his comedies—in the tenth and final essay of the book, "Die Parabasenlieder." Beginning with the metrical forms themselves, he suggests that the parabasis-odes hark back to an earlier stage of comedy, when the parabasis preceded the body of the play and was in turn preceded by a prayer to the gods, especially in the form of a κλητικὸς ἕυος (cf. δεῦρ' ἔλθε ἐς χορόν, *Equ.* 559; also *Nub.* 564 f., *Acharn.* 635-75). He points out, with a fine combination of learning and sensitivity, the literary effect of some of the metrical forms, such as the dactyls in the parabasis of the *Clouds*. The oldest parahasis-odes, he argues, draw upon this simple hymnic style. Only later does Comedy turn for inspiration to the "grossen Chorlyrik" of poets like Stesichorus or Pindar; and here Aristophanes is perhaps the innovator. There is much plausi-

bility to such an hypothesis, although Fraenkel's treatment of the invective aspect of the odes as a definitely subordinate part (see p. 204) seems to create a perhaps artificial distinction between elements that may have been inseparably fused in early Comedy, for invective too is a release of vital energies and hence not unrelated to the "religious" (in the Greek sense) aspect of a Dionysiac festival, as the parodos of the *Frogs* illustrates. But in general Fraenkel's essay is extremely valuable in bringing out Aristophanes' love for the older choral lyricists like Phrynicus and his keen interest in matters of song and music as an integral part of his rich and exuberant art. Toward the end of his essay, he beautifully sums up this inclusive lyrical vitality in Aristophanes: "Wir beobachten auch dass er überall, in Wald und Feld und am Froschteich wie gegenüber den mannigfachen Gesängen, mit denen die Menschen ihre Tätigkeiten begleiten und ihre Festfeiern verschönern, mit wachem Ohr auf alles lauscht was seine eigenen Lieder zu bereichern vermag" (p. 215).

Fraenkel's book again and again points up the inadequacies of the present texts of Aristophanes. It is hoped that the projected editions may make good some of these wants. For many of the problems Fraenkel's discussions will serve as an important starting point. Students of the text and language of Aristophanes will be especially grateful for these learned "Lesefrüchte" which, with the more "literary" essays on the *Frogs* and the choral odes, mark nearly half a century of his contributions to Aristophanic scholarship.

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J. P. V. D. BALSDON. Roman Women. Their History and Habits. London, The Bodley Head, 1962. Pp. 351; frontispiece; 16 illus. \$6.95.

J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Lecturer in Ancient History at Oxford, introduces his book *Roman Women, Their History and Habits* with the following statement: "Intriguing as ancient Roman women may have been, they are the subject of no single work of deep and learned scholarship in English or in any other language; and I regret the fact that, though by profession a scholar, I have not the time or the knowledge to write such a book." Fortunately for us, the 351 pages which follow this statement prove that this eminent scholar not only did write a book of "deep and learned scholarship" about Roman women, but offered to a wide public a brilliantly written, most entertaining piece of literature.

The book fully exploits the ancient literary sources. Greek and Roman historians and poets are constantly used as authority for factual or critical information and modern scholarship is represented through references to all major works on Roman culture in general as well as on special subjects. A selected bibliography and an alphabetical index offer opportunity for further study and quick reference.

Four genealogical trees help to clarify the complicated family relations under the Julio-Claudian dynasty, Trajan and Hadrian, the Antonines, and the Severi. Excellent photographs of Roman portrait sculpture, coins, wall-paintings, and jewelry illustrate the text.

The organization of the vast amount of information—the book covers a period of about a thousand years, from the foundation of Rome to the death of Constantine—is chronological. This arrangement is natural for the historical part of the book, Part One, but even the discussion of certain habits of Roman women in Part Two is treated in the same way.

The amount and variety of the subject matter can be seen from the titles and subtitles of the different chapters. Part One, History, is divided into six chapters:

- I. Early Republican Rome
 - I. Foundation of the City: the She-Wolf and other Women involved
 - II. The Rape of the Sabine Women
 - III. Innocent Women, Lustful Men, and a Better Government to follow
 - IV. The Mother of Ccriolanus
 - V. Sacrifice and Service
 - VI. Moral Decline in a Post-War Period
 - VII. The Bacchanalian Scandal
 - VIII. Noble Women
- II. Female Emancipation
- III. Introduction to the Empire
- IV. The Women of Augustus' Court
- V. Messalina, Agrippina and Poppaea
 - I. The Death and Life of the Empress Messalina
 - II. The Death and Life of the Empress Agrippina
 - III. The Daughters of Claudius and the Womenfolk of Nero
 - IV. Epilogue: The Last of the Julian Ladies
- VI. From the Flavians to Constantine
 - I. The Flavians: Women of the Court
 - II. The Womenfolk of Trajan and Hadrian
 - III. The Women of the Antonines
 - IV. The Achievement of Julia Domna and her Sister
 - V. The Mother of Constantine and the Daughter of Diocletian

In the introduction to his book, the author points out that the two functions, from which the importance of Roman women in public and social life derives, are their guardianship of moral standards—expressed particularly in their sacerdotal duties—and their motherhood through which they guaranteed the survival of society. It is in the light of these two functions that Roman legends, history, and poetry have recorded the names of outstanding women.

The historical part of the book is somewhat uneven in characterization. The author mentions too many women to be able to do justice to the personalities of all of them. On the other hand, there

are several striking figures which are so brilliantly characterized—sometimes in a surprisingly short account—that they leave a lasting impression on the reader. This is usually the case where ancient writers express what the author feels to be an unbalanced or unfair view of a woman whose character and achievement were superior to—not always “better” than—her contemporaries. There is, for instance, Clodia—Catullus’ Lesbia—of the *Pro Caelio*. The author reminds us that “it is easy to forget that for Clodia, from whose humiliation and resentment the case arose, the verdict was a crushing tragedy. She was thirty-eight, and losing her hold. We never hear of her again.” There is Augustus’ daughter, Julia, whose character and doom were subject to various interpretations by ancient and modern writers. Following Carcopino’s argument, the author explains her moral decline as rebellion against her father’s exploitation for the sake of his political and dynastic ideals and her cruel punishment as his political caution rather than moral indignation. Of Livia, the author refuses to accept Tacitus’ “venomous” treatment and depicts her as the noble, faithful, and prudent wife, who used her great influence on husband and son for the best purposes. In Chapter VI an interesting parallel between Plotina and Livia is drawn with respect to their character and political achievements. When Pliny, praising Plotina in conventional terms, calls her *santissima femina*, the author remarks: “She deserves better epithets than these; in the first two centuries of the Empire, Livia is her only rival in greatness.”

Explaining the causes for the often “hardly credible” accounts of ancient writers about the lives and morals of the imperial ladies, the author names “the salacious imagination and scurrilous gossip of Roman society” and “the historians’ lack of integrity, . . . instead of rejecting scandal, they repeated it.” Unfortunately, one can occasionally say *de te fabula*. The story of Messalina in Chapter V is no more than a paraphrase of Tacitus without critical evaluation.

In Part Two, which is dedicated to the “Habits” of Roman women, the author is not limited to written sources, but has the works of art and survivals of feminine paraphernalia as valuable aids for a colorful and pleasant presentation of his subject. The chapters in their sequence show an equally thorough treatment of the happy, enjoyable aspects of Roman women’s life and of the darker sides of female existence.

In Chapter VII, “The Wedding Ceremony,” the author describes the dry, business-like aspects of marriage as well as the charming appearance of a bride and the strange, amusing customs of the wedding celebration.

Chapter VIII, “Children,” is disappointing, since it does not proceed beyond the birth and legal status of legitimate and illegitimate babies and their mothers. The reader would like to learn more about children’s—especially girls’—education, amusements and duties, which would give the background to many of the womanly characteristics described in the following chapters.

In Chapters IX and X, bearing the titles “Happy Marriages” and “Unhappy Marriages, and Divorce,” the author quotes a number of epitaphs praising the virtues of Roman wives as testimony for

numberless marriages which were "as successful as they were unspectacular." In the case of unhappy marriages he wittily remarks, that "in the ancient sources, it was always the wife who was in danger of getting on her husband's nerves."

In Chapter XI, "Less Reputable Women," the unpleasant existence of prostitutes is contrasted with the elegant life of popular courtesans.

Following his principle of effective variation, the author changes subject, mood and background for the opposite extreme and introduces us in Chapter XII to "Holy Women, Religious Women and Divine Women." Most interesting is the detailed description of the selection, life, and duties of the Vestal Virgins. In the discussion of "Religious Women" the author again calls our attention to the fact that early Christianity found its strongest support among the powerful women of the imperial court.

In Chapter XIII, the last chapter of the book, bearing the title "Woman's Daily Life," the author discusses "Dress, Coiffure, Make-up and Jewels, Baths, Woman at Home and Woman Abroad." Again sculpture, wall-paintings and coins help to demonstrate the factual information although the lack of colored pictures is badly felt. But the neatest phrases are found here:

On baths: "People probably washed too little in early Republican Rome; in the days of the Empire they may well have washed too much;" on the sources of information for women's beauty culture: "In museums all over the world which was once Rome's, showcases are full of mirrors, the empty pomade jars, the combs, the tweezers, the hairpins and all the other instruments of the Roman woman's dressing table. The poets take us farther, and fill the empty jars."

In his very last words, the author expresses his relief that no ancient Roman lady could foresee the severe judgment posterity would give her life and habits through the uncritical acceptance of ancient literary sources: "It was, indeed, as well that no woman who was contemporary with Ovid, Martial, Tacitus or Juvenal could know that posterity would feast its eyes on his distorting mirror and think that what it saw there was a true image of herself."

For its wide range of subject matter, thorough treatment and agreeable presentation, the book will be welcome in many libraries. It will be of use to the scholar who is looking for a convenient collection and a keen analysis of the evidence on woman's place in the Roman world, and it will delight the general reader with some hours of highly profitable and entertaining reading.

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LOUIS DOUTRELEAU. *Didyme l'aveugle sur Zacharie.* Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes. Tomes I-III. Paris, Éditions du Cerf, 1962. Pp. 1210. 84 N. F. (*Sources Chrétiennes*, Nos. 83-85.)

Didymus the Blind lived at or near Alexandria in the period 313-398 A. D. Although his reputation for learning was great and

although he attracted such notables as Jerome and Rufinus to his conferences, his work was suspected of Origenism and fell under a condemnation of the Council of Constantinople in 553. Hence in spite of the fact that he was universally respected and much quoted during the whole of the fifth and the earlier part of the sixth century, little of his work survived into modern times. In 1941, however, some workers happened upon a pile of papyrus in a cave at Tura, about twelve kilometers to the south of Cairo. Thus was revealed to us not only the *Dialektos* of Origen, but also certainly the commentaries of Didymus on *Zacharias*, *Genesis*, and *Job*, and probably those on *Ecclesiastes* and *Psalms* 20-44 as well.

Although the Tura papyrus makes no mention of the author of the commentary on *Zacharias*, Doutreleau has no difficulty in demonstrating that it is that of Didymus. This is made possible mainly through our knowledge of the fact that Jerome invited him to write such a commentary and the revealing circumstance that Jerome leans very heavily upon it in his own, as only now appears. The technical arguments on this matter are competently and exhaustively handled by the editor, even if he shows an undue simplicity in his calculation of the average speeds of commentary-composition of both Didymus and Jerome (pp. 25 f.).

Doutreleau discusses the debt of Didymus for this commentary to Origen (whose commentary reached only the first six chapters of *Zacharias*) especially for the use of allegory; but he comes to rather negative conclusions on indebtedness to Hippolytus, Ephrem, and Theodore of Mopsuestia. Likewise he engages in the rather negative exercise of showing that there was little, if any, influence of this commentary on the work of Didymus' oriental successors, such as Cyril of Alexandria and Theodore.

Didymus, blind from the age of four and a layman, "composed," it would appear, in speaking to an audience. He showed little appreciation of the importance of establishing the scriptural text on which he commented (which would seem to approximate nearest to the Marchalianus Septuagint) and passed quickly on even from the discussion of the literal sense of the text to, what was his chief interest and *forte*, the "spiritual" one. In discussing the various aspects (if they are really various) of this "spiritual" sense, Doutreleau shows indebtedness to de Lubac's *Histoire et esprit* and *Exégèse médiévale: Les quatre sens de l'écriture*. It would seem that of the terms used by Didymus: ἀναγωγή, ἀλληγορία, θεωρία, τροπολογία and διάνοια the first is that of widest comprehension and the second that of the most frequent and useful application. The editor's examination of the allegories and symbols employed by Didymus (light, joy, fecundity) does not come to surprising conclusions—and it would be surprising if it did.

Although there are some notable absences in his technical vocabulary in dealing with the Trinity, Didymus' doctrine here shows little basis for the charge of Origenism, and Doutreleau easily proves the author's repudiation of each and every one of the several heresies that might have tempted him. His moral teaching uses, as we might expect, much of the vocabulary of Stoicism. He has a preference for contemplation over action and shows no interest in secular letters.

These are some of the many problems raised by the editor in a satisfying introduction of 188 pages. To judge from *sondages*, the editing of the text itself is competent, as is the translation. There are over a hundred pages of Indexes which will be of immense use to philologists and students of patristics. Altogether this is an important volume on which the editor and *Sources Chrétiennes* deserve congratulation.

JOHN O'MEARA.

DUBLIN.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under Books RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notices are not returnable.)

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METRICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOPHOCLES' LYRICS.

Introductory

1. In a useful and informative article "Lyrical Meters and Chronology in Sophocles" (*A.J.P.*, LXXXIV, pp. 280-6), H. A. Pohlsander reviews the frequency of various types of colon, dicolon, and stanza in Sophocles' extant works and their possible bearing on dating—in particular on the dating of *Trach.* He concludes that this evidence supports the chronological order favoured by Webster, Whitman, and Lesky—viz. *Aj.*, *Ant.*, *Trach.*, *O.T.*, *El.*, *Phil.*, *O.C.*


2. The present article does not dispute this chronology, which I believe to be sound; but its aim is to furnish some additional facts that may be of interest in considering the metres of *Trach.*, and in reviewing the poet's general development in metrical subtlety. I divide the material into three sections:

I (4-9) : Some matters of responsion in *Trach.* and elsewhere.

II (10-15) : Certain late developments in Sophocles' mixture of dactylic with iambic elements (from *O.T.* to *O.C.*), in which it *may* be significant that *Trach.* has no part.

III (16-28) : Some possible signs of especially close intermingling of metres in *O.C.*.

3. The reader should be warned from the outset that some of II, and most of III, involves speculation that must be regarded as hazardous, in view of our slight knowledge about methods of performance, and about what to *modern* ears seems the difference between classes of rhythm. But this is not a valid reason



against approaching the subject *at all, so long as* the hazards of its conjectural nature are constantly borne in mind.

I

Trachiniae: Dating and Responsion.

4. As Pohlsander rightly points out (*loc. cit.*, p. 281), the mere occurrence of a certain genre of metre need not "fit into a chronological pattern." Dactylo-epitrite is commonest in *Aj.* and *Trach.*; major ionic runs occur only in *Trach.* and *El.*; *Aj.* and *O.C.* exhibit a puzzling brand of aeolic line discussed in 26-27 below. More convincing may be the incidence of certain established individual dicola: the (comparative) frequency in *Trach.* and *O.T.* of the Archilochean and Alcmanian dicola (cf. Pohlsander, p. 284) is certainly striking.

5. Nor do the overall figures for free responsion help us in dating the plays. It is true that the early date of *Aj.* may be reflected in an unusually small proportion of strophic lines (15%) showing freedom of responsion; but the percentage frequency for *Trach.* (22%) is almost identical with that of plays as widely separated as *Ant.*, *O.T.*, and *O.C.* And the divergences from this pattern displayed by *El.* (17%) and *Phil.* (26%) are probably due to the respective rarity and frequency, in these plays, of certain aeolic cola (such as the polyschematist) whose changeable bases are particularly susceptible to strophic variation.

Two special points in *Trach.* dc, however, deserve attention:

(A) *Responsion within aeolic cola.*

6. Pohlsander maybe overstresses (pp. 282-3) the importance of resolution in the base of the glyconic at *Trach.*, 844 f. (e.g. *προσέβαλεν, τὰ δὲ ἐπί αλλόθησον* — — — — —) as possibly reflecting Euripidean influence. He makes the suggestion cautiously; but it is not supported by evidence from other sources. Outside the drama, the two-element "aeolic base" of pherecratean, glyconic, and hippoactean is resolved into tribrach form by Bacchylides (e.g. 4, 17); Corinna¹ similarly resolves the opening of pherecratean (e.g. fr. 1, Page, 26) and of the polyschematist dimeter (or *wilamowitzianus* *xx* — — — — (e.g.

¹ Assuming her date to be early enough for the evidence to be of value.

fr. 1, Page, 27, fr. 4, Page, 1-4). Within the drama, Aeschylus resolves the base of the pherecratean at *Ag.*, 698/716 and elsewhere; and Sophocles himself gives early examples of *double* resolution in the polyschematist base (--- ~~~ ---) at *Aj.*, 1185/1192, *Ant.*, 108/126. There seems no sufficient reason to trace the opening resolution of the glyconic at *Trach.*, 844 f. to "Euripidean influence."

7. On the other hand, the evidence of responcion *may* be of importance here. The Aeschylean and Sophoclean instances quoted above show no strophic variation; *Trach.*, 845 shows a feature new in the drama:² the glyconic base (following an iambic metron) is resolved *out of responcion* with 856, where the base is unresolved:

845 γνώμας μολόντ³ ὀλεθρίαισι συναλλαγῆς
856 ἵω κελαινὰ λόγχα προμάχου δορός

What is more, even Euripides gives (I think) only three instances of this particular freedom of responcion: *Hipp.*, 147/157, *Hel.*, 1493-4/1510-11. (To these may be added five similar instances in the polyschematist base.)

But this evidence—if it indicates anything at all—is too slight to be used in itself as a help in dating.

(B) Responcion between aeolic *cola*.

8. Responcion between aeolic lines of the same overall length is not uncommon in late 5th-century drama: most notably, (a) that between glyconic and polyschematist dimeter

$$\text{xx} - \sim \sim - \sim - \}^3$$
 e.g. at *Phil.*, 1082/1102 and 1124/1147

$$\text{xx-x} - \sim \sim - \}$$
 (only)⁴ in Sophocles, and at least 21 times in Euripides. Much less common is (b) responcion between enoplia

$$\begin{matrix} x & - \sim \sim - & \sim - \} \\ x-x & - \sim \sim - \end{matrix}$$
, attested by *O.C.*, 512/523, *Eur.*, *El.*, 168/191 (on which cf. Miss A. M. Dale, *Lyric Metres of Greek Drama*, p. 132, n. 1).

² Instances of these licences are provided by Corinna (e.g. fr. 1, Page, 22-31); but (dating problems apart) we cannot assume that licences admitted in recurrent stanza forms were immediately admitted to the single repetitions of tragedy.

³ See note 2, above.

⁴ For *Ant.*, 106/123, see below, 9.

Similar instances (the above lengths plus or minus a syllable) are given by Eur., *El.*, 116/131 (matched perhaps by *Vesp.*, 529/634), by Eur., fr. 773 N. 25/33 (matched perhaps by *Rhes.*, 463/829), and (each unique) by *Hel.*, 1481/1498 and *Hyps. Par.*, 1, ii, 4/1, iii, 5.

It is interesting that (in addition to the examples listed above) *Trach.* gives a clear example of (b) (free responsion between enoplia) at 960/969

$\chiωρεῖν πρὸ δόμων λέγονσιν$ - - - - - - -
 $\tauὶ χρῆ, θανόντα τιν, ἢ καθ... .$ - - - - - - -

Apart from this, all probable dramatic instances of such free responsion between *different cola* can be dated later than 424 B.C.

9. *Ant.* gives three improbable instances: one of (a) at 106/123, but only if Erfurdt's *ἄπ*' *Ἀργόθεν* is correct; *Ἀπίθεν* (Ahrens) is more probable; one of (b) at 336/346 if *περιβρύχλουσιν* be derived, as the scholiast suggests, from *βρύχαμαι*; but *περιβρύχλουσιν* (from *βρύχιος*, etc.) is far more likely. The third instance is provided by 607/618, where Pearson follows the MSS in printing *οὐτ' ἀκάματοι θεῶν/εἰδότι δ'* *οὐδὲν ἔρπει* i.e. telesilleion / aristophanean, - - - - - - - }. Scholars who have held (rightly) that such responsion of "blunt" to "pendant" colon is unparalleled have tended to suspect 607, and to accept (e.g.) Hermann's emendation *εὗτε θεῶν ἄκμητοι*. Actually 618 is far more objectionable: in the context, *εἰδότι—δ'*—*οὐδὲν ἔρπει* demands the unnatural interpretation "it steals on him-that-knows-nothing," which is rendered even harder by the fact that the words *οὐδὲν—ἔρπει* occur five lines earlier, and there must be taken together ("nothing steals . . ."). It seems much more plausible that *ἔρπει* in 618 is a mistaken repetition and that the line originally read (e.g.) *⟨οὐκ⟩ εἰδόσιν οὐδέν*⁶ - - - - - (reizianum) to correspond with *οὐτ' ἀκάματοι θεῶν*. (For this synizesis at the end of the line cf. *H.F.*, 407.)

II

Dactylo-iambic Intermingling in Sophocles.

10. In his second table (*loc. cit.*, p. 284) Pohlsander notes the increasing frequency in later Sophocles of the dicolon dactylic tetrameter + iambic dimeter catalectic. My aim is to consider,

⁶ Since first hazarding this conjecture, I find that Wilamowitz (for the same reason) suggested *εῦ εἰδόσιν οὐδέν* (*Hermes*, LIX [1923], pp. 253-4).

rather more broadly, certain late Sophoclean developments in the mixture of dactylic with iambic elements.

11. Intermingling of the two rhythms is common enough in Aeschylus (e.g., *Pers.*, 852-907) and in early Sophocles (e.g. *Ant.*, 337-41). But in his latest surviving works Sophocles develops the following peculiar traits, which will be considered at greater length below:

(a) the running-on of "falling" dactylic closes into "rising" iambic openings—i.e. — — — / — — —

(b) cases (too recurrent to be coincidental) where, in dactylic surroundings, iambic lines open with a dactylic foot (i.e. long *anceps* + resolved *longum*)—e.g. — — —

Both these features are confined to *O.T.*, *El.*, *Phil.*, and *O.C.*. When they combine, we are presented with

(c) an illusion (carried on to the first foot of an iambic line) that the dactylic run is continuing—e.g. — — — / — — — . This feature, again, is only found in *El.*, *Phil.*, and *O.C.*; with our unfortunate ignorance about methods of performance in general, and the question of *ictus* in particular, we cannot tell how effective the illusion may have been; but it can hardly be doubted that *some* effect was intended.

12. The absence of all these features from *Trach.* may be a further indication of the play's relatively early date. Their incidence in the later plays may now be considered at greater length.

13. (a) The sequence of rising iambi upon falling dactyls is shown, for example, by *O.C.*, 676-7

φυλλάδα μυριόκαρπον ἀνάλιον
ἀνήνεμόν τε πάντων
— — — — — — / — — —

The exceptional nature of the sequence was noted by Maas;⁶ Sophocles uses it in the following places (some of which are also considered under c below): *O.T.*, 177-8/188-9; *El.*, 125-6/141-2, 134-5/150-1, 162-3/183-4, 170-1/190-1, 211-12/231-2; *Phil.*, 142-3/157-8, 861-2, 1093-4/1114-15; 1097-8/1119-20, 1130-1/1153-4, 1133-4/1156-7; *O.C.*, 235-6, 241-2, 248-9, 252-3, 540-1/547-8, 676-7/689-90, 1570-1/1698-9, 1675-6/1702-3.

⁶ *Griechische Metrik*, 35.

In 19 of these 35 cases (antistrophes included in the reckoning) the iambic line opens with a pure iambic foot, as in the above example; in 7 with a spondaic foot, in 2 with a tribrach, and in 7 with a dactyl—for which special effect see (c) below.

The dactylic colon is usually a tetrameter, or the last of a series of tetrameters; the iambic colon is nearly always of at least dimeter length (as in the above example), sometimes a trimeter. However, a single iambic metron in this position can be seen in Euripides (*Hipp.*, 1108 ἀλλα γὰρ ἀλλοθεν ἀμείβεται —— —— —— ——), and, without word-division, in Aristophanes (*Ran.*, 675

Μοῦσα χορῶν ἵερων ἐπίβητι καὶ ἔλθετι τέρψιν ἀοιδᾶς ἐμᾶς

and for this reason I think *O.C.*, 241-2, 248-9 can best be scanned after the same pattern—a single iambic metron following the dactyl; e. g. 248-9

κείμεθα τλάμονες· ἀλλ' ἵτε, νεύσατε τὰν ἀδόκητον χάριν

(See 15 below for the similar case of 252, and its possible link with the puzzling lines at 213 ff.)

14. (b) Opening dactylic feet (producing the metron form - ~ ~ ~ -) are commoner in lyric than in spoken iambics, and more favoured by Sophocles than by the other dramatists (sometimes being combined with heavy syncopation, as at *El.*, 504 ff. - ~ ~ ~ . - . -). The occurrence of this opening among *genuinely* dactylic lines must be accepted as a Sophoclean subtlety, by which the two rhythms are made to coalesce with especial smoothness (cf. Dale, *op. cit.*, p. 84).

The effect is first seen in the parodus to *O. T.*, an ode in which dactylic and iambic elements are carefully balanced: the first strophe (151 ff.) is uniformly dactylic except for a single iambic line, the third strophe (190 ff.) iambic except for one dactylic

⁷ Admittedly this makes (unusually) an odd number of dactyls; nevertheless I think it preferable to the alternative of dragging in aeolic (of which there is no further trace in the context) and calling τὰν ἀδόκητον χάριν a "blunt aeolic heptasyllable." (So Dale, *op. cit.*, p. 133.) The length could be paralleled from Pindar (e.g. *Ol.*, 1, 7), but not from the drama.

colon. The second strophe (168 ff.) mingles the two rhythms more evenly, opening

ὦ πόποι, ἀνάριθμα γὰρ φέρω
πήματα· νοσεῖ δέ μοι πρόπας
στόλος, οὐδὲ ἔνι φροντίδος ἔγχος

— — — — — —
— — — — — —
— — — — — — (enop.)

A single instance could be dismissed as coincidental, but the effect is established as deliberate by a number of similar instances in *El.*, *Phil.*, and *O.C.*. Some of these are listed in (c) below; perhaps the best examples occur in the parodus of *El.*, e.g. 160-3 and 207-12, concluding

209 οἵς θεὸς ὁ μέγας Ὄλύμπιος
ποίημα πάθεα παθεῖν πόροι,
μηδέ ποτ' ἄγλαῖς ἀποναίστο
τοιάδ' ἀνύσαντες ἔργα

— — — — — —
— — — — — —
— — — — — —
— — — — — —

15. (c) The closing dicolon of the last example combines the tendencies noted in (a) and (b): a dactylic line (usually a tetrameter) with falling close leads straight into a rising iambic opening *whose first foot is resolved into an illusory dactyl*. This subtlety occurs in the following places: *El.*, 162-3/183-4, 211-12; *Phil.*, 1097-8/1119-20, 1153-4; *O.C.*, 252-3.⁸ As with most of the cases noted under (a), usually the iambic segment is of at least dimeter length, but at *O.C.*, 253 [cf. 242 and 249 under (a) above] there is a clear case of a monometer

οὐ γὰρ ἴδοις δὲν ἀθρῶν βροτὸν ὅστις δὲν
εἰ θεὸς ἄγοι,
ἔκφυγεν δύναιτο.

— — — — — — /
— — — — — —
— — — — — — (ithyph.)

With this in mind, it is worth considering the puzzling lines (earlier in the same *astrophum*) 216, 218, 220, 222. These lines, alternating with paroemiacs, are of the form

— — — — — — — —
e.g. 218 ἀλλ' ἐρῶ · οὐ γὰρ ἔχω κατακρυφάν.

The lines are treated by Pohlsander (p. 284), following Wilamowitz,⁹ as hemiepes + cretic—a strange combination; they have

⁸ The same effect is seen once or twice in Euripides, e.g. *Med.*, 138, *Hec.*, 167-8 (divide after οὐκέτι); but the general intermingling of the two rhythms in Euripides is not intense enough for the effect to carry the same significance.

⁹ *Griechische Verskunst*, p. 364.

been explained (by others) as “meiuric” (= mouse-tailed) dactyls with the last foot inverted, such as appear in standardised form at a much later period.¹⁰ I suggest that the lines are better viewed as the equivalents of the last part of 252-3 quoted above

... ὁν βροτὸν ὄστις ἀν εἰ θεὸς ἄγοι . . . - - - - - - - - - - ;

a dactylic dimeter runs into an iambic metron whose first foot is (as elsewhere) an illusory dactyl. Seen from the angle of a pencil-and-paper game, the distinction may seem a meagre one, but it does at least work out as a natural development of the Sophoclean tendency already noted.

(It is interesting that T. C. W. Stinton, *C.R.*, June 1965, independently reaches the same conclusion; the similarity of our views was only discovered at the proofs stage.)

III

O.C.: Further Instances of Metrical “Overlap.”

16. Pohlsander remarks (*lcc. cit.*, p. 286) that “Sophocles became more inclined not only to employ different genres of meter in a single stanza, but also to intermingle them more closely.” Pohlsander’s third table (p. 285) shows how spectacular this development has become in *O.C.*, the poet’s last play, in which 16 out of 17 stanzas are “polymetric.”

17. Some instances of such intermingling were given in the last section. My aim is now to note some further examples of possible “overlap” between metres in *O.C.*. It will not be amiss to warn the reader once again that this sort of speculation is hazardous, and can easily become over-imaginative; and the remainder of this article should be read with this danger constantly in mind. Nevertheless I feel that the play in question provides us with at least possible cases of overlap which it would be cowardly to ignore altogether. I divide these into two types:

(A) Ionic (or “aeolo-ionic”) overlap with anapaests.

(B) Aeolic overlap with dochmiac.

(A) *Ionic (or “aeolo-ionic”) overlap with anapaests.*

18. The name “aeolo-ionic” is given by Miss Dale¹¹ to a form

¹⁰ Cf. T. F. Higham on “teliambi,” *Greek Poetry and Life*, pp. 299 ff.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 138 ff.

of ionic line which displays affinities with aeolic. The simplest example is the form of ionic dimeter --- ~~~~ (occurring in unequivocally ionic surroundings at e.g. *Bacch.*, 81) which is also identical with the pherecratean when the latter takes a spondaic base. Extensions of this length, e.g. to --- ~~~~ ~~~~, occur both as independently ionic lengths and among cola such as the asclepiad --- ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~, which are self-evidently similar but can *not* be analysed in terms of ionic metra.¹²

Ionic lines of this nature are used by Sophocles in plays as far-ranging in date as *Aj.*, *Ant.*, *Phil.*, and *O.C.*, and are particularly common in *O.C.* (510/521, 694/707, 696/709, 701/714). To these references it is tempting to add 176-7 (/192-3)

οὐ τοι μῆποτέ σ' ἐκ τῶνδ' ἐδράνων, ὦ
γέρον ἀκοντά τις ἄξει. —— ~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~

But at this point an ambiguity (or an ambivalence?) with anapaests arises, which must now be considered.

20. The anapaestic and iionic rhythms are sufficiently alike for occasional lines to occur which are theoretically analysable in terms of either rhythm, but firmly categorised by context. Thus *Pers.*, 72 ζύγον ἀμφιβαλῶν αὐχένι πόντου ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ (sync. iionic trimeter) is syllabically identical with the anapaestic dimeter *ibid.*, 63. Unwary readers who expect the chorus to enter to anapaests may well make a false analysis of *Bacch.*,

¹² E.g. at *Ant.*, 944 ff., *Phil.*, 707 ff. Three different extensions of this aeolo-ionic type occur at *O.C.*, 694, 696, 701, and in view of the type's connection with the asclepiad elsewhere I think the closing lines of that stanza should be analysed as follows:

703) συνναλων ἀλιώσει χερὶ πέρσας.

δ γὰρ εἰσαὶν ὄρῶν κύκλος	— —oo— _oo— _oo— _oo— o—
λεύσσει νιν Μοψοῦ Διὸς	— —oo— oo— o— (glyc.).
χά γλαυκῶπις Ἀθάνα.	— —oo— — (pher.)

From *συνναλων* to *κύκλος* thus has the effect of a "maximal" asclepiad. Miss Dale rejects this possibility as "a monster unknown to Greek metric" (*Greek Poetry and Life*, p. 203), but the length is only one syllable longer than 696-7 a few lines earlier, and seems far preferable to the alternative of dividing after *πέρσας* and producing a glyconic with the "taboo" anapaestic base (δ γὰρ εἰσαὶν ὄρῶν κύκλος ~~~ ~~~ ~~~), or combatting this defect by emendations such as *ἐσαιὲν* (unfortunately the antistrophe is too corrupt to help).

64 'Αστιας δπὸ γᾶς, and similarly of *Vesp.*, 273; but in each case the context eventually makes ionic scansion certain.¹³

21. It may be equally coincidental that *O.C.*, 176-7 (scanned above in ionic terms) can also be analysed as anapaestic dimeter + paroemiac

οὐ τοι μῆποτέ σ' ἐκ τῶνδ' ἐδράνων, - - - - -
 ὦ γέρον, ἀκοντά τις ἄξει. - - - - - - -

and (both in strophe and antistrophe) conforms to the rules for anapaestic metron-diaeresis (which could not be said for Sophocles' other "aeolo-ionics").¹⁴ There are strong points against anapaestic analysis—notably the exact strophic responson¹⁵ and the unusual position of *μῆποτε* as a dactyl in the second foot of a metron.¹⁶ The similarity would easily be dismissed as coincidental were it not for a textual difficulty which must now be discussed.

22. The parodus to *O.C.*, noted elsewhere in this article¹⁷ for its rhythmical ambiguities, is of the following form:

- | | |
|---------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| 117-37. | 1st strophe (concluding with anapaestic period) |
| 138-48. | Anapaestic system. |
| 149-69. | 1st antistrophe (concluding with anapaestic period) |
| 170-5. | Anapaestic system. |
| 176-87. | 2nd strophe (ambiguous opening under discussion) |
| 188-91. | Anapaestic system. ¹⁸ |

¹³ Since we do not know whether or not "syncopation" was marked by an audible protraction, it must remain uncertain whether an ionic dimeter of the form 'Αστιας δπὸ γᾶς was distinguishable in delivery from an anapaestic metron, or whether the Athenian audience was as fallible as the modern reader.

¹⁴ It is interesting that Jebb in his metrical introduction reproduces Schmidt's analysis of these lines in "logaoedic" terms, but in his commentary on 175 refers to 177 as a "paroemiac," apparently without any awareness of inconsistency.

¹⁵ Strophic responson is usually very free between various forms of anapaestic metron. All the same, 135 f./167 f. respond almost as closely.

¹⁶ It may be added that paroemiaca of the form - - - - - - - , though common in Aeschylus and Euripides, are remarkably rare in Sophocles: elsewhere only *certainly* at *O.C.*, 1776, possibly at *Ant.*, 113, *very unlikely* at *Aj.*, 1416.

¹⁷ Cf. 15 for 216 ff., 26-7 for 117 ff.

¹⁸ The form of parodus in which anapaestic systems alternate with lyrics is of no significance for dating: it is found in *P.V.*, *Ant.*, *Phil.*,

- 192-206. 2nd antistrophe (ambiguous opening)
 207-53. Astrophic lyrics.

Of the anapaestic systems in this structure, the first and third end unproblematically with the normal paroemiac; the second (170-5) concludes (in the transmitted text)

174 ὡς ξεῖνοι, μὴ δῆτ' ἀδικηθῶ
 σοὶ πιστεύσας καὶ μεταναστάς

after which follows the ambiguous period 176 f. quoted above. If we are to have a concluding paroemiac at 175, some excision is necessary. Now it is true that scribes had a tendency to "fill out" paroemiacs into full dimeters (e.g. *Ag.*, 1334), and it is possible that a syllable should be eliminated here: but what syllable? In 175, sense and flow are considerably weakened by the omission of *σοὶ* or *καὶ*; and we are faced with the alternative of emending 174, e.g. by the not unattractive change of *ξεῖνοι* to *ξένε*, and then either transposing the two lines—assuming a rare but not unparalleled scribal error—or moving *σοὶ* from 175 to the end of 174. But in the latter case the resultant paroemiac, as printed in fact by Pearson

πιστεύσας καὶ μεταναστάς

concludes with a pentasyllabic word-group, -- -/- ~ ~ --, an effect strictly avoided in tragedy (though not in comedy),¹⁹ and certainly most unpleasing to the ear.

O.C., *Med.*; at other points of the action, similar alternations occur in *Ag.*, *Cho.*, *Eum.*, *Aj.*, *Ant.*, *Alc.*, *Andr.*, and *Rhes.*; and some sort of symmetrical pattern of anapaestic systems (but without lyric alternations) can also be seen at *P.V.*, 1040 ff., S., *El.*, 86 ff. In some of these cases, the anapaestic systems are of widely differing lengths; more usually they roughly correspond (no doubt for reasons of general balance); but the original text yields exact equivalence of length, metron for metron, only at *P.V.*, 1054 ff./1071 ff. (the 2nd and 4th of five systems), *Eum.*, 949 ff./968 ff./988 ff. (three out of five systems), *Cho.*, 1007 ff./1017 ff. and *Andr.*, 515 ff./537 ff. These instances are scarcely sufficient to justify the zeal with which Hermann and other editors (particularly of Aeschylus) have misguidedly inserted and excised metra in order to obtain exact "responson" elsewhere: the probability that balancing systems will be composed to roughly the same length should not lead us to assume that exact correspondence will be other than accidental.

¹⁹ Cf. L. Parker on "Word-End in Anapaestic Paroemiacs," *C.Q.*, 1958, pp. 82 ff.

23. These undesirable alternatives are avoided if we retain the original text of two full dimeters and assume that these led, without appreciable break, into the next strophe, scanning the ambiguous 176-7 anapaestically as suggested above (21), or (given the plausibility of ionic analysis) at least assuming an anapaestic cross-rhythm. It is unfortunate that we know too little of ancient metrical distinction and methods of performance to be able to determine whether such a theory is even remotely possible.

(B) *Aeolic overlap with dochmiae.*

24. The idea of any common ground between aeolic and dochmiae verse may seem repugnant to those whose view of dochmiae is centred on the scenes of excitement or lament in which (particularly in late 5th-century tragedy) this metre played a dominant role. But even in such scenes *occasional* aeolic lines are not uncommon;²⁰ and Aeschylus (possibly the inventor of dochmiae lyric) makes extensive use of the metre (notably in *Sept.* and *Supp.*) as a recurrent *motif* without any marked emotional connotation.

25. A link between dochmiae and aeolic is provided by the colon --~--~, which is common both as a dochmiae variant (third in frequency to ~~~~- and ~--~) and as an ingredient in aeolic structures. (Thus it is the equivalent of a glyconic xx ~~~~- without the two "base" syllables; it forms the second part of the asclepiad *edite regibus*; and occurs as a *kurzvers*—sometimes known as "dodrans"—in its own right.) In one chorus (*Supp.*, 630 ff.) Aeschylus clearly uses this ambiguous colon as a link between the two rhythms: sometimes the dochmiae rhythm prevails (as at 633 ff.), sometimes the aeolic (as at 656 ff.), and the ambivalent --~--~ constantly recurs and interweaves the two.

Miss Dale, in reviewing this overlap,²¹ speaks of it as "a peculiarly Aeschylean blend." But here it may be relevant to turn yet again to the parodus of *O.C.*, where I consider it at least possible that the same ambiguity has been exploited.

26. The first stanza (117-37) of this parodus three times shows

²⁰ For examples cf. Dale, *Lyric Metres*, pp. 159 ff.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 104.

a peculiar formation usually analysed as “bacchius + anaclastic glyconic,” as at 119-20

δ πάντων,
δ πάντων ἀκορέστατος

~~~~~  
~---~---~

and similarly, even down to the verbal echo, at 123-4

πλανάτας,  
πλανάτας τις δι πρέσβυς, οὐδεὶς

and again at 130-1. In each case the verbal echo is reproduced also in the antistrophe. The combination “bacchius + anaclastic glyconic” is analytically a strange one; what is more, although the base syllables of glyconics, both “anaclastic” and otherwise, normally enjoy some freedom of strophic responson,<sup>22</sup> the particular “anaclastic” opening of the lines in question shows exact responson in the antistrophe. Presumably *some* further effect is intended. Here it is illuminating to compare *Aj.*, 1205-6, interpreted by Miss Dale<sup>23</sup>

ἔρωτων δέ ἔρωτων ἀπέπανσεν, ώμοι

~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~

as a single aeolic line with five-syllable base **xxxxx** ~~~~ ~~~~; but the form and length of base is unusual, and we may observe that the period is actually not unlike certain Aeschylean closes, such as *Supp.*, 637

τὸν ἀρότοις θερή—
ζοντα βροτὸν ἐν ἄλλοις

~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~

in a chorus which (as noted above) makes great interplay of dochmiac and aeolic elements. Thus too

δ πάντων, δ πάντων ἀκορέστατος

~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~

is syllabically equivalent to the dochmiac dimeter *Ag.*, 1164

πέπληγμαι δέ ίπαλ δῆγματι φοινίφ.

27. I suggest, therefore, that *O.C.*, 117 ff. should be approached from the same angle: dochmiac and aeolic are interwoven by means of the ambivalent ~~~~ ~~, exploited in its dual capacity. In the analysis which follows, this phrase, whenever it

²² Cf. 127/159 below, and—elsewhere in the same play—670/683.

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 137.

occurs and in whatever connection, is denoted by Δ ; what I take to be "ordinary" dochmii are denoted by δ .

| $\delta\rho\alpha.$ | --- | excl. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| $\tau\acute{\iota}s \ddot{\alpha}p' \eta\nu; \pi\bar{o}\bar{u} \nualei;$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | δ^{24} |
| $\pi\bar{o}\bar{u} \kappaurei \acute{e}któpios \sigma u\theta eis$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | ibycean. ²⁵ |
| $\delta \pi\acute{a}ntaw, \delta \pi\acute{a}ntaw \acute{a}koréstata\tau o;$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | $\delta + \Delta$ |
| $\pi roo\acute{d}\acute{e}rkou, \lambda e\bar{u}so\acute{s}e \nu i\bar{u},$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | i. dim. |
| $\pi roo\acute{p}e\bar{u}thou \pi anta\chi\bar{u}.$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | i. dim. |
| $\pi lanáta\tau, \pi lanáta\tau tis \delta \pi r\acute{e}sthus, o\bar{u}\delta'$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | $\delta + \Delta$ |
| $\acute{e}g\chi\bar{u}ros: \pi roo\acute{d}\acute{e}ra \gamma\acute{a}p o\bar{u}\acute{k}$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | glyc. |
| $\acute{a}n \pi o\acute{t} \acute{a}stib\acute{e}s \acute{a}l\acute{o}sos \acute{e}\acute{s}$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | glyc. |
| $\tau\acute{a}n\delta' \acute{a}maia\mu ake\tau\acute{a}n kora\bar{n},$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | glyc. |
| $\delta s \tau r\acute{e}mo\mu en \acute{a}leg\acute{e}i\bar{u}, \kappa al \pi a\mu a\mu e\beta\acute{o}me\sigma\theta'$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | $\Delta + \Delta$ |
| $\acute{a}d\acute{e}r\acute{e}ktaw, \acute{a}f\acute{a}nwaw, \acute{a}l\acute{e}gywaw \tau\acute{a} \tau\acute{a}s$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | $\delta + \Delta$ |
| $\acute{e}n\acute{u}f\acute{a}mu\acute{o}n \sigma\acute{t}\acute{o}ma \phi roo\acute{t}\acute{d}\acute{o}z$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | glyc. |
| $\acute{e}n\acute{u}t\acute{e}s: \tau\acute{a} \acute{d}\acute{e} \nu\bar{u}n \tau i\bar{u}' \eta\acute{e}kei\bar{u}$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | hipp. |
| $\lambda\acute{e}g\acute{os} o\bar{u}\delta\acute{e}n \acute{a}g\acute{e}n\theta'.^{26} \delta n \acute{e}\acute{g}\acute{a} \lambda e\bar{u}staw$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | anapaests. |
| $\pi e\acute{r}i \pi \acute{a}n o\bar{u}\acute{p}a \acute{d}\acute{u}na\mu a\acute{t} \tau\acute{e}m\acute{e}no\acute{s}$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | |
| $\gamma\acute{u}n\acute{a}nai \pi o\bar{u} mo\acute{i} \pi o\acute{t}e \nualei.$ | $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ | |

28. Our knowledge of ancient metric is here again so limited that there is no means of deciding whether these highly speculative suggestions rest on any foundation; scholarly caution may well shake its head at them. But if there is any foundation for them, support is surely given to Pohlsander's general conclusion that the poet's metrical subtlety grew continually—as may be seen from these passages from *O. C.*, a play written by the poet at a time of life when modern scholars can seldom achieve such enviable inventiveness.

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²⁴ So Wilamowitz, *G. V.*, p. 405.

²⁵ For the ibycean among dochmii cf. *Sept.*, 222.

²⁶ If the reading $\acute{e}g\acute{e}n\theta'$ is correct, the anapaests begin at $\delta n \acute{e}\acute{g}\acute{a}$, and are preceded by the short colon $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ ($\lambda\acute{e}g\acute{os} o\bar{u}\delta\acute{e}n \acute{a}g\acute{e}n\theta'$); for this colon among aeolics cf. *Ant.*, 609.

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THE RELATIVE USE OF THE ABLATIVES OF QUALITY AND RESPECT IN LATIN LITERATURE.

An effort will be made in the following pages to trace the growth of the ablative of respect with an adjective, particularly in those areas where it competes with the ablative of quality as a descriptive phrase.¹ I have set a limit to the words which I will treat. These are principally words which designate parts of the body as well as *species*, *facies*, *forma*, and *corpus*. I have also included *animus* and *ingenium*, for it is these two words with which the relative use of the ablative of quality and the ablative of respect with an adjective is best illustrated. I have also included comparative adjectives, adjectives of quality like *par*, *similis*, *aequis*, and their opposites, as well as adjectives which denote superiority and excellence.

The authors whom I have treated are Plautus, Cicero, Caesar, Lucretius, Vergil, Livy, Velleius Paterculus, and Tacitus.²

¹ Bibliographical references to be interpreted as follows: *A. J. P.* = *American Journal of Philology*; Bennett = Charles E. Bennett, *Syntax of Early Latin*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1910-1914); Crusius = Friedrich Crusius, *Römische Metrik* (Munich, 1955); Delbrück = B. Delbrück, *Vergleichende Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen* = *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*, vols. 3-5 (Strassburg, 1893-1900); Gries = Konrad Gries, *Constancy in Livy's Latinity* (New York, 1949); Hofmann = Manu Leumann and Joh. Bap. Hofmann, *Stolz-Schmalz, Latzinische Grammatik*⁵ (Munich, 1928); Kuehnast = L. Kuehnast, *Die Hauptpunkte der livianischen Syntax* (Berlin, 1872); Marx = Fredericus Marx, *C. Lucili Carminum Reliquiae*, vol. I (Lipsiae, 1904); Norden = Eduard Norden, *Die antike Kunstsprosa*, 2 vols. (Berlin and Leipzig, 1915-1923); Palmer = L. R. Palmer, *The Latin Language* (London, 1954); Ribbeck = Otto Ribbeck, *Scaenicae Romanorum Poesis Fragmenta*, vol. I (Lipsiae, 1871); Riemann = Othon Riemann, *Etudes sur la langue et la grammaire de Tite-Live*² (Paris, 1884); Stacey = S. G. Stacey, *Die Entwicklung des livianischen Stiles* (Leipzig, 1896); Stegmann = R. Kühner and C. Stegmann, *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache*³, 2 vols. (Hanover, 1912-1914); *T. A. P. A.* = *Transactions of the American Philological Association*.

² I have limited myself to the orations of Cicero. In the case of Livy my research is not exhaustive, since the voluminous work of this author has limited the amount of attention I could give to him. I have used Fügner's *Lexicon Livianum*, vol. I; Ernesti's *Glossarium Livianum*;

There is no unanimity among scholars regarding the development of the ablative of quality, although most authorities concede that it is related to the sociative-instrumental case which denotes the circumstances attending or accompanying the action of a verb, but the phrase, in some way, became attached to the noun, perhaps through some qualifying particle, and became adjectival in function.

Delbrück (III, 240-2) shows that the instrumental of quality did not occur in Sanskrit and Greek; therefore, it probably developed in the individual languages after the breakup of the parent-tongue. In Latin, Delbrück maintains, the ablative of quality developed in two ways, first sociatively, that is closely dependent on the verb, for example: *serpens immani corpore labitur*, where, if the verb is omitted, *immani corpore* acquires an adjectival character, e. g., Lucr., V, 33, *asper acerba tuens immani corpore serpens*, and secondly, in close connection with the verb *esse* in imitation of the ablative with a verb of more precise meaning like *aggredi: bono animo aggredi*.³

Rudolph Methner (*Glotta*, VI [1915], pp. 36-42) opposes the prevailing view of the development of the ablative of quality from an original ablative of manner in close connection with the verb, for he argues that the sociative use of the instrumental does not demand a circuitous path of development. Delbrück's

in addition to separate editions such as that of Drakenbarch which has an index of words, by no means exhaustive, appended to the final volume. R. B. Steele's *Case Usage in Livy* has also been a source of words. The examples for early Latin, apart from Plautus, are drawn chiefly from Marx and Ribbeck.

³ Bennett (II, 317) adopts Delbrück's view of the ablative of quality as a development of the sociative aspect of the instrumental case. This is fundamentally the view of Hofmann (431-2), who claims that it originally was an adverbial instrumental which denoted the accompanying circumstances in close connection with the verb, but by the insertion of some qualifying word or phrase the ablative came to be shifted from the verb to dependency on the noun, e. g., Plautus, *Poen.*, 1034, *huc venisti . . . bisulca lingua quasi proserpens bestia*. Hofmann observed that its sociative character is apparent in early Latin with the use of the preposition *cum*: *Stich.*, 350, *illos itidemne esse censes quasi te cum veste unica?* Bennett and Hofmann also subscribe to Delbrück's view that the ablative of quality was extended in its use by its frequent application to *esse*, and the combined phrase was often used as a circumlocution for a verb of specific meaning as in Plautus, *Epid.*, 12, *ut tu es gradibus grandibus*, for *incedo*.

construction, *serpens immanni corpore labitur*, is not necessarily a preliminary step to *Lucr.*, V, 38, *asper acerba tuens immanni corpore serpens*. According to Methner, the ablative of quality, even from the beginning, was associated with the noun; therefore, it is unnecessary to create a hypothetical series of steps in the development of the ablative of quality from the ablative of manner.

In addition to the ablative of quality originating in the associative-instrumental case, Methner maintains that it developed by enallage from the ablative of respect. He cites instances of adjectives found in both constructions and maintains that the progress was from the ablative of respect to the ablative of quality. His examples are drawn from Cicero.

| | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Verr.</i> , III, 185, <i>virum excellētē lentem virtute auctoritate copiis.</i> | <i>Arch.</i> , 15, <i>homines excellenti animo ac virtute.</i> |
| <i>Marcell.</i> , 8, <i>adversarium nobilitate ingenio virtute praestantem.</i> | <i>Sen.</i> , 12, <i>praestanti dignitate hominem.</i> |
| <i>De Or.</i> , I, 180, <i>homo ingenio prudentiaque acutissimus.</i> | <i>De Or.</i> , I, 191, <i>homo acutissimo ingenio.</i> |
| <i>Sen.</i> , 21, <i>si sis natura tardior.</i> | <i>Leg. Agr.</i> , III, 26, <i>quem nostrum tam tardo ingenio.</i> |
| <i>Vat.</i> , 4, <i>nimium es vehemens feroxque natura.</i> | <i>Cluent.</i> , 44, <i>erat immanni acerbaque natura.</i> |

The influence of a construction is generally from one of common occurrence to one of relatively less frequency. Yet there are only a few instances of the ablative of respect with an adjective in Plautus and Terence in contrast to the very many occurrences of the ablative of quality. The ablative of respect becomes more frequent in Cicero, but in the orations it is restricted to certain adjectives, principally to comparatives and to adjectives which denote excellence or superiority, like those cited in the examples above.

The ablative of respect, or specification, is also instrumental in origin. Delbrück (III, 273) has established the instrumental as the case for specification in Sanskrit, Slavic, and Lithuanian. The instrumental origin of the ablative is supported by Bennett (II, 365), Hofmann (443), and Stegmann (II, 1, 392-3). In the case of verbs of surpassing: *superare*, *vincere*, *praestare*, and

excellere, sometimes it is observed that the instrumental (by means of) and the ablative of respect (in point of) encroach upon each other so that it is difficult to determine precisely what notion the writer is conveying. For instance, Plautus, *Trin.*, 345, *pol pudere quam pigere praestat tctidem litteris*, "surpasses by just so many letters," ablative of degree of difference, can be regarded from a different standpoint as "surpasses in point of the same number of letters," and Hofmann (444) maintains that the ablative of degree of difference evolved, in part, from the ablative of respect. Again in Plautus, *Bacch.*, 402, *cave sis te superare servom siris faciundo bene*, *faciundo* is probably instrumental, "by doing"; yet with verbs of surpassing the ablative of respect also occurs, for the ablatives in the following sentences are, in all probability, ablatives of respect. Compare Bennett (365). Plautus, *Poen.*, 530, *vinceretis cervom cursu vel gralatorem gradu*; Caesar, *B.G.*, VI, 13, 9, *si qui ex reliquis excellit dignitate*; Cicero, *De Or.*, I, 197, *quantum praestiterint nostri maiores prudentia ceteris gentibus*. This usage of the ablative of respect with verbs which denote superiority or excellence is extended to the participles of these verbs which have become adjectives: *praecellens*, *praestans*, *excellens*, and then to adjectives of kindred meaning such as *insignis*, *illustris*, *inclusus*, and *egregius*.

Another group of adjectives which contribute to the development of the ablative of respect is the comparative, and less frequently, the superlative adjectives. Here also should be included adjectives of quality such as *par*, *similis*, *aequus*, and their opposites. In all these adjectives there inheres the notion of comparison, and hence they take a dependent ablative of specification to designate in what respect a person or thing is inferior, equal, or superior, to another.

A use of the ablative of respect, which is distinct from the preceding usage which involves comparatives and adjectives of kindred meaning, is to indicate the part of the body affected, e.g.: Plautus, *Mil.*, 630, *pernix sum pedibus manibus mobilis*; Cicero, *Epist.*, XIV, 4, 3, *mulierem aegram et corpore et animo confectam*; Caesar, *B.G.*, VI, 27, 1 (*alces*) *mutilaque sunt cornibus*; Varro, *R.R.*, II, 9, 3, *canes facie debent esse formosi*; Martial, XII, 34, 4, *rufa crinibus*. In the case of Martial, the ablative of quality, *rufis crinibus*, would provide the same mean-

ing as *rufa crinibus*; however, the meter was a factor which determined the use of the ablative of respect with an adjective.⁴

The remains of early Latin are too few, aside from Plautus and Terence, to permit us to determine conclusively the extent to which the ablative of quality and of respect with an adjective competed among early Latin authors in their use as descriptive phrases. The fragments, however, show a preponderant use of the ablative of quality. The ablative of respect is used far more sparingly; in reference to the part of the body affected there are only a few occurrences. They are drawn chiefly from Lucilius: fr. 106, *expirans animam pulmoribus aeger agebat*; fr. 398, *praetor noster ad hoc 'quam spurcuit ore . . .'*; fr. 798, *quaeque aspectu sunt spurca et odore*. Meter determined the choice of *aeger*, since *aegris* is inadmissible. In the case of *spurcus* and *spurca*, meter was not a factor; *spurca*, however, distributes its adjectival force to both *aspectu* and *odore*, and this seems to determine its use with the ablative of respect in cases where the ablative of quality would result in ambiguity.

Plautus has only a few instances of the ablative of respect with an adjective. He almost consistently uses the ablative of quality for description; therefore, the considerably fewer ablatives of respect with adjectives, about twenty in number, could hardly be regarded as rival constructions in Plautus. *Animo* occurs only twice as an ablative of respect with an adjective and *forma* once. In these three instances the meter seems to have determined the construction. *Rud.*, 606, *atque illa animo iam fieri ferocior*; *Mil.*, 1323, *et quia tecum eram, propterea animo eram ferocior*; *Mil.*, 1390, *qui formast ferox*. *Rudens*, 606 is an iambic senarius, and *ferocior* provides an iamb at the end of the verse where there can be no substitution. The same situation applies to *formast ferox*. With equal facility the poet fits *ferocior* in *Mil.*, 1323 into a trochaic pattern where the final syllable has the ictus and the preceding foot must be either a trochee or a tribrach. *Genere antiquior*, fr. 596 in Accius, is similarly determined by the meter; for it occurs at the end of a trochaic septenarius: *ab draconis*

⁴ Significant in this connection is the colloquial use of the ablative of separation with *ab* to designate whence the affection proceeds: Plautus, *Epid.*, 123, *ab animo aeger fui*; *Truc.*, 833, *ab ingenio improbast*. Also later, in Columella, VI, 1, 2, *boves durissimos . . . nec ab aspectu decoros*.

stirpe armata exortus genere antiquior. Here, as in Plautus where the verses ended in a comparative, the ablative of quality is precluded in this position because of the extra syllable. In designating the part of the body affected, Plautus uses the ablative of respect in an instance where the meter seemed to be a factor which helped to determine his choice: *Mil.*, 630, *pernix sum pedibus, manibus mobilis*. The ablative of quality was excluded because of the meter.

Cicero's usage in the case of adjectives in the comparative degree inclines to the ablative of respect. *Sulla*, 47, *aetate robustior*; *Verr.*, II, 1, 127, *inferiores loco, auctoritate, ordine*; *Cluent.*, 107, *auctoritate praestantior*; *Phil.*, X, 16, *robore firmior*. This dependent use of the ablative of respect on a comparative is extended in Cicero to adjectives of kindred meaning, that is, adjectives of quality such as *similis* and *par* and their opposites, as well as adjectives which denote superiority and excellence, *excellens* and *praestans*. *Cluent.*, 107, *ingenio et diligentia et religione par*; *Lig.*, 10, *homo cum ingenio tum etiam doctrina excellens*; *Cluent.*, 46, *homines inter se cum forma tum moribus similes*. Cicero, however, is also inclined to use the ablative of quality in combinations with these adjectives with no apparent difference of meaning. Significant is the fact that five of six instances of the ablative of quality with *pari* as a component function as predicate adjectives: *Cluent.*, 107, 109; *Sulla*, 36, *Phil.*, VII, 6; XI, 19. Only one is found functioning as an attributive adjective: *Phil.*, III, 35, *civis egregius, parique innocentia M. Vehilius*.

In a discussion of Cicero's style the clausulae cannot be omitted, for Cicero's choice of the ablative of respect with comparative adjectives at the end of the clauses is determined to some extent by his effort to attain rhythmic endings. The phrase, *aetate robustior*, *Sulla*, 47, represents one of Cicero's preferred clausulae, the double cretic. In the same rhythmic pattern are the following clausulae: *Cluent.*, 107, *auctoritate praestantior*; *Vat.*, 9, *immanitate taeterrimus*; *Marcell.*, 4, *probitate praestantior*; *Phil.*, VIII, 1, *sententia lenior*. Of the nine occurrences of *praestans* with the ablative,⁵ four are with nouns in

⁵ *Praestans* is found five times as an ablative of quality: *Sen.*, 12; *Har. Resp.*, 57; *Lig.*, 1; *Mil.*, 66; *Sest.*, 91. Only in *Sest.*, 91, does the ablative of respect appear with a predicate adjective; in the other

combinations which form clausulae. In addition to those already quoted, there is the combination of a cretic and a trochee or spondee. This is one of Cicero's favorite clausulae and accounts, according to Crusius (p. 134), for about a fourth of the clausulae in Cicero: *Balb.*, 25, *virtute praecellens*; *Balb.*, 50, *prudentia praestans*; *Planc.*, 33, *integritate praestantem*. Cicero occasionally uses the combination of a first or fourth paeon and a cretic, or trochee, or spondee, as in the following examples: *Cluent.*, 164, *brevia responsu*; *Marcell.*, 4, *genere praestantior*; *Verr.*, III, 170, *auctoritate graviorem*; *Flacc.*, 71, *culturaque meliores*. In the last two instances, Cicero could have used the ablative of quality and retained the same clausulae; the adjectives, however, are attributive and Cicero seems to prefer the ablative of respect with an adjective in such cases. How Cicero will arrange the members of a sentence to attain an effective clausula is indicated by *Brut.*, 7, *Alcibiades et Critias, grandes verbis, crebri sententiis, compressione rerum breves*. Although the adjectives precede in each of the first two phrases, it follows in the final one, where it forms with its dependent noun a double cretic.

The table below indicates the relative frequency of the more common words in Cicero which are found in either or both constructions.

| | Ablative of Respect | Ablative of Quality |
|---------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Aetate | 3 | 6 |
| Aspectu | 2 | 0 |
| Animo | 4 | 45 |
| Corpore | 1 | 4 |
| Ingenio | 5 | 16 |
| Lingua | 3 | 0 |
| Mente | 2 | 0 |
| Natu | 16 | 0 |
| Natura | 19 | 3 |

Two of the instances of *natura* as a component of the ablative of quality function as predicate adjectives, *Quinct.*, 59 and

examples the adjective is used attributively. *Excellens* occurs twice as a component of the ablative of quality, and both times in the predicate: *Arch.*, 15; *Quir.*, 15. The other three instances are ablatives of respect with attributive adjectives. One, *doctrina excellens*, *Lig.*, 10, forms a clausula of a double molossus pattern.

Cluent., 44. The other, *Cael.*, 14, is used attributively. *Aetate* in two instances depends upon comparatives, and there is one occurrence with *grandis*: *Sulla*, 47; *Phil.*, V, 50; *In Rosc.*, 44. *Ingenium* occurs twice as an ablative of respect with *excellens*: *Quinct.*, 72 and *Lig.*, 10; once with *par*, *Cluent.*, 107; and twice with comparative adjectives, *Cluent.*, 107 and *Sest.*, 47.

In a descriptive passage where contrast or antithesis is sought, Cicero seems to use the ablative of respect because it emphasizes the characteristics by sharply contrasting them, e.g., *Phil.*, V, 18, *illud vero taetrum non modo aspectu, sed etiam auditu*; *Verr.*, IV, 112, *neque tam barbari lingua et natione illi quam tu natura et moribus*; *Scaur.*, 24, *qui homines! prudentes natura, callidi usu, doctrina eruditii*.

In conclusion, in those areas where the rivalry between the ablative of quality and the ablative of respect with an adjective is strongest, e.g., in the case of comparatives, adjectives of quality, and adjectives which denote superiority or excellence, Cicero seems to prefer the ablative of quality when it is used predicatively; but when these adjectives are used attributively he frequently uses a dependent ablative of respect. A characteristic feature of Cicero's style is the rhythmic phrase at the end of a clause, and frequently, although not consistently, he postpones the adjective and its dependent ablative to the end of the clause in order to achieve an effective clausula.

It is interesting to compare Caesar's practice in relation to some of the words from Cicero's list.

| | Ablative of Respect | Ablative of Quality |
|--------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Animo | 10 | 7 |
| Aetate | 1 | 2 |
| Natura | 5 | 0 |
| Natu | 2 | 0 |

The ambiguous case of *natura* in *B.G.*, V, 13, 1, *insula natura triquetra*, should perhaps be regarded as an ablative of respect with an adjective on the basis of the consistent use of that word in this construction in Caesar. Similarly, in *B.G.*, I, 53, 5, *una Sueba natione* is, in all probability, an adjective with a dependent ablative of respect rather than an ablative of quality. In subsequent historians, *natione* almost invariably appears as an ablative of respect with an adjective which denotes national

origin. Compare Nepos, III, 1, 2; and Tacitus, A., II, 52; XI, 8, 3; XIV, 60, 2.

In his use of the ablative for description, Lucretius almost consistently uses the ablative of quality. There are, by contrast, only a few instances of the ablative of respect with an adjective. Since he is the first poet writing in hexameter verse whose work has been entirely preserved, a survey of these occurrences would help to determine why the poet used the ablative of respect in a few instances in preference to the more frequent ablative of quality.

IV, 709, *ut non sint aliis quaedam magis acria visu.*

IV, 728, *quippe etenim multo magis haec sunt tenuia textu.*

IV, 1022, *exterruntur et ex somno quasi mentibus capti.*

V, 580, *aera per multum, specie confusa videntur.*

VI, 778, *insinuant naris infesta atque aspera tactu.*

VI, 1150, *debilitata malis, motu gravis, aspera tactu.*

VI, 1233, *deficiens animo, maesto cum corde iacebat.*

In the case of *acria*, *tenuia*, etc., the ablative of quality is not excluded, since *aci* and *tenui* are metrically possible. The poet, however, uses the nominative plural forms to provide a dactyl in a foot where it is almost mandatory. In the case of *confusa* and *aspera*, the rival construction, the ablative of quality, is metrically inadmissible.

Animo, mentibus, and specie are instances of the part affected in the ablative of respect. In the case of *specie*, V, 580, the meter was a deciding influence in the use of the ablative of respect instead of the ablative of quality, for the position of *confusa* excluded the latter construction. The meter was no hindrance in IV, 1022, *mentibus capti*, nor in VI, 1233, *deficiens animo*, where the ablative of quality was admissible. *Deficiente animo*, however, would be ambiguous, since it could be ablative of manner (without preposition *cum*), ablative of quality, or an ablative absolute. *Deficiens animo*, moreover, provides variety, a contrast to *maesto cum corde*, an effect which the poet might have sought intentionally. *Captis* is acceptable metrically in IV, 1022, although, as in the case of *deficiente*, the ablative might result in ambiguity.

Vergil often evades precise classification in his use of the abla-

tive case.⁶ He occasionally departs from strict logic in his efforts for variety of construction, and his fondness for hypallage,⁷ as the following lines illustrate, results in a transfer of the adjective from the noun which it modifies to a noun to which it only indirectly applies: *Aen.*, II, 52, *curvam compagibus album*; V, 663, *pictas abiete puppis*; XI, 890, *duros obice postes*. *Abiete* and *obice* are ambiguous constructions in that they can be ablatives dependent upon the adjectives preceding them and for metrical reasons the ablative of respect is preferred to the ablative of quality which would be the logical construction, or they can be regarded as (1) ablative of material without the preposition *ex*: V, 663, "painted ships of wood"; (2) ablative of means: XI, 890, "doors firm by means of the bolt." *Compagibus* is, in all probability, ablative of respect with *curvam*. Here the exigency of meter was not a factor in deciding the construction. The poet is illogical, and by a kind of poetic rationality he emphasizes the roundness of the belly rather than the curved joints which comprise it. Fortunately we are not confronted with ambiguity in connection with all ablatives and there is a sufficiently large number of distinct ablatives of quality and of respect with adjectives to permit us to investigate and to determine their distribution.

The frequency with which *corpore* occurs as a component of the ablative of quality, twelve times, is significant, for this is obviously due to Lucretian and perhaps, ultimately, Ennian influence. Since the one instance of *corpore* in Ennius and the thirteen in Lucretius invariably occur in the fifth foot, the dactylic pattern of the word, as Edwards has shown,⁸ naturally adapts it to this position and usage of previous poets has fixed it there.

⁶ There is no complete study of the ablative in Vergil, although some attention has been given to it in the following works: F. Antoine, *De Casuum Syntaxi Vergiliana* (Paris, 1882), pp. 158 ff.; H. Kern, *Zum Gebrauch des Ablativs bei Vergil* (Schweinfurt, 1881); Madeleine E. Lees, "The Ablative Case in Vergil," *C. Q.*, XV (1915), pp. 183-5; Einar Löfstedt, *Syntactica*, I (Lund, 1928-33), pp. 232-3.

⁷ Adelaide Hahn, "A Linguistic Fallacy," *Studies Presented to Joshua Whatmough* (The Hague, 1957), p. 53. In connection with Vergil's use of hypallage see Miss Hahn's discussion in *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVII (1956), pp. 147-89.

⁸ George V. Edwards, *The Ablative of Quality and the Genitive of Quality* (Baltimore, 1899), p. 39.

There is one instance of *corpore*, ablative of respect, in *Aen.*, XI, 640-2:

Catillus Iollan
ingentemque animis, ingentem corpore et armis
deicit Herminium.

The meter did not exclude *ingenti* (although it did *ingentibus* with *animis*); Vergil, however, as we shall observe later, chose the ablative of respect in expressing the epithet with the hero. The force of the adjective, moreover, extends to *armis* and this might have determined the construction. Significant also is the resulting parallelism of *ingentemque animis, ingentem corpore*.

The exigency of meter occasionally compels Vergil to use the ablative of respect where the ablative of quality would seem to be the preferred construction as in *Aen.*, I, 71-2:

sunt mihi bis septem praestanti corpore nymphae,
quarum quae forma pulcherrima, Deiopea.

In line 72 the ablative of respect is required because the cretic pattern of *-cherrima* (in the ablative) excludes the ablative of quality.

This situation confronts Vergil again in the same book where he describes Dido, I, 496, *forma pulcherrima Dido*. He applies the same epithet to Dido as he did to Deiopea, and for metrical reasons he retains the same construction.

The following lines are several more instances of the ablative of respect with an adjective in positions where the poet was obliged to comply with the meter:

- Ecl.*, VII, 4, ambo florentes aetatibus, Arcades ambo.
 - Aen.*, I, 705, centum aliae totidemque pares aetate ministri.
 - III, 591, ignoti nova forma viri miserandaque cultu.
 - V, 730, defer in Italiam; gens dura atque aspera cultu.
 - VI, 137, aureus et foliis et lento vimine ramus.
 - VII, 483, cervus erat forma praestanti et cornibus ingens.
 - IX, 530-1, turris erat vasto suspectu et pontibus altis,
opportuna loco.
 - IX, 703, tum Bitian ardenter oculis animisque frementem.
- Ardentem oculis* and *animis frementem* are properly stock-epithets, a characteristic device of Vergil's art which he bor-

rowed from Homer to enhance the epic flavor of the *Aeneid*.⁹ Sometimes his stock phrases are direct translations from Homer: *Aen.*, IV, 180, *pedibus celerem* = *Il.*, X, 316, ποδάκης; *Aen.*, IX, 572, *bonus iaculo* = *Il.*, X, 109, δουρίκλυτον; *Aen.*, X, 354, *insignis . . . equis* = *Il.*, XI, 445, κλυτοπόλωφ; *Aen.*, XI, 641, *ingentem . . . animis* = *Il.*, XX, 493, μεγαθύμον. More frequently, however, they are Vergil's own invention and when they involve the ablative, the relation is generally adjective and dependent noun, ablative of respect, rather than the ablative of quality.

Although Vergil is not too reluctant to use compound adjectives in the Greek manner, he is chary of the type in which the first member in the stem of a declinable adjective. There are only six of these in Vergil, and *magnanimus* occurs with the greatest frequency, twelve times. To supplement this deficiency in composition of compound adjectives in the Greek manner, Vergil often uses the ablative of respect with an adjective. *Animo*, for instance, occurs as ablative of respect dependent upon an adjective fourteen times. There is no occurrence of it, moreover, as part of an ablative of quality.

Among other words which are found as ablatives of respect with an adjective and frequently used as stock-epithets are *armis* (12 times) and *forma* (7 times). There is one occurrence of *forma* as component of the ablative of quality, *Aen.*, VII, 483, *forma praestanti*. Other phrases occur sporadically: *Geor.*, III, 119, *calidumque animis et cursibus acrem*; *ibid.*, III, 8, *acer equis*; *Aen.*, I, 10, *insignem pietate virum*; IX, 790, *velocem iaculo*; XII, 480, *levis cursu*. *Viribus*, because of its dactylic pattern, is invariably found in the fifth foot as an ablative of respect: *Aen.*, V, 68, *viribus audax*; VI, 394, *invicti viribus*; X, 748, *praedurum viribus*; XII, 230, *viribus aequi*. In the last three instances Vergil could have substituted the ablative of quality, for the meter was no hindrance. *Invicti* and *praedurum* could be regarded as adjectives denoting superiority, while *aequi* is an adjective of quality. They belong, therefore, to classes of adjectives which have an affinity for the ablative of respect. *Praestans*, however, which properly belongs to this group occurs only once with the ablative of respect: *Aen.*, VIII, 548, *praestantes virtute*, where the substantive use of the parti-

⁹ Nicholas Mosely, *Characters and Epithets, A Study in Vergil's Aeneid* (New Haven, 1926), pp. 2-7.

tiple, object of the verb *legit*, compelled the poet to use the ablative of respect rather than the rival construction, the ablative of quality.

In conclusion, Vergil seems to prefer the ablative of quality when metrically possible, otherwise he resorts to the ablative of respect (1) in order to avert inadmissible feet, (2) to maintain parallel constructions, and (3) to avoid concinnity. Frequently, for clarity, where an adjective is distributed over two or more nouns, the poet uses the ablative of respect, e.g., *Aen.*, V, 295, *forma insignis viridique iuventa*; VII, 745, *insignem fama et felicibus armis*. In the case of the stock-epithets where an ablative is involved, Vergil often uses the ablative of respect with an adjective, and he consistently uses it in the case of *animus*, *arma*, and *forma*.

The style of Livy is still a disputed question. Stacey's theory (pp. 1-5), supported by many intentional or accidental similarities in diction with the poets, maintains that the first decade of Livy, since it is legendary in character and draws upon semi-mythical periods of Roman history, is a prose-poem composed in the style of Ennian epic. This interpretation has been challenged and strongly criticized by Gries (pp. 4-5), who argues that the peculiarities that mark the first decade should be attributed to the peculiar requirements of the contents of these books, and not to Livy's desire to write in a poetic manner. Riemann (pp. 1-33) concedes that Livy was influenced by the authors and poets whom he read but he maintains that the historian's style is fundamentally his own. Archaisms in the syntax of Livy have been pointed out by Kuehnast (p. 14).

In his use of the descriptive ablative, Livy shows a notable increase in the use of the ablative of respect with an adjective in the case of words like *animus* and *ingenium* over their participation in the ablative of quality. With comparative adjectives there are over a hundred instances of the ablative of respect, although *maior*, *minor*, and *superior* account for about eighty-four of them. With comparatives the usage, however, is not exclusively with the ablative of respect. The rival construction is found: XXV, 6, 15, *nunc deteriore condicione*; XXXIX, 37, 14, *immo ne meliore jure sirt*. In both instances, it will be observed, the ablative of quality is in the predicate. With the superlative the ablative of respect is found less frequently: VIII,

5, 3, *florentissimum Latium armis virisque*; IX, 6, 1, *proximus gradu*; X, 16, 6, *opulentissimam armis, viris, pecunia*; 38, 7, *nobilissimus genere factisque*.

Adjectives which denote superiority or excellence are frequently found with the ablative of respect: II, 20, 8, *insignem veste armisque Mamilium*; 47, 6, *consulem insignem armis*; X, 15, 12, *eloquentia civilibusque artibus haud dubie praestantem*. The use of stock-epithets in Livy, e.g., VI, 24, 10, *in-signes armis animisque*; 27, 1, *Camillus consilio et virtute . . . insignis*, suggests Vergil and it would seem that Livy is deliberately employing them in order to enhance the epic character of his history.

Par and its compounds are freely used with a dependent ablative of respect: IV, 28, 5, *virtute pares, necessitate superior*; X, 38, 13, *nec corporum specie nec gloria belli nec apparatu dispar*. Although adjectives which denote superiority and excellence and adjectives of quality such as *par*, *similis*, and their opposites are found with the ablative of respect, the ablative of quality also occurs with these adjectives, chiefly in the predicate after *esse*: III, 70, 1, *consules essent potestate pari*; XXVI, 49, 13, *aliaeque nobilitate pari erant*; XXVII, 19, 8, *puerum forma insigni*.

The part of the body affected is very often expressed by an ablative of respect with an adjective: II, 36, 8, *capti omnibus membris*; XXI, 40, 8, *vigentes animis, corporibus*; XXII, 2, 10, *ipse Hannibal, oculis aeger*; XXVIII, 15, 6, *fessi . . . corporibus animisque*.

Animo is frequently found as an ablative of respect. There are thirty-two instances of it dependent on an adjective in contrast to ten instances of it as a component of the ablative of quality. Nine of these are in the predicate after *esse*.¹⁰ *Ingenium* is similarly affected, for there is only one example in Livy of *ingenio* as part of the ablative of quality. This, however, functions as an attributive adjective: III, 54, 3, *Appius, truci ingenio et invidia praecipua*. This one instance of *ingenio*, ablative of quality, is negligible in contrast to the many occurrences of it as an ablative of respect: XXI, 5, 12, *ingenio feroce*; XXIII, 7, 12, *praeceps ingenio in iram erat*; XLII,

¹⁰ Livy, I, 4, 5; III, 68, 9; VII, 12, 11; XXII, 61, 14; XXV, 9, 17; XXVI, 27, 11; XXXIII, 11, 4; XXXIV, 59, 4; XXXIX, 13, 7.

59, 3, *ingenio impavida gens*; XLV, 10, 3, *Popilius, vir asper ingenio*.

In the case of *forma*, however, Livy uses both the ablative of respect with an adjective and the ablative of quality, the latter even with adjectives such as *insignis* and *eximus* which seem to show an affinity for the ablative of respect: III, 44, 3, *virginem adultam forma excellentem*; XXVI, 49, 13, *aetate et forma florentes*; however, we find also: XXVI, 50, 1, *virgo eximia forma*; XXVII, 19, 8, *puerum . . . forma insigni*. In the case of *virgo*, etc., *eximia* can participate in either construction, since there is no meter here to help us to determine its quantity. Another ambiguous case is XXXVII, 31, 8, *posita haec urbs est, oblonga forma*, where *oblonga forma* can be either ablative of quality, or *forma* can be ablative of respect dependent upon *oblonga*. The construction echoes Caesar's *insula natura triquetra*, although the consistent use of *natura* as ablative of respect in Caesar seems to argue for that construction in the case of *insula*, etc. Livy's practice in the case of *forma*, however, is to employ it in both constructions.

Velleius Paterculus, according to Norden, *Ant. Kunst.* (I, p. 302), is the first historian to write from the standpoint of an orator. He strives for oratorical effect through repeated use of antithesis, in brevity of statement, and through parallel sentence structure. Velleius almost consistently uses the ablative of respect for rhetorical effect:

II, 73, 1, *hic adulescens erat studiis rudis, sermone barbarus, impetu strenuus, manu promptus, cogitatu celer, fide patri dissimillimus*;

II, 118, 2, *tum juvenis genere nobilis, manu fortis, sensu celer, ultra barbarum promptus ingenio, nomine Arminius*.

There is one occurrence of the ablative of quality with *aetas*; this functions as a predicate adjective:

II, 9, 6, *sane non ignoremus eadem aetate fuisse Pomponium sensibus celebrem, verbis rudem et novitate inventi a se operis commendabilem*.

Even here the writer shows his preference for the ablative of respect in his use of *sensibus*, *verbis*, and *novitate*.

Velleius is of special interest in the study of the ablative of respect in that he almost exhausts all the conceivable nouns and

adjectives which appear in the construction; for he uses comparatives, adjectives of quality, and adjectives which denote superiority or excellence. Among the nouns, those of the fourth declension occur frequently: II, 18, 1, *manu*; 118, 2, *sensu*; 7, 2, *vultu*. The use of the multiplicative adjective, 105, 1, *virum multiplicem virtutibus*, seems to echo Horace, *Carm.*, I, 5, 5, *simplex munditiis*.

In Tacitus, the ablative of respect with an adjective has also gained considerable ground, especially in the case of *animus* and *ingenium*. There are four instances of *animo* as a component of the ablative of quality, whereas it is found fifteen times as an ablative of respect with an adjective. Tacitus employs it in a variety of phrases: *H.*, II, 1, *anxius animo*; 23, *animo ignarus*, *procax ore*; III, 15, *discordes animo*, *discretos viribus*; *A.*, I, 6, *firmatus animo*; XIII, 14; *fractus animo*; XVI, 7, *praeruptum animo*; 14, *inquieris animo*, to cite a few instances. Two of the four occurrences of *animo* as a component of the ablative of quality are in the predicate: *H.*, IV, 52, *bono esse animo*; V, 49, *alienato . . . animo fuisse*.

Ingenio occurs fifteen times as an ablative of respect, while there is only one occurrence of it as part of the ablative of quality: *H.*, II, 87, (*lixae*) *procacissimis ingeniis*. The use of *ingenio* almost exclusively as an ablative of respect was due to the influence of *animo* in this construction.

Physical characteristics in Tacitus with regard to the part affected are often expressed by the ablative of respect with an adjective: *Agr.*, 39, *fronte laetus*, *pectore anxius*; *H.*, II, 28, *placidus ore*, *intrepidus verbis*; IV, 81, *alius manu aeger*; *A.*, IV, 60, *Tiberius torvus aut falsum renidens vultu*; XV, 45, *Seneca . . . quasi aeger nervis*. An ambiguous case is *A.*, IV, 63, *urbs . . . maesta facie*, which can also be ablative of quality. There are no other instances of *facie* as an ablative of respect in Tacitus to determine his usage. *Maestus*, however, is found with *vultu*, ablative of respect in poets of the Silver Age: Seneca, *Phaed.*, 433, *maesta vultu*; Lucan, I, 187, *vultu maestissima*. Tacitus' usage, however, is not consistent; for his striving for variety permits him to use one construction in preference to another without any apparent reason except his desire to avoid parallel structure. *Vultu* occurs eight times as an ablative of quality. Three instances of it are in the predicate after *esse*;

one, however, is an effort to avoid concinnity: *A.*, XV, 72, *habitu procerus et torvo vultu erat*. Other fourth declension nouns also occur in both constructions: *Agr.*, 40, *cultu modicus*; *A.*, I, 9, *urbem . . . magnifico ornatu (esse)*. *Corpore*, likewise, is distributed between the two constructions; it occurs seven times as an ablative of respect and eight times as a component of the ablative of quality.

The poetic *insignis*¹¹ is found frequently with a dependent ablative of respect in Tacitus: *H.*, IX, 10, *caput insigne oculis, comaque et torvitate vultus*; XVII, 4, *consilio, manu, voce, insignis*; *A.*, II, 17, *insignis Arminius manu, voce*. It occurs twice as a component of the ablative of quality: *H.*, IV, 15, *erat in Caninefatibus stolidae audaciae Brinno, claritate natalium insigni*; *A.*, XI, 36, *is modesta iuventa, sed corpore insigni*. *Claritate . . . insigni* functions as a predicate adjective. In accordance with his practice, Tacitus varies his construction with a genitive of quality.

Ingens is also drawn from the domain of poetry, and Tacitus, who borrows from the poets, uses it eight times. Its occurrence with *corpore*, ablative of respect, is reminiscent of Vergil: compare *A.*, XV, 53, *Laternus . . . animi validus et corpore ingens*, with *Aen.*, XI, 641, *ingentemque animis, ingentem corpore*. This adjective in Tacitus, moreover, is consistently found with a dependent ablative of respect, never part of an ablative of quality.

One feature of Tacitus' style in connection with the descriptive use of the ablative requires further comment: his use of the ablative of respect with an adjective, the ablative of quality, and other descriptive phrases for variety. Although it is not unusual to find the ablative of respect with an adjective used continuously for description in a passage, e.g., *G.*, 2, 7, *Germaniam . . . informem terris, asperam caelo, tristem cultu aspectuque*; *H.*, I, 2, *opus adgredior, opimum casibus, atrox proeliis, discors seditionibus*; more frequently, however, Tacitus varies his descriptions with combinations of ablative of

¹¹ E. Skard, "Ennius und Sallustius, Eine sprachliche Untersuchung," *Abhandl. Norske Vid.-Akad., Historisk-Filosofisk Klasse*, II (1933), p. 9. Skard has collected words from Sallust which he maintains are almost exclusively a part of epic vocabulary. He argues that words like *pectus, aevus, anxius, ferox, ingens, inclutus*, and many others are drawn principally from early epic and tragedy, and that Sallust used them to give an epic flavor to his history.

quality and of respect with an adjective and genitive of quality and reference along with prepositional phrases, commingling them with no other object than to avoid concinnity: *H.*, IV, 32, *Montanum praeferocem ingenio paratumque in res novas*; *A.*, I, 53, *qui familia nobili, sollers ingenio, et prave facundus (fuit)*; *A.*, II, 43, *Pisonem ingenio violentum et obsequi ignarum*; *A.*, IV, 3, *Drusus impatiens aemuli et animo commotior*.

Tacitus' rhetorical training has also contributed to his more extensive use of the ablative of respect, for he frequently resorts to antithesis for more pungent rhetorical effects, e.g., *H.*, I, 40, *truces armis, rapidi equis*; *H.*, III, 62, *procax moribus neque absurdus ingenio*; in addition to some phrases included in the examples above.

The preceding survey of Latin authors has traced the growth of the ablative of respect with an adjective from Plautus, where it is an infrequent construction, to Tacitus, in whose works the construction becomes quite prevalent largely because of the influence of the Augustan and later poets.

The factors which contributed to the development and wider use of the ablative of respect with an adjective were poetry, and to some extent, oratory. In the case of poetry, metrical necessity was often a cogent factor in the poet's choice of the ablative of respect with an adjective rather than the ablative of quality. Stylistic considerations, however, often determined the choice of the ablative of respect, e.g., the stock-epithets in Vergil where he employed the ablative of respect with an adjective rather than resort to the composition of compound adjectives for which the language showed such reluctance.¹²

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¹² The use of descriptive phrases, perhaps, might offer a solution why Latin failed to develop compounds in the formative period of the language after its separation from the parent-tongue. The early development of the ablative of quality, the ablative of respect with an adjective, and the genitives of quality and reference eliminated the need, and what is more significant, the incentive for such formations. It is interesting to note in this connection the lack of constructions comparable to the ablative and the genitive of quality in Greek and Sanskrit, languages which freely resorted to the composition of compound adjectives. For a discussion of compound adjectives and their relation to the ablative of quality, etc., see James W. Poultney, "The Declension of Latin Compound Adjectives," *A.J.P.*, LXXIV (1953), p. 371.

HERACLITUS, FR. 114.

Ἐννι νόῳ λέγοντας ἴσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, ὅκωσπερ πόλις νόμῳ καὶ πολὺ ἴσχυροτέρως· τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμῳ ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἔθέλει καὶ ἔξαρκει πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.

Kirk, who gives us the most detailed recent analysis of the fragment, translates: "Those who speak with sense must rely on what is common to all, as a city must rely on its law, and with much greater reliance: for all the laws of men are nourished by one law, the divine law; for it has as much power as it wishes and is sufficient for all and is still left over."¹

As the punctuation of the translation shows, Kirk understands "law" to be functioning in this fragment only as a simile. On this reading Heraclitus' point is that intelligent men will order their thinking on the basis of the *ξυνόν* (which may be plausibly identified with the *λόγος* of other fragments) very much as the city orders itself by law, but even more so, inasmuch as human laws are only relative and secondary compared to the absolute law of God.²

This is, no doubt, the correct line of interpretation. The *πολὺ ἴσχυροτέρως* must mean *πολὺ ἴσχυροτέρως* *ἢ πόλις ἴσχυρίζεται νόμῳ*.³ The *γάρ*'s which follow do not serve to introduce reasons, as Heinemann thought,⁴ for reliance on the *ξυνόν* or *νόμος*; they function, rather, as an explanation for the author's qualifying the comparison of *ξυνόν* with *νόμος* by *καὶ πολὺ ἴσχυροτέρως*. This means that the conception of the hierarchy, city—human law—divine law, does not enter into the fragment as part of the thesis. The plea is that men should follow the *ξυνόν*. To this is added an analogy; and this is followed by a commentary which removes certain inadequacies of the analogy. We may very well have here the first statement of that hierarchy; but the conception itself is not original but orthodox.⁵ Heraclitus adopts and em-

¹ G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge, 1954), p. 48.

² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

³ Kirk's "as a city must rely on the law" is a slip; it translates *πόλιν*.

⁴ *Nomos und Physis* (Basel, 1945), p. 66.

⁵ *Iliad*, IX, 98 ff. strongly suggests that kings cannot be absolute

ploys this familiar conception as a model for his own radical and novel conception of the relation of human intelligence to the *ξυνὸν πάντων*.

A consequence of this analysis, though one not drawn by Kirk,⁶ is that there is no reason to identify the *ξυνόν* or *λόγος* with divine law. There is no explicit reference to divine law in the fragment. In view of the contrast *πάντες-ένός* it may indeed be valid to add an understood *νόμον* after *τοῦ θείου*. But it is also possible that *ένός τοῦ θείου* may simply mean “one, the divine.”⁷

- Heraclitus may very well have registered his preference for such an expression over *Ζεύς* or *ὁ θεός* in fr. 32: “One, the only wise, wants and does not want to be called by the name of Zeus.” At any rate, whether we understand *τοῦ θείου νόμον* or simply *τοῦ θείου*, the syntax of the fragment makes the divine (law) *no more than a model*—though a more appropriate one than the *ἀνθρώπειον νόμον*—for the *ξυνὸν πάντων*. In short, Heraclitus is explaining or paraphrasing in fr. 114 something which Kirk and other scholars have established on their own, through an analysis of Heraclitus’ language: that *λόγος* is not the same as Law, but something in the universe for which human norms (standards, measures) can serve as a convenient analogue.⁸

But while the overall syntax of the fragment is now clear, the meaning of key words remains obscure. The roughest spot is *τρέφονται*. The idea that the divine (law) “nourishes” human laws is, to say the least, bizarre. What was it that Heraclitus had in mind? Kirk’s paraphrase, that human laws are “the

rulers. Holding their “sceptres and rights” from Zeus they are expected to conform to certain standards of decency and tact. In Hesiod, *Theog.*, 901 ff. we get the first statement of the association of Zeus with Dike and Eunomia. But the clearest passage is *Erga*, 248-64 and 257-80 which states that kings and their subjects are punishable for transgressing the law of Zeus: the law of *δικῆ* which applies to men as distinct from other animals. Note also that we have something very much like Heraclitus’ hierarchy of city—human law—divine law in the hierarchy of Homeric adjectives: *κολπανός*, *ἄναξ*, *ποιμῆν λαῶν* (of the king relatively to his subjects); *διοτρεφής*, *θεράπων Διός* (of the king relatively to Zeus); and *κάρπιτωτος ἀπάντων*, *ὕπατος κρειόντων* (of Zeus relatively to all kings).

⁶ Cf. p. 54.

⁷ Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, I (Cambridge, 1962), p. 425.

⁸ Kirk, pp. 37 ff.

off-shoots" of divine law,⁹ militates against his own analysis of the syntax of the fragment. If human laws are indeed off-shoots of the divine law (of divine lineage) why qualify so strongly the comparison of *ξυνόν* with *νόμος*? The comment *καὶ πολὺ ἵσχυροτέρως* becomes necessary only if human laws are *far inferior* to the divine (law); it is appropriate only if the word *τρέφονται* diminishes rather than exalts the status of human laws.

One may also raise questions over Kirk's translations of *κρατεῖ*, *ἔχει κράτος*, and *περιγίνεται*. The effect of combining "are nourished" in the second sentence with "is sufficient for all" and "is still left over" in the third is that of a divine law which is consumed by the many human laws and, like Prometheus' liver, is always growing back. The total effect is one of a mixture of ideas and images borrowed from quite distinct semantic contexts: social and political action ("to rely on," "law") and feeding ("are nourished," "is sufficient for," "is still left over"). Other translations of the fragment contain a similar mixture of metaphors, with additional intrusions from the contexts of athletic and military encounter.¹⁰ To press the case for linguistic unity might be both picayune and unwise generally; but I believe it is profitable in Heraclitus who, for all his obscurity, likes to focus on single and luminous images (the bow, the lyre, the river, the sleepers) which serve both to illustrate his doctrine and to fix the meaning of his words.

In attempting to accommodate the language of the fragment as a whole to the translation "are nourished" for *τρέφονται*, critics may have been following a false lead. The language of Heraclitus is not the colloquial Ionic of fifth and fourth century writers,¹¹ but a language much more charged, much more monu-

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁰ Burnet: "hold fast to . . . are fed . . . prevails . . . suffices for . . . with something to spare." Diels-Kranz: "sich stark machen mit . . . nähren sich . . . gebietet . . . reicht aus für . . . ist noch darüber." Fränkel: "sich sichern durch . . . nähren sich . . . hat Macht . . . reicht aus für . . . reicht darüber hinaus." Wheelright: "hold on strongly to . . . are nourished . . . prevails . . . suffices for . . . is something more than . . ." Guthrie: "trust in . . . are nourished . . . extends its sway . . . is sufficient for . . ."

¹¹ The Hippocratic *Περὶ τροφῆς*, which contains (15) a reminiscence of fr. 114, cannot be used as evidence on Heraclitus' semantics. It is both much more recent and wholly superficial in its imitation of Heraclitean diction.

mental, often deliberately archaic and bearing on the epic language of Homer and Hesiod.¹² The only definitely prosaic words in the fragment are *ἰσχυρίζεσθαι* and *ἰσχυροτέρως*. But even for these the familiar fifth and fourth century translations "to contend," "to maintain" and "more strongly" are clearly inappropriate to the context. Kirk rightly translates "to rely on" and "with greater reliance."¹³ I now would like to show that a translation of the verbs *τρέφονται*, *κρατεῖ*, *ἐξαρκεῖ*, and *περιγίνεται* which respects Homeric-Hesiodic usage and patterns is both appropriate to the context and peculiarly congruent with the theme of law and reliance. What emerges is a statement unified under one single image or paradigm, a statement playfully balanced in characteristically Heraclitean fashion.

The verbs *κρατεῖ* and *περιγίνεται* both have parallels in Homer. Unless we, implausibly, connect the first with *πᾶσι*, the indicated translation is "it rules as far as it wills."¹⁴ As for the second, whether we take it with an understood or restored *πάντων*¹⁵ or connect it to the dative *πᾶσι*, we could very well give it the Homeric sense "to excel" or "to prevail over."¹⁶

We do not find *ἐξαρκέω* in Homer, but we find *ἀρκέω* and *ἐπαρκέω*; also *ἀρκιος* in both Homer and Hesiod. The first of these taken with the dative means "to defend" or "to protect." In one case it is the breastplate which protects (*Il.*, XIII, 371), in another the river (XXI, 131). Often *ἀρκέω* takes the object

¹² This is recognized by Kirk in his interpretation of many Heraclitean words (e. g. *ἀρμονία* pp. 207, 224). But to say that Heraclitus "still lived, as his language shows, in the tradition of poetical thought" (p. 396) is to overstate the case.

¹³ This translation treats *ξύνει* and *νέμει* as complements of *ἰσχυρίζεσθαι* (and *-ται*). So do other English translations (above, n. 10). If we treat the datives as instrumental or comitative we get the German translations (n. 10), which are nevertheless equivalent in sense to Kirk's "to rely on." The closest parallel in fifth century literature appears to be Thuc., V, 26, 3, which even contains a rhetorical effect similar to Heraclitus': *καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ χρησμῶν τι ισχυρισαμένοις μόνον δὴ τοῦτο ἐχνῶς ξυμβάν . . . [εὐρήσει τις]* (for those who maintained something on the basis of oracles, one will find this alone strictly fulfilled).

¹⁴ Cf. Homer's *μέγα κρατέω*, *εὐρὺ κρείων*; Hesiod's *μέγα κρατεῖ ηδὲ ἀνάσσει* (*Theog.*, 403).

¹⁵ The restoration, proposed by Diels, is supported by a paraphrase in Plut., *De Isid.*, 369A.

¹⁶ Cf. *Od.*, VIII, 102; 252; *Il.*, XXIII, 318.

δλεθρον and carries the sense "to succeed in defending against."¹⁷ This usage is also found in the post-Hesiodic *Shield of Heracles* (358). For the adjective *ἀρκιος* the translation "adequate" is perhaps never warranted in the epic; the contexts in which it occurs can all be served even better by the more literal "on which one may rely (depend, count)," more simply "unfailing, certain, sure."¹⁸ The Homeric *ἐπαρκέω* has the same meaning as *ἀρκέω*. If Heraclitus conforms to this usage it is unlikely that *ἔξαρκέω* (recorded for the first time in fr. 114) differs from these, except perhaps in having more of the nuance of success ("to out-defend").

Assuming that *πᾶσι* means *πᾶσι νόμοις* we can now translate the last sentence of fr. 114: "For it rules as far as it wills and succeeds in defending all (laws) and prevails over (them)." We are told, in other words, that the divine (law) does what is normally expected of a sovereign power: it has unlimited jurisdiction; it protects, but also controls. It both guarantees all human laws, but can also overrule them on appeal.

Placed in this environment Kirk's translation of *ἰσχυρίζεσθαι* and *ἰσχυροτέρως* makes excellent sense. The language of the fragment appears, on the whole, to be dominated by the idea of the relation of subjects to the sovereign. We may even have what begins to appear as a symmetrical mode of expression: *ἰσχυρίζεσθαι τινι* is a precise relational converse of *περιγέγνεσθαι τινος*. If A *ἰσχυρίζεται τῷ* B then B *περιγίγνεται τοῦ* A and vice versa. The force of the words examined so far is mainly legal and political.

How is *τρέφονται* related to this paradigm? If we take seriously the idea that Heraclitus' language emulates the language of epic poetry we would find very little dictionary support for the translation "are nourished." The standard translations for *τρέφομαι* in Homer are "to be nurtured, to be brought up, to grow up" and the like. Similar translations are listed for Hesiod and also for Herodotus. Even the active *τρέφω* has no firm connection with feeding. Men are said to *τρέφειν* and so is Athena (a virgin) and elderly women.¹⁹ The function of the *τροφός* in

¹⁷ Cf. *Il.*, VI, 16; XIII, 440; XV, 534; XX, 289; *Od.*, IV, 292.

¹⁸ Cf. *Il.*, II, 393; XV, 502; *Erga*, 551. The *ἄρκιος μισθός* of *Il.*, X, 304 and *Od.*, XVII, 358 is "a reward one may count on." So too in *Erga*, 370; similarly for *ἄρκιος βίος* (sure livelihood) in 501 and 577.

¹⁹ Epic Greek has, of course, other words for the processes of feeding

Homer is not that of a wet nurse, but that of a protector or guardian.²⁰ In the Homeric Hymn to Demeter which, because of its central incident (Demeter in the form of an old woman becomes the *τροφός* to the newborn son of Metaneira at Eleusis), can be consulted as a case study of *τρεφ-* words, the “nurse” describes her role in these words:²¹

Gladly will I receive this boy, as you ask, and I shall take care of him (*θρέψω*) ; and neither witchcraft nor the undercutter (*ὑποταμνόν*) will, I vouch, through heedlessness of the nurse (*τιθήνης*) hurt him. For I know an anti-cutter (*ἀντίτομον*) much stronger than the woodcutter (*ἰλοτόμοιο*) ; and I know a check against much-tormenting witchcraft.

Without entering into questions of etymology²² it seems to me probable that the core idea in *τρέψω* is “to shelter, to protect, to keep safe, to preserve intact,”²³ especially where such protec-

and nourishment: *ἀλδαινω*, *βόσκω*, *φέρβω*, also *σιτέομαι*, *ἐσθίομαι*, *δαίνυμαι*, etc. Of board at public expense Xenophanes uses the words *καὶ κεν σῖτ'* *εἶη* (B 2, 14).

²⁰ Cf. T. D. Seymour, *Life in the Homeric Age*, p. 139.

²¹ *Hom. H.*, II, 226-30. We do not know what the “undercutter” or the “woodcutter” are. What matters for us is that the *τροφός* is expected to ward off their evil effects, work, or influence.

²² Kirk (p. 53) accepts Boisacq’s derivation of *τρέψω* from a root shared with *θρόμβως*. This etymology has recently been challenged by Benveniste (*Word*, X [1954], p. 233). It has also been questioned by students of the Mycenaean script who read *to-ro-qa*, the Mycenaean counterpart of *τροφή*, in a number of Knossos tablets and in a context which suggests “provisions for consumption, or yield”: cf. A. Heubeck in *Indogermanische Forschungen*, LXIII (1958), p. 121, who argues that *to-ro-qa* may justify a return to the etymology **dhregwā* (holding firmly) for *τρέψω*, which had been suggested in 1896 by Meillet but was rejected by Boisacq.

²³ Not “to nurture,” as the dictionaries would suggest, or “to promote natural growth,” as Benveniste thought (*loc. cit.*), for that would make nonsense out of a sentence like *τὸν μὲν ἔγώ φίλεόν τε καὶ ἔτρεφον* (Calypso with respect to Odysseus: *Od.*, V, 135). The puzzling *ἥμισυ θρέψας γάλακτος* (*Od.*, XI, 246) and *τέτροφεν ἀλμη* (XXIII, 237) probably mean “having prepared half of the milk for storage” and “the brine settled (stored).” By the same token: *τρέφειν ἵππους* is “to keep horses”; *τρέφειν χαλτῆν* “to keep one’s hair (uncut)” ; *τρέφειν ἀλοιφήν* “to store fat”; *ὅσα τρέφει χθών* “as many as the earth upholds or maintains.” As for other *τρεφ-*words, *κουροτρόφος* is “a warden of young men”; *ἀνεμοτρεφέσ* applied to waves and spears, ought

tion and shelter is absolutely vital for survival. It is therefore used most appropriately of the old and experienced in relation to the young and immature; of the herdsman in relation to his cattle; of a rescuer in relation to a shipwrecked sailor (Calypso and Odysseus).

It is precisely this idea which lies behind the *τρέφονται* of Heraclitus. The word portrays human laws as young, immature, unfledged, green, tender, and weak: utterly dependent on the divine (law)—which explains the qualification *καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως*.²⁴ We should translate not “are nourished by” but “are under wardship to.”²⁵ The divine (law) is the *τροφός* of human institutions: it guards their integrity; preserves them inviolate. It is in this sense that we should understand the Homeric *διοτρεφής* (the fosterling of Zeus, the ward of Zeus), which is the obvious archetype of Heraclitus’ formulation.²⁶

Note that we again have a logical echo in the third sentence: if *A τρέφεται ὑπὸ B* then *B ἔξαρκε τῷ A* and vice versa. In each of the pairs, *τρέφονται-ἰσχυρίζεσθαι* and *ἔξαρκε-περιγίνεται* we have a convergence of two ideas: the *τροφός* and the sovereign ruler. For Heraclitus the two aspects are complementary. To his contemporaries the two ideas and the relationships which they signal, submission to the king and wardship to a *τροφός*, are peculiarly congruent and familiar: we only need to remind ourselves of the Homeric king who is both *κοίπαρος* and *ποιμήν* or *ἄναξ*.²⁷ We are now in position to translate the whole fragment:

to mean “the ward, or charge of the wind” (cf. “at the mercy of the wind,” an idea very clearly implied in passages referring to the deflection of a missile, correctly aimed, because of wind: e. g. *Il.*, XX, 438-40). Most significantly *διοτρεφής* now takes the meaning “the ward of Zeus,” as if “under the aegis of Zeus.” The American motto “in God we trust” and the line from the spiritual “He’s got the whole world in his hands” are not far from this concept.

²⁴ Cf. Hes., *Erga*, 131: ἐτρέφετ' ἀτάλλων, μέγα νῆπιος.


²⁵ The Oxford English Dictionary illustrates this metaphorical use of “wardship” with examples interestingly analogous to fr. 114: “To deliver his Crown once for all, from wardship (as he counts it) to Parliamentary power” and “We have written the origin of our country [U. S. A.]; we are now to pursue the history of its wardship.”

²⁶ Cf. n. 5 and n. 23, above.

²⁷ The king or prince, who alone carries heavy armor, *protects* his people from the foe as a shepherd protects his flock from beasts of prey: a theme elaborated in a number of Homeric similes: cf. H.

Those who gauge things with intelligence must rely on what to all is common, as the city relies on law, and even more firmly: for all human laws are under wardship to one, the divine (law); for it rules as far as it wills and protects all (laws) and prevails over (them).

I prefer "gauging things" over "speaking" in this fragment since *λέγοντας* is here clearly emphatic. The word must be carrying special weight in a statement which, though obviously concerning the purview of the *λόγος*, contains no explicit reference to it. Note, in this connection, that of the two overt puns, *ξὺν νόμῳ-ξυνῷ, νόμῳ-νόμῳ*, the former mediates a covert or conceptual pun: *ἔχων λέγω* (to gauge things in common) must be very close to Heraclitus' *δυολογέω* (to come together in the measurement of) as in frs. 50, 51; it is also the opposite of *ἀξύνετος γίγνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου* (to fail to be in communion with the *logos*) in fr. 1. To these formal features we can now add the logical symmetries suggested by our translation. The relation *ισχυρίζεσθαι* is the converse of the relation *περιγίγνεσθαι*; the relation *τρέφεσθαι* is the converse of the relation *ἐξαρκεῖν*. Moreover, the conjunction of the relations *ισχυρίζεσθαι* and *τρέφεσθαι* is the converse of the conjunction of the relations *ἐξαρκεῖν* and *περιγίγνεσθαι*. In the sequence in which the words occur in the text we get the following schema:



Logical balancing of this sort is wholly Heraclitean in spirit and is found in the structure of many of his fragments.²⁸

Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (Munich, 1962), pp. 45 f.

²⁸The more obvious cases: frs. 8, 10, 25, 26, 30, 62, 72, 79, 88. For an analysis of the logical structure of fr. 1 cf. O. Gigon, *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit*, p. 9 and B. Snell in *Hermes*, LXI (1926), p. 366.

This analysis confirms and strengthens the view that in fr. 114 law is introduced simply as a model. It is precisely the subordinate and junior status of human law vis-à-vis the divine (law) which makes the relation of city to law inadequate as a model of the desired relation of λέγοντας to the ξυνόν. The qualification καὶ πολὺ ἴσχυροτέρως is, accordingly, not otiose but emphatic and crucial. The result of combining the comparison with the qualification is the emergence of a legal-political hierarchy, city—human law—divine law. To this there probably corresponds in Heraclitus' mind the epistemic-methodological hierarchy: other men—Heraclitus—the *logos*. It is interesting that this latter hierarchy also is introduced by a famous qualification: οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας . . . (fr. 50).

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IRONY AND FORESHADOWING IN *AENEID*, I, 462.

Interpretations of Vergil's familiar lines (*Aeneid*, I, 461-3):

En Priamus. Sunt hic etiam sua praemia laudi;
sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt.
Solve metus; feret haec aliquam tibi fama salutem

have long remained divided on the question whether in line 462 Aeneas is referring primarily to his specific situation in the poem or to the human lot in general. Those who choose the former alternative follow the reasoning of the Servian commentary: as Aeneas scans the scenes of the Trojan War represented on the Temple of Juno, he concludes that he need not fear for his reception at Carthage, *qui enim bella depingunt, et virtutem diligunt et miseratione tanguntur . . . Nam ubi virtus praemia, adversa miserationem merentur, rite formido deponitur*. On this reading, *sunt* in line 461 and again in 462 must be considered coördinate, with *hic etiam* applying to both clauses: "even here (in Carthage) courage has its due rewards—(even here) there are tears for adversity, and mortal chance evokes concern."

On the other hand, James Henry and others have seen in line 462 a general appraisal of the human condition.¹ Henry argued that if *sunt* in line 462 were meant to parallel *sunt* in 461, one would expect a similar repetition of *hic etiam*. He objected to the interpretation of *rerum* without a modifier as *res adversae* and cited passages from Horace, Ovid, and elsewhere in Vergil where *res* means 'the world.' Taking *rerum* as a predicate genitive, line 462 would thus read, "tears are universal (*rerum*), belong to the constitution of nature, and the evils of mortality (*mortalia*) move the human heart." The verse is "not a further enunciation of the particular sympathy of the Tyrians with the Trojans, but a general reflection concerning human sympathy, viz., that tears are part of the constitution of nature, and to be met with wherever there are men. It is as if Aeneas had said: 'Behold Priam! Even *here* the misfortunes of the brave meet with sympathy, for sympathy is a part of human nature.'"²

¹ J. Henry, *Aeneidea*, I (Edinburgh, 1873), pp. 705-7. For a résumé of related interpretations, see L. Feder, "Vergil's Tragic Theme," *C.J.*, XLIX (1953-54), pp. 197-209, especially pp. 199-202. Cf. also Duckworth's survey, *C.W.*, LI (1957), pp. 152-3.

² Henry, *op. cit.*, pp. 705-6.

Successive attempts to extend or refine either method of interpretation to the exclusion of the other are unwitting testimony to the lexical and syntactical ambiguity inherent in Aeneas' words.³ Several recent critics have attempted to resolve the difficulty through a re-appraisal of the context of line 462. Among these, two discussions call for particular comment.

Lillian Feder has rejected the Servian interpretation by pointing out that Aeneas and Achates remain invisible to the Carthaginians and resist the impulse to greet their comrades when they approach Dido within the temple (514 ff.): only after Dido's speech of 562 ff. does the cloud part and Aeneas emerge. "Obviously then the pictures did not seem to Aeneas sufficient proof of the Tyrians' friendliness."⁴ She likewise rejects Henry's interpretation of line 462 as a general reflection concerning human sympathy: "How could he (Aeneas), at this difficult point in his career, observing the cruel treatment of Hector by Achilles and the other sufferings inflicted on the Trojans, be moved to speak of universal sympathy?"⁵ Taking *lacrimae* not as tears of sympathy but as tears of sorrow, Miss Feder argues that a general statement is, nevertheless, intended in a tragic rather than hopeful sense: when Aeneas sees the panel representing the ransom of Hector (indicated by the *En Priamus* of 461 and more fully described in lines 483-7) he is moved by "Priam's specific plight and his reward" to "the general reflection which concerns not only Priam but himself and there-

³ L. A. MacKay, "Three Notes on Vergil," *C. W.*, XLV (1952), pp. 257-9, especially p. 258, preserves reference both to Aeneas' immediate situation and to a general truth by construing *rerum* as a genitive of the sphere: "tears are in the class of real things . . . Even here, on the remote and savage shore of Libya, renown has its due, and tears are real things, i.e., sympathy exists as part of the real world, not as a merely imagined consolation." For further discussion of syntactical problems see A. Pagliaro, "Sunt lacrimae rerum," *Maia*, I (1948), pp. 114-28, and A. M. Cayuela, "Sunt lacrimae rerum," *Helmantica*, V (1954), pp. 71-94. K. Quinn, "Syntactical Ambiguity in Horace and Vergil," *A. U. M. L. A.*, no. 12 (1960), pp. 36-46, acknowledges ambiguity in line 462 but does not discuss the possibilities: "only a poet can say *sunt lacrimae rerum* and affect us thereby as Vergil affects us" (p. 37). Cf. the compendious paraphrase of W. F. Jackson Knight, *Roman Vergil* (London, 1944), p. 193.

⁴ Feder, *op. cit.* in n. 1, p. 201.

⁵ *Ibid.*

fore all men, whom he exemplifies": namely, that "sorrow is implicit in the affairs of men."⁶

Miss Feder's rejection of Henry's reading of *lacrimae* as tears of universal sympathy seems fully justified. In defense of the Servian interpretation, however, one may answer that it does not assume specifically pro-Trojan feelings on the part of the Carthaginians, only that the pictures give proof of their humanity. Aeneas says that their fame will bring his men some measure of safety (*aliquam salutem*), though how much is still *res incognita* (line 515) until Dido confirms the testimony of the pictures. Aeneas' *solve metus* (463), which develops the tentative note of lines 450-2, is later repeated, and now confirmed, by Dido herself: *solvite corde metum!* (562) . . . *non obtunsa adeo gestamus pectora Poeni/ nec tam aversus equos Tyria Sol iungit ab urbe* (567-8). Although full confidence in security is not gained until Dido's speech, Aeneas meanwhile derives a distinctly hopeful sign from the panels. It seems therefore most implausible that Aeneas would at this juncture give conscious expression to a general reflection on the tragic character of human life.

In a second rejection of both Servius' and Henry's interpretations of line 462 based on a reëvaluation of the context, W. H. Alexander has argued that the verse refers neither to the Carthaginians nor to the human lot in general but to the action represented in the panel itself.⁷ This picture, he maintains, is an illustration of the passage in *Iliad*, XXIV where Priam enters the tent of Achilles to reclaim the body of Hector. ". . . In Homer the claim made by Priam for an unrivalled courage in doing what no mortal before him had dared to do (lines 505-6), which must be identical with the *laus* of *Aeneid* I, 461, is followed by a flood of tears and wailing [509-12] . . . It seems to me entirely reasonable to assume that all this mutual weeping, all this contemplation of inescapable doom, is what is covered by . . . *sunt lacrimae rerum . . .*"⁸ In support of this identification, Alexander asserts that Vergil derives from Homer "item

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ W. H. Alexander, "Aeneid, I, 462: A New Approach," *A.J.P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 395-400. Cf. Tib. Claudius Donatus' reading of *hic etiam* as *in ista pictura* (Georgii, p. 93).

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 399.

by item . . . both the material and the order for his abbreviated recapitulation of the Priam-Achilles story.”⁹ On the contrary, while in the Homeric version (*Iliad*, XXII, 188-208) Achilles pursues Hector three times around the walls of Troy before slaying him and drags the corpse around the tomb of Patroclus thrice daily, Vergil states that Achilles had dragged Hector thrice around the walls of Troy (483). Vergil is not, in fact, summarizing the Homeric narrative but is utilizing a later tradition which appears, for example, in Euripides’ *Andromache* (107-8).¹⁰ Further, in describing the ransom as a sale (*ven-debat*, 484) of the body for gold, Vergil has introduced a tone of heartless commercial transaction lacking in the Homeric version, where it is only when Achilles later asks Patroclus’ forgiveness for returning Hector that he sounds a note of evaluation, pleading that the ransom was “not unworthy” (*Iliad*, XXIV, 594). Thus in departing from Homer in two important respects in order to emphasize Achilles’ cruelty, it seems most unlikely that Vergil intends to evoke the ransom scene as it appears in the *Iliad*.¹¹

Although brief, Vergil’s *ekphrasis* is appropriately panoramic rather than narrative and suggests that he is thinking less of an epic model than of an artistic prototype—whether painting or sculpture—or a dramatic tableau. While the earliest representations of the ransom scene in Greek art remain faithful to the Homeric account, an iconographic scheme now attested as early as the mid-fifth century B.C. depicts the body of Hector literally in process of being weighed against gold.¹² In a Melian

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ As for the series of panels as a whole, contrary to Alexander’s assertion that “the pictures derive almost in their entirety from the *Iliad*” (*op. cit.*, p. 397), one finds that relatively few specific details are drawn from Homer. For the great variety of possible sources, see the commentaries, especially Heyne’s *Excursus XV-XIX* to Book I.

¹¹ See the remarks of R. D. Williams, “The Pictures on Dido’s Temple,” *C. Q.*, N.S. X (1960), pp. 145-51, especially p. 150. The scene in Homer, on the other hand, is in effect a dramatic repudiation of Apollo’s charge (*Iliad*, XXIV, 44), that Achilles has “destroyed pity.”

¹² The evidence is collected in K. Bulas, *Les illustrations antiques de l’Iliade [= Eos, Supplementa, III]* (Lwów, 1929); “La colère d’Achille,” *Eos*, XXXIV (1932-33), pp. 241-50; and “New Illustrations to the *Iliad*,” *A.J.A.*, LIV (1950), pp. 112-18; K. Friis Johansen, *Iliaden i tidlig græsk Kunst [= Studier fra Sprog- og Oldtidsforskning*, no. 165]

relief, dated *ca.* 440, Achilles stands at the left, his left hand resting on the large scales in the center, while an attendant holds a gold vessel drawn from a treasure-chest in the background; Hector lies prostrate along the base of the panel and Priam stands at the right, his head bowed, one hand raised to his forehead in a gesture of grief.¹³ In certain Hellenistic and Roman examples, such as the Ruvo amphora and the Woburn Abbey sarcophagus,¹⁴ the corpse is being carried to or actually placed on the scales. It is such a scene as this, as Bulas and Graham have suggested,¹⁵ that Vergil may have visualized: only in the light of this tradition do the words *exanimumque auro corpus vendebat Achilles* (484) seem to gain their full impact. The literary source of this scheme has long been identified as the third part of Aeschylus' *Achilleis*, the *Phrygians, or the Ransom of Hector*,¹⁶ where Aeschylus developed literally the idea expressed by Achilles as he vaunts over the dying Hector in *Iliad*, XXII, 349-53:

οὐδὲ εἴ κεν δεκάκις τε καὶ εἴκοσι νήριτ³ ἄποινα
στήσωσι⁷ ἐνθάδ⁸ ἄγοντες, ἐπόσχωνται δὲ καὶ ἀλλα,
οὐδὲ εἴ κέν σ' αὐτὸν χρυσῷ⁹ ἐρύσασθαι ἀνώγοι
Δαρδανίδης Πρίαμος, οὐδὲ ὡς σέ γε πότνια μῆτηρ
ἐνθεμένη λεχέεσσι γοήσεται, δην τέκεν αὐτῆς,
ἀλλὰ κύνες τε καὶ οἰωνοί κατὰ πάντα δάσονται.

(Copenhagen, 1934), especially 72 f. and p. 162; E. Kunze, *Olympische Forschungen*, II (Berlin, 1950), p. 145; and F. Brommer, *Vasenlisten zur griechischen Heldenage*² (Marburg, 1960), p. 330. See also H. Kenner, "Zur Achilleis des Aischylos," *Wiener Jahreshefte*, XXIII (1941), pp. 1-24.

¹³ J. Walter Graham, "The Ransom of Hector on a New Melian Relief," *A. J. A.*, LXII (1958), pp. 312-19 and plates 82-3.

¹⁴ Bulas, *Les illustrations antiques*, fig. 55, and Graham, *op. cit.*, plate 83, fig. 5.

¹⁵ Bulas, *op. cit.*, p. 103; Graham, p. 315.

¹⁶ H. J. Mette, *Supplementum Aeschyleum* (Berlin, 1939), p. 42, no. 97. The weighing of Hector's corpse became a widespread motif, to judge from Diphilos, *Emporos*, fr. 33 (Kock II, p. 551 = Edmonds, *F. A. C.*, IIIA, pp. 110-11, no. 30); cf. Plautus, *Merc.*, 488. Among dramatic versions dependent upon Aeschylus, Ennius' *Hectoris Lytra* apparently included a description of Achilles dragging Hector's body around the walls of Troy. Cf. J. Vahlen, *Ennianae Poesis Reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1903), pp. CCVI-VII. It would seem probable that this detail, as well as the weighing of the corpse, first appeared in the *Phrygians*.

Scholiasts A and T on line 351 remark that Achilles is speaking ὑπερβολικῶς, and mention the adoption of this hyperbole by Aeschylus. To these testimonia should be added the comment of Eustathius, *ad loc.*, who notes that later writers described the ransom as a process of weighing Hector's body against gold and that Achilles himself, according to Lycophron, met the same fate after being slain by Paris. Both stories are, in fact, alluded to in lines 269-73 of the *Alexandra*:

And having slain the bull [Hector], he [Achilles] takes the price thereof, weighed in the strict balance of the scales: But one day he shall for recompense pour in the scales an equal weight of the far-shining metal of Pactolus and shall enter the cup of Bacchus . . . (Mair)

Again in line 276 Lycophrcn refers to Achilles as ‘*νεκροπέρως*’—‘one who traffics in corpses.’ Since it seems clear, then, that Vergil has utilized the tradition established by Aeschylus, we must reject Alexander’s contention that *sunt lacrimae rerum* refers to a representation of the scene of mutual lamentation in *Iliad*, XXIV, with which the Vergilian narrative is irreconcileable in tone, purport, and specific detail.

The Servian interpretation may therefore be retained, despite the objections of Feder and Alexander, as a basic reading of line 462 fully justified by the context. There remains, admittedly, an ambiguous quality about the verse, and the impulse to see in it a general appraisal of the human lot is difficult to resist. In what sense such a view is, in fact, justified emerges from an understanding of the context quite different from that which has been hitherto proposed. It can be shown that this context contains elements of irony suggestive of an interpretation of Aeneas' situation and his reaction to it precisely the reverse of that offered by Servius. In this way, the complexities of the context, properly appreciated, will serve as a guide in evaluating the ambiguities presented by line 462.

An essential clue is provided by Vergil's reflections in the ransom scene of still another Aeschylean passage, the first stasimon of the *Agamemnon*, describing the effect of the war with Troy upon the Greeks at home. The chorus has spoken of the desolation within the palace of Menelaus following Helen's abduction, and in lines 429 ff. turns to the universal mourning among the families of those who were sent forth to retrieve her:

And at large, for those who set forth together from Hellas,
in every house is seen a woman mourning, steadfast in sorrow.
Many are the things that touch to the heart:

Those they sent forth they know: but now, in place of
men, to every house come urns and ashes.

The God of War, gold-changer who deals in corpses, holding
his scales amid the battle of the spear, from the pyres at
Ilium sends to their dearest only dust, heavy and hard-lamented,
packing the urns with ashes, easily stowed, that once were men.
They praise them through their tears . . .

(Lattimore-Page)

W. T. Avery pointed out the similarity of *et mentem mortalia tangunt* to *Ag.*, 432: *πολλὰ γοῦν θτυγάνει πρὸς ἡπαρ.*¹⁷ While he refrained from asserting that Aeschylus had directly inspired the Vergilian passage, there are further hints that this was the case. The phrase in *Ag.*, 437, *ὅ χρυσαμοιβὸς δ' Ἀρῆς σωμάτων*, as Fraenkel has observed, "describes in a very condensed form the activity of a murderous daemon."¹⁸ Similarly in Vergil Achilles appears as the arch-enemy, the embodiment of the Greek destroyer in this climax to a panorama of Greek cruelty.¹⁹ Moreover, while Achilles sells a lifeless corpse for gold and Ares weighs out ashes like gold-dust in exchange for men, the basic metaphor of transaction is the same. Again, at the hands of Ares, the victor suffers no less than the vanquished. Likewise, Achilles' cruelty is felt by both Priam and the Atreidae: *saevom ambobus Achillem* (458). As the Greeks praise the dead in their grief (*Ag.*, 445, *στένονται δ' εὗ λέγοντες*), so the Carthaginians render to Priam, as *sua praemia laudi*, the praise of tears—compassion which Aeneas now begins to hope will be extended to himself and his men.

In a passage emphasizing Greek savagery, there is an obvious and striking paradox in the allusive parallel Vergil has thus drawn between Carthaginian sympathy and Aeschylus' description of Greek suffering. An explanation for this association between Greek and Tyrian may be found in the ominous dramatic irony that pervades the passage as a whole. The evidence of the panels is, in fact, ambiguous. It is not without significance that

¹⁷ W. T. Avery, "Aeneid I, 462," *C.P.*, XLVIII (1953), pp. 19-20.

¹⁸ Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, ed. E. Fraenkel (Oxford, 1950), II, p. 229.

¹⁹ Cf. Williams, *loc. cit.* in n. 11: "This scene is the climax of Greek cruelty as well as of Trojan doom."

Aeneas stands confronting the temple of his nemesis, Juno.²⁰ While Aeneas' hope of safety is later confirmed by Dido, it is short-lived and results in the revival of Greek enmity in the form of Carthaginian hostility. Like the Greek force sent to avenge the rape of Helen, *aliquis ulti* will arise from Carthage to pursue the Trojans, as Dido predicts before her suicide (IV, 625).

The panels, then, do not mean what Aeneas thinks they do. Deceptively offering tentative hope, they play a decisive role in bringing about the first encounter with Dido and thus the disaster of Aeneas' involvement with her; they are the ultimate agency of Rome's involvement with Carthage.

There is a more elaborately contrived irony in the fact that the panels, in evoking the Trojan War, not only reflect the past, but prefigure a more immediate conflict, the events of Books VII-XII, Vergil's *Iliad*.²¹ There is of course no question here of direct anticipation, such as that studied by Duckworth and others;²² Vergil's present method of foreshadowing is symbolic rather than verbal. Viewed in this way, the panels provide clues in sequence to what lies ahead, though the roles of Greek and Trojan, the besieger and the besieged, will be reversed in the war between Trojan and Latin.²³ Among the specific events

²⁰ Cf. A. Cartaud, *L'art de Virgile dans l'Énéide* (Paris, 1926), p. 119: "Il est piquant que ce soit justement dans un temple de Junon que les Troyens renaisse à l'espérance . . ."; also B. Otis, *Vergil, A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford, 1963), p. 238.

²¹ To be sure, Vergil is in the second half of the poem no more slavish an imitator of Homer than he is in the series of panels. For recent discussions of Vergil's handling of Homeric materials see especially W. S. Anderson, "Vergil's Second *Iliad*," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVIII (1957), pp. 17-30; L. A. Mackay, "Achilles as Model for Aeneas," *ibid.*, pp. 11-16; G. E. Duckworth, "Turnus and Duryodhana," *T. A. P. A.*, XCII (1961), pp. 81-127; G. N. Knauer, "Vergil's *Aeneid* and Homer," *G. R. B. S.*, V (1964), pp. 61-84, and *op. cit.* in n. 23 below.

²² Cf. G. E. Duckworth, *Foreshadowing and Suspense in the Epics of Homer, Apollonius, and Vergil* (Princeton, 1933).

²³ Vergil's arrangement of the episodes has been commonly misunderstood, to the point of suggested rearrangements of the text. Cf. J. Kvíčala, *Vergil-Studien* (Prague, 1878), pp. 133 ff. While Cartaud (*op. cit.*, in n. 20, p. 122) pointed out certain of the correspondences between the pictures and events later in the poem, he too maintained that the series lacked order and indeed that lines 478-82 "étaient encore sûrement à la marge et non soudés au contexte." Williams,

depicted, the death of Rhesus (469-73), drawn at least in part from Book X of the *Iliad*, anticipates Vergil's imitation of the *Doloneia* in *Aeneid* IX, 314 ff.²⁴ While the pathetic description of Priam's son Troilus, *infelix puer atque impar congressus Achilli* (474-8) has no obvious counterpart in the second half of the poem, it seems possible that Vergil meant to anticipate another unfortunate youth whose death is presented in terms equally affecting, Mezentius' son Lausus, whom Aeneas kills in X, 791 ff.²⁵ The scene of the Trojan women supplicating Athena in lines 479-82 is echoed in the prayers offered to Pallas by Amata and her companions in XI, 477-85. And the death of Hector will be paralleled in Aeneas' maddened slaughter of Turnus in XII, where the motif of the return of a son's corpse reappears in Turnus' plea (XII, 935-6).²⁶

Finally, and most remarkably, the Amazon Penthesilea (490-3) doubly prefigures the future. Just as this résumé of past battles ends with the daughter of Ares, so in the war to come Vergil concludes the catalogue of Latin allies with another *belatrix*, the Volscian Camilla (VII, 803-17).²⁷ When Camilla reappears in Book XI, she is described (648-9) in terms similar to I, 492, *aurea subnectens exsertae cingula mammae*:

op. cit., in n. 11, however, sees in the order of the scenes a progressive emotional development to the climactic encounter of Priam and Achilles followed by the *diminuendo* of the Camilla scene. For other references and a study of the "typological" connection of these scenes with events in *Aeneid*, IX-XII, see now G. N. Knauer, *Die Aeneis und Homer* (Göttingen, 1964), pp. 327-9, 349-50, and 354.

²⁴ Cf. *Iliad*, X, 494 ff.; among non-Homeric elements are the omen alluded to in lines 472-3 and the anachronistic detail *niveis tentoria velis* (469). For the relation of *Iliad* X to *Aeneid* IX, see Anderson, *op. cit.*, in n. 21, p. 24; cf. Duckworth, *op. cit.* in n. 21, p. 112, n. 10, and Knauer, *op. cit.* in n. 23, pp. 266 ff.

²⁵ Cf. Cartaud, *op. cit.* in n. 20, p. 121: "Il faut noter que Troilus est le prototype de ces jeunes héros trahis par leurs forces, que Vergile a multipliés dans les derniers livres de l'*Aénèide*, Euryale, Pallas, Lausus." Cf. Knauer, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-8.

²⁶ For similarities between Turnus and Hector, see Duckworth, *op. cit.* in n. 21, especially pp. 83-6.

²⁷ J. W. Mackail, *The Aeneid* (Oxford, 1930), p. 31, *ad loc.* notes the parallel positions of Penthesilea and Camilla in the two passages, but remarks that the inclusion of Penthesilea "seems an addition which still requires the final hand for its adjustment."

At medias inter caedes exsultat Amazon,
unum exserta latus pugnae, pharetrata Camilla

and in XI, 659-63 the comparison of Camilla with Penthesilea is made explicit. Just as the sequence of panels ends with a figure whose death occurred shortly before the fall of Troy, Camilla's death, and the rout of her followers (XI, 794 ff.), will be the immediate prelude to Turnus' defeat. A second indication of future conflict is provided by the juxtaposition of Penthesilea, who leads the ranks of the Amazons *lunatis . . . peltis . . . mediisque in millibus ardet* (490-91) and Dido, approaching *magna iuvenum stipante caterva* (497), like Diana armed with her quiver leading her bands of Oreads.²⁸ The warlike exploits of Penthesilea are echoed in the military overtones of Dido's enthronement *media testudine templi, / saepta armis* (505-6).²⁹ (In this setting the menacing double meaning in 504, *instans operi regnisque futuris* is unmistakeable: in 'urging on' the work of her own kingdom, Dido will indeed come to 'stand in the way' of Aeneas' mission and the future Rome.) Thus the description of Penthesilea, the immediate prologue to Aeneas' encounter with Dido, contains hints which will be made explicit in the epilogue to the affair when Dido prophesies struggles with both the Latins and the Carthaginians (IV, 622 ff.).

As Aeneas views these scenes, then, with cautious but fatal optimism, he unintentionally enunciates a principle which applies not only to his situation in Carthage but, more generally, to the course of the entire poem and to the course of history: in Vergil's literary and historical perspective, Achilles and Aeneas, Greek and Trojan, Roman and Tyrian are bound to that realm

²⁸ V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils* (Innsbruck, 1950), p. 109, n. 2, and p. 242, notes the function of Penthesilea as an "inner preparation" for the appearance of Dido. The Diana simile may be taken as a link between the two, joining the world of the Amazons, whose lunate shields become emblematic in this context, with the world of Dido and the tragedy to come. Cf. E. Wolff, "Der Brand der Schiffe und Aeneas' Wiedergeburt," *M.H.*, XX (1963), pp. 151-71, especially p. 166. For the manner in which the simile anticipates the events of Book IV, see Pöschl's perceptive analysis on pp. 112-13.

²⁹ The unusual choice of the word *testudo* seems to have been made with a view to its military as well as architectural meaning. For the latter usage, see C. C. van Essen, "L'architecture dans l'*Énéide* de Virgile," *Mnemosyne*, VII (1939), pp. 225-36, especially pp. 233-5.

where the rôles of the slayer and the slain are inevitably united by the reversals of time—where, indeed, “sorrow is implicit in the affairs of men.”³⁰ The general application of line 462 is vindicated as dramatic irony, as a statement whose truth is far more valid in a sense far different from that which Aeneas suspects. While the Servian interpretation of line 462 provides a dramatically plausible analysis of Aeneas’ reaction to the panels, the irony of the context, properly understood, provides a clue to the unconscious ambiguity in Aeneas’ words and allows us to hear the voice of the poet himself. In justice to the complexity of Vergil’s poetic art, *sunt lacrimae rerum* must be regarded not only as a statement of Aeneas’ hope of safety in Carthage, but also as an ironically prophetic assessment of Aeneas’ mission and as a tragic reflection about the human condition.

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³⁰ The words are Feder’s, *op. cit.* in n. 1, p. 201. Cf. Pagliaro, *op. cit.* in n. 3: “le lacrime sono un attributo, un appanaggio, un prodotto delle cose” (p. 120). In my view, paraphrases such as these capture something of Vergil’s meaning, but not Aeneas’.

HORACE, *ODES*, I, 33: THIRST FOR LIFE.

Persicos odi, puer, apparatus,
displacent nexae philyra coronae;
mitte sectari, rosa quo locorum
sera moretur.
simplici myrto nihil allabores
sedulus curo: neque te ministrum
dedecet myrtus neque me sub arta
vite hibentem.

Persicos odi is a poem strategically placed. Its Sapphic stanzas reply to the Alcaics of the preceding *nunc est bibendum* (and this antiphony will be the prevailing pattern in Book II); its quiet tone dissipates the frenzied enthusiasm of the previous ode (*nunc est bibendum* is transmuted at the close to a leisurely *vite bibentem*); and its theme—the rejection of Oriental luxury in favor of Roman simplicity—eases the passage from Cleopatra who precedes to Cato and the civil wars which follow. This is a prime instance of *callida iunctura*—not of words within a poem but of poems within the corpus.

One hesitates to take *Persicos odi* too seriously. If the odes which conclude the other books are parallel cases, it might be an elaborate leg-pull.¹ Book II concludes with Horace's grotesque metamorphosis into a swan as he prepares to sing the Roman Odes,² and Book III ends with a self-tribute so stupendous that of late it has been called "diffident" if not mock-serious.³ Similarly, Book I ends with *Persicos odi*, a rejection

¹ Cf. Eduard Fraenkel: "*eip̄wrela*, the attitude of a man who is habitually *dissimulator opis propriae*, is here carried to the extreme . . . he is indulging in an enormous understatement" (*Horace* [Oxford, 1957], p. 298).

² Fraenkel (*op. cit.*, p. 301) calls the detail in the third stanza "repulsive or ridiculous, or both." G. L. Hendrickson ("Vates *Bi-formis*," *C.P.*, XLIV [1949], pp. 30-2) and E. T. Silk ("A Fresh Approach to Horace II, 20," *A.J.P.*, LXXVII [1956], pp. 255-63) take Horace seriously. L. P. Wilkinson (*Horace and His Lyric Poetry* [Cambridge, 1945], p. 62) considers the third stanza whimsical but regards the rest as serious. H. Musurillo ("The Poet's Apotheosis: Horace *Odes* 1.1," *T.A.P.A.*, XCIII [1962], p. 238) calls the poem a "mock apotheosis."

³ See N. E. Collinge, *The Structure of Horace's Odes* (Oxford, 1961),

of luxury in which "the rose lingers in our memory longer than Horace's renunciation of it."⁴

Encouraged, then, by Horace himself to approach I, 38 with tongue at least partially in cheek, I should like to call attention to a striking bit of parallelism which may give a clue to the meaning of this thought-teasing epilogue. Page has noticed that *apparatus* in the first line is balanced by *alabores* in the corresponding position in stanza two; the words are not only metrically equivalent but sound alike, and "the *ad* in both words suggests the idea of excess."⁵ In addition, there is metrical equivalence (and contrast) in the initial *Persicos* and *simplici*, the corresponding word in stanza two (though there is little assonance here). One might find some amusement and perhaps even profit comparing the corresponding words in the two stanzas throughout, seeking what Collinge calls the "balance of content parallel to the metrical correspondence of the formal Greek style."⁶ If this is done, the choicest plum is saved for last, and rightly so, for in the Sapphic stanza we expect the concluding short line, the Adonic, to linger longest on the taste-buds. The Adonics in this poem are *sera moretur* and *vite bibentem*.

These melodious phrases sum up their stanzas; Horace may be contrasting rose and myrtle, but metrically it is *sera moretur* he rejects and *vite bibentem* he asks for. The rose and the vine are recurrent life-images in Horace; this is especially true in the predominantly somber book of odes which follows *Persicos odi*.⁷ Our days on earth are, for Horace, days of wine and roses (II, 3, 13-14):

huc vina et unguenta et nimium breves
flores amoena ferre iube rosae.

pp. 69-70 and p. 32, n. 1. Fraenkel's exclamation is, once more, "an enormous understatement" (*op. cit.*, p. 304), but he sees neither humor nor dissimulation in the ode.

⁴ Steele Commager, *The Odes of Horace* (Yale, 1962), p. 118.

⁵ T. E. Page, *Q. Horati Flacci Opera* (London, 1896), p. 240.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁷ A. W. Verrall, excepting 4, 7, 8, and 12, remarks, "But for these four poems the book might be called a dirge" (*Studies in the Odes of Horace* [London, 1884], p. 8). For wine-roses symbolism, cf. *Odes*, II, 3, 13-14; 7, 19-25; 11, 9-17; 14, 25-8; and elsewhere, I, 36, 13-16; III, 15, 15-16; III, 19, 9 ff., 22; III, 29, 2-3.

But, as the Epicurean finds to his dismay, amid the cups and chaplets *surgit amari aliquid*—some bitter reminder wells up to spoil the fragrance of the flowers.⁸ The roses, in Horace, are *nimum breves* or *sera*; the wine will be spilled on the pavement by some worthier heir. Roses “sind ein Symbol der flüchtigen Lebensfreude”⁹; wine “represents a commitment to present life.”¹⁰ There is a difference worth noting here. The rose fades and dies, as we ourselves must inevitably do. But wine can be stored away in cellars, preserved and guarded with a hundred keys; we may die without the enjoyment of it, and it will keep its sweetness for someone who knows how to live in the present. So when Horace dissociates his two life-images in *Persicos odi*, rejecting one and demanding the other, it is as if the rose has become for him a reminder of death.¹¹

Oddly enough, the change from *sera moretur* to *sera morietur* is an addition of only one letter, while it is almost a matter of phonetics to pass from *vite bibentem* to *vita viventem*.

This need not be mere fooling on Horace’s part, or on mine. It is not mere aural association. There are similar sound-patterns in Lucretius, and while some editors deplore these phenomena as unworthy puns, Paul Friedländer has dignified them with the term ‘atomology’.¹² Lucretius himself notes the connection, naturally and orthographically, between *ligna* and *ignis* (I, 911-14):

atque eadem paulo inter se mutata creare
ignis et lignum? quo pacto verba quoque ipsa
inter se paulo mutatis sunt elementis,
cum ligna atque ignis distincta voce notemus.

Doubtless most instances of this in Lucretius are playful, but Bailey concludes “the fundamental idea is sound and goes far to explain arguments in the poem which might otherwise appear puerile.”¹³

⁸ Cf. *De Rerum Natura*, IV, 1131 ff.

⁹ Kiessling-Heinze, ed., *Horaz* (Berlin, 1960), I, p. 175.

¹⁰ Steele Commager, “The Function of Wine in Horace’s Odes,” *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVIII (1957), p. 80.

¹¹ It is worth noting that II, 20 also ends with a (mock-serious?) rejection of death-symbols: *absint inani funere neniae*.

¹² See “*Pattern of Sound and Atomistic Theory*,” *A.J.P.*, LXII (1941), pp. 16-34.

¹³ Cyril Bailey, ed., *De Rerum Natura* (Oxford, 1947), I, p. 159.

'Atomology' of words may or may not be a trade-mark of the playful Epicurean poet. But I suspect a trace of it in *Persicos odi* where Horace is speaking as an Epicurean and (in a closing ode) being playful as well. Literally he rejects Oriental luxury for Italian simplicity; perhaps alliteratively he is also bidding farewell to a lingering *memento mori* and calling his slave boy to come fill the cup of life.

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TWO EMENDATIONS.

I. Euripides, *Cyclops*, 258

Oδ. τοὺς δὲ ἄρνας ἡμῖν οὗτος ἀντ’ οἶνου σκύφοι
 ἀπημπόλα τε κάδίδον πιεῖν λαβὼν
 ἔκπων ἐκοῦσι, κοῦδὲν ἦν τούτων βίᾳ.
 ἀλλ’ οὗτος ὑγίεις οὐδέν ὃν φησιν λέγει,
 260 ἐπεὶ κατελήφθη σοῦ λάθρᾳ πωλῶν τὰ σά.

258 τούτων Barnes: τούτῳ L

I give Murray's text. For the corrupt *τούτῳ* (== *τούτῳ*) in 258 Barnes conjectured *τούτων*, which editors have almost unanimously adopted. The antecedent of *τούτων*, however, is vague since *τούτων* can refer to the barter, or to the drinking, or to both, or else to Odysseus and his comrades. Even if we disregard this ambiguity, Barnes's *τούτων* introduces a grammatical difficulty into the text since *τούτων* can be taken either as a partitive genitive with *οὐδέν* (in 258) or as a genitive governed by *βίᾳ*. Duchemin wrote *τούτῳ βίᾳ*. But *βίᾳ* with or without the dative does not occur in Euripides, whereas *βίᾳ* (in any construction) is found at the end of an iambic trimeter in Euripides more than 25 times. Hence in 258 *βίᾳ* is most probably sound.

I suggest *τούτον* for the corrupt *τούτῳ*, and construe *τούτον* (== Silenus) with *βίᾳ*. Earlier in the play (224 ff.), Cyclops, after noticing that some of his lambs and cheeses have been set out in front of his cave, and that Silenus has been cudgeled, asks Silenus: . . . *τίς ἐσ σὸν κρᾶτ' ἐπύκτενσεν, γέρον;* (229). Silenus answers that he was struck by Odysseus and the latter's com-

rades upon exhorting them not to carry out of the cave property belonging to Cyclops (230) : ὑπὸ τῶνδε, Κύκλωψ, ὅτι τὰ σ' οὐκ εἴων φέρειν. Silenus' opposition to them is again mentioned in 232 ff.:

ἔλεγον ἐγὼ τάδε· οἱ δὲ ἐφόρουν τὰ χρήματα·
καὶ τόν γε τυρὸν οὐκ ἔσπειρον ἥσθιον
τούς τ' ἄρνας ἔξεφιροῦντο.

A few lines later (256 ff.) Odysseus informs Cyclops that Silenus has falsified (in 230 ff.) what actually took place. Silenus, in point of fact, bartered the lambs (and cheese) to Odysseus for a drink of wine, and was not averse to the exchange (cf. ἐκών, 258); “nothing took place against this fellow's will” (*κοὐδὲν ἦν τούτου βίᾳ*).¹ Silenus lies only to protect himself from a vengeful Cyclops.²

The confusion of *ον* and *ω* is easy enough, and *τούτου*, because it is singular, cannot be a partitive genitive with *οὐδέν*. I would punctuate the text with a half-stop after *βίᾳ* (i. e., *βίᾳ*.) on the assumption that the contrast to 256-8 that *ἀλλ'* (259) introduces is not *οὗτος* (259), but *οὗτος . . . λέγει* (259), that is, Silenus' falsification (in 230 ff.) of what according to Odysseus (in 256-8) actually happened.³ Some Euripidean parallels for *τούτου βίᾳ* are: *Phoen.*, 18 (*δαιμόνων βίῃ/*) ; fr. 354 N² (*τῶν θεῶν δὲ μὴ βίᾳ/*) ; *Ion*, 1295 (*ἐμοῦ βίᾳ λαβών/*).⁴

III. Aeschylus, *Supplices*, 309

- | | |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------|
| 306 | Xο. τί οὖν ἔτενε ⁵ ἔτ' ἀλλο δυσπότημῷ βοτ; |
| | Βα. βοηλάτην μύώπα κινητήριον. |
| 308 | Xο. οἰστρον καλοῦσιν αὐτὸν οἱ Νείλον πέλας. |
| | Βα. † τοιγάρ τι ἐγῆς ἥλασεν μακρῷ δρόμῳ; |
| 310 | Xο. καὶ ταῦτ' ἔλεχας πάντα συγκόλλως ἐμοί. |
| | Βα. καὶ μὴν Κάναβον κάπτε Μέμφις ἵκετο. |

In 309 *τοιγάρ* (= “therefore”) introduces an inference that does not follow from line 308. Tucker suggested *τῇ γάρ* (“did he

¹ That is, Silenus was not beaten. *ἦν* here has the sense of *έγένετο* (as some commentators have noted). Duchemin's *τούτῳ βίᾳ* presupposes the same interpretation for 224-60 that I have given.

² If we may judge from 161-5, Odysseus in 256-8 is probably telling the truth. Presumably Silenus struck himself.

³ Murray's full stop after *βίᾳ* assumes *τούτων*.

⁴ For other instances of this construction in Euripides see Allen and Italie, *s. v.*, *βίᾳ*, II.

then drive her *thither* [that is, to the Egypt implied in *οἱ Νεῖλοι πέλας*] by so long a course” [?]),¹ but the parallels that Tucker cites for $\tau\bar{\eta}$ (e.g., *Il.*, XI, 149; XII, 124, etc.) are not in question, and $\tau\bar{\eta}$ in the sense of “*illucne?*” is not paralleled in Aeschylus, or, to my knowledge, in any Greek poet of the classical period. Even if these objections could be overcome, Pelasgus in 311 of his own accord names the very cities in Egypt to which Io was driven, and hence $\tau\bar{\eta}$ (= “*illucne?*”) $\gamma\acute{a}ρ$ is most unlikely, since Aeschylus would scarcely represent Pelasgus in 309 as asking the chorus whether Io was driven to Egypt, yet as knowing two lines later, without any help from the chorus, that Io visited Canopus and Memphis. Murray accepts Tucker’s $\tau\bar{\eta}$ $\gamma\acute{a}ρ$, but prints 309 as a statement. But if $\tau\bar{\eta}$ $\gamma\acute{a}ρ$ in a statement (or, for that matter, in a question) is read, the reference in $\nu\nu$ is not made unambiguously clear by the sense of 309. The subject of $\eta\lambdaασεν$, to be sure, may readily be inferred from *οἰστρον* (or *αὐτόν*), but understanding “Hera” from $\epsilon\tauευ\xi(\epsilon)$ ² in 306 as the subject is just as easy. But if “Hera” is the subject of $\eta\lambdaασεν$, the reference in $\nu\nu$ can conceivably be either to the *οἰστρος* (if not the $\mu\acute{ωψ}$) or to Io.

I suggest that we read τῷ (sc. οἰστρῳ) γάρ for the corrupt τοιγάρ, and that we understand "Hera" (from 306) as the subject of ἥλασεν. The instrumental dative with ἥλασεν is paralleled in *Eum.*, 604 (. . . ἐκείνην . . . ἥλαννες φυγῆ) and in *P. V.*, 681-2 (. . . οἰστροπλήξ δ' ἔγω [sc. Io] μάστιγι θείᾳ [=the gadfly] γῆν πρὸ γῆς ἐλαύνομαι), though in this instance the dative may possibly be ἀπὸ κοινοῦ with οἰστροπλήξ and the verb. For the proposed interpretation of 309, whereby Hera causes Io to be driven far from Argos by means of a gadfly, we may compare, in addition to the preceding passage, lines 540-64 of the *Supplies* (ἐνθεν [sc. Argos] Τώ οἰστρῳ ἐρεσομένα φεύγει . . . πολλὰ

¹ Tucker did not translate *ἐκ γῆς* in his rendering of 309. (Cf. also his translation on p. 206: "What? did he drive her thither? And was the chase so far?")

In 309 *M* has $\tau\bar{\eta}\varsigma$, but Canter's $\gamma\bar{\eta}\varsigma$ is virtually certain. From the δις of the scholium (δὶς αὐτὴν ἡλασε μακρῷ δρόμῳ) Burges conjectured αὐτης (for ἐκ γῆς), and Paley (London, 1879), αὐθις. But the scholiast most probably refers to the gadfly's harassment of Io in Argos (307) and outside of Argos (309). Weil's διό (for δις) assumes the corrupt τογύρα.

² The subject of ἔτενξ(ε) is ἄλοχος . . . Διός (302).

βροτῶν διαμειβομένα φῦλα . . . ἰκνεῖται δ' . . . ὕδωρ . . . Νείλον . . . μαινομένα πόνοις . . . ὀδύναις τε . . . θυὶς "Ηρας), and *P. V.*, 589-92: . . . τῆς οἰστροδινήτον κόρης . . . τὸν ὑπερμήκεις δρόμους "Ηρα στυγητὸς πρὸς βίαν γυμνάζεται.³ Aeschylus himself, or his amanuensis, wrote ΤΟΙΓΑΡ, that is, τῷ γάρ οτιγάρ. It is tempting to assume that the corrupt *τοιγάρ* arose at the time of the *μεταχαρακτηρισμός*, but a later date is perhaps just as likely.⁴

Some editors have seen fit to delete line 308 on the grounds that *οἰστρος* is not the Egyptian word for "gadfly," or that the whole line is superfluous. *οἰστρος* is not, of course, the Egyptian word for "gadfly," though a Greek word for an Egyptian term would not be unusual in 308, since Aeschylus normally represents *βάρβαροι* as talking in Greek.⁵ The chorus, however, consists of Egyptians of *Greek* lineage: there is no difficulty in supposing that the chorus states in 308 that the *οἰστρος* is what they, in the Greek they speak, call the *μύωψ* in their version of the myth of Io. Line 308, furthermore, is needed for the progression of the dialogue. In 307 Pelasgus describes the gadfly as an "ox-driving goad" (*βοηλάτην . . . κινητήριον*). The chorus next says (308) that the *μύωψ* goes by the name of *οἰστρος* in their version of the legend of Io. In 309 Pelasgus affirms that the *μύωψ* and the chorus' "*οἰστρος*" are identical: "For with it (sc. the *οἰστρος*) Hera drove Io from Argos on a long course."⁶

³ Cf. *P. V.*, 580-1 (*οἰστρηλάτῳ δὲ δεῖματι δειλαῖσν . . . τείρεις;*), where, however, the subject of *τείρεις* is "Zeus."

⁴ Cf. Murray's *OCT*, p. ix. For the confusion of Ο and Ω in the MS tradition of Aeschylus compare e.g. the variants at *Supp.*, 107, *P. V.*, 428, *Sept.*, 64, 65, and *Eum.*, 76. Possibly τῷ γάρ was written τῷ γάρ, which subsequently was corrupted to *τοιγάρ*.

⁵ Cf. Tucker, p. 73.

⁶ That is, to Egypt. The γάρ-clause explains why the *μύωψ* that attacked Io in Argos had become known beyond the confines of Argos (i.e., by *οἱ Νείλοι πέλας*—a phrase that includes the chorus) as the *οἰστρος*: the *μύωψ* and the *οἰστρος* in the legend of Io are simply two different names for the same thing. At first glance one might expect the γάρ-clause to elaborate upon *οἰστρος* as a peculiar appellation of the gadfly, but the emphasis in 308 (at least for Pelasgus) is rather on *οἱ Νείλοι πέλας* than on *καλοῦσιν*. For *μακρῷ δρόμῳ* see Smyth, 1527, and compare *Pers.*, 207-8, where δρόμῳ describes the accompanying circumstance ("at top speed") and περοῖς is a dative of instrument or means. Cf. also *P. V.*, 674-6.

With *νν . . . ἥλισσεν* (= *βοῦν ἥλισσεν*) Pelasgus etymologizes *βοηλάτην*, and thus refers back to 307.

The chorus then sums up (310) the appropriateness of all the answers Pelasgus has given to their questions. Pelasgus, however, does not let the matter rest. Instead, he harks back to the wanderings of Io, which he had mentioned in 309, and says (311): "Yes, but she also came to Canopus and to Memphis."⁷ The chorus and Pelasgus then discuss the fate of Io in Egypt (313 ff.). Without the reference to Egypt in 308, the reader (or audience) would be somewhat unprepared for 311.⁸

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⁷ On the force of *καὶ μῆν* in 311 see Denniston, *G. P.*, p. 352.

⁸ I might add that Callimachus, fr. 301, as Pfeiffer (*ad loc.*) remarks, very probably contains an imitation of lines 307-8. If so, we have still another reason for not deleting 308. (Euripides, *Bacch.*, 32-3 [where *τοιγάρ* is sound] is not an imitation of 309.) Tucker, pp. 72-3, also defends 308 as genuine, though with arguments different for the most part from those I give.

In 308 Hermann's 'Ινάχου (for *οἱ Νεῖλοι*) is impossible since the article is needed (see Burges, *ad loc.*, in Buckley's edition [New York, 1856]). I mention this only because E. Fraenkel, *Agamemnon*, III, p. 655, n. 1, apparently accepts Hermann's conjecture.

REVIEWS.

CLAUDE MOSSÉ. *La fin de la démocratie athénienne. Aspects sociaux et politiques du déclin de la cité grecque au IV^e siècle avant J.-C.* Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1962. Pp. 495. NF. 25. (*Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Clermont-Ferrand*, Nouvelle série, Fasc. X.)

This book will be an important tool for the study of fourth-century Greece. The modest title limiting its scope to the Athenian democracy reflects the fact that our information on ancient Athens far exceeds that on all the rest of Greece.

The chaotic history of fourth-century Hellas, with its maze of wars and revolutions, demands explanation. To point to an innate Greek "particularism" or "greed for gain" begs the question. What deeper historical forces caused this long and bitter strife? Although Plato and Aristotle and Isocrates perceived many of the underlying issues, the historians of the period, Xenophon and the sources of Diodorus and Plutarch, gave them scant attention.

In the past few decades scholars have produced detailed studies of the deeper aspects of the social, economic, and political evolution of Greece in this crucial period; these studies are but incompletely synthesized even in the recent works of N. G. L. Hammond and Hermann Bengtson. Mlle. Mossé has undertaken the ambitious task of synthesis in order to produce "as objective an analysis as possible of the crisis through which the Greek city-state passed during the fourth century, a crisis which culminated in the decisive ruin of Athens and the civilization of which she was the principal support." The exceptional city of Athens was the soundest body politic of the time. If the disease in the social and political structure of Greece brought even Athens low, one may draw probable inferences from the plight of Athens for the condition of cities less favored.

Mlle. Mossé devotes Part I of her book to the social and economic crisis. Each topic in her discussion has been a battleground of scholarly interpretations, and each receives from her, along with her own cautious conclusions, a sound assessment of previous research. Part I, chapter i, surveys the general conditions of production and commerce in fourth-century Athens. Mlle. Mossé finds that agriculture, industry, and trade in Athens and in Greece never recovered from the ruin brought by the Peloponnesian war. The small Athenian farmer found it difficult to remain on his devastated land. Hence, throughout the fourth century there was a gradual concentration of landownership into the hands of the rich and new-rich, and a migration of the landless from the countryside into the city. The industries of Athens at best were on a primitive level, and the low price of slaves meant that Attic industry, however it might flourish, could not have absorbed the displaced farmers, even had they sought employment. Industry, however, could not flourish.

Athens and Greece were losing their markets to local production in the non-Greek world. Only the arms and textile industries were able to prosper, the one because of the continual warfare, the other because of the growing luxury market; in both industries the labor force consisted almost entirely of slaves. Under such conditions commerce, too, languished and was no help to the struggling economy. Mlle. Mossé brings up to date the findings of Rostovtzeff on the shrinkage of the Greek trade with the non-Greek world, making conspicuous use of material published in the Slavic languages.

As a result of this evolution, Athens had a large population of unemployed poor citizens who saw their only recourse in the relief provided by the city. Part I, chapter ii, traces the growing strains within Athenian society by examining the conditions of the citizens, the metics, and the slaves. Among the citizens, the social balance achieved by Periclean Athens was gone. Like the rest of Greece, Athens experienced the increasingly bitter antagonism of rich and poor as the growth of new-rich profiteers and political and military racketeers fanned the resentments of the landless who were streaming into the city. Mlle. Mossé reexamines the question of the citizen population of Athens during the period and concludes, with some diffidence, that it remained around 30,000 throughout the period, with no sharp decline, but the percentage of propertyless *thetes* rose steeply.

The author avoids the use of uninformative labels such as "the decay of Athenian moral fiber." She takes note of the evidence how impoverished Athenians could swallow their pride and do menial "banausic" work for a living. But they did so reluctantly, and litigants in the Athenian courts had to give excuses for being laborers. Hence, she concludes that the majority of poor Athenians depended on the resources of the city. Athens' weak economic structure had to support a large population of parasitic poor.

Manual labor was the proper province of the slave. Mlle. Mossé gives an unsentimental and undoctrinaire treatment of the problem of slavery in Athens. She deals with it as a historical phenomenon, not as a political issue of the debate between Marxist and non-Marxist. Harsh systems of slavery tend to develop where slaves are plentiful and cheap, as in the last two centuries of the Roman republic. She finds slaves plentiful and cheap in fourth-century Greece; their juridical position at Athens was not significantly better than elsewhere in the ancient world. To the question why Athens, unlike Rome, experienced no slave revolts, Mlle. Mossé answers that at Athens the organization of slave labor never reached the point at which slaves were concentrated in gangs capable of revolting (for a more complete answer, see M. I. Finley, *Historia*, VIII [1959], pp. 158-9).

Part I, chapter iii, is a cautious evaluation of the scanty evidence on corresponding developments in the rest of the Greek world. Outside Attica there were the same troubles, with far greater violence—an agrarian crisis arising from concentration of landownership, an aggravated hostility between rich and poor, and revolu-

tionary pressures for redistribution of land and cancellation of debts. Only when one faction sought to increase its forces by arming the slaves did the issue of emancipation of slaves enter (cf. Demosthenes, 17, 15), and then it was usually only semi-servile populations (like the Lacedaemonian helots) who were involved. In Athens, where even poor citizens held slaves, a revolution of the impoverished with slave-support was unthinkable.

In Part I, chapter iv, Mlle. Mossé considers the diagnoses and the suggested solutions of the Athenian political theorists, who were aware of these explosive tensions. The solutions she organizes under the heads of "communism," "reinforcement of the middle class," and "imperialism." None of these could be realized by the functioning Athenian democracy. The communistic theories prove to be impractical and utopian. The reinforcement of the middle class, in its practical aspect reduced to the exclusion of the poor from the franchise, carried through in 322 only under foreign compulsion. Imperialism on the patterns of the fifth century was attractive to active politicians, but rejected by all the extant theorists. Xenophon hinted at a new type of imperialism, to be at the expense of the barbarians, and Isocrates fervently preached it; but Isocrates had to turn outside the cities of Greece to Macedonia for the means to carry it through.

Part II of the book treats the political aspects of the crisis. In chapter i, Mlle. Mossé traces the development of Athens from the moderation of the restored democracy of 403 to the radical democracy described by Aristotle and its collapse. The driving force of this evolution, she finds, was the social and economic crisis which turned the Assembly into a mass-meeting of the unemployed. Although legally it was master of the state, the sovereign People "sold much of its authority" to the politicians and military chiefs in return for "a few crumbs." The general picture of Athenian politics in the fourth century as depicted by the author is familiar from the orations of Isocrates: unscrupulous politicians get ahead by prosecuting the rich while the indigent, sitting as judges, get a share of the fines; in league with generals out to enrich themselves, these politicians advocate an aggressive foreign policy. The author's principal contribution is her careful assessment of the evidence.

Mlle. Mossé gives a perceptive account of the evolution of "political parties" in fourth-century Athens. "Oligarchical subversives" remained throughout a stock bugaboo used in the speeches of the politicians. As Mlle. Mossé reads the evidence, after the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants, there was no organized party seeking to subvert the democratic regime. The extreme oligarchs withdrew from politics and were conspicuous chiefly for their Spartophile and pacifistic sentiments. "Moderates" like Eubulus and Lycurgus worked within the democratic structure to ease the burdens on the rich. She reexamines the question of the truth of Demosthenes' identification of the supporters of Philip with the oligarchs and concludes that eventually the equation came to be true. Originally the anti-Macedonian leaders were rich industrialists and traders, but the rich, hard hit by the cost of the unprofitable wars voted by the

demos, grew hostile to democracy and sought an accommodation with the Macedonian power. The development culminated in the oligarchic regime set up by Antipater and Phocion.

The nexus between the needs of the indigent demos and the self-defeating foreign policy of Athens is well traced. In the course of her own detailed discussion, Mlle. Mossé gives valuable summaries of recent research into the problems of finance and of military manpower faced by the democracy and the unsuccessful attempts of Athenian politicians to solve them.

Part II, chapter ii, is a very sketchy survey of the political crises which shook contemporary Sparta and Syracuse. Outside Athens, only for these two cities have we any reasonably complete accounts of the developments of the period, as Mlle. Mossé recognizes. She might have considered them in more detail.

Part II, chapter iii, considers the theories of Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle on the political aspects of the crisis. All shared a tendency to favor monarchy, the political form which was to predominate in the Hellenistic age. All lived much of their lives at Athens; Athenian patterns of thought tended to circumscribe their ideological horizons. In practice, they all made peace with the Athenian democracy they criticized so severely, and they had no effect on the march of events. To the author they were all educators, not practical politicians; they never took direct action and offered no practical proposals. None of them could show how to reform an existing city without the violent revolution which they wished to avoid.

Part II, chapter iv, treats the failure of Athenian foreign policy and the end of Greece as a system of independent city-states, incorporating studies of the decline of Athenian imperialism and the nature and limitations of panhellenic ideas in the fourth century. Mlle. Mossé concludes that the Athenian demos, which depended on the city for its subsistence, could never have set up a stable panhellenic alliance, whether the purpose was to resist Philip or to arrest the baneful social and economic evolution. The starveling demos eventually would have returned to the old pattern of exploiting the allies. The other leading cities were equally incapable of rallying the Greeks. Philip and Alexander were military geniuses, neither bent on ruining Greece nor on being champions of panhellenism. They took advantage of the situation for self-aggrandizement. Nevertheless, when the system of free Greek city-states fell, it fell victim to its own internal ailments.

The author's concern is to trace the progress of a disease, and she has succeeded. But throughout she risks underestimating the vitality of Athenian democracy. To overthrow Athenian democracy and the system of Greek city-states, it took vast military power, and the pivotal battles of Chaeroneia and Crannon were close fought (Mlle. Mossé herself, on p. 475, takes note of the possibility that the democracy fell rather to external force). In particular, she risks interpreting what may have been the normal rough-and-tumble of democratic polities and the normal impressionability of a democratic electorate as a pathological symptom. In a democracy it is not

necessarily a pathological symptom if intellectuals like Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates complain of the blindness of the masses, and a politician like Demosthenes rebukes the people for being hoodwinked by his opponents. The contrast between the fifth and fourth centuries may be exaggerated. Military commanders like Chares and Iphicrates, with independent foreign policies and resources abroad, existed in the earlier period (Miltiades and Alcibiades); and Pericles and Cimon dominated the demos as effectively as any fourth-century "demagogue." The extraordinary thing is not that the Athenians were usually enthralled by the oratory of their politicians and unable to control their "strong men" abroad on campaign; rather, it is that they exerted such power over those men, both soldiers and politicians, at home. Miltiades, Pericles, Alcibiades, Timotheus, Callistratus, Demades, and Demosthenes were all sentenced by the People, and still no Sulla and no Caesar marched an army into the city. The mutability of the laws scandalized Plato and Aristotle, but would shock few modern observers, particularly in view of the increasingly complex legal needs. We hear of no violations of the law to compare with the hysteria after the battle of Arginusae. Athenian juries often did follow emotion or greed in deciding a case. Mlle. Mossé's example, however, does not prove the fact: the conviction of Timarchus in 346/5 followed by the acquittal of Ctesiphon in 330 may even reflect the good judgment of the demos. Timarchus was guilty as charged, whereas Aeschines himself was responsible for making the chief issue of the case on the crown the value of Demosthenes' policy rather than the legal technicalities which Ctesiphon probably violated.

All this is not to deny that the ruinous evolution traced by Mlle. Mossé took place, but only to suggest that if she has overlooked anything in her study it is the problem of accounting for the vitality of fourth-century Athens.

Given the nature of the evidence, many will dispute one or another of Mlle. Mossé's conclusions, and in a work of such scope one can hardly avoid making slips. Thus, she does the political theorists less than justice in regarding them merely as secluded academics who looked back to a golden age and made little effort to find practicable remedies for the ills of their times. She completely ignores the evidence of Plato's letters. Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, and Speusippus, as it happens, remained outside active political life (taught by the fate of Socrates?). But they did publish their unpopular views, and they did train men of action, some of whom attempted to implement the theories of their teachers. Isocrates cherished the hope that his propaganda might influence the demos. The others had less hope, but all tried to influence politics through organs which looked more promising—Isocrates and Speusippus through Philip; Aristotle through Alexander, Antipater, and Hermias; Plato through Syracuse. Isocrates even turned to Sparta. Theophrastus and Demetrius of Phalerum were pupils of Aristotle; Hagnonides in the brief and troubled period of his leadership of the restored Athenian democracy (318/7) prosecuted Theophrastus, and Sophocles and Demochares after the fall of the regime of Demetrius of

Phalerum launched an attack on all philosophers. That these attempts failed is a tribute to the Athenians; that they were made shows that the theorists' opinions had enough practical impact to produce a hostile reaction.

Mlle. Mossé draws much from Isocrates and gives a sympathetic appreciation of him. However, she still has Isocrates in the *Panegyricus* an advocate of Athenian naval imperialism (pp. 254-5, 412-14, 417, 431-5); see now E. Buchner, *Der Panegyrikos des Isokrates (Historia, Einzelschriften, Heft 2)*. It is not true (p. 443) that Philip was the only king invited by Isocrates to lead a Hellenic crusade against the Persian empire; see Isocrates, *Epp.* 9 and Speusippus, *Epp. Socrat.*, 30, 14.

The pact establishing Athens' second naval confederation was tied to the King's Peace of 386; hence, one cannot say (p. 435) that "the second naval confederation might possibly have survived and the pact establishing it might have been respected, had the conquest of the Persian empire then been possible." Cleon, Hyperbolus, Cleophon, and perhaps Thucydides the son of Melesias (Plut., *Per.*, 11) had not held high military office before achieving political eminence; hence, it is not true (pp. 269-70) that in the fifth century a political leader who had not first been a military commander was inconceivable. Though it may be proper to place Lycurgus in the middle of the Athenian political spectrum, it is strange to see this austere and implacable man called (p. 270), "l'homme politique le moins suspect d'extrémisme." On p. 20, last paragraph, read "Nous avons donné nos références d'après l'ordre de l'édition Susemihl¹² suivi, entre parenthèses, de l'indication des pages de l'édition de Bekker. On p. 36, n. 1, for "II^e" read "IV^e"; on p. 96, n. 2, for "III, 13" read "III, 14"; on p. 113, n. 5, and p. 118, for "Damon" read "Démon." Other obvious typographical errors need not be enumerated here.

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ENRICO BERTI. *La filosofia del primo Aristotele*. Padova, Edizioni Cedam, 1962. Pp. 590. (*Università di Padova Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, XXXVIII.*)

With infinite patience, prodigious industry, and much success, Enrico Berti has collated and, in some instances, happily discussed the many and often radically conflicting views that have been advanced by a great many scholars concerning the "evolution" of Aristotelian thought as it becomes manifest in the so-called exoteric writings of the Stagirite. As might be expected, Berti, who by no means displays an uncritical or blind adherence to Jaeger's theories, insists—and, in the opinion of this reviewer, correctly—that no one who intends to reconstruct the evolution of Aristotle's philosophy can possibly ignore W. Jaeger's interpretations. Thus, the publication of Jaeger's *Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner*

Entwicklung (1923), in a way, becomes the pivotal point, not to say the starting point, of Berti's excellent book, although the author also deals thoroughly and competently with pre-Jaegerian Aristotelian scholarship. Jaeger's fundamental theses concerning the evolution of Aristotelian philosophy—theses which fundamentally affect our understanding of not only the "esoteric" compositions of Aristotle—are, in the words of W. D. Ross, but a general point of departure and, as such, despite their far-reaching significance, stand in need of certain corrections and implementations. Subsequently, a plethora of papers and books was written by a host of scholars, often with reference to the exoteric writings, either wholly supporting Jaeger, or taking minor (and at times major) corrective exceptions, or, in some instances, flatly and even blindly rejecting Jaeger's theses. All these currents and cross-currents are ably and, on the whole, objectively presented by Berti who has an astonishing grasp of almost all of the relevant literature on this involved subject.

By relying primarily on Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.*, II, 17, 14, and F. Solmsen (whose suggestions still seem to be the most plausible), Berti holds that the *Gryllus*, aside from being a "memorial" and, perhaps, a *consolatio* (or *meditatio*) *mortis*, was above all a polemic against contemporary rhetorics in general and, like the *Protrepticus*, against Isocrates (and his pupils) in particular. It has also been suggested that in the *Gryllus* Aristotle elaborates some of the arguments advanced by Plato in the *Gorgias* (462B-463B). It was probably a dialogue but, as Jaeger has pointed out, not a "dramatic dialogue" in the Platonic sense, but rather an "expository dialogue" or "a scientific discussion in dialogue form," a literary innovation possibly introduced by Aristotle himself.

D. J. Allan has recently announced that vital contacts exist between the *On Ideas* and the Platonic *Parmenides*. Jaeger's attempt to date the *On Ideas* after the death of Plato (348/7) is mainly based on the assumption that Aristotle did not or would not criticize Plato's main doctrines while the latter was still alive, a position that was also taken by P. Wilpert. But, as Berti points out, Jaeger's thesis hinges on several additional theories, namely, that Aristotle was a "Platonist" until about 348/7; that his *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus* are essentially Platonic in spirit; and that the first indications of an "anti-Platonic" trend in Aristotle are to be found only in book II of the *On Philosophy*. On the other hand, there exists some reasonable evidence that the *On Philosophy* was written before 348/7. Be this as it may, certain parts of the *Ur-Metaphysik* and of the *On Ideas* could very well be a reaction to the *Parmenides*. In the light of all that has been said about the *On Ideas*, Berti holds that this work antedates *Metaphysics*, book A, chap. 9; that it is related to Plato's *Parmenides* (though considerably later than the *Parmenides*); and that it is later than the *Gryllus*. Hence he suggests the year 357 as the likely date for its composition. The *On Ideas* raises a number of fundamental questions: it may be a purely intramural (and perhaps merely a partial) critique of Plato's doctrine of Ideas by a "modified Platonist"; or, as I. Düring would have it, it may be indicative of the "fact" that Aristotle

never adhered to Plato's basic teachings, not even in his earliest works. Perhaps G. E. L. Owen, in his proposed work, *Aristotle's Essay On Ideas*, will succeed in clarifying the many puzzling problems raised by the surviving fragments of the *On Ideas*.

It is commonly held, though by no means universally conceded, that Aristotle's *On the Good* is a "reaction" to some lectures delivered by Plato between 360 and 353. Also, the thesis that it is somehow related to the Platonic *Timaeus* seems to have some merit. In view of the fact that the *Protrepticus* (written between 352 and 350) apparently takes up some of the notions contained in the *On the Good*, it has been conjectured by Berti and others that the latter was composed between 357 and 353. Here, too, we will have to await the publication of S. Mansion and E. de Strycker, *Aristote 'Du Bien': Essai de Reconstruction*, which might clarify some of these issues.

In ancient as well as modern times the *On Philosophy* occasionally has been confounded with the *On the Good* and even with some treatises found in the traditional *Corpus Platonicum*. J. B. Skemp and E. Bignone hold that it was stimulated by Plato's alleged plan to write a *Philosopher* in order to round out a projected sequence consisting of the *Sophist*, the *Statesman*, and the *Philosopher*; Jaeger insists that it was written after *Metaphysics*, Book A, and that it holds a sort of intermediary position between the exoteric and the esoteric works of Aristotle; W. Theiler (and A. Mansion, F. Nuyens, and M. Gentile) dates it prior to the *Protrepticus*; H. von Arnim and W. K. C. Guthrie (as well as J. Moreau, J. Bidez, and A. J. Festugière, at least in part) maintain that it was composed after 348/7; J. Moreau and others claim that it was influenced by the *Timaeus*; P. Wilpert (who calls it wholly Platonic and, hence, anterior to the *On Ideas*) believes that it is essentially a "demonstration of the divine *ex gradibus*"; and I. Düring (and M. Untersteiner, who sees in the *On Philosophy* the beginnings of such typical Aristotelian teachings as the principles of matter, form, privation, potency, and act) proclaims that it displays a marked independence from Plato, although he concedes the indirect influence of the *Timaeus*. Further subtle investigations take up the problem inherent in the term *σοφία* as it is used in the *On Philosophy*. Thus it is claimed that this term signifies "the science of what is first" or "the science of the first principles." Other scholars are concerned with the question of whether book II of the *On Philosophy* rejects Plato's Ideas in general or merely his doctrine of "Ideal Numbers"; Jaeger insists that in book III Aristotle announces for the first time the eternity of the world and the "ether theory"; Berti suggests that certain similarities exist between book III and Aristotle's *De Divinatione per Somnium* as well as the *De Caelo*; and others, again, see definite connections between book III and the *Timaeus*. Cicero's remark (*De Nat. Deor.*, I, 13, 33) that "in the third book of his *On Philosophy* Aristotle creates much confusion in that he disagrees with his teacher Plato" concerning the deity, has given rise to prolonged and at times violent controversies (Jaeger *versus* von Arnim) as regards the Supreme Being.

or Supreme Deity advocated by Aristotle in the *On Philosophy*. Berti concludes that Aristotle primarily saw in the Supreme Deity the *νοῦς* (or something beyond the *νοῦς*), rather than merely the cosmos; that *σοφία* as used here deals with "first principles"; that in book II he takes up the Platonic notion of the One and the Indeterminate Two, reducing them to the first formal principle and the first material principle respectively; and that in book III he introduces an additional principle which is both a final and an efficient principle or cause, thus establishing in fact the four basic principles of Aristotelian philosophy. Perhaps the publication of P. Wilpert, *Dialog über die Philosophie: Ein Versuch der Wiederherstellung*, will succeed in shedding additional light on some of these problems or at least stimulate further scholarly discussion.

The *Eudemus* or *On the Soul*, which is usually dated between 354 and 352, according to O. Gigon offers important points of contact with the *On Philosophy*. But it is certainly more Platonic than the latter and hence has been called a "reminiscence of the *Phaedo*" (Gigon), or a *consolatio*, that is, the expression of a sentiment rather than a statement of philosophical conviction (Jaeger). I. Düring, however, sees no drastic difference between the *Eudemus* and Aristotle's *De Anima*, while Jaeger and others hold the opposite view. The assertion that the *Eudemus* to a large extent had been inspired by the *Phaedo* raises a problem which does not escape Berti: How could Aristotle around the year 353 adopt a Platonism which in view of the intervening later dialogues had become somewhat antiquated? Perhaps in the light of the particular (emotional) circumstances to which the *Eudemus* owes its origin, this work holds a special place among the exoteric works and hence may not safely be used to prove or disprove the Platonism of the early Aristotle. Here, too, we might have to await the publication of O. Gigon, *Aristoteles' Dialog Eudemus: Ein Versuch der Wiederherstellung*.

W. Jaeger and E. Bignone, on the evidence of Cicero's *De Republica*, relate the *On Justice* to Plato's *Republic*. P. Moraux, who calls the *On Justice* an "imitation" of the Platonic *Republic* and dates it in the vicinity of the *Protrepticus*, in what seems to be for the time being the definitive treatment of this dialogue (*A la recherche de l'Aristote perdu: Le dialogue 'Sur la Justice'* [Louvain-Paris, 1957]), maintains that in his ethical and political *pragmateia* Aristotle frequently refers to this early work. Other scholars, however, deny this.

According to G. Rabinowitz, we possess no reliable materials or fragments of the *Protrepticus* whatever, while other scholars, especially I. Düring, maintain that we have a great deal of information about this work. It would appear, indeed, that the latter view may reasonably be accepted. Weighty evidence places the *Protrepticus* in the vicinity of Isocrates' *Antidosis*, which is dated around 353/2. While it is generally accepted that Aristotle's earliest compositions were dialogues rather than discourses, in the case of the *Protrepticus* no consensus has been reached as to its original form. It seems, however, that it was an expository essay, that is, a literary form of writing which between 380 and 360 B. C. began to gain the upper hand over the traditional dialogue. Since the days of J.

Bernays, V. Rose, and J. Bywater, attempts have been made to reconstruct the *Protrepticus* either with the help of Cicero's *Hortensius* (not too successfully) and/or Jamblichus' *Protrepticus* (as well as some other minor reports). Jaeger, and after him Gadamer, and now Düring, to mention only a few scholars, have concentrated their attention on Jamblichus, although they widely disagree on the number of fragments that might safely be culled from this source, the sequence in which these fragments should be arranged, and the influence Platonic teachings had on the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*. Ignoring Rabinowitz's radical thesis (not to mention the somewhat extravagant theories of J. Zürcher), Berti on the whole accepts Düring's findings (but not always Düring's interpretations which deny any and all Platonic influences), including Düring's arrangements as they have been published in *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction* (1961). Düring and R. Stark, to mention but two prominent scholars, flatly reject Jaeger's fundamental thesis that the *Protrepticus* is basically Platonic. As a matter of fact, in a certain way Jaeger and Düring seem to have become the leading representatives of two conflicting opinions. But like so many others, the present author has some difficulty in completely accepting Düring's extreme position. The reviewer's own investigations have shown that for practically every fragment attributed to the *Protrepticus* one or several authoritative passages from Plato could be cited as the likely source or at least the probable "inspiration." But the reviewer fully agrees with Berti and Düring that the language and style of the *Protrepticus* are essentially Aristotelian, as is the internal structure of this essay as well the manner of argumentation employed in the several fragments. Here as elsewhere there still exists little agreement among scholars, a fact which is tellingly brought out by the *Symposium Aristotelicum*, a collection of papers on the early Aristotle delivered in 1957 and published in 1960.

Some explanation of why the exoteric works of Aristotle came to be lost in the course of time might have been included in Berti's book. It seems that the alleged "re-discovery" or "recovery" of the esoteric writings of Aristotle during the first century B.C. (Appellicon of Teos, Tyrannion of Amisos and Andronicus of Rhodes) caused a sudden shift of interest to the "dogmatic" compositions at the expense of the exoteric works. The latter came to be progressively neglected and ignored and, as a result of this neglect, were "lost." But parts or "fragments" of them managed to survive in the writings of ancient and early Christian authors.

These somewhat brief observations and remarks, needless to say, fail to do full justice to the work under review. The author, whose learning, mastery of the relevant literature, and industry are simply overwhelming, undertakes nothing less than a comprehensive as well as objective presentation of a most involved and thoroughly debated subject. All this he achieves against the background of an astonishing array of information mustered with great dexterity and good sense. To review and, at the same time, to judge fairly a work of such wide range is no easy task. Of necessity the reviewer had to limit himself to the role of an eclectic and, occasionally, casual

causeur. But this does not detract from the fact that Berti's is a magnificent as well as monumental work. No matter what one may think about Berti's basic attitudes towards the essential theses advanced by so many scholars, his work is an outstanding—and probably the most outstanding—contribution to a desperately difficult and complex problem: the early philosophy of Aristotle.

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ROBERT S. BRUMBAUGH. Plato on the One: The Hypotheses in the *Parmenides*. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1961. Pp. xv + 364. \$6.50.

Although Professor Brumbaugh's intention is primarily a philosophic one (p. 1), he has executed it with a solid foundation of textual criticism and emendation as well as a translation of the *Hypotheses*.¹ In his translation, commentary, and text, he divides the argument according to a "rigid mathematical proof-scheme," making a strong case for the possibility that Plato actually had such a "rigid, Euclidean plan" in mind.² The text and translation are arranged into numbered individual propositions in accordance with this systematic organization. The notes on the translation are "concerned primarily with this architeconic and with the validity of the argument" (p. 13). The translation compares favorably with that of Cornford, although intentionally more literal than the latter.

With the aid of previous collations, Brumbaugh has worked out the first text combining all available reports of 45 manuscripts (pp. 52, 241 ff.). His own collations are the basis for the readings of the V, N, n, o, p, r, x, x*, beta, and the two Vatican manuscripts (p. viii). In constructing his text, he has assumed that certain variants in later manuscripts (e.g. V, Y, r, and b) which are more reasonable than the primary sources (B, T, W) are derived in some way from an earlier archetype (p. 241; cf. p. 254). Establishing as definitive a text as possible would then require primarily B, T, W and secondarily Damascius, the Latin Proclus lemmata, D, V, Lambda, and alpha (pp. 259-60). It is possible only by a study of the manuscript and the indirect traditions. Although Brumbaugh has done a commendable job of advancing our knowledge of the former by his text, his contribution to the study of the latter is admittedly more limited (p. 260).

Brumbaugh's study leans to the conclusion that there has been "no major restyling or interpolating in this text which . . . goes back to the sixth, and very probably, to the fourth, century" (pp. 241 f., cf. p. 13). His own text comes very close to that of Diès, suggesting variants and emendations in no more than 50 of 500 propositions. The change of $\alpha\bar{\nu}\tau\bar{\omega}$ (MSS) to $\dot{\alpha}\bar{\nu}\tau\bar{\omega}$ (V), in order to make the con-

¹ In this review, we will designate the so-called second part of the *Parmenides* as the *Hypotheses*.

² Pp. 47-52. A table outlining the formal arrangement appears on p. 53.

clusion (138 B 5) repeat exactly what was to be proved, seems plausible here as well as in other similar cases listed (p. 64). Against Burnet's use of the present *φαμεν* (139 A 4), it is probably correct to place Stallbaum's suggested emendation *γ' ἔφαμεν*, since an old point is being reintroduced here (p. 69) as in 157 C 4 (p. 152). At 139 E 1, the punctuation of V is accepted as more in keeping with the dialogue form (pp. 73, 270), although this is perhaps a little far-fetched. The *τι* (145 C 2) in V r s x alpha is missing in the other MSS. Since it is the form used in similar cases later, Brumbaugh rightly suggests its use here (p. 105). At 146 D 1, Lambda, V, and X, support *τού τι*, the B1 reading (p. 111). The omission of the final *όλον* (158 A 6) in Vsx, alpha gets rid of an unnecessary tautology (p. 154). The *πολλά ἐστιν* (165 E 8) of s, x, alpha and beta is more explicit than the *πολλά* of the other manuscripts and has many parallels earlier in the dialogue.³

Brumbaugh stresses the fact that his philosophical commentary on the *Hypotheses* is independent of his use of V, s, *et al.* in his text. Any standard critical text would support that commentary (p. 260). Its purpose is to show that the *Parmenides* "offers a rigorous argument for the need of a philosophy that views reality neither as process in flow nor as a domain of abstract, valuationally neutral, structural form" (p. 1). The *Hypotheses* "are a negative and indirect proof that philosophy needs a theory of forms and that the abstractions of Zeno's logic or of Pythagorean mathematics . . . are not the only forms it needs" (p. 14). In his analysis of the *Hypotheses*, Brumbaugh takes issue with those who see them as a revelation of "mystical" oneness (pp. 8 ff., 84 ff., 211) as well as those who interpret them as a "humorous, flamboyant parody of verbal tangles and sophistry" (p. 5) or as a mere textbook of logical fallacies (p. 7). Since he subscribes to the opinion that Plato's concept of "participation" does not admit of abstract description (p. 234), he also rejects the view that the *Hypotheses* are a "sober attempt to defend the theory of forms by a technical account of participation" (p. 5).

Through his analysis of the *Hypotheses*, Brumbaugh tries to show that they "reveal the limits and presuppositions of dianoetic analysis."⁴ They reveal these limits by proving that "a mathematical property which we might be tempted to take as primitive or self explanatory in fact presupposes the notions of part and whole, one and many, and rests finally on some implicit notion of the relation of existence and unity" (p. 192). "Each hypothesis then shows by its strength some weaknesses of the others, although by its final internal inconsistency each reveals its own incompleteness."⁵ In this way, the *Hypotheses* accomplish what Plato's *Parmenides* set out to do: They give an indirect proof that the doctrine of forms is presupposed by the very possibility of knowing, even if the diffi-

³ P. 185. For a list of the other important variants and emendations, see p. 259, n. 5.

⁴ By "dianoia," Brumbaugh means a faculty of understanding which systematizes or "isolates and links parts" as distinct from "nous" or reason, an intellectual faculty which can grasp wholes (p. 190).

⁵ P. 197; cf. the classification of the contending hypotheses on p. 210 as well as the last words of the dialogue 166 C 2-6.

culties preventing an acceptance of this theory are well nigh insuperable (pp. 41, 223).

Brumbaugh considers the hypotheses relevant not only to the problems confronting Plato's Academy (pp. 19-26), but also to contemporary philosophical difficulties. They attack both the modern and the ancient adherents of the view that "mathematical" or "hypothetical deductive systems" (p. 3) can be sufficient unto themselves. Although rejecting their claim to self-sufficiency, he stresses the fact that such "formal systems" are needed to connect "atemporal ideas" and changing things (p. 190; cf. p. 43). Thought which is unaware that these abstractions are not complete in themselves "is a very poor guide to human life which must be examined and lived by a man who knows himself" (p. 4). Such thinking only manages "to generate infinite regresses when it tries to understand itself" (p. 199).

Moved by his conviction that the hypotheses are meant to appeal to men seeking self knowledge, Brumbaugh is not content to picture them as simply a clash of abstractions. He is convinced that the "literary elements such as setting, character, prologue, and epilogue are carefully chosen to give an aesthetic statement about the entire dialogue's structure and intention" (pp. 26-32, 14). He is thus led to ask why we should put any confidence in the seriousness or philosophic capacity of Cephalus, the narrator of the *Parmenides* (p. 27). Perhaps Cephalus is by nature unfit to speak on such matters. Brumbaugh concludes for the reliability of Cephalus, since he is a friend of Glaucon, Adeimantus, Antiphon, and a group of men who are considered quite philosophic by Cephalus. But does the available evidence really warrant this conclusion? It may well be that it establishes "an aesthetic presumption of his serious intention" (p. 27). One could still ask whether it is correct to characterize him as a philosopher. "If anyone in the dialogue meets Parmenides' subsequent description of the sort of person who can understand the argument (someone 'of natural talent, wide experience, and the ability to follow a technical discussion'), Cephalus is that man" (p. 27). That Cephalus considers some people quite philosophic is no argument for their being such, unless Cephalus is a competent judge of what a philosopher is. Furthermore, if it is correct to see Glaucon and Adeimantus as spokesmen for the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul (p. 27), they would seem to be disqualified as spokesmen for the soul's most philosophic part, reason. As for Antiphon who supposedly heard about the conversation from a certain Pythodorus, he is "dominated by the spirited not the rational part of the soul" (p. 30). Thus the philosophical talents of Cephalus, as distinct from his serious interest, are vouched for solely by men whose philosophic worth is attested to by Cephalus alone.

Unless Cephalus can somehow be shown to be moved primarily by reason, one would have to consider the possibility that Plato intended the *Parmenides* to appeal to men governed by something less than philosophical insight. However, all this is only conjecture. Are Glaucon and Adeimantus really spokesmen for the spirited and the appetitive parts of the soul? Brumbaugh merely suggests this without much elaboration (p. 27, n. 17; p. 196, n. 10). Why does

their being friends of Socrates make them more philosophical? Does not Socrates often show a liking for non-philosophical men such as Alcibiades or Callicles? Moreover, Brumbaugh seems to assume the importance of the literary aspects of the *Parmenides* without making it clear why these aspects need to be taken very seriously. One wishes that he had been more explicit about the considerations that led him to become aware of this aspect of Plato's intention.⁶

In any case, if one subscribes to Brumbaugh's views, one cannot abstract from the dialogues a doctrine held by Cephalus, Parmenides, or even by Socrates and without further ado attribute it to Plato.⁷ In order to understand an opinion expressed by one of Plato's characters, one would first of all need an adequate picture of that character's soul, his psychological make-up. Of course, really to gain such an insight, one would have to come to grips with the soul of Plato, the creator of the world of the dialogues.

Brumbaugh cites the argument of Plato's *Parmenides* that not every man is capable of properly understanding the problem of "participation" or the doctrine of forms (p. 40). Only a man unusually gifted by nature (*ἀνδρὸς πάντων μὲν εὐφυοῦς*) will be able to become knowledgeable about these things (135 A 7). An even more remarkable man (*έπι δὲ θαυμαστότερον*) will be required to discover and teach such things adequately to others (135 B 1). If this is true and Brumbaugh is correct about the importance of character and setting, is it not as necessary to question the reliability of Plato's *Parmenides* as it is to question that of Plato's *Cephalus*? Is Parmenides endowed with those extraordinary gifts which Plato has him demand?

Of course one might claim that the *Hypotheses* have something important to say regardless of who teaches them or how they are taught. We cannot make this claim, if we must first assure ourselves of the reliability of a character in order to take his opinions seriously. If we must exercise such precautions in the case of Cephalus, we must certainly exercise them in regard to Parmenides. Should one assume that Plato considered his *Parmenides* gifted with those

⁶ The attempt to clarify the importance of the literary or "existential" aspects of the dialogues has been made by P. Merlan, "Form and Content in Plato's Philosophy," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, VIII (1947), pp. 408 f., 423 f., 430; W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, II (New York, 1943), pp. 36 f.; P. Friedländer, *Platon*, I² (Berlin, 1954), pp. 176-81; G. Krüger, *Einsicht und Leidenschaft* (Frankfurt am Main, 1948), pp. 158 ff.; E. Frank, "The Fundamental Opposition of Plato and Aristotle," in *Wissen, Wollen, Glauben* (Zurich, 1955), pp. 91-4, 118 = *A.J.P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 39-41, 182. It is possible, of course, that Plato considered the "existential" aspect of his dialogues as a complement to or even secondary to, their objective or doctrinal aspect, as is maintained by L. Edelstein, "Platonic Anonymity," *A.J.P.*, LXXXIII (1962), pp. 20 ff. On this point, see the remarks about Socrates made by H. Jaffa, "The Case Against Political Theory," *Journal of Politics*, XXII (1960), p. 271.

⁷ On the various interpretations of Socrates, see Merlan, *op. cit.*, p. 418, n. 44; Friedländer, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-44; K. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, I (London, 1945), p. 258, n. 56; R. Levinson, *In Defense of Plato* (Harvard, 1953), pp. 632-45; C. J. de Vogel, "The Present State of the Socratic Problem," *Phronesis*, I (1955), pp. 26-35.

extraordinary natural talents prerequisite to adequately teaching or learning about the problem of "participation"?⁸

According to Brumbaugh, Plato's Parmenides does possess these gifts, combining "the sharpness of a great logician with the insight of a great philosopher that reality must form a single, coherent whole" (p. 197). However, he indicates this necessity in a negative way, proving that each of the most comprehensive "dianoetic" schemata of unity, the eight hypotheses, are internally inconsistent (p. 237). As distinct from *nous*, understanding (*dianoia*) by itself cannot join the various, asymmetrical levels of being into one coherent whole. It tends to produce symmetrical and, as it were, "horizontal," structures. Since "participation" is a "vertical" relation of "asymmetrical" levels of being it cannot be presented or described abstractly (p. 234).⁸ In other words, Brumbaugh maintains that Plato was unable to produce a completely satisfactory solution for the problem of "participation," since that relationship includes two different levels of being. It is a "vertical" relationship of better and worse and not a "horizontal" one of equals. Although Brumbaugh thinks some knowledge is possible here, he feels it must be confined to "an indefinite number of analogues, or partial explanations, since any metaphor that expresses an asymmetrical relation of levels can serve as partial explanation of participation" (p. 234). However, the best possible knowledge is self knowledge uniting the varicus asymmetrical levels of one's own being. "What we can do is to be intuitively aware of (or in fact simply to be) the kind of vertical dynamic entity that connects several levels at once."⁹

Brumbaugh is undoubtedly correct in maintaining that the Platonic conception of "participation" involves two different kinds of beings. He also makes a good case for the impossibility of understanding this relationship adequately in terms of the eight most comprehensive hypotheses available to "diancia," which is only one of the levels of reality. "Plato . . . knew that he had not met the requirements of offering a deductive explanation and a defense of Platonism without stumbling or mistakes which he set for the philosophic rulers of the *Republic*" (p. 237). If the forms are separate from the things of this world, it would be equally hazardous to seek an ultimate solution by attempting to embody "the kind of vertical dynamic unity that connects several levels at once." Neither the existential nor the metaphysical explanation seems to be sufficient by itself.

⁸ J. Klein ("Die Griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra," *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik, Astronomie, und Physik*, III, I [1934], pp. 79-95) has tried to show how such a description of the "participation" relation is possible. According to Klein, Plato was able to accomplish this by means of a certain understanding of what it means to count or number.

⁹ P. 234. Brumbaugh does not devote much time to how one can become such a "dynamic entity." He does believe the *Symposium* shows that "from the standpoint of all mortal things, persistence, creation, even self identity, are the result of love because there is internal relatedness, and no real separation, of form and thing" (p. 236; cf. p. 42). However no attempt is made to explain how love, as Plato conceived of it, can cause these things. Such an attempt has been made by Krüger, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 158 ff.

Brumbaugh's interpretation of the *Hypotheses* culminates in the problem of the relation of the two levels of being or something resembling the so-called "third man" dilemma. If the many things which participate in one form are completely separate from that form, how can they participate in it? If they have something in common with it, must not this something be another form, etc.? It has been suggested that Plato found it impossible to solve this problem.¹⁰ However this may be, Brumbaugh is convinced that any possible solution must take into account not only the intellect (*nous*) and its forms, but also the individual selves of the knowers. His reminder about the importance of the personalities of the interlocutors is particularly necessary in reading the *Hypotheses* where one easily overlooks what is actually taking place. The *Hypotheses* are, after all, a talk between two people and not merely an impersonal exposition or clash of ideas. In his treatment of this aspect of the *Hypotheses*, Brumbaugh is more illuminating than Cornford, although not so perceptive as Friedländer (*Platon*, III² [Berlin, 1960], pp. 173-200).

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W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT. Ancient Athenian Calendars on Stone. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of California Press, 1963. \$4.00. (*Univ. of California Publ. in Classical Archaeology*, IV, no. 4, pp. 267-402; pls. 20-24; 3 text figs.)

The title may suggest to the reader coming to the Athenian calendar for the first time that this book is a study of inscribed *parapegmata*; but in fact it is an extensive review of Professor B. D. Meritt's *The Athenian Year*, the printed version of his Sather Lectures delivered in Pritchett's university. Despite much joyless acrimony *Athenian Calendars* is a careful restatement of Pritchett's own views and a weighty contribution not only to Attic time reckoning but also to the vital subject of epigraphical method. Pritchett's work is marked throughout by his passionate desire to find out the truth and by a remorseless search for defects in the arguments of his opponent. This reviewer does not know why he was asked for an opinion of the book by the editors of *A.J.P.* The reason may be that, since he is neither a North American nor an epigraphist (in the restrictive, Princetonian sense of that word), he was expected, as an amateur of astronomical matters, to take, in the reposeful isolation of Ireland, a reasonably competent and detached view of this transatlantic controversy.

In *The Calendars of Athens* (Cambridge, Mass., 1947) Pritchett and Neugebauer distinguished dates in the prytany calendar from festival dates (*κατ' ἄρχοντα*) and from regulatory or lunar dates (*κατὰ θεόν*). In the 'Αθηναίων πολιτείᾳ (43, 2) Aristotle or [Aris-

¹⁰ G. Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides*," *Philosophical Rev.*, LIII (1954), pp. 319-49. For the debate on this article, see H. Cherniss, "Plato, 1950-1957," *Lustrum*, IV (1959), pp. 125-6.

totle] states that the *βουλή* at Athens consists of fifty persons from each of the ten tribes. The prytany year is, he explains, conducted *κατὰ σελήνην* and each tribe has one prytany, the order of tribes in each year's prytanies being decided by lot. There are 36 days in each of the first four prytanies and 25 in each of the remaining six. This gives an ordinary prytany year of 354 days. The arrangement of prytanies in intercalary years is not explained in the *'Αθηναίων πολιτεία*, but Pritchett and Neugebauer, claiming that in them too the prytanies were kept as equal as possible, reasonably proposed that there were four prytanies of 39 days and six of 38, or 384 ± 1 days in all (*op. cit.*, p. 27). Other arrangements were necessary in periods when there were not ten tribes. In 47, 2-4 the *'Αθηναίων πολιτεία* goes on to show that dating by prytanies was used by the *πωληταί* in their many financial dealings including the leasing of mines (for which see M. Crosby, *Hesperia*, XIX [1950], especially p. 192) and by the *βασιλεύς* in the letting out of the sacred *τεμένη*. Since these officials needed a regular calendar for the calculation of dues and interest, it is very difficult to accept Meritt's view that the prytany calendar was flexible (*Year*, p. 134). Meritt himself, who is on record (*Year*, pp. 65-6) as declaring to be "intolerable" an error of about two drachmae in roughly 3080 over a period of ca. 647 days would presumably concede that a rigid calendar was necessary for the accurate calculation of Attic mining dues. Incidentally, would an ancient accountant have found a two drachmae difference quite so intolerable as Meritt does? We must beware of imposing on the evidence a greater rigidity than the ancients themselves may have required, but when we have a precise statement, such as Aristotle's on the length of prytanies, interpretations should be crisp.

Pritchett patiently restates his many reasons for claiming that in the *κατ' ἄρχοντα* calendar tampered dates are found, since the Archon could as it were "stop the clock" or alternatively suppress days. Since one of the aims of the prytany calendar was to ensure that no tribe had an unfairly long share of presidency over the city's business in the course of a year, we may again question Meritt's conclusion that even in Aristotle's day there was no rigid pattern of prytanies. On the other hand the Archon had much scope for tampering with dates in his festival calendar, which was so irregular that even the gods complained (Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 615 ff.). Because Meritt's regular festival year *κατ' ἄρχοντα* is subject to slight adjustments from time to time in the assumed alternation of 29 and 30 day months, it is dubbed, somewhat sardonically but accurately enough, by Pritchett the calendar of the leap day. For it there is no ancient literary testimony whatever. The calendar of the leap day is obtained by restoring calendar equations in inscriptions so as to produce (in defiance of Aristotle's contemporary, eyewitness evidence) highly irregular prytanies: but in fact not a single *unrestored* calendar equation has yet been found in published inscriptions, either of Aristotle's time or of another, in which the Aristotelian pattern is violated, and as Pritchett remarks (*Calendars on Stone*, p. 358) "If the irregularities were as numerous as Dinsmoor and Meritt assume, some of their higher dates should by now have appeared" in unrestored parts of stones. Meritt believed (*Year*, p. 35) that

"by indirection," a puzzling expression, knowledge of the actual Athenian calendar can be extracted from the *Eἰσαγωγή* of Geminus. But not even indirectly, as Van der Waerden made clear in 1960 (*J. H. S.*, LXXX, p. 169), does that handbook tell us anything about the Athenian festival calendar: indeed Athens is not even mentioned in the index to Manitius' edition. Pritchett's strictures on Meritt for failing to quote anywhere in *Year* the text of Geminus on which Meritt builds so much are just.

In his negatively critical study of methods employed by the Princeton school of epigraphy and its dependencies Pritchett is at his best. He rightly complains that hypothetical supplements of calendar equations, which in their nature are non-formulary, have been used to support arguments they cannot bear. Writing with all the fervour of a convert, Pritchett is now much less willing to accept equations based on supplements than he was in *The Calendars of Athens*—and rightly: the alert reader has only to study the supplements in *Year*, pp. 86-8 to recognise that far too many inscriptions are being published overloaded with speculative restorations, many of which are not even presented *exempli gratia*. Pritchett cogently questions the practice of offering hypothetical restorations in the same line as preserved text: even the trained mind has to make a continuous effort to distinguish fact from hypothesis, and the inexpert reader may all too easily assume that what is restored must have been on the stone. I well recall the effort I had to make, as an undergraduate studying the Pentecontaetia, to separate ancient text from modern epigraphic prose composition in Part B of Hill's *Sources for Greek History*.² If questionable restorations are to be intermingled with preserved text, then there is much to be said for adding frequent question marks, as is done by some continental European epigraphists. Moreover, it is high time that the expression "inevitable restoration" and the attitude of mind it presupposes were dropped from epigraphical practice. In an excursus (pp. 379-82) Pritchett demonstrates how much better are the methods by which the best papyrologists separate preserved from added words and letters, and praises the care with which they regularly describe the condition of papyri and of individual letters. He then goes on to emphasise the need for careful description of damaged stones: Caskey's remarks quoted on p. 272 seem to me a model of what such a description should be. The accuracy of readings by Meritt in ten inscriptions is subjected to detailed examination at the beginning of the book (Section II): enough palpable hits are scored to establish Pritchett's case that the epigraphy of Attic calendar equations could be a more disciplined affair, but the reader is bound to feel still a sense of obligation to Meritt for his devoted services to Attic epigraphy, even after Pritchett's prolonged exposure of erroneous readings, questionable statements, and deficient logic.

Some comments, queries, corrections, and criticisms follow. Without a scale beside an inscription or squeeze in a photograph it is not always easy to grasp the nature of a dispute over a reading: epigraphists would do well to include metric scales more often, as is now done in most archaeological photography. Of course, even the distances on a scale can be distorted in a closeup, but scales always help nonetheless. Plate 21a is upside down. P. 268, line 24: read "hypotheses." P. 274, paragraph I: we would like to know

when the latex squeeze was taken. These comments have to be read in conjunction with what Pritchett says about the advantages of latex on p. 371. P. 274, section 3 at bottom: *why* is I. G., II², 356 dated in the same archonship as the inscription, *Hesperia*, III (1934), pp. 3-4, cited on the previous page, 273? P. 277, bottom: one wonders how Meritt can ever have had "complete confidence in the accuracy of the record, however much the doubt about any" (= every?) "individual letter." Plate 21b shakes confidence in any proposed reading of *Hesp.*, III (1934), p. 14, No. 17, even with a latex squeeze. P. 280 bottom with plate 22a: Γ looks the best reading. P. 278, n. 17: did Pritchett see the first and third letters of ENΔEKATEI or did he not? P. 290: a pity that Pritchett even in 1947 accepted Meritt's "without hesitation." P. 297 with n. 21: Meritt does not say in the quotation that the Greeks could not handle 5ths, 7ths, etc., but that they avoided them. P. 315, n. 6: read "JHS 80(1960) 168 ff." P. 323, n. 37: read "328 F88b." P. 318, n. 14: read "T. L. Heath." P. 325, last paragraph: Proklos is deservedly praised here. It is a great misfortune for students of the Athenian calendar that there are in his writings no more fragments of the περὶ ἡμερῶν of Philochoros (*F. Gr. Hist.*, 328 F88a, F189, and 190). Meritt's slighting reference to Proklos, a great pagan scholar, whom he calls "bishop of Constantinople," is incautious; nor should late testimony be devalued just because it is late. Proklos had excellent authorities and knew how to use them (cf. *Year*, p. 39 with n. 2). P. 343, penultimate paragraph: the correct reference is *Mor.* 741B. P. 345, penultimate sentence: better perhaps to have written "In the cities of Euboea, in Corinth, and in Athens, the politicians including the archons were tampering with the festival calendars." P. 347: Pritchett's remarks about the duties of heralds deserve to be pondered. Before there were ten regularly prytanizing tribes the heralds were the chief means of communication between the Archon and the countryfolk. When political meetings were held according to a tampered calendar an unscrupulous Archon could keep the country people in ignorance of what was happening in the city by failing to send heralds or by sending them too late. But when Kleisthenes introduced ten regular prytanies with his ten tribes, he did not also abolish the κατ' ἀρχοντα year. In Wade-Gery's words (*Essays in Greek History*, p. 150) "Kleisthenes did not destroy the religious structure of the state: he merely created alongside of it a secular structure, and transferred the political validity to the latter." P. 353, n. 56: for "deduction" read "inference." P. 359: the only way to refute Aristotle's statement about regular prytanies would be to find a prytany day higher than 36 in an ordinary year, or than 39 in an intercalary year, in the period ca. 341/0 to 307/6 B. C. (cf. *The Calendars of Athens*, Ch. 2). Meritt however treats Aristotle as though he were in error till proved correct, that is not cricket. P. 360, n. 13: for "434" read "43.4." P. 361, line 17: read "prytany." P. 363, at note 23: read "altogether." P. 367: Pritchett discusses the phenomenon of "seeing" what is not on the stone, and quotes from Bergson. Compare with Bergson's remarks the interesting treatment of eidetic or "projected" images by H. H. Price in *Thinking and Experience* (London, 1953), p. 251. Price's mention of the strong verbal imaging

of learned persons (whose powers of imaging are otherwise normally weak) is strikingly relevant to the psychology of epigraphical restoration. P. 373: Restorations. Pritchett must regret that he printed so much speculative restoration in *The Calendars of Athens*. See for example *Hesperia*, IX (1940), No. 35, cited on p. 42 of that book: here in one line of thirty-two letters no less than twenty-six are restored though the context is not genuinely formulary. Pp. 374-7: the entire discussion of the term *stoichedon* makes instructive reading for those who, like the reviewer, have never been sure how the term was being used by epigraphists: see also pp. 382-4. We can certainly do without the expression "quasi-*stoichedon*" even if Dow's definition of *stoichedon* may be too exclusive (p. 382). P. 387: if we don't adopt Meritt's principle of minimum disturbance of his calendar, then the assignation of Antigenes to one of Miss Thompson's intercalary years may still be correct. But the point is that Meritt does not clearly explain why the principle is adopted by him. P. 388, d: simultaneous use of three different ways of counting the days of the last decade of the month, such as Meritt postulates, must be a sore test of faith to his adherents: one wonders how the Athenians would ever have got their dates right at the end of the month (see also pp. 349 to 353). P. 388, e: strictly, *Traversa* should have written "[]o ipse vidi," not "[δυ]o ipse vidi." The δυ is a projected image. A nice point in the logic of restoration, not a quibble. *Year*, p. 32, n. 30: did Pritchett never send Meritt a copy of his article in *C.P.*, LIV (1959), pp. 151-157? No wonder so much of the debate on the Athenian calendar reads like a dialogue of the deaf, as Pouilloux described it, if the principal participants are incapable of communicating through the post. For Thmocharis and his contemporaries see now *G.R.B.S.*, V (1964) pp. 130-1.

Meritt's objections to the notion of Pritchett and Neugebauer that the first day of the month *κατὰ θεόν* was the time of the new crescent are puzzling (*Calendars of Athens*, p. 17. Cf. *Year*, pp. 17-18). Meritt's long quotation from Maimonides tells us nothing about Athenian practice, and it is not "astonishing" that nothing is said in the literary sources about observing the lunar crescent at Athens if that was done regularly and without difficulty. If the Athenians had suffered from a Hibernian climate, or were preternaturally lazy and careless, then we might have heard about trouble in maintaining a regular *κατὰ θεόν* calendar. We do know that they heeded the orb of the moon when it was facing the sun on the sixteenth of the month (*Philocharos*, 328 F86 a, b) but that was not for regulatory purposes.

One of Pritchett's great virtues is to treat technical epigraphy within the context of scholarship as a whole. He refuses to isolate problems of the calendar from those of "textual and historical interpretation" (cf. *Year*, p. 239), justly regarding the distinction as irrelevant and pernicious. If Pritchett's work results, not in the refinement of a questionable technique, but in the more frequent use of caution, restraint, and commonsense in the restoration of Attic inscriptions, he will be remembered as a courageous benefactor of the commonwealth of Greek scholarship. *Ancient Athenian Calendars on Stone* has an index of inscriptions cited: a list of literary texts discussed would have been useful.¹ To review this book has been a

¹ Add Apollonius Rhodios, IV, 1479-80, which would amuse Pritchett.

rewarding task, but neither an easy nor a brief one. Most readers are likely to find the subject hard going, but Pritchett's acute mind and lucid style will help them along. As he states, "The basic hypotheses are much simpler than they have been made to seem."

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CARLO FERDINANDO Russo. *Aristofane, Autore di teatro*. Florence, Sansoni, 1962. Pp. 384.

Professor Russo's book is based upon two premises: first, that Aristophanes' plays should be read with the awareness that they were intended to be acted on the stage; and second, that the surviving comedies exhibit distinct differences according to whether they were intended for the Dionysia or the Lenaean. Following upon the work of Anti (whose theories he in part rejects), Russo suggests that each set of plays was performed in the theater appropriate to its festival and that the "two theaters," each with different scenic arrangements and requirements, are in large part responsible for the differences between the two sets of plays.

The first chapter sets out the scenic criteria on which rest the distinctions between the "Dionysiac" and "Lenaean" plays. Russo's criteria, though interesting in themselves as observations on the staging of the comedies, are not convincing enough to support the "two theater" hypothesis. There is no firm archaeological evidence for a Lenaean theater, nor do any of the ancient sources clearly refer to two distinct theaters in the time of Aristophanes.¹ The evidence for the performance of the Lenaean comedies in the theater of Dionysus after 432 B. C. when they become a regular part of the officially recognized dramatic contests is very strong, if not overwhelming.

To turn to a few of these criteria in detail: the flying machine, or *mechane*, Russo claims, would be a distinctive feature of the Dionysiac comedies. But of the roughly forty known plays by Aristophanes merely five instances of the *mechane* are known for certain, three in Dionysiac plays, two in "uncertain" plays (including the *Daedalus*: see frag. 188 K). These are not proportions from which one can generalize about "two theaters."

Only the Lenaean plays, Russo maintains, indicate the existence of a difference of ground level between entrance and orchestra; hence a separate "Lenaean theater." Russo relies here on the use of *ávraβalíw* or *kataβalíw* by an actor entering or departing. The passages in question are *Ach.*, 732, *Equ.*, 149, *Vesp.*, 1341, and *Eccl.*, 1152. Russo, however, does not cite some of the other interpretations of these passages (see, e. g., the references in P. Arnott, *Greek Scenic Conventions* [Oxford, 1962], p. 31, n. 1) nor the important scholion

¹ Pollux, IV, 121 seems to speak of two distinct theaters, though even this is not clear, and of course the period he means is completely uncertain: see A. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* (Oxford, 1953), p. 38, n. 3.

on *Eqū.*, 149. From these passages Arnott has argued convincingly for an arrangement that would hold true for Dionysiac as well as Lenaean plays and would in fact be a regular feature of the theater of Dionysus. He shows this arrangement as possible, for example, in *Av.*, 1206. Such a difference of levels seems to exist also in the Dionysiac *Clouds* (508) when Strepsiades exits into the *phrontisterion* with the words, ἄσω καταβαίνων ὥσπερ ἐς Τροφωτόν.

Russo's suggestions for the staging of many of the Dionysiac plays seem often to be in the spirit of the modern illusionistic theater rather than the conventional theater of the Greeks: on this point see the salutary warnings of A. M. Dale, *J. H. S.*, LXXVII (1957), p. 206 and *W. S.*, LXIX (1956), p. 102; also Arnott (*op. cit.*), chap. 6. To take but one instance, surely the first scene of the *Birds* gains in effectiveness with greater simplicity of staging: the two Athenians and their guide appear against the neutral, non-committal scene-building, representing Anywhere and Nowhere and hence transformable into the Cloud-cuckoo-land which goes beyond their most hopeful imaginings.

The setting of the Lenaean plays in or about the Pnyx, Agora, the sanctuary in Limnae is also not a decisive argument for a separate Lenaean theater in the area, but is most simply explained by the subjects of the plays themselves (so K. J. Dover in *Lustrum*, II [1957], p. 57 against the views of Anti). Russo, however, may be right insofar as the nature of the festival and the traditional associations with Limnae may have favored a certain setting and subject; but the only play for which such an argument seems firmly justified is the *Frogs*.

More open to objection is Russo's suggestion of differences in tone or atmosphere between the two sets of plays. It is perhaps true that on the whole the Dionysiac plays have a larger scope than the Lenaean (yet the supposedly Dionysiac *Thesm.* is quite "local" and restricted in scope, whereas the Lenaean *Frogs* includes Heracles and the underworld). Again, there is much buffoonery and low-comic playfulness in the *Clouds* and *Birds*, both Dionysiac plays, and relatively little in the Lenaean *Frogs* (note *Frogs*, 1 ff., where such antics are deliberately forbidden by Dionysus). And what play could be said to contain "un ambiente solenne" (a "Dionysiac" trait) more than the *Frogs*? It is questionable too whether it could justly be said that the fantasy in this Lenaean play is any less bold or ambitious than that of the "Dionysiac" plays. The "Dionysiac" protagonists, Russo also claims, tend to be similar in some way to "tragici eroi nobili o patetici," while the Lenaean heroes are more buffoon-like. Yet Dicaeopolis explicitly models himself after the most pathetic of Euripidean heroes: and characters like Philocleon of the *Wasps* and Dionysus of the *Frogs* have levels which go considerably beyond the buffoonish. On the other hand "Dionysiac" protagonists like Strepsiades or Trygaeus have many "rustic" traits in common with "Lenaean" heroes like Dicaeopolis (see, e.g., *Pax*, 535 ff., 566 ff., 999 ff.).

In the following chapter, "Cronologia di un Tirocinio," Russo sets forth in detail what can be deduced about the early career of Aristophanes. He employs both the available epigraphical evidence and a careful combing of the texts themselves. Though the sparseness of the evidence renders certainty impossible, Russo demon-

strates persuasively that Aristophanes' dramatic activity in the years 427-424 is greater than is often supposed; and he attempts to cast light on the contests and victories leading up to the *Knights*. Russo would dismiss as a modern "superstition" the idea that the *Babylonians* won the prize at the Dionysia of 426; and contends instead that the *Ach.* at the Lenaea of 425 was the poet's first victory. This hypothesis, in placing the poet's first Dionysiac victory *after* rather than before the *Ach.*, offers an attractive explanation of why Aristophanes did not bring out this play in his own name. Yet in tracing Aristophanes' relation with the Athenian public and his encounters with Cleon, it may be that Russo lays too much stress on whether or not the plays were produced in the poet's name. As Arnott (*op. cit.*, pp. 110 f.) has plausibly suggested, production by a *didaskalos* may indicate only the increasing complexity of the producer's role and not a desire to conceal identity. Many, perhaps even most, of the audience would surely have known the real author anyway, as Russo admits; and, on the other hand, the innocuous *Birds* was not brought out under the author's name.

One point of some interest emerges from Russo's study of this period of Aristophanes' career. From the evidence of the didascalic inscriptions, he observes that Aristophanes' success coincides with the rise of a number of "new" poets of a younger generation, like Phrynichus and Eupolis, whereas in the preceding decade and a half only a handful of older poets dominates the comic stage. Russo thus provides a tantalizing glimpse into the literary scene and possible sudden changes of taste in these difficult years following the plague.

With such a careful coverage of the ancient sources, one misses a discussion of the general problem of the state "censorship" of comedy in the course of the fifth century. Russo does not take up the famous passage in the Old Oligarch (Ps.-Xen., *Ath. Pol.*, 2, 18) which would be especially relevant to his discussions of the *Babylonians* and *Knights*.

The remainder of the book is devoted to the extant comedies, one chapter per play. In Russo's detailed examination of the *Acharnians* a number of usually neglected points emerge, as for example the nice problem of what Dicaeopolis does with the rags he borrows from Euripides. Russo suggests that he casts them off in his confrontation with Lamachus in 595. Yet might it not sharpen the point of his words if he spoke 595-8 in rags to the well-plumed general? He could then reappear in his regular clothes after the parabasis (626-718). The announced change of scene in 719 would accompany the change of costume.

In the Euripides-scene, Russo follows Pickard-Cambridge and others in maintaining that the *ekkyklema* in which Euripides appears is nothing more elaborate than a couch rolled out from the central door. The arguments against this view have often been set forth (for recent discussion see Arnott, *Introduction to the Greek Theater* [London, 1959], chap. 2, and *Greek Scenic Conventions*, pp. 78 ff.; also Dale, *W. S.*, LXIX, pp. 100-1). Russo repeats the often used argument from the *Thesm.*, but it is not decisive, for the two scenes are not entirely parallel in length or dramatic relevance. Also the couch and reclining posture would have special relevance for Agathon's supposed effeminacy, but this point has little significance for Euripides (he was, in fact, notoriously *φιλογύνης*: Ath., 13, 603 e).

The scene in *Ach.* would have more comic effectiveness too if Euripides were actually on high (so especially the pun in Χολλῆδης, 406 and 409-11, and cf. the similar joke in *Pax* 146-8).

Russo well shows that Aristophanes is not bound by any rigid unities of time. But still, he sometimes presses too far the logical consistencies of the comedies; and the rigor of his method seems occasionally to do violence to the spirit of Aristophanes which often lies in a peculiar twisting about of what is "logical." In fact, one might define this spirit as the logic of the illogical. The ordinary every-day logic of the war, the generals, Lamachus, is joyously overthrown by the deeper, more fundamental logic of the longing for peace and plenty. Dicaeopolis' "illogical" desires are thus the most "logical" thing in the play. Hence rather than seeing in the Megarian and the Theban the exemplars of two different comic styles, one buffoonish, the other more refined, as Russo does (pp. 97 f.), we might find in both of them the common concern with the "logic" of man's basic needs, sex, food, the good things of the country. It is from this earthy "logic" too that arises much of Aristophanes' lyricism, an element almost totally neglected by Russo. Hence a "poetic" line like πρέσβειρα πεντίκοντα Κωπάδων κορᾶν (883) follows directly upon the exuberant enumeration of Boeotian wild-life in 873-80. This confrontation between the two kinds of "logic" is dramatically and scenically realized at the end of the play where the feathers of the game-birds which Dicaeopolis is preparing for his feast contrast sharply with the pretentious feathers of Lamachus, a contrast of the pleasure afforded by the edible bird with all the vanity of a Great Boastrich.²

Russo's approach to the plays through their stage-presentation casts some interesting light on the problems of the *Clouds*. He points to the unusually large number of actors apparently required by the two *Logoi*. The debate of the *Logoi*, he then argues, must belong to the Second *Clouds*. Russo rejects the notion that Aristophanes prepared his revised version as a "closet play," but he still leaves open the possibility that in the revision, left incomplete, the poet may not have made all the parts correspond to the scenic practice of his time (see pp. 170-1). It might still be possible, however, to construe the action as requiring only a fourth actor: Socrates departs at 887. The choral cde following here and now lost—or, more probably, never written—would have allowed time for Socrates (the second actor) to change costume and reappear as one of the *Logoi*. The scramble that ends the *agon* (see especially 1102-4) would then allow him time to change back and speak in 1105 (for the dexterity of Greek actors at quick changes see Arnott, *Greek Scenic Conventions*, p. 43; and for the possibility of a fourth actor for limited parts, Dover, *op. cit.*, pp. 58 f.). Russo's alternative, that Strepsiades is also absent from the *agon*, thus leaving both first and second actors free for the parts of the two *Logoi* (see pp. 155 ff.) seems to me thematically unacceptable. Russo asserts, "Ed è giusto che Strepsiade non ascolti gli argomenti del Ragionamento

² The feather-theme in the *Acharnians* is interestingly treated in Cedric H. Whitman's forthcoming Martin Classical Lectures, *Aristophanes and the Comic Hero*, chap. 3, part 1. I am indebted to Professor Whitman for allowing me to see his book in typescript.

ingiusto, che saranno quelli che lo sorprenderanno alla fine della commedia nel figlio socratizzato" (p. 157). Yet are not the irony and the "justice" greater if he knows and approves this *Logos* and thus is discomfited by what he has explicitly approved? And, secondly, the point of the ending lies not only in the *content* of what the Unjust *Logos* says, but the possible area of its *application* which Strepsiades had not foreseen. His presence during the *agon* thus condones the general subversion of morality which later subverts his own morally supported position as a father.

In considering the much-vexed problem of the relation between the First and Second *Clouds*, Russo ranges himself with the majority of recent scholars in maintaining fairly drastic differences between the two plays. He relies heavily on the Seventh Argument and on various scenic conventions; and he adds in a note (p. 188, n. 5) Holwerda's recent evidence which almost certainly proves that the two plays were substantially different. Welcome might have been a fuller consideration of the text of the Seventh Argument and the contradictions it seems to maintain. Russo accepts its assertion that the contest between the two *Logoi* was one of the major innovations of the Second *Clouds*. Less certain, though not, of course, impossible, is his own suggestion that Chaerephon played ("indubbiamente") a significant part in the First *Clouds*. Russo also regards the ending as unchanged from the first version. Yet this ending, though reasserting the common-sense reality ostensibly overthrown by the sophistic *logoi*, is by no means a fully satisfactory resolution of the problems raised by the play; and there is much to be said for the suggestion³ that this ending too has been greatly reworked, perhaps as a "moralized" revision of an ending which was even more strident and fuller of unresolved violence—an ending then perhaps anticipating the end of the play produced the year after the First *Clouds*, the *Wasps*.

On the *Wasps* too Russo's treatment suffers somewhat from the separation of scenic techniques and thematic elements. Hence, in noting the unusual length of the prologue, he regards it as having "the character of an intermezzo" (p. 196) and sees the "dramatic action" of the play as beginning properly with the parodos. Such an interpretation seems to me to neglect the central irony in the structure of the play, in terms of which the length of the prologue is clearly comprehensible, i. e. the inability of Philocleon to change his basic character, his innate *physis*, despite his superficial adaptation to the various pressures put upon him. His Odysseus-like (see 180-6) capacity for change in the prologue only underlines the irony. Thus the play ends essentially with the situation with which it began, the reversal of the dependent relation between father and son, for the father is, as at the beginning, still "guarded" (see 69) by the son. The dance at the end of the play, an outburst of purely Dionysian energy, is perhaps intended also, like the burning of the *phrontisterion* in the *Clouds*, to take the edge off the unresolved tensions of this relationship.

In terms of this central irony too can be understood the significance of the choral ode at 1450: the chorus congratulates the son on the change effected in the *physis* of the father at the point where

³ Most recently put forth by Whitman, *op. cit.*, chap. 4, part 1.

this *physis* has revealed its basic intransigence and incorrigibility. Hence there is no need to interchange this ode with the parabatic passages, 1265-91, as Russo, following Zielinski and others, suggests.

On the *Peace* Russo essentially follows Dale and Pickard-Cambridge in maintaining that the play could be acted all at ground level (on this point now see Platnauer's edition [Oxford, 1964], p. xii with n. 3). Russo has a neat solution for the problem of the chorus of this play, but again it is possible that Aristophanes was far looser and less logical in his staging than a modern critic demands, and that neither he or his audience would have been seriously troubled by the sudden shifts and apparent inconsistencies in the make-up of the chorus. The balance between what is physically presented on stage and what is left to the imagination is a recurrent issue in these plays and a matter of great interest in an age so much concerned with *apatē* and illusion. Russo offers much that is relevant to the subject, and one could have been grateful for a more systematic treatment.

With the *Peace*, however, the tightness of the distinction between "Lenaean" and "Dionysiac" comedies seems to break down, for aside from the use of the *mechane* this Dionysiac comedy has much in common with the Lenaean plays: a rather loose and episodic structure, the enterprising but country-minded hero, the wedding, the banquet, the general physical vitality asserted at the end. Even the themes of the fantastic journey to a usually inaccessible place and the rescue through an underground passage have close analogies with the Lenaean *Frogs*. One could, of course, argue, as Russo does, that this play is one of the weaker ones (he notes, e.g., the loss of intensity after the prologue, the lack of organic unity, the inactivity of the third actor for long stretches; one might add the use of perhaps too overt and transparent an "allegory"). Yet the *Peace* seems rather to illustrate that the generic similarities among all the plays are really greater than differences between "Lenaean" and "Dionysiac" productions.

Russo's chapter on the *Birds* is one of the best in the book and contains interesting observations both on dramatic structure and staging. Though the fantasy element in this play is perhaps the most consistent of any Aristophanic comedy (Russo notes, for example, the handling of the chorus in the parabasis), still we should not be seriously disturbed by inconsistencies like the fact that the walls are supposed to be built in one day while the gods are starved into submission as by a long siege (Russo well remarks, "La paradossale commedia è naturalmente sotto il segno dell' annullamento paradossale del tempo e delle distanze," p. 240). On the other hand Russo seems unnecessarily disturbed by the entrance of Iris flying. In a city full of winged creatures she is the only character who actually appears on the stage as flying, and she totally ignores the walls which the birds have been so zealous to construct. Yet the point of her appearance with the flying machine need not be, as Russo suggests, the irony of "i mitomani uccelli, i nuovi dei, incapaci di sollevarsi da terra" (p. 251), but rather the sheer fantasy in the birds' transmutation of their airy environment into an empire of winged and unwinged beings alike, in defiance of such realities as the gods' own ability to fly. In this "inconsistency" lies in fact a comic irony of a different sort: not only is there no question of

the birds' own ability to fly (see 1122 ff.), but in fact this ability was itself a liability early in the play (see 571 ff.) and Peithetaerus had to prove to them that it is precisely because they, like the gods, are winged and fly, that men will accept them as gods. This passage too perhaps gives a clue as to why Iris appears in flight later, for in enumerating examples of winged gods Peithetaerus names Nike and Eros and continues (575): *"Ιρις δέ γ' Ὄμηρος ἔφασκ' ἵκέλην εἶναι τρήπων πελεῖη"* (nearly all the MSS have *"Ιριν"* here; the fourteenth-century M is the only exception listed in Coulon, giving *"Ηρην"*, which some editors, following Bentley, have accepted). Hence in sending a winged Iris in 1196 ff. Aristophanes may be developing his stage-fantasy from an original verbal joke, as he not infrequently does,⁴ and may in fact be confirming the birds' assumption of god-like power through the reminiscence of the earlier passage.

On the *Lysistrata* Russo offers an attractive interpretation of the difficult scene at 1216-24. There are a number of fine observations on the *Thesmophoriazusae*, including the irony of the crude trick to which the intellectual Euripides has at last to resort. Russo seems to go rather too far, however, in stressing the novelty or uniqueness of the play as an "artistic experiment" and its atmosphere of "privacy" see (p. 296). Still Russo's interpretation is interesting in pointing to the comic poet's ability to reshape certain elements in his work in response to new developments in the sister-art. Russo connects the *Lys.* and *Thesm.* closely: he argues that both were produced at the Dionysia of 411 and even goes so far as to see in the two references to Euripides in *Lys.*, 283 and 368 f. "la cellula della prima parte delle *Tesmoforici*" (p. 298). In an author who makes such consistent comic capital of Euripides, such references carry little weight, though the plays are certainly related in their "feministic" character, as Russo notes, and, he might have added, in some structural elements (note the formal religious lyrics ending both plays).

The chapter on the *Frogs* is a condensed restatement of the author's *Storia delle Rane di Aristofane* (Padua, 1961). The main thesis is that after the death of Sophocles Aristophanes made drastic revisions in the play, with the result that various inconsistencies are still apparent, at least to the discerning eyes of critics like Russo. Many of his objections to the "unity" of the play are, in fact, anticipated and answered by Eduard Fraenkel's recent essay, "Die Aufbau der *Frösche*," in his *Beobachtungen zu Aristophanes* (Rome, 1962).⁵ Fraenkel, who has now come around to a "unitarian" view of the play, has well emphasized (p. 185) that we should not understand "unity" in a work of Old Comedy in the same way as in a tragedy by Euripides or a comedy by Menander. Dionysus, it is true, does not accomplish the purpose he originally intended, but the change makes perfectly good dramatic sense as part of Aristophanes' original conception wherein are united the choice of the best poet and the settling of a *stasis* in Hades, just as these two elements, the aesthetic and the political, are united in Aeschylus (see 1004 ff.) and in the final contest between the two tragedians

⁴ Aristophanes' tendency to enact metaphors was noted by Russo himself in an earlier essay (*Festschrift Jachmann* [1959], p. 245).

⁵ See the discussion in my review, *A.J.P.*, LXXXVI (1965), p. 218.

(see 1414 ff.).⁶ Sudden reversals too are part of Comedy's stock-in-trade, as the *Knights*, *Clouds*, and *Wasps* testify. And, as Fraenkel points out, where but on a journey to Hades is the unexpected and unpredictable more likely to occur?

But however one regards Russo's analytic approach and his conclusions, his close reading of the text of the *Frogs* produces a number of suggestive interpretations. He makes the original suggestion that the *νεῦρα τῆς τραγῳδίας* in 862 allude to the strings with which marionettes are played, and he refers its broader meaning to "l'aspetto tematico-etico della tragedia" (p. 325). There are a number of interesting remarks on the staging: for Charon's skiff he finds a parallel in Cratinus' *Odysseis*, and in the staging of the journey to Hades he suggests a convincing simplicity. One mark of the ambitious scope of this comedy appears from Russo's observation that it is the only play to make constant and equal use of all three main actors. As reasons for the title of the comedy he suggests the fact that the Frogs are the first choral element to appear, or perhaps that the poet wished to avoid confusion with Phrynicus' *Mystae* of 407, that being a logical title for this play. But no solution to this elusive problem has yet been fully satisfactory.

The chapters on *Ecc.* and *Plut.* are shorter and less detailed than the earlier chapters. Russo supports the general view that *Xopoū* in the MSS of these plays indicates an intermezzo of music and/or dancing, for which a lyrical text was never written. In *Plut.* the action is much looser, Russo notes, even than in *Ecc.*, and the chorus still more attenuated. The central protagonist has really been broken into two parts, Chremylus and Carion; and the latter, a development of the slave of the *Frogs*, is in fact the more vivid of the two—an anticipation of New Comedy. Still, there is more vitality in *Plut.* than many commentators concede, and Russo does well to point out the connections with the older comedies: the country-folk in the chorus, the political allusions, the syzophant.

The final chapter is a summary of the whole and attempts to draw together the "elements" of Aristophanes' "dramatic career." Russo's attempt to view this career from "inside," as it were, to see his work in terms of the competitive spirit of the festivals and the poet's relation with his audience is one of the most interesting features of the book.

Taken as a whole, the work is perhaps more valuable for the detailed observations on specific plays or passages than for any overall view of Aristophanes. It gains a certain freshness from the author's willingness to challenge and reexamine received opinions. Large parts of the work have appeared in article form, and there is a certain looseness of connection among the various parts and sometimes within the individual chapters. Each discussion of a specific play ends with an enumeration of the parts among the various actors, mutes, and "extras." It appears from a glance at some of these lists that the number of persons involved in a comic performance would be considerable (though rather smaller, I suspect, than Russo often implies). Here, nevertheless, Russo's work sug-

⁶ On this point see my essay on the unity of the *Frogs* in *H. S. O. P.*, LXV (1961), pp. 207-42.

gestively illustrates how in externals too tragedy and comedy complemented one another at the dramatic festivals: the one form severe, employing relatively few actors and subject to many restrictions; the other exuberant and prodigal, using many actors and fantastically conceived choruses; and both together expressing the unity with which the Greeks strove to represent the world.

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GIUSTO MONACO. Teatro di Plauto, I: Il Curelio. Rome-Palermo, Istituto Editoriale Cultura Europea, 1963. Pp. 114. L. 1,600.

The author describes this as a teaching commentary, with emphasis on staging. For Latin text, the reader is referred to Paratore (Florence, 1958) or Collart (Paris, 1962). A short introduction, uninnovating, treats Plautus' *tria nomina*, his life, the Varronian canon, the MSS tradition, and editions. There is nothing on meter, Greek sources, or dates of plays. The bulk of the book is taken up with an "analisi scenica," a useful *varicrum* of other editors' ideas, scrupulously footnoted and indexed. A few pages of textual notes complete the book.

Since no complete annotated text of the *Curelio* is in print in English (though A. G. Gillingham has produced a useful cut version for school use [Andover, Mass., 1961]) it may be useful to survey the high points of Monaco's commentary. He stresses the debt of the prologue to the *Iphigenia in Aulis*, also a night scene, and suggests that it is a burlesque of the *Choephoroi*. Leaena's *canticum* Lindsay's text, vv. 96-146) is praised as the best in Plautus; Phaedromus' *paraclausithyron*—the earliest in extant Latin—is treated as an appendix to it, and as a parody of ritual. Monaco does well to note the parody of legal terminology in the love-scene, vv. 162-3, but misses the opportunity to point out how common this is in Latin, even in Catullus (e.g. 87, 3-4). It is a pleasant thought that when Phaedromus says (v. 184) *at meo more dormis: hic somnust mihi*, he rests his head on Planesius's shoulder. *Caria* (v. 206) may be a corruption for *Calauria*; from Caria to Epidaurus in three days is impossible. The idea that Cappadcx's *morbus hepatarius* (v. 239) comes from eating too much *pâté de fois gras* is ingenious and amusing, presenting a nice problem for Asclepius (we must not forget that the play is set in Epidaurus). It is worth noting that the *servus currans*—or rather *parasitus currans*—motif (vv. 278 ff.) is unique among the twenty examples (p. 52 and n. 15) in Roman comedy as a parody of the convention. The picture in vv. 288 ff. is of the streets of Rome, not Epidaurus; here Plautus is the mouth-piece of the elder Cato, mocking the affectations of philhellene Roman *jeunesse dorée*. The parallel with *Cavalleria Rusticana* suggested by v. 292 is nicely observed. It is well to be reminded (v. 394) of Elderkin's suggestion (*A. J. A.*, XXXVIII [1934], pp. 29 ff.) that the reference to Sicyon would be topical to the spectators of the Greek version, who would remember that Demetrius Poliorcetes stopped in Epidaurus after the liberation of Sicyon in 303. Deme-

trius' father, Antigonus Monophthalmos, supplied the *redende Name* of the *Curculio's miles*, Therapontigonus, who is a parody of Demetrius. And Roman readers might be reminded of the war with Nabis (194-192 B.C.). The *Curculio* is a short play (only 729 lines): Monaco comments that Plautus tailored his plays to the order of the magistrate in charge of the *ludi*. The famous guided tour of Rome (vv. 470-485) is well compared to an Aristophanic parabasis, but the inference of *retractatio* is not drawn from the reference to a basilica in v. 472; Monaco reasonably supposes that Rome may have had basilicas before the Porcia, inaugurated in the year of Plautus' death. Perhaps it is this line that should be bracketed and not v. 485 with its reference to *Leucadia Oppia*, which may be Lugli's *Forum lupanar*. If the *rogationes* of v. 509 refer to the *lex Sempronnia*, the play may be dated in 193 B.C.

The textual notes are good on ἄπαξ λεγόμενα in this play. The note on *noctuini oculi* (v. 191)—from lovesickness, not hangover—is ingenious. In the note on *Peredia et Perebipesia* (v. 444) Monaco fails, as usual, to point the striking parallels (e.g., 36, 310, 394, 435, 686) between this play and the *Miles Gloriosus* (in this case the invented place-names). The readings at v. 612 (*dubis*), v. 622 (*tete*), and v. 636 (*Periphanes*) are well defended. V. 647, *specacula ibi ruont*, is well taken as referring to the movable wooden seats of the theater in Plautus' time.

Monaco perhaps somewhat underestimates the intelligence of his students. Must they be told that a *vinea statua* (v. 139) is "impossible a raffigurarsi concretamente"? Or that *inopiam* (v. 334) is *paraprosdokian* for *copiam*? Or that v. 487 means that the girl passes in front of Curculio? It seems a pity, too, that *pietas* and the tradition of variorum editions apparently combine to discourage Monaco from putting forward his own conjectures about staging and text, which would have been well worth having. I make bold to express the hope that he will show more independence in his commentary on the other plays.

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WOLDEMAR GÖRLER. MENANΔPOY ΓΝΩΜΑΙ. Berlin, 1963. Pp. 152. DM. 7.50.

The avowed chief purpose of this dissertation is to account for a strange anomaly in the Menander tradition. On the one hand there is the universal reputation of Menander in later antiquity as a purveyor of maxims, a moral teacher, and a "wise man." This is seen first at the end of the first century A.D. in the reference by Plutarch (*Quaest. Conv.*, VII, 8, 3, 712b, 7 ff.) to Menander's "noble and artless maxims, which, infiltrating even the most stubborn of characters, . . . soften and bend them to greater seemliness." By the end of the second century specimens of Menandrian florilegia with gnomic content appear in the papyri, e.g., *Pap. Giss. Janda*, Inv. No. 348. By the fifth century Stobaeus preserves well over three hundred quotations of more or less sententious character, and by

Byzantine times we have the huge collection (877 items in the new edition by Jaekel [Leipsic, 1964]) of completely stylized *sententiae* in the so-called Monostichs. On the other hand, inspection of the actual remains of Menander's plays in the papyri shows a remarkably small amount of gnomic material even in the broadest sense, and almost none of the single-line moralistic abstractions of the Monostichs.

Görler's explanation of this anomaly, concisely stated, is as follows. The quotations by Stobaeus fall into two groups. One is distinguished by the fact that the items are accompanied by the title of the play from which they were abstracted. These came, not directly from Menander's text, but from earlier exclusively Menandrian florilegia in which the selections were listed according to the alphabetical order of the titles. The items in these florilegia were not exclusively gnomic in character, but included anything which the excerptor considered of general interest or characteristic of Menander, e.g., striking monologues, descriptions, or comments. These selections were quoted within the context of the play without change, and thus, for example, even the specifically "gnomic" ones were not necessarily co-terminous with the trimeter. Such items have the hallmark of authenticity in the form of the appended title citation.

The second and much larger group is derived from a different type of florilegium in which the items appeared according to a predetermined classification of subject-matter, i.e., of the type exemplified by Stobaeus' own collection. Since such a collection is gathered from many different authors, and since the important thing is the subject-matter and not the precise sources, the Menandrian quotations like the others were identified only by Menander's name in the genitive case with no mention of the title of the plays. This group is far less reliable than the first. In fact, the excerptor is so intent on producing "quotations" to fit his subject-matter classification that he is guilty of "Verfälschung" of individual items. The original text is "drastisch verkürzt," the gnomic thought is "herausgelöst" from the dramatic context, incomplete lines are "abgeründet," and the original is otherwise distorted to produce formal, "in sich Geschlossene" *sententiae*, usually in one-line units, approaching the type standardized in the Monostichs. It is the inclusion of this group in the "quotations" by Stobaeus and the other anthologists which accounts for the otherwise inexplicably large number of *sententiae* in the florilegia as compared with their scarcity in the papyrus texts.

So far as I know, this theory of deliberate distortion by excerptors, although it has been partially demonstrated in the case of Euripides, has not been previously applied to Menander, and since it is the cornerstone of Görler's thesis, his evidence must be examined closely. Obviously the best evidence,—indeed, the only direct and convincing evidence—would be a demonstration of gnomological distortions in those instances in which it is possible to compare citations from the florilegia with the Menandrian text. Görler attempts to provide this demonstration. First, taking Group I of the Stobaeian quotations, which are characterized by the citation of the title of the plays, he does indeed demonstrate that in all nine opportunities for comparison, there are no discrepancies which cannot be accounted for by the accidents of transmission. Group I is, then, free from gnomological distortion.

In the case of Group II, where identification by play title is lacking, he promises us "ein ganz anderes Bild." Here, his examples must be reviewed individually. There are only six opportunities for comparison, three from Stobaeus and three from the Monostichs. In the case of fr. 250Ko, 8-16 (Stob., *Ecl.*, III, 22, 19) *vs. Dysc.*, 284-7, there is no significant variation in the text and the distortion turns out to be merely the fact that the MSS of Stobaeus have combined this selection with another from the *Kybernetai* without a distinguishing lemma. In the case of fr. 173K *vs. Epitr.*, 56-9, the whole passage is quoted by Orion, *Anth.*, 6, 4 without variation. Stobaeus (*Ecl.*, III, 9, 11) on the other hand quotes a part of the same passage, again without variation, but combines the end of line 56 with the beginning of line 57, in order "einen vollständigen Trimeter vorzutäuschen." It is difficult to see how the same text when written in two lines is an authentic quotation and when written in one line is a gnomological distortion. In the case of fr. 564Ko (Stob., *Ecl.*, IV, 19, 7) *vs. Epitr.*, 388-90 Görler has produced one instance which, if there were others, might confirm his theory of deliberate distortion. Here, after the pertinent quotation ends in the middle of line 390, the rest of the line is abandoned and a very lame substitution has been supplied to round off the trimeter. There is also scribal corruption at the beginning of the quotation which may conceal further distortion.

When we turn to the three opportunities for comparison with the Monostichs, we find them even more disappointing. In the case of Mon. 688 Mein. (which Görler for some strange reason includes here, although it occurs as the first line of a three-line quotation of the same passage by Stobaeus [*Ecl.*, III, 10, 21], who assigns it to the *Kolax*) *vs. Kol.*, 43, there is nothing but a minute textual variation. Mon. 150 Mein., when compared with *Epitr.*, 75 ff., is labelled as "eindeutig gnomologisch bearbeitet und verfälscht," but actually all that the two passages have in common is the phrase "counsel by night," which is as old as Herodotus (VII, 12) and recurs repeatedly in the paroemiographers. There is no necessarily exclusive connection with this passage from the *Epitrepontes*. Finally a *sententia* from Cod. Par., Supp. Gr. 690 (Meyer, "Nachlese zu den Spruchversen Menanders, etc.", p. 366 [*Sitzb. Bayer. Akad.*, Philos. Cl., 1890, no. 2]) does indeed distort *Dysc.*, 797 to the point of rendering it completely unmetrical and unrestorable, save to its original form—which in fact appears without distortion in Stobaeus (*Ecl.*, III, 16, 14). If this is an example of the "falsifier's" art, it is a very poor one. To sum up, Görler's direct evidence for deliberate gnomological re-working rests upon one not very convincing example.

All this is merely to say that this theory has not proved susceptible of direct demonstration. As a theory, it is quite possible and even highly plausible. The derivation of Stobaeus' selections from two types of earlier florilegia with divergent purposes is reasonable and adequately documented. The automatic distinction between title-supported quotations and others shows perhaps a little too great faith in the fidelity of the Stobaeus MS tradition, but works fairly well, and the possibility, or even probability of deliberate distortion by the makers of subject-matter florilegia receives support from the studies of Bernhardt and Hense on the re-working of Euripidean

quotations in Stobaeus. In fact, the chief weakness of Görler's theory as such lies in its implied limitation on the activity of the "exceptor." If we are to allow them liberty to transform specific Menandrian material by relatively slight changes into "gnomic" form, what is there to prevent them from free invention of "well-rounded" *sententiae*, based, if at all, on general Menandrian situations? For example, limiting the experiment to the *Dyscolus* alone, may we not see the whole "lesson" of the play summed up in fr. 646 Ko (Stob., *Ecl.*, IV, 53, 4a and Mon. 585 Mein.); τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ζῆν μὴ σεαυτῷ ζῆν μόνον? Is not the essence of *Dysc.*, 284-6: μήτ' αὐτός, εἰ σφόδρ' ἐπορεῖς, / πίστεις τούτῳ μήτε τῶν πτωχῶν πάλιν / ημῶν καταφρόνει distilled into Mon. 499 Jaekel: μὴ καταφρονήσῃς τοῦ πτένητος εὐτυχῶν? Cannot *Dysc.*, 742 ff.; περὶ νόμου γὰρ βούλομ' εἰπεῖν ὀλίγα σοι καὶ τοῦ τρόπου. / εἰ δίκαιοι οἱ πάντες ἡσαν, οὕτε τὰ δικαστήρια / ἦν ἄν, ο]ὗτ' αὐτὸς ἀπῆγον εἰς τὰ δεσμωτήρια be gnomo logically compressed into Mon. 135 Mein.: δίκαιος ἀν̄ ἵστηται, τῷ τρόπῳ χρήσης νόμων? In the absence of direct demonstration this theory is as likely as that of mere "distortion." In fact, the extension of Görler's theory to include that of "free invention" would allow much more scope to account for the original anomaly, the otherwise inexplicably large disproportion of *sententiae* in the florilegia.

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GEORGE E. MYLONAS. *Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. xx + 346; 88 figs. on plates. \$8.50.

Nearly twenty years before publishing the book under review Professor Mylonas had written a valuable monograph, *The Hymn to Demeter and Her Sanctuary at Eleusis*, which I reviewed in this Journal in 1944. The new book is a full-length study of the history, archaeology, and religion of Eleusis, which, besides taking up many additional topics, adheres to and expands positions taken in the earlier work. For example, he still maintains, probably correctly, that temple and telesterion were one and the same building in every era, since no convincing trace of a separate temple has yet been found.

The book begins with an introduction (chapter I) on legends and history and concludes with a chapter (IX) on the Mysteries, followed by an Appendix which deals with the testimony of four church fathers—Clement of Alexandria, Hippolytos, Tertullian, Asterios—on the Mysteries. In between are seven chapters, the bulk of the book (200 pages), on the archaeology of Eleusis as revealed in the excavations: six chapters on the successive building periods from Mycenaean to Roman times, and one (VIII) on art objects. In the archaeological chapters Mylonas is on ground with which he is intimately familiar. I have full confidence that they are as sound as they are interesting. The book is chiefly valuable for these chapters

and for its many photographs, maps, and plans. Since I can deal more competently with the first and last chapters, I confine my attention to them.

This book retains the faults as well as the virtues of the earlier. Mylonas still finds historical value in myth and legend. That the Homeric Hymn to Demeter attributes the foundation of the Eleusinian cult and mysteries to Demeter herself means to Mylonas that the cult was already ancient in 600 B. C.:

Furthermore, the legend that Demeter, who arrived at Eleusis as a stranger and from other lands, taught her rites to Keleos and his princes, the lack of any tradition indicating the existence at that village of an earlier shrine that was usurped by the Goddess, and the further lack of any rumors of a contest over the site with another divinity or power that once held sway over it, prove definitely that the cult of Demeter was introduced to Eleusis from some other part of the Hellenic or Mediterranean world (p. 14).

This is very naive argument. What the Hymn and the mythical tradition contain and don't contain proves nothing at all about the beginnings of the Eleusinian cult. The Hymn reports only the Eleusinian myth about supernatural and miraculous events set a thousand years back. The Parian Chronicle's date of 1409/8 for Demeter's visit to Eleusis is worthless and gives the Hymn no factual support. The Hymn cannot be used to prove or disprove that Demeter was an imported goddess. She and her cult could be Eleusinian inventions, for all that we know to the contrary (and the myth must have her *visit* Eleusis in her search for Kora). I am not inclined to believe that they were, but my reasons are not derived from anything said in the Hymn.

The Mycenaean settlement at Eleusis surely had a cult of a goddess or goddesses. Megaron B may have been a temple of Demeter or of a goddess who was later called Demeter. But we cannot be sure that mysteries of Demeter go back beyond 800 or 700 B. C. The prehistoric temple foundations tell us nothing at all on that subject; the myths and legends tell us nothing reliable.

In the Hymn, Keleos is *koiranos* and the Eleusinian princes are *themistopoloi basilées*. Mylonas says, "This political system fits well the Mycenaean age" (p. 15), thinking of Linear B's *wanax* and attendant *basileis*. But does it not suit the oligarchic period equally well, the poet's own time? In fact Hymn 149-56 and 473-8 fit the oligarchic age much better: Triptolemos, Dioklos, Polyxeinos, Eumelpos, Dolichos, and Keleos alike have great power, and they rule over the city; Keleos is *primus inter pares*.

Since Mylonas believes that Demeter's cult came to Eleusis from elsewhere, he debates whether its provenience was Egypt, Thessaly, Thrace, or Crete, each having been proposed by some scholar. He favors the north, Thrace or Thessaly, because "Eumolpos, the first celebrant of the Mysteries at Eleusis, whose mother was Chione, is reputed to have come from Thrace. Tradition brings Thracians to the help of the Eleusinians in their war against Athens" (p. 19). The war to which he refers was fought in the reign of Erechtheus,

Apparently Mylonas considers Eumolpos, Erechtheus, and this war to be historical, and the pseudo-Apollodoros to be a reliable historical document. Eumolpos is plainly the legendary eponym of the Eumolpidai; and if you are going to accept as fact that Erechtheus was really son of Chione, you must believe also that he was son of Poseidon. That Demeter was worshipped in Thessalian Pyrasos and at Anthela, seat of the Thessalian-dominated Amphictyony, is historical fact, but of no weight for proving a Thessalian provenience of the Eleusinian Demeter. You also cannot prove that Demeter's temenos at Pyrasos was prehellenic because the *Iliad* mentions it, nor that it had "a hoary antiquity" (p. 19) because Callimachus (*Hymn*, 6, 25) says that Pelasgians of Dotion founded her sacred grove. Mylonas understands Callimachus to refer to the early peoples called Pelasgian (even so, what trust can be put in Callimachus as historical authority for prehistoric times?); but Callimachus means only the inhabitants of Dotian Argos, which was also called Pelasgic Argos; that is, Callimachus' Pelasgians are simply Thessalians.

Again Mylonas takes myth as history when he says, "The fact that [Triptolemos'] mission was not mentioned in the Hymn is proof that it was not part of the *orgia* instituted by the Goddess herself" (p. 269). Suddenly the goddess becomes a real person who founded the Mysteries herself, just as the Hymn says. I don't suppose that this is exactly what Mylonas intends, but under no other interpretation is the statement meaningful. He has it both ways. He argues that Triptolemos' mission was not part of the Eleusinian *drómena* on the grounds (1) that it was represented often in art and so could not be part of the secret rites; (2) that it was not mentioned in the Hymn and so could not be part of the secret rites—all in a single paragraph.

This is the main weakness of the book—the author's credulity, his tendency to read history into myths and legends. His great merit in his treatment of the Mysteries is to rid the subject of many misconceptions drawn from Christian authors. Mylonas has studied the aforementioned church fathers' texts carefully and has perceived that in their attacks on pagan mysteries they refer to the practices of several mystery cults, to the confusion of scholars, who have attributed to the Eleusinian Mysteries much that took place in other mysteries: Phrygian, Dionysiac, and "Orphic." Mylonas, however, has not properly informed himself on Orphism: he refers to Guthrie's *Orpheus and Greek Religion*, but not to Linforth's *The Arts of Orpheus*. He still accepts a single widespread Orphic movement, a kind of church with a fixed doctrine, in which the "statement ['our body is a tomb'] is a basic theory of the Orphics"—a view long outmoded.

A number of minor errors and annoying practices mar the work. On pages 4-6, in summarizing the Hymn, Mylonas quotes phrases and lines from Evelyn-White's translation, as "over the firm land and yielding sea" for ἐπὶ τραφερήν τε καὶ ὑγρήν (2, 43), which means just "over wet and dry"; and "deathless horses," and odd way of translating ἵπποις ἀθνάτοις (2, 375 f.). At 2, 374 he misquotes Evelyn-White with "august, dark Demeter" instead of

"grave, dark-robed Demeter," which is correct. Why did not Mylonas make his own translations? And why not his own translations of Pausanias instead of Frazer's (p. 19, n. 34)? Or why not just the Greek text in a book meant primarily for scholars? He says "a few pomegranate seeds" in reference to Hymn, 2, 412, where the poet has but one seed—not Evelyn-White's error this time.

P. 3, n. 1, "Nonnus in his sixth poem." Presumably he means the sixth book. And why *Nonnus* instead of *Nonnos* this time? Mylonas ordinarily insists upon direct transliteration of Greek names to the point of adopting *Thoukydides* and *Oidipous*. But he is not quite consistent, and he has some mixed forms such as *Nikander*, which is neither fish nor fowl. And what is the point of *Kretan*, *Attik*, *Epikourean*, *Akademy*? These are aberrations: the forms are wrong however one looks at them. The words are English nouns and adjectives made from Latinized Greek names. Reprehensible too for different reasons are *Hesiodian* for "Hesiodic" and *Firmicius Maternus*.

There are some obscurities. On p. 20 we read about Triptolemos, "Pausanias and Apollodoros give us the Athenian version, according to which he was the son of Keleos and Metaneira; but there were other traditions of his lineage, including a mythological origin." What is meant by "mythological origin," and how is it distinct from the other "origins," also found in myth? And why "Athenian version" for that which we find in the Hymn (which may antedate Athenian possession of Eleusis)? On p. 240 I don't understand "... he (Herakles) wanted to be initiated into the Mysteries, into the whole of the telete, from the Lesser Hades." Something is wrong with the last sentence on p. 241; should "which" be "when"? Also on p. 263, in "even sang invocations," we should apparently read "sung," which still makes an awkward phrase. P. 256, "The purpose of these *gephyrismoi* ... seems to have been apotropaic; piling insult on exalted persons so that they would be humbled and would not be visited with the jealous reactions of the evil spirits." Can a purpose pile insult? And can reactions visit one? On pp. 289 f. "violent attack by Zeus of his mother Demeter" occurs three times. Does Mylonas consider "of" the right preposition after "attack"? P. 312, "The short-lived reign of Julian the apostate (361-362), ..." Julian's reign was *short*, but not so short as that: it ended in 363. Why capitalize "god" and "goddess" always (see quotations above)? This usage appears to be a mistaken transfer of the reverential Christian practice to a context where it is inappropriate. I am sure that pagan deities do not demand this.

In spite of abundant slips and infelicities, and in spite of the rather unsatisfactory treatment of cult, myth, and history, no serious student of Greek religion, archaeology, or history can afford to neglect this book. It is especially valuable for its archaeological chapters, which are after all the major portion. And it is as yet the only book on both the religion and archaeology of Eleusis.

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Jean Gagé. *Matronalia: Essai sur les dévotions et les organisations cultuelles des femmes dans l'ancienne Rome*. Bruxelles, 1963.
Pp. 289. (Collection *Latomus*, LX.)

Matronalia covers a wide range of topics, on many of which Gagé has touched in previous articles, but, as the sub-title suggests, it is an essay, not a systematic presentation and analysis of the evidence for an important phase of Roman religion. If anyone wants to find out exactly what part the *matrona* played in Roman state cult, or in private cult, he will not find it here. What he will find is the discussion of various cults associated with women, and of various episodes from Roman legend and history in which women play a part, and the ingenious hypotheses by which Gagé relates them to each other and interprets their significance for the structure of Roman society. The main headings of the table of contents will indicate the variety of material covered. I. Des fortunes aux Junons: variantes et transferts cultuels. A. La Fortuna servienne et les vêtements rituels. B. Fortuna Virilis et Fortuna Muliebris. C. Les Junons de haut culte (*Lucina, Regina*) et les déesses mineures; la fable d'*Albinia* (?) et le probable antécédent cultuel. II. 'Ordo Matronarum.'—Nature, recrutement et compétences des organisations matronales. A. Participations rituelles positives et manifestations publiques: processions, "supplicationes" ou ambassades? B. Recrutement, classement et discipline des matrones. C. Compétences religieuses régulières, cultes féminins 'à mystères' et 'ordaines matronales.' III. 'Aurum matronarum'—honneurs rituels et priviléges publics; les bijoux des matrones à la parure de la déesse. A. La série des 'honneurs' concédés aux matrones; l'usage du char rituel et celui du char profane; à propos d'un détail des 'Carmentalia.' B. Des bijoux des matrones aux offrandes d'or faites aux déesses; à propos de la contribution des femmes au paiement de la rançon gauloise. C. Les matrones, garantes de l'or capitolin?—A propos du culte de Junon Moneta et du mythe de Tarpeia. IV. Marrainages rituels ou maternités consacrées.—La transformation du matronat et les survivances de son caractère primitif. A. Tantes ou marraines?—De la préparation au mariage aux particularités du culte de Mater Matuta. B. Du nutriciat au marrainage nuptial—Breuvages d'initiation et 'veneficia.' C. Reconversion des anciens cultes et nouvelle qualification, familiale, de la 'matrone' romaine; *Albinius* ou *Albinia*?

Gagé summarizes his work in the opening sentences of his conclusion:

Les analyses de nos quatre Chapitres ont été conduites à dessein de la façon la plus empirique possible, sans invoquer de grandes théories explicatives, et en restant dans les cadres des faits religieux romains attestés ou susceptibles de reconstitution plausible. Une idée principale les a traversées: celle d'une grave différence de sens, dans la même vocabulaire latin de *matrona*, entre les fonctions de marrainage, archétype du rôle de la *pronuba* du mariage classique, et des compétences religieuses strictement liées à la dignité personnelle de la femme comme épouse et comme mère. Cette idée nous a paru se confirmer à travers l'ensemble de l'étude.

This is not an easy book to read. The argument rambles from point to point as though the author had given us a preliminary draft, before the ideas had been organised into a logical presentation and interpretation of evidence. Topics are often raised and then postponed for later discussion. As no exact cross references are given and there are no indices, this trick becomes irritating. For many of the topics little or no ancient evidence is presented or even cited, so that, to test the validity of many of the hypotheses set forth, the reader will be obliged to repeat the research of the author.

Like some others which deal with similar themes, the book lacks reality, perhaps because there has been little effort to put the developments under discussion in any historical setting. The *matronae* do not carry conviction. One cannot imagine one of them worrying herself into the grave, like Atticus' grandmother, from concern over a religious rite. One is left with a lively appreciation of Gagé's learning, imagination, and ingenuity, and a great desire to find out the actual facts about the religious activities of Roman matrons in the periods for which there is more concrete evidence.

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REINHOLD MERKELBACH. *Isisfeste in griechisch-römischer Zeit, Daten und Riten.* Meisenheim am Glan, Verlag Anton Hein, 1963. Pp. 82. DM. 11.50. (*Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie*, Heft 5.)

The origin of the great Christian feasts has long been the object of curiosity. Although Merkelbach's contribution is presented as a study of the feasts of the Isis-cult of the Graeco-Roman Period, it can be added to the long list of writings in this tradition. Despite his insistence that the oriental background is his starting point, his concern to explain the dates of the Christian feasts does not long remain disguised. Thus he follows in the footsteps of Wilhelm Hartke, whose recent work "Über Jahrespunkte und Feste, insbesondere das Weihnachtsfest" (*Deutsche Akad. der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaften*, Nr. 6 [1956]), strangely enough, is not mentioned by the author. They both discuss the origin of the date of Christmas and Epiphany, and achieve almost identical results; they both connect the former with the Kikellia, presumably the concluding day in the five-day feast of Osiris at the end of the Egyptian month Khoiak (in this connection see Stricker, "De Egyptische mysterien, Pap. Leiden T 32," *O. M. R. O.*, XXXIV [1953], pp. 13 ff.).

The explanation of Epiphany by the two authors differs; Hartke derives it exclusively from the Alexandrian Aeon's feast, while Merkelbach also links it with a dynastic feast of the Ptolemies, which he assumes to be a commemoration of the day of ascent of Ptolemy I Soter in 304. In support of his view he refers to the feast calendar of the Temple at Edfu so that a consideration of his position from

an Egyptological point of view is in order. He cites the feast which would fall closest to the required date, the feast on the 21st of Mekhyr. This feast, however, although possibly called "feast of victory" (a very likely restoration of the damaged passage), is not the main feast of the cult at Edfu; nor does it have any connections with the coronation. The "great great feast," the main feast of that cult, falls on the 4th of Mekhyr, while one most feasibly connected with a coronation, a feast called "feast of the opening of the (regnal-) year of Horus, son of Osiris and son of Isis" and also "royal coronation of Horus of Edfu, son of Ra, beloved of men," is dated in the Edfu Calendar to the 1st of Tybi.

A detailed discussion of the feasts is offered by Alliot, *Le Culte d'Horus à Edfou au temps des Ptolemées* (fasc. 2), pp. 560 ff., mentioned but apparently not consulted by the author. Such indiscriminate use of sources is unfortunately not infrequent in the book. For instance, the Rosettana does not state that Ptolemy V's fight against a rebellion in Lycopolis had anything to do with his ascent to the throne; nor is the capturing of the town by cutting the dikes and flooding it any reflection of the Osiris myth, but rather an ingenious stratagem. In Esna the royal feast was celebrated on the 1st of Phamenoth (cf. Sauneron, *Les fêtes religieuses d'Esna* [Cairo, 1962]).

Two additions complement the study; one discusses the basic year of the Sothic cycle, the other "Tistrya-Sirius und die Nilflut im Avesta." The array of material is extensive; but one can hardly avoid the uneasy feeling that the focus of the discussion is sometimes more on the answers to be attained than on the arguments for them; and in the process the author is led to a sometimes indiscriminate use of the materials.

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ANTONIO QUACQUARELLI. Q. S. F. Tertulliani *Ad Martyras. Prolegomeni, Testo Critico, Traduzione e Commento*. Rome, Paris, Tournai and New York, Desclée and Co., 1963. Pp. 181. (*Opuscula Patrum*, 2.)

This is the second volume in a series entitled *Opuscula Patrum* which Professor Quacquarelli inaugurated in 1957 with his edition of Tertullian's *Ad Scapulam*. Following the pattern of the initial volume Quacquarelli has printed the Latin text of the *Ad Martyras* in *cola* and *commata* in order to assist the modern reader in grasping the rhetorical style of Tertullian "come un lettore antico." This format, which has met with both approval and criticism (e. g. Harry Caplan in *C. J.*, LIV [March, 1959], pp. 273-5 and J. H. Waszink in *Vigiliae Christianae*, XIII [April, 1959], pp. 61-4), is perchance a mixed blessing. For although it makes the *concininitas tertullianea* more evident, it also increases the difficulty in following the author's train of thought, a difficulty that is compounded by the deletion of all punctuation marks. Whether the advantages of such a text out-

weigh the deficiencies and whether such a format has any place in a critical edition are questions that the reader must answer for himself. Certainly Quacquarelli has helped us to gain a feeling for Tertullian's literary style, and we must be grateful for a most useful supplement to the well known editions of E. Dekkers and V. Bulhart and to the more recent one of F. Sciuto (reviewed by John J. O'Meara in *A.J.P.*, LXXXIV [April, 1963], pp. 222-3).

The text is preceded by a series of prolegomena which provide very helpful, if at times disjointed, discussions of the problems raised by this pre-Montanist work of Tertullian. After a short introduction and a bibliography which attests to the editor's wide research, the question of dating is briefly surveyed. On the grounds that the description of conditions in chapter six of the *Ad Martyras* refers to the events following the defeat of Albinus by Septimius Severus, Quacquarelli endorses the theory of Monceaux and others that the work was composed in February of 197 A.D. The editor rightly points out that this exhortation to the martyrs is the earliest extant work of its type and that it belongs to a "genere litterario nuovo librato tra la consolazione il discorso protrettico e la diatriba." Quacquarelli's treatment of the genre is informative and interesting if also a bit diffused, since the section entitled "La brevità del trattato" might well have been included under the more general discussion which follows it and might well have dispensed with the rather lengthy digression on the background of some of the early Christian martyrs. In the prolegomenon which follows this discussion Quacquarelli emphasizes Tertullian's dependence on the Scriptures and provides a handy reference guide to the Scriptural passages that are echoed in the *Ad Martyras*.

After a brief mention of Tertullian's "forme proverbiali" Quacquarelli discusses the concept of martyrdom and its relation to heresy. In this general but useful treatment he points to the absence in the *Ad Martyras* of any polemical anti-Gnosticism such as characterized the *Scorpiae* and thereby accounts for the fact that in this exhortation Tertullian's style is "più immediata . . . più semplice e più lineare." The editor then touches on the significance of the *Ad Martyras* for later ages and speaks briefly of the literary judgments that were passed upon it.

One of the most helpful parts of the prolegomena from a stylistic point of view is the editor's analysis of Tertullian's rhetorical figures and clausulae. The brevity of the *Ad Martyras* permits us in brief scope to see the Carthaginian's fondness for antithesis, parallelism, and homoeoteleuton and to get more than a superficial acquaintance with the way in which form is joined with content.

The discussion of manuscripts which was well handled in the first volume of the series is not repeated here. The editor merely summarizes the principal variants which appear also in the *apparatus criticus*. It is to be noted with gratitude that in this volume Quacquarelli returns to the usual sigla for the manuscripts. Thus N once again signifies Florentinus Magliabechianus 1, VI, 9 and F becomes the siglum for Flor. Magl. 1, VI, 10. However, the practice of citing the manuscripts in the *apparatus criticus* individually rather than by groups remains unchanged.

Unfortunately Quacquarelli has discontinued the practice begun

in the first volume of listing the translations that have been made of the Latin text. He has also departed from the format of the first volume by including an interpaginal translation of his own. Though it would be presumptuous of the present reviewer to judge the literary merits of this welcome addition, the Italian seems to remain quite close to the Latin without being overly literal.

There is no place here for a detailed discussion of textual readings, but it might not be amiss to point out a few of the passages in which Quaquarelli differs from other modern editors. Neither Bulhart nor Quaquarelli appears to have improved on Dekkers' reading *si quod infirmum . . . quod infirmius* (1, 1), and this seems true of *odiis* (1, 5) as well. Quaquarelli's *coelum* (3, 2) is closer to the manuscripts, but *gelum* which is found in the editions of Dekkers and Bulhart as well as in that of Sciuto seems preferable. Again Quaquarelli's *voluisse* (4, 6) seems to do more violence to the sense of the text than the *noluisse* of the other editors. It is to be regretted that the critical commentary contains little discussion of textual problems. The citation of parallel passages such as those found in Bulhart's edition and in his *Tertullian-Studien* (*Sitz. Oest. Akad. Wiss., Philos.-Hist. Kl., CCXXXI*, 5 [1957]) would have been most useful.

The textual notes, dealing chiefly with historical and literary questions, are undoubtedly the most comprehensive commentary on the *Ad Martyras* to date. Copious citations of parallel passages from both pagan and Christian authors make it easier to see more precisely how Tertullian's exhortation fits into the history of ancient Christian literature. This reviewer found the citations from other works of Tertullian particularly helpful. At times, however, a tighter and more succinct organization of the notes would have been in order. For the editor seems to quote at length unnecessarily (e.g. the comments on *eremus prophetis*, p. 119 and those on *crucem excelsam*, p. 147) and to include material which has a very general bearing on the text but does not help a great deal to elucidate the particular word or phrase under discussion (e.g. the commentary on *catenas*, p. 111, and that on *thesaurus tuus*, p. 124). The latter criticism must also apply to the eight photographs which illustrate the text.

An index to the biblical passages cited in this edition, an index to the Greek terms used; and a general index are included at the end.

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F. E. ADCOCK. *Thucydides and His History*. Cambridge at the University Press, 1963. Pp. viii + 146. \$3.95.

During the last few years the composition of his *History* by Thucydides and the time at which he wrote this passage or that have once more been subjected to close scrutiny. Adcock has long been interested in the problem and in this little book he publishes the results of his meditations.

Part I consists of twelve chapters, the first five of which (The Background of the Work and its Declared Purpose, The Narrative, The Speeches, Thucydidean Dialectic, Thucydidean Ethics and Politics) are preparatory. Adecock takes Thucydides' own words as literally as possible: the war will be a great one, the powers are at their acme, readers of the *History* will gain the "mediated experience" that is, in a statesman, the beginning of wisdom. Thucydides was painstaking in his collection of information; the most natural time for writing was while situation and evidence were fresh in his memory and that of his informants. His exile brought gaps to the narrative; after the Peace of Nicias he continued his account, perhaps visiting Peloponnesian and Sicily. The Sicilian expedition led to a resumption of the war in earnest and now Thucydides saw hostilities as part of one great war. This involved some revision; and unifying insertions were made when he finally returned from exile.

The speeches represent speeches actually made and in each case Thucydides had some knowledge of what was said; this is not always the truth, Thucydides knew, but it is what the speaker wanted believed. Book VIII has no speeches because it contains no debate of first importance. The *Epitaphios* belongs to 431 B.C., closely linked, like the other speeches, to the situation of the moment. Its composition would have been impossible after Aigospotamoi.

Adecock now passes through the *History*, lingering over those topics and passages that have relevance to the method of composition (The Ten Years War, The Exile: Book V, Sicily: Books VI and VII, Book VIII). Thucydides wrote steadily, he thinks, as events occurred. Of course, he could add later, as he added in II, 65, 12 a series of observations made at different points of time and formulated as they were made; the "three years" of this passage is a cogent example, followed by comment on incidents that took place after 411/0. The Ten Years' War, at its end, seemed to Thucydides a single theme. Although he continued his record, he did not assert that what he had written was "part of that war of which Thucydides wrote the history." For the Sicilian expedition Peloponnesian sources and Alcibiades could have supplied the material almost contemporaneously; and Thucydides himself probably visited the theatre of war. For 411/0 Athenian exiles were available; the loose ends of Book VIII point once more to contemporary writing as does the absence of reference to documents (Thucydides was in exile).

Rewards and Additions (Chapter 10) there were and a final editing would have increased them. The History was published (Chapter 11) by a Redactor (Xenophon?), but Thucydides had written more than we have; his sudden death (at sea?) placed the final section beyond reach of the Redactor.

Thucydides proceeded by observation and deduction (Chapter 12: Conclusion); most probably, he "composed his history *pari passu* with events and with his observations of them" (p. 110).

In Part II, Interpretations, Adecock examines thirteen passages of Thucydides, one of Diogenes, three of Marcellinus, and one of Pausanias. The results, textual and interpretative, he has already used in Part I. These studies are introduced by The Early Transmission

of the Text, in which he argues that a faithful Redactor caused the autograph to be reduplicated by dictation; errors produced by misreading and mispronunciation would tend to appear in all copies and to survive in our manuscripts.

The book is equipped with an Index of Passages Cited and a General Index.

Without examining all aspects of the problem of composition, Adcock selects the most significant and produces a reasonable, even impressive, *prima facie* case: if Thucydides began to write as war broke out, then he persevered year after year very much as most authors compose today, with frequent revision and adjustment. Because he was writing contemporary history, he lacked the perspective that the historian usually possesses; hence the later editing.

I mention a few passages of particular interest. Because the second sentence of I, 97, 2 is an insertion, says Adcock (pp. 22, 122-3), it follows that the *Pentekontaetia* was written before the publication of the *Atthis* of Hellanicus. "Sometimes there may be no speech because the general has not grasped the situation or because it changes . . ." (p. 40); but surely Thucydides did not report every speech (Adcock is not clear here). "That Thucydides himself was not a general of the first rank seems probable enough" (p. 65); what is the evidence? The Melian Dialogue, I think, is itself a pronouncement by Thucydides on Athenian conduct (p. 73). Adcock argues (pp. 135-6), rather weakly, for $\pi\rho\omega\rho\nu$ (which, I believe, is right) in VIII, 86, 4; written soon after 411, it "belongs to a phase in the historian's thinking . . . which began at that moment."

I note a few technical flaws. On p. 6 (line 9) for "her" read "their"; on p. 24 (line 14) delete "an"; on p. 30 (line 20) read "believes"; on p. 32 (line 4) "they" is obscure; on p. 54 (line 3 from bottom) for "to" read "for"; on p. 70 (line 9) for "were" read "was"; on p. 82 for "eve" read "morrow" (?); on p. 101 "would begin" is questionable usage; on p. 118 (line 1) read "enlarge." The spelling Mytilene is to be preferred to Mitylene.

This is an interesting and provocative book, with a sensible thesis. It will, as is proper, be subjected to the criticism of scholarship; but, to paraphrase Adcock, it is a tissue of probabilities rather than a tissue of improbabilities.

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J. HELLEGOUARC'H. Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la république. Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1963. Pp. 601. (*Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de l'Université de Lille*, XI.)

Roman republican usage of words and phrases to express political relationships is the subject of this valuable monograph. While mastering a vast (and inevitably incomplete) bibliography of some 300 titles, the author has put the emphasis directly on the ancient

sources, wasting little space in polemics. Particularly revealing are the many quotations from Plautus, whose language is the best indication of the ideas of the common man. Greek usage and Greek and Stoic influences on Latin writing are discussed only incidentally. Strictly technical material, for instance on comitial procedure, is excluded. Political slogans are referred to from time to time, but there is no attempt to collect them.

The opening chapter on political life at Rome is not inadequate, but the bibliography, limited largely to French writers and the French translation of Mommsen's *Römisches Staatsrecht*, is antiquated. Like other scholars, Hellegouarc'h fails to realize that Mommsen's early work on the tribes (1844) was completely replaced by the third volume of the *Staatsrecht* (1887). In assigning 373 voting centuries to the reformed centuriate assembly he is unaware of the revolution in thinking produced by the *Tabula Hebana* and of the general agreement that the reformed assembly retained the 193 centuries of the "Servian" assembly. For the tribal assembly Fraccaro's studies would have been helpful. The voting power of the city population is exaggerated.

The book is divided into four parts: 1) La notion de groupe politique; 2) Les relations entre personnalités politiques; 3) L'homme politique; 4) Les partis politiques dans la Rome républicaine. There is inevitable overlapping in the leisurely discussion, which would have gained from the abbreviation that an American editor would have demanded. But the detailed analysis of words like *fides*, *dignitas*, *auctoritas*, *princeps*, though it contributes little that is actually new, is illuminating in placing all the material together. The lists of words used as synonyms or opposites are helpful. One word not adequately discussed is *tenuis*; especially in the form *tenuiores*, it shows the attitude of the man who has risen in politics toward the lower population.

Fides is rightly viewed as the basis of Roman political relationship. Here E. Badian's *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford, 1958) would have been suggestive on the use of the word and the significance of the idea of *fides*. One misses an analysis of the remarkable essay on the relations of patron and client in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant.*, II, 9-11. Whatever the source (see E. Gabba, *Athenaeum*, XXXVIII [1960], pp. 175-225 for arguments that the source was Sullan), this is a priceless document for the nature of *fides* and *clientela*.

Another example of the unfortunate exclusion of Greek sources is the treatment of democracy, aristocracy, and oligarchy, conceptions for which Latin had no compound words, though the ideas, long current at Rome, must, at least from the time of the Gracchi, have been familiar to a population infiltrated with men of foreign origin for whom Greek was the *lingua franca*. The connection between *boni* (or *optimi*, who could be described in one sentence as the upper group of the *boni*) and *ápioroi* and between *pauci* and *ðlýyoui* is realized but inadequately stressed. For oligarchy the treatment of *factio* and *factio paucorum* (pp. 100 ff., 443 ff.) is interesting, especially in the stress on the rarity of the word in other Ciceronian works than the *De re publica*, where *factio* describes the

bad oligarchs familiar from Greek political theorists. That is the way Sallust uses the word in the earlier letter to Caesar (of whose genuineness Hellegouarc'h is convinced), and in his later writing. To my mind Sallust's usage, for instance in Memmius' speech (*Jug.*, 31), suggests that *factio* was a common term in tribunicial oratory.

In a work with as much citation of sources as this one, there are bound to be some mistakes, and the three pages of *Errata* issued with the volume are not surprising. But I can report that not one of the dozens of references I examined was incorrect. There are a few misstatements. Caesar in 50 was campaigning in the Cisalpine province not for Antony's tribunate of the plebs but for his augurate (p. 106; Antony was elected to both offices in 50). In 197 the number of praetors was raised to six, not eight (p. 433). The statement (p. 321) that the *auctor* of a law is not the *lator* is true for the passages cited from Cicero, but not for those from Livy and Velleius. The word *popularium* in the phrase *mos partium popularium* in Sallust, *Jug.*, 41, 1 is the reading not of "certain manuscripts" (p. 525, n. 6) but of all except one of the manuscripts cited in the critical apparatus of texts of the *Jugurtha*. I am disposed to follow Jordan in his third edition in 1887 and retain it. That is apparently the view of Ernout in his critical note in the Budé edition of 1947, though the reading is not in the text.

This is a useful book, accurate, intelligent, often revealing in interpretations. But its usefulness as a reference work is limited by the lack of analysis in the seemingly exhaustive word index. With sometimes as many as seventy-five references under a word, the scholar receives no help in finding material except for the use of black type for the major discussions. Evidently the author expects the book to be read rather than consulted, and there is a seven-page analytical table of contents to guide the reader through the careful development of the theme.

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CHRISTOPH HEINRICH BRECHT. Zur Haftung der Schiffer im antiken Recht. Munich, C. H. Beck, 1962. Pp. 163. (*Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, 45.)

The *receptum nautae* of Roman law is an agreement whereby a shipowner accepts the responsibility for the safe delivery of the goods entrusted to him (*salutum fore [recipere]*), a liability that extended to damage or destruction by himself or his crew, loss or shortage through a third party, or other similar contingencies, but did not include *vis maior*, i. e., acts of god or irresistible assault by pirates *aut sim*. Since this form of liability is of a distinctive nature limited in application to shipowners (and inn- and stable-keepers; i. e., groups offering services to wayfarers), it has been the object of much study. From the beginning of this century on, scholars, notably Ludwig Mitteis, have sought light from that source of so

much fresh information on Roman law, the Greco-Egyptian papyri. Mitteis concluded that the series of documents called *γαυλωτικά*, contracts for hauling freight on the Nile, revealed the influence of the *receptum nautae*, a judgment that ever since has held the field. In the monograph under review, Brecht subjects the whole question of a shipowner's liability to a searching study. His conclusions challenge many an accepted view.

Brecht's first section is devoted to the papyri, and he begins with a most useful collection of all extant examples of freight contracts (pp. 16-21) and a careful analysis of the clauses they contain specifying the shipowner's liability (pp. 13-76). These clauses, he demonstrates, remained virtually unchanged for six hundred years, from the late Ptolemaic period to the sixth century A. D.—in other words, they show no impingement in their history of any outside influence. Moreover, neither in language nor intent do they show any relation to the Roman *receptum nautae*, whereas in both language and intent they are clearly to be linked with clauses found in other, purely Greek, types of legal document. Indeed, Brecht concludes (p. 151) that the first and only Greek papyrus to reveal the influence of the *receptum nautae* is *P. Oxy.*, I, 144 of 580 A. D. He suggests, following Kunkel and others, that the appearance here is to be linked with the widespread effect the publication of Justinian's compilation had in Egypt; this, however, may be questioned, for incontrovertible proof of such an effect has never been forthcoming.

In the process of correcting Mitteis' view, Brecht makes a number of lesser but significant contributions. He offers (pp. 38-47) cogent arguments that the Greco-Egyptian freight contracts included no liability for *vis maior*; the phrases hitherto used to support such a view Brecht interprets in other fashions, e. g., that in agreeing to deliver *ἀκακούργητος ἀπὸ γαυτικῆς κακουργίας aut sim.* a shipowner meant no more than that he assumed responsibility for the behavior of his crew (another point of difference from the *receptum nautae*, which, taking for granted that a shipowner was liable for his crew, spelled out only liability against a third party; cf. p. 46) and that with phrases such as *τῷ ἐμαντοῦ κινδύῳ* he meant nothing more than that he would restitute in kind (pp. 60-9). Brecht demonstrates (pp. 76-82) that *P. Grenf.*, II, 108, which, ever since Mitteis republished it (*Chrest.*, 339), has been taken as an example of a *receptum nautae*, is not such—though exactly what it is admittedly is far from clear (I think Brecht hardly helps matters by reading with Mitteis *ad statione Liburnes, fide{s} interveniente*, etc. instead of the far more natural *ad statione Liburnes Fides, interveniente*, etc.; mention of a *Liburna* without its name makes no sense). Brecht's analyses provide a useful determination of the precise type of liability intended by such expressions as *σῶος* (pp. 48-52), *ὑγῆς* or *ἀστεῖς* (pp. 52-7), *καθαρός* (pp. 57-9), *πλήρης* (p. 59), not only in freight contracts but in the numerous other types of legal documents in which they occur.

In a second section Brecht leaves the papyri and turns to the Roman sources. From these he re-creates the history of the development of the shipowner's responsibility in Roman law and in so doing

sheds much light on the development of the concept of *custodia* as well. A shipowner originally was objectively responsible for performance; there was nothing subjective about his responsibility, i. e., no provision made for circumstances manifestly beyond his control. Moreover, the shipowner was conceived of as one who provides a service for people—passengers—not for things. During the reign of Augustus, exception was allowed for *naufragium* and *vis piratarum*—in other words, for *vis maior*. However, these were the sole exceptions. During the Empire, when jurists steadily allowed for subjective consideration in liability, shipowners—and inn- and stable-keepers—were sternly kept to the old strict mark; the explanation offered by the jurists was the unfortunate characteristics of the businessmen providing such services. In the Late Empire, however, even for them subjective considerations were finally allowed to enter.

The author had completed this monograph as long ago as 1941, but a tragic illness prevented him from doing anything further with it. We owe thanks to the editors of the *Münchener Beiträge*, Wolfgang Kunkel and Hermann Bengtson, for seeing it through the press and to Johannes Herrmann and Dieter Nörr for bringing the references and bibliography up to date.

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DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL. Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators. Manchester, Manchester Univ. Press, 1963. New York, Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1964. Pp. x + 161. \$3.75. (*Publications of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Manchester*, No. 15.)

This brief and useful book on Athenian homicide law in the fifth and fourth centuries appeared just a year after the publication of the author's fine edition of Andocides, *On the Mysteries* (Oxford, 1962). Since, except for the republication in 409/8 of Draco's laws on homicide, preserved in part on an inscription (*I. G.*, I², 115), practically no evidence dealing specifically with Athenian homicide law is extant until the latter part of the fifth century, MacDowell has deliberately avoided speculation about the earlier years and concentrated on the period, roughly 425-325, from which contemporary evidence—primarily from Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Demosthenes, and the *Athenaiōn Politeia*—is available. Although MacDowell is clearly familiar with the views of the scholars listed in his bibliography, he has reduced polemics to a minimum by limiting himself almost entirely to a presentation of the evidence provided by the contemporary authors themselves, reinforced at times by quotations from the later lexicographers. The titles of the various chapters reveal the methodical manner in which the author has presented all the material relevant to procedure in homicide cases: Purposes; the Family; The Basileus; The Areopagos; The Ephetai;

The Palladion; The Delphinion; In Phréatto; The Prytaneion and the Phylobasileis; Oaths; Witnesses; Penalties and Pardon; *Apagoge* and *Graphe*; Vengeance, Cleansing, and Deterrence. Since each chapter contains the evidence pertinent to its subject matter, presented both in Greek and in translation, and since MacDowell possesses the too uncommon virtue of not being afraid to suspend judgment when the evidence is inadequate, ambiguous, or contradictory, this little book can serve as a very handy work of reference, and its usefulness is greatly enhanced by an Index of Passages quoted or cited.

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THOMAS GOULD. *Platonic Love*. New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Pp. vii + 216. \$5.50.

This book deals with much more than the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. The first and last chapters attempt to distinguish Plato's theory of love from rival theories which Gould calls the Christian, the Romantic, and the Freudian. The remaining chapters deal mainly with the actual Platonic text, and all that is relevant to love (and perhaps some that is not) in the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Phaedrus*, and *Laws*, as well as in certain texts of Aristotle, is recounted and analyzed. Gould's aim in presenting theories of love other than the Platonic—in a necessarily abbreviated form—is to show what Platonic love is not, as a means of demonstrating exactly what it is. Unfortunately he is compelled to oversimplify the problem by defining each of the rival theories only by what distinguishes it from the others—which tends to produce a theoretical rather than an historical approach.

Gould recognizes clearly that the dominant characteristic of Platonic love is desire. He attempts to show that at the time of the middle dialogues Plato saw this desire pulsating not only through the individual, but through the whole world as well. He thinks (p. 77) that at the time of the *Phaedo* Plato supposed that *eros* could provide a teleological account of the cosmos. Particulars have *eros* for Form, and thus motion is imparted to them. Later, when the problem of evil led Plato to develop the notion of the *psyche* as self-generated motion, and thus to introduce an efficient as well as a formal cause into the universe, the teleological force of *eros* was lost. Thus arose, in Gould's view, one of Aristotle's main objections to Platonism, namely that in the later dialogues particulars do not desire their Form. Accordingly Aristotle, who abolished self-generated motion, restored the force of *eros* in nature by his doctrine of potency striving to attain actuality (pp. 139, 150 ff.), as well as by the introduction of the Prime Mover as a final cause.

Much of the discussion of these points is interesting and informative, but the idea that Gould has of cosmic love in the *Phaedo* does not seem convincing. He places inordinate emphasis (p. 77) on the words *όρεγέται* (75A2, 75B1)—Particular equals are said to be striving for Equality, but to be unable to attain it—and *προθυμεῖται* (75B7). He interprets the whole passage as follows: "The clear

implication is that the Forms . . . are by nature all good, and things on the sensible level yearn only for their perfection." Yet he has to admit on the next page that "Plato never did do much more with this theory of causation." It may be true, as Gould seems to suppose, that Plato toyed with the idea that there is something akin to *eros* in every particular which makes it desire perfection, and that there is such an unconscious teleological force in nature as a whole, but it seems far more likely that Plato is simply using metaphorical language to describe the relationship of particulars to Forms. After all, if he were not, he would have to suppose that everything in the world was alive and had *psyche*. Yet even in the *Phaedo* itself, when Socrates is shown hoping that Anaxagoras will demonstrate a teleological explanation of phenomena, he wants to learn not that all things *strive* for their perfection, but that *Mind* orders all things for the best (97C ff.). The distance from the *Timaeus* is not as great as Gould supposes.

Apart from these remarks on love as a cosmic force, Gould's treatment of *eros* is fairly conventional. It is to be regretted that although he refers to the article of R. A. Markus, "The Dialectic of Eros in Plato's Symposium," *Downside Review*, LXXIII (1955), 219-30 on p. 187, he makes little use of it except perhaps on pp. 3-7 and 163, where he notices that Anders Nygren's view of *eros* as essentially selfish (*Eros and Agape* [trans. P. S. Watson, Philadelphia, 1953]) does not always do justice to the Platonic text. A more careful examination of Plato's words on these matters would have been helpful, and Gould would have benefited from A. H. Armstrong's "Platonic Eros and Christian Agape," *Downside Review*, LXXIX (1961), pp. 105-21, where relevant passages of the *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and *Timaeus* are discussed.

It would be wrong to end on too harsh a note. There is much to be learned from this book. The suggestion on p. 96, for example, that the bottom section of the Divided Line deals with "the grasp which one might have of such things (particulars) if one were dependent on the way these matters were represented to us by others, and did not observe them for oneself," is illuminating. The account Gould gives of Platonic *eros* is lively and interesting, and his retelling of sections of the dialogues is always lucid. It is only occasionally marred by a wholly anachronistic coyness which many will find irritating. A particularly bad example is the account of Diotima's tale of the begetting of *Eros*, which according to Gould runs as follows (p. 45): "He was conceived on Aphrodite's birthday, in Zeus' garden. Resourcefulness, it seems, had drunk a great deal of nectar at the birthday party and had gone out to sleep it off among the flowers. Poverty saw her chance to improve her circumstances, and—well, that is how it happened." This seems nearer to Oscar Wilde than to Plato.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under Books Received. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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
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AN ANALYSIS OF *AENEID*, XII, 176-211. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE OATHS OF AENEAS AND LATINUS.

A close examination of the invocations and prayers in the *Aeneid* demonstrates clearly Vergil's careful insistence on the appropriateness of the invocation to the particular situation.

Thus, Aeneas, at the opening of Book III (19-21),¹ stands on the Thracian shores and says:

Sacra Dionaeae matri divisque ferebam
auspicibus coeptorum operum superoque nitentem
caelicum regi mactabam in litore taurum.

It is natural for him to single out Venus and Jupiter as gods to whom veneration is due upon his arrival in a place he expects to be the site of a future Troy, and whose protection he needs. Yet, when evil omens appear, he does not pray to the same gods for guidance and propitiation. Instead (III, 34-6) :

multa movens animo Nymphas venerabar agrestis
Gradivumque patrem, Geticis qui praesidet arvis,
rite secundarent visus omenque levarent.

Here, Aeneas appeals to these nymphs as deities of wild nature and as guardians of woods and trees who are most appropriate to avert the consequences of the strange phenomenon of the *cornea virgulta* and the *densis hastilibus horrida myrtus*. He also prays to Mars, specifically designated as the god who presides over the Thracian fields.

¹ All textual references to and quotations from the *Aeneid* are cited from the edition of F. A. Hirtzel (Oxford, 1900).

When the Trojans catch their first glimpse of Italy, Anchises makes an immediate libation to the gods, and his prayer is explicit (III, 528-9) :

di maris et terrae tempestatumque potentes,
ferte viam vento facilem et spirare secundi.

The foregoing examples are only a few representations of this pattern which is common throughout the poem.²

With this Vergilian device in mind, let us turn to the two invocations under consideration. In this final book of the poem Turnus has demanded a confrontation in single combat with Aeneas to decide the fate of Lavinia and the future of Italy (XII, 11-17). In preparation for this duel Aeneas and Latinus solemnize a *foedus* with sacrifices and oaths, each pledging to abide by the outcome of the contest. Yet each prayer is expressed in totally different language.³

The conclusion of this *foedus* is one of the vital scenes in the poem. Despite the temporary resumption of hostilities at Juno's instigation, this *foedus* represents the legendary-historical bond contracted between Latins and Trojans, divinely sanctioned by Jupiter (X, 15) and reaffirmed by Juno (XII, 822). This was a well known event in Roman mythological tradition.⁴ In respect to the simple narrative of the poem, the *foedus* represents the achievement towards which the active energy of the last six books has been directed. On the symbolic level, the *foedus* is meant to portray the final triumph of *pietas* over *violentia* and *furor*, a theme which has been well marked out in recent studies as the recurrent motif in the *Aeneid*.⁵

² Some other examples might include III, 118-20; V, 743-4; VII, 136-40; VIII, 71-2.

³ There are many interesting points and problems with respect to the nature of the entire ceremony as Vergil depicts it here with liberal poetic license. See Cyril Bailey, *Religion in Vergil* (Oxford, 1935), Worship in the State Cult, p. 99; also, Ward Fowler, *The Death of Turnus* (Oxford, 1919), pp. 58-60; but these issues are not within the scope of this paper.

⁴ See Alföldi, "Hasta—Summa Imperi, the Spear as Embodiment of Sovereignty in Rome," *A.J.A.*, LXIII (1959), pp. 1-27. He discusses this oath scene depicted on gold coins dated 209 B.C. and coin types of a later date. He also recalls the portrayal of the alliance on engraved gems (pp. 20-1).

⁵ See V. Pöschl, *The Art of Vergil* (Ann Arbor, 1962), pp. 18 ff., 93,

The awesome majesty of the encounter between Latinus and Aeneas is enhanced by the regal splendor of the old king and the shining god-given armor of Aeneas in addition to the lengthy and elaborate prayers offered by each.

If in lesser scenes Vergil has demonstrated a relevance of ritual invocation to situation, we might with confidence expect him in the poetic rendition of this solemn undertaking to choose its details with consummate care.

It is our purpose, then, to analyze these two oaths, to clarify their salient features, and to demonstrate that Vergil, by the careful selection of elements from customary usage, intentionally creates strong contrasts between them in order to illuminate the contrasting attitudes and emotional moods of Aeneas and Latinus.

Aeneas' invocation, we shall show, proves to be ritually correct, relevant to the immediate set of circumstances, and a pertinent example of Vergil's pattern noted above, while in its use of the traditional Homeric triad of the oath gods, Helios, Ge, and Zeus, it resembles Agamemnon's great oaths (*Il.*, III, 276-80; XIX, 258-60).⁶

He begins with two great generalities—the sun and the earth. The sun is the focal point of this ceremony as indicated by the costume of Latinus (XII, 162-4) :

... cui tempora circum
aurati bis sex radii fulgentia cingunt,
Solis avi specimen ...

and by the orientation of the ceremony which is described *ad surgentem solem*. The time is fixed in the morning, as Vergil sets forth in detail (XII, 113-15) :⁷

95; and B. Otis, *Virgil, A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 93-5, 215-16, and *passim*.

⁶The oath formula Zeus, Ge, Helios is not confined only to Homer but is a commonplace in antiquity (see R.-E., s. v. *Eid*, cols. 2075 ff., and A. B. Cook, *Zeus* [Cambridge, 1925], II, pp. 720-30). We shall show how Vergil particularizes traditional material.

⁷We shall demonstrate *infra* that, if either of the two aspects of the heavens in their temporal significance of night or day are addressed as deities, there is normally a close correlation with the time of day at which the prayer is pronounced.

Postera vix summos spargebat lumine montis
orta dies, cum primurn alto se gurgite tollunt
Solis equi lucemque elatis naribus efflant.

The word *terra* is used not only properly in a chthonic sense of earth but (XII, 176-7) :

... et haec mihi vocanti,
quam propter tartos potui perferre labores

in the sense of native land or country, the land on which Aeneas stands here and now, the land in which the right of settlement is the issue in point.

The two major deities, Jupiter and Juno, next make their appearance. Jupiter is the ruler of the cosmos; it is he who has decreed Aeneas' destiny (I, 257-96) and it is his protection Aeneas has continually sought. He is the *pater omnipotens*, the father of all mankind, but he is also the personal *pater* of the Trojans (VII, 219-21) :

ab Iove principium generis; Iove Dardana pubes
gaudet avo; rex ipse Iovis de genta suprema,
Troius Aeneas . . .

Juno is included, not only because she is important as consort of the supreme deity, but also because the earlier oracle of Helenus directed him to invoke her good will (III, 437-9). Her reconciliation is not far off now and Aeneas in his prayer, *iam melior, iam, diva, precor* (XII, 179) echoes the promise of Jupiter, *consilia in melius referet* (I, 281). Juno's influence is made still more relevant by the epithet, *Saturnia*,⁸ which

⁸ This epithet is frequently applied to Juno in the *Aeneid*: I, 23; III, 380; IV, 92; V, 606; VII, 560, 622; IX, 2, 745, 802; X, 659, 760; XII, 156. Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 105 prefers to think that the epithet "should be considered purely Greek and is to be compared with the recurring Κπορλων or Κπορλδης as an alternative for Zeus in Homer" rather than an emphasis of "Juno's partisanship with the old Italy before the coming of the Trojans." In support of the latter view, one need only note the increased frequency in the use of *Saturnia* as Juno's epithet in the second half of the *Aeneid* where the scene shifts to Italy. (In Books I-VI Juno is mentioned 41 times, *Saturnia* 4 times. In Books VII-XII she is mentioned 31 times and *Saturnia* is used 12 times.) Mosely, in fact, considers the use of *Saturnia* as central to the final reconciliation of Juno: "Vergil, by emphasizing her friendship for and patronage of the Italians, is able to make her both the villainess of the

defines her as the daughter of Saturn, and through her father's role as legendary founder of Italy associates her with the land. Thus, *Saturnia* also reinforces the reference of *terra* to *Italia*.

Mars is properly addressed (XII, 180) :

cuncta tuo qui bella, pater, sub numine torques

as the deity of war appropriate in this scene before the battle.⁹ *Pater* is allusive of Mars, the future progenitor of the Roman race (I, 273-7).

In fact, Jupiter, Juno, and Mars, aside from their combination as *di indigetes*, recall the great prophecy foretelling the bright future of Aeneas and Rome in Book I. By invoking them here in terms of that pronouncement, Aeneas lends a confident note to his oath as he says later on, *ut potius reor et potius di numine firment* (XII, 188).

Aeneas next calls upon the *numina loci* as represented by the *fontes fluviosque*. Rivers and streams would seem to be vague abstractions paralleling Agamemnon's *ποταμοί*, but these are an allusion to the Tiber river god who gave him protection (VIII, 31-65), and to his ships which were transformed into river nymphs (IX, 117-21; X, 220-3).¹⁰

Only with the last two appeals, the *quaeque aetheris alti/religio et quae caeruleo sunt numina ponto* (XII, 181-2), is there a movement away from the local and specific to the broad inclusion of nameless divinities of the sky and sea. Yet the reference to the sky and sea complement the prayer to *terra* in the first line of the oath.

Aeneas' invocation is a model of proper form. It suits his situation in every respect. It has a strong Roman coloring¹¹

Aeneid and the later protectress of Rome" (N. Mosely, *Characters and Epithets, A Study in Vergil's Aeneid* [Yale, 1926], p. 31; cf. also L. A. MacKay, "Saturnia Juno," *G. & R.*, III [1956], pp. 59-60).

⁹ The *bella . . . torques* perhaps brings to mind the Roman ceremony of shaking or whirling the sacred spears preparatory to war accompanied by the words "*Mars vigila*," explained in modern terms as a magic rite "to propitiate the numinous power of the spears in action" (see Alföldi, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-20, his sources and discussion of the concept, "the occult power of the ravaging spear").

¹⁰ See Servius, *ad loc.*, VII, 137-8, who discusses the Roman custom of worshipping the rivers, especially the Tiber.

¹¹ Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 60. "The attitude in prayer towards the rising

which supports Vergil's introduction of him in this scene as *pater Aeneas, Romanae stirpis origo* (XII, 166). And yet, strangely enough, we would not be surprised if Latinus were to utter the very same invocation. Latinus, as a descendant of the sun himself,¹² ought to invoke the sun; as recipient of Juno's support, pray to Juno for further strength; as ruler in Latium and native of Italy, allude to his own native *numina*. He says he intends to echo Aeneas (XII, 197) :

haec eadem, Aenea, terram, mare, sidera iuro.

Eadem is the key word. He promises to parallel Aeneas' invocation but the clue to the drastic change is found in this very first line. Instead of *Sol*, Latinus, the *solis avi specimen*, substitutes *sidera*.¹³

In the *Aeneid*, *sidera* and *sol* are not altogether interchangeable except where they are used as metaphors of height—*ad astra*, *ad sidera*, or *ad solem* (III, 619-20) :

... ipse (Cyclops) arduus, altaque pulsat
sidera ...

and (II, 474-5) :

lubrica convolvit sublato pectore terga
arduus ad solem, et linguis micat ore trisulcis

sun is old Roman: of this we have conclusive evidence in *Acta Fratr. Arv.* (Henzen p. 7) (cf. *Aen.* VIII 68)." All the other deities are Roman, the primitive worship of the *numina loci* has an ancient Italian tradition and persisted in Rome (see H. J. Rose, *Early Roman Religion* [London, 1948], pp. 9-48), and the concept of *religio* has been termed the essence of Roman religious experience (see C. Kerényi, *Religion of Greeks and Romans* [Dutton, 1962], pp. 154-62).

¹² Cf. Hesiod, *Theog.*, 1011: Κίρκη δ' Ἡλίου θυγάτηρ . . . γεινάτο . . . "Ἄγριον ἦδε Δατίνον. Vergil himself gives a different genealogy (VII, 47 ff.). There have been attempts to reconcile the differences between the two accounts (see Conington, *ad loc.*). Nevertheless, suffice it to say that here Vergil refers to Latinus as grandchild of the Sun, adopting Hesiod's tradition, and in Book VII selects the descent from Saturn. This is not the only inconsistency in the poem.

¹³ The shift is made more pointed because, as Latinus is associated with the sun as *solis avi specimen*, conversely, Aeneas is described here *sidero flagrans clipeo*. But Vergil reverses the allusions in the oaths.

or of lofty aspiration (I, 259-60) :

. . . sublimemque feres ad sidera caeli
magnanimum Aenean; . . .

Sidera is distinctly contrasted with *sol* (VI, 641) :

. . . solemque suum, sua sidera norunt.

Both *Sol* as day and *sidera* as night (or their periphrases) are found in other invocations in the poem. These allusions to sun and stars, although often overlaid with various strata of meanings, are, as a rule, used with some appropriate reference to the time of day at which the prayers are made.¹⁴

Dido makes the other great appeal to *Sol* (IV, 607-10) :

Sol, qui terrarum flammis opera omnia lustras,
tuque harum interpres curarum et conscientia Iuno,
nocturnisque Hecate triviis ululata per urbes
et Dirae ultrices et di morientis Elissae.

The sun itself bears a wealth of allusions in this passage, but the time context is clearly stated (IV, 584-5) :

Et iam prima novo spargebat lumine terras
Tithoni croceum linquens Aurora cubile.

This description of the rising of the sun in terms of Aurora's leaving her partner's bed directly contrasts with Dido's dawning intention to mount her lover's bed as a funeral pyre.¹⁵ *Sol qui flammis lustras* images these funereal flames soon to blaze. *Sol* as *lux* is mentioned again in her final agony (IV, 692) :

quaesivit caelo lucem ingemuitque reperta

and *Sol*, the personification of both light and life, is a clear

¹⁴ In connection with this observation it is interesting to note Servius' comment (*ad loc.*, XI, 183) on another correlation: "Asinius Pollio dicit, ubique Vergilium in diei descriptione sermonem aliquem ponere aptum praesentibus rebus." A beautiful case in point is the correlation between the introduction of day in this scene as *Solis equi lucemque elatis naribus efflant* (XII, 115) and the arrival of Latinus (XII, 161-5).

¹⁵ Servius, in the passage quoted *supra*, uses this very same example: "in quarto, quia navigaturus Aeneas et relicturnus Didonem, dicit (585) Tithoni croceum linquens Aurora cubile." This too is a possibility.

antithesis to *nocturnis Hecatè triviis ululata per urbes* where Hecate-Trivia refers back to the previous physical night of black magic and despair (IV, 511) and looks ahead to the eternal metaphorical night of the dead.

When Aeneas meets Dido in the underworld, he says (VI, 458-60) :

... per sidera iuro,
per superos et siqua fides tellure sub ima est,
invitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi.

Aeneas is not contrasting night and day, but the heavens above and the underworld below. *Sidera* is more fitting to this realm of darkness and death than *sol*.¹⁶ But Vergil localizes the allusion still further. He not only sets the scene of Aeneas' reunion with Dido in the gloom of night, but describes Dido herself approaching as (VI, 453-4) :

obscuram, qualem primo qui surgere mense
aut videt aut vidisse putat per nubila lunam.

Sidera is used in three other prayers :

Dido (IV, 519-20) :

testatur mortitura deos et conscientia fati
sidera. . . .

The scene is the performance of the magic rites. The time is night.

Nisus (IX, 429) :

. . . caelum hoc et conscientia sidera testor.

The adventure of Nisus and Euryalus takes place at night. The *hoc* shows us Nisus gesturing to the expanse of sky about him. A short while before he has prayed to the moon for assistance (IX, 403-5) :

suspiciens altam Lunam sic voce precatur:
“tu, dea, tu praesens nostro succurre labori,
astrorum decus et nemorum Latonia custos.”

¹⁶ See Vergil's description of the descent to Avernus which is filled with images of darkness (VI, 268-72). We will return to this point *infra*.

Aeneas (*orientia signa* instead of *sidera*, VII, 136-8) :

... et geniumque loci primamque deorum
Tellurem Nymphasque et adhuc ignota precatur
flumina, tum Noctem Noctisque orientia signa. . .

Night is implied in VII, 130-4 and 148-50.

There are three exceptions to this pattern of correlation, but the peculiar circumstances which surround these invocations serve to explain the deviation from the usual form. One, Achaemenides' strange cry, is actually a partial exception (III, 599-601) :

... per sidera testor
per superos atque hoc caeli spirabile lumen,
tollite me, Teucri. . .

References to both night and day are combined in this one prayer,¹⁷ but the problem here is that Vergil states it is daylight (III, 588-9; and there are no previous nocturnal circumstances for allusion, as IV, 607-10) :¹⁸

postera iamque dies primo surgebat Eoo,
umentemque Aurora polo dimoverat umbram. . .

The sun is the central idea in the invocation because of its arresting phraseology. However, we cannot overlook the mention of the stars which appears to be a direct contradiction to our hypothesis. This anomaly can be explained in the same way as the beautiful but illogical phrase itself—*caeli spirabile lumen*. This prayer is the almost incoherent plea of a man half crazed with hunger, terror, and loneliness. The garbled language of his supplication is an eloquent expression of his mental condition.

¹⁷ *caeli spirabile lumen* is most probably the sun.

- a. *Lumen* is singular, *sidera* plural.
- b. The moon would not likely be the light of life. The sun whose warmth irradiates the earth is a more logical choice.
- c. *hoc* as a demonstrative shows Achaemenides gesturing to daylight which has just dawned (III, 588). Cf. *Nisus*, IX, 429.

¹⁸ The confused use of *sidera* is emphasized by Vergil's description of the preceding night where he has gone to some lengths to tell us that the stars were not visible (III, 585-7) :

nam neque erant astrorum ignes nec lucidus aethra
siderea polus, obscuro sed nubila caelo,
et lunam in nimbo nox intempesta tenebat.

Sinon's plea presents us with complications of a different order (II, 152 ff.):

. . . ille dolis instructus et arte Pelasga
sustulit exutas vinculis ad sidera palmas:
“vos aeterni ignes, et non violabile vestrum
testor numen” eit, . . .
fas mihi Graiorum sacra resolvere iura.

The circumstances indicate that the time is probably day, although Vergil does not say so explicitly. But we assume that the meeting of the Trojans with Sinon, Laocoön's horrible death, and the bringing of the Horse within the city walls all took place within the space of one day. Night brings the Trojan revels and the subsequent attack of the Greeks. Yet Sinon swears by the stars.

Sinon, however, is consciously swearing a false oath—ostensibly to nullify other oaths and bonds of loyalty. His entire story is an artful structure of lies. This is the only deliberately deceitful oath in the *Aeneid*, a fact which may account for the inversion. In addition, the *ignes* have a proleptic force, referring to the events to take place that night, and, more specifically, to the signalling of the Greeks by Sinon with fire, and the utter destruction of Troy by fire.¹⁹

The third exception is the invocation of *sidera* by Latinus in this passage under analysis. As in the two cases just discussed, Latinus' unusual use of *sidera* is a deliberate device on the part of the poet to help us delve deeper into the mood of the speaker. We shall discuss Latinus' use of *sidera* more fully below.

Through the foregoing examples we have attempted to demonstrate that Vergil makes careful distinction between his choice of *sol* or *sidera* as metonymies for *caelum*, and that *sol* implies day, while *sidera* bears the connotation of night. Furthermore, Vergil ordinarily correlates invocations to *Sol* with clear evidence that the time is day, and conversely, places invocations to *sidera* in the context of night. Whenever there are exceptions

¹⁹ This may be an example of one artistic device taking precedence over another. One of the central images of Book II is fire (see B. M. W. Knox, "The Serpent and the Flame: the Imagery of the Second Book of the *Aeneid*," *A.J.P.* LXXI [1950], pp. 379-400). Sinon's air of innocence is dramatically contradicted by this ominous allusion to *ignes*.

to this general rule, cogent and compelling reasons can be adduced.

Latinus next appeals to *Latonaequē genus duplex*, perhaps the most puzzling allusion in the king's invocation. Barren of any descriptive epithet or explanatory phrase with which Vergil endows the other deities invoked by Aeneas and Latinus, *Latonaequē genus duplex* does not make clear whether Latinus is appealing to Apollo and Diana as cosmological deities, personifications of the sun and the moon,²⁰ or as deities of the Pantheon embracing a broad spectrum of attributes.

Fontenrose maintains that Apollo is not identified with Sol and his functions—neither in Vergil, nor in Ovid, nor, indeed, in any Augustan poetry.²¹ He concedes, however, that Phoebus is an epithet common to both and that Diana is definitely personified as Luna.

Apart from the merit of his original thesis (which we shall take up a little further on) is the explanation he offers for Latinus' appeal, namely, that it is customary in oaths to invoke the gods whose baneful influence one most fears. In this case he contends that, just as Aeneas invokes Juno, his most implacable foe, Latinus invokes Apollo and Diana who have demonstrated their support for Trojans in the past. But Diana's championship of Camilla, ally of the Latins, at the close of Book XI cannot fail to be fresh in the reader's mind. Furthermore, Vergil tells us earlier that Latinus had consecrated a laurel tree to Apollo when he first built the royal palace and founded his kingdom (VII, 59-63). Although this last reference is probably intended to support the popular etymology of Laurentes from laurus²² and to lend further credence to the omen of the bees,²³ nevertheless it does not argue for Apollo's unfriendliness to Latinus.

²⁰ This is the view held by Conington, Nettleship, and Sedgwick among others.

²¹ J. Fontenrose, "Apollo and Sol in the Latin Poets of the First Century B. C.," *T. A. P. A.*, LXX (1939), pp. 439-55; "Apollo and the Sun God in Ovid," *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 429-44; and "Apollo and Sol in the Oaths of Aeneas and Latinus," *C. P.*, XXXVIII (1943), pp. 137-8.

²² See Servius, *ad loc.*, VII, 59; B. Tilly, *Vergil's Latium* (Oxford, 1947), p. 94.

²³ W. F. Jackson Knight, *Roman Vergil* (London, 1944), p. 166, in speculations on the universality of the laurel tree symbol, points out

On the other hand, it is equally good form to invoke favorable or protecting gods in an oath. But neither deity is portrayed as either helpful or beneficent to Latinus in any significant way.

Nor would it be proper to assume that Latinus, in referring to Apollo and Diana, envisions their future role in the Augustan revival. It is to Aeneas that Vergil gives the expression of this concept (VI, 69-73), to Aeneas who has just claimed for himself not the political kingship but the religious protectorate (*sacra deosque dabo*).

One may conclude, then, that a non-cosmological interpretation of Apollo and Diana offers no convincing answer to the problem of their relevance to Latinus in this oath.

Let us examine the phrase itself, *Latonaeque genus duplex*. The one salient feature of this periphrastic expression is the emphasis placed upon the duality of Apollo and Diana. Literally, of course, they are by birth the twin children of Latona but, figuratively, the one simple mythological association they share is the cosmic aspect of sun and moon.

While we would agree with Fontenrose that Sol is not identical to Apollo any more than Helios is identical to Apollo in Agamemnon's oath, we cannot say that the two have no identification with each other at all. We feel that Altheim has assessed the situation more accurately when he says, "we find an unmistakable connection between the two, but we cannot speak of a complete identification."²⁴ If indeed Diana is closely associated with Luna and both Apollo and Sol share the epithet *Phoebus* in Augustan poetry, we can deduce that some blurring between the metaphorical radiance of Apollo and the physical abstraction of Sol has occurred.²⁵ The chariot of the sun god repre-

that the laurel "grows both in Priam's palace at the start of the voyage of the Trojans, and in the palace of Latinus its end . . . the laurel is deeply fixed and most ancient in Mediterranean culture; it has magic power and roots humanity to the soil of its home . . . There must be a laurel in a home secure and blessed by Heaven. Augustus knew and he had a laurel of which a miraculous tale was told."

²⁴ F. Altheim, *A History of Roman Religion* (New York, 1937), p. 399.

²⁵ "Whilst Apollo is in the most marked sense a spiritual figure, whose nature is based on no natural occurrence and no element, Helios always remained bound by a close link to the physical sun. An identification of the two powers could not therefore be completely achieved" (Altheim, *ibid.*, p. 398; see the entire discussion of the Apollo-Sun

sented on the temple of Apollo and Diana is another curious coincidence which Fontenrose, however, dismisses on the ground that "pediment and acroterium figures often represent other deities than the one who is worshipped in the temple."²⁶

The very absence of any characterizing epithets indicates that Vergil meant the Roman reader to make a ready identification of the dual divinities, if not in religious cult terms, then on the basis of literary conditioning in Greek poetry. In this phrase, Apollo and Diana are given their Greek genealogy as children of Latona, in which context their cosmic association of sun and moon causes little difficulty.

But as children of Latona, the two gods are inappropriate for the old Latin king who is connected with the ancient Italian gods (VII, 47-9, 177-91). What then is the reason Latinus invokes them?

Servius informs us that it was customary in treaties to invoke *duplicia numina* to symbolize the union of the two peoples. He also explains the invocation of *Ianus bifrons* as representative of the same mode of thought.²⁷ Servius' observation effectively clarifies the placement of the invocations to *Latonaeque genus duplex* and to *Ianum bifrontem* side by side in the same line. The central word in this verse is *duplex*; and *bifrontem*, the

controversy and the related problem of Horace's *Carmen Saeculare*, pp. 396-407; see arguments against the significance of Diana-Luna and the epithet *Phoebus* in Fontenrose, "Apollo and the Sun God in Ovid," cited *supra*, n. 21).

²⁶ J. Fontenrose, "Apollo and Sol in the Latin Poets of the First Century B.C.," cited *supra*, n. 21, pp. 450-1. For arguments supporting the relevance of the sun chariot to the temple of Apollo see W. Fowler, *Roman Ideas of Deity in the Last Century before the Common Era* (London, 1914), p. 60.

Fontenrose's argument that Apollo could not be identified in any way with the sun because he "is often busy in the daytime; this would be difficult if he had to spend the whole day drawing the sun chariot" ("Apollo and the Sun God in Ovid," cited *supra*, n. 21, p. 433 [and the same argument in the article cited on Vergil, p. 442]) is logic perhaps too relentlessly applied to the paradoxes of polytheistic religion. In addition, Fontenrose, in dealing with *Latonaeque genus duplex*, appears to base his interpretation primarily on his previous conclusions about Vergil, which, however, were determined without consideration of this allusion ("Apollo and Sol in the Oaths of Aeneas and Latinus," cited *supra*, n. 21, p. 137, n. 2).

²⁷ See Servius, *ad loc.*, XII, 198.

usual epithet of Janus, is also emphasized by its final position. But conformity to the spirit of the old Roman tradition does not fully explain any personal meaning for Latinus.

We have marked the ominous significance of Latinus' earlier shift to *sidera* especially in view of his costume and his pedigree. The appeal to *Latonaequē genus duplex* is a shift in the same direction, an ironical substitution of Apollo for Sol with added support of the allusion to night in Diana-Luna. In fact, Vergil elsewhere mentions Latona only with reference to Diana (I, 502) and applies the term Latonia only to her (XI, 534, 557; IX, 405). In this last passage cited Nisus appeals to Luna as *astrorum decus et nemorum Latonia custos*. If any shade of emphasis alters the delicate equilibrium of this phrase, it would seem to fall on Diana rather than Apollo.

In *sidera* Latinus has turned his gaze away from the light of the sun as well as from the beneficent warmth of Sol, his ancestral sire, beneath whose rays he formerly prospered. In the jarring note of *Latonaequē genus duplex* he acknowledges the power of the sun expressed by circumlocution in the intrusion of another deity with solar associations, but whose effect is largely clouded over by his union here with his moon sister.

If the invocation of Latona's progeny falls strangely upon our ears, *Janus bifrons*, on the other hand presents undisputed credentials for inclusion in Latinus' oath. He is an ancient Italian deity localized by Vergil as resident in Latium and ancestor of Latinus (VII, 180). As the god of beginnings he opens invocations to a plurality of divinities. Even more specifically, he is associated with the enactment of *foedera*. In this connection Servius says that this custom arose at the time the *foedus* was solemnized between Romulus and Titus Tatius, when, to commemorate the occasion, a statue of Janus was erected to symbolize the union of Sabines and Romans.²⁸ But the most significant element of Janus' worship in the state cult and the one most closely related to Latinus is his guardianship of the gates of war.²⁹

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ In view of the prominence given Janus as the *custos* of the gates of war in *Aeneid*, we omit other speculations as to his significance here, including the fascinating theory connecting Janus of the door, Apollo (*Θυραιος*, *Ἄγνειος*), and Diana-Trivia. Also the concept of Janus (*Dianus*) .

This strange custom has given rise to many speculations as to its significance,³⁰ but the meaning Vergil adopts is that of Janus as custodian of peace who keeps war imprisoned within his doors (VII, 607-10) :

Sunt geminae Belli portae (sic nomine dicunt)
religione sacrae et saevi formidine Martis ;
centum aerei claudunt vectes aeternaque ferri
robora, nec custos absistit limine Ianus.

In this scene climaxing the fury and passion aroused by Juno with the aid of Allecto, Latinus refuses his obligation to perform the *foeda ministeria*. Juno herself assumes the task of opening the massive gates (VII, 621-2) :

impulit ipsa manu portas, et cardine verso
belli ferratos rumpit Saturnia postis.

But later Latinus does not disclaim his responsibility for the outrage whereby the first agreement is nullified, the war begins, and *furor* gains the upper hand (XII, 30-1) :

... vincla omnia rupi :
promissam eripui genero, arma impia sumpsi.

The powerful effect of this scene which graphically outlines the end of the *Pax Latina* under Latinus' leadership (VII, 45-6) is further intensified by the earlier allusion to the future *Pax Romana* (in that same prophecy of Book I) whereby we learn the form and nature of the war spirit guarded by Janus (I, 394-6) :

... dirae ferro et compagibus artis
claudentur Belli portae; Furor impius intus
saeva sedens super arma et centum vincitus aenis
post tergum nodis fremet horridus ore cruento.

We who have passed through the underworld with Aeneas in Book VI recall too the "horrid shapes and shrieks and sights unholy" crouched before the entrance, among whom are Bellum and Discordia (VI, 279-81) :

as corresponding to Diana and his cosmological attribution. For these and others see Macrobius, *Sat.*, 9, 1-16; Servius, *ad loc.*, VII, 610.

³⁰ See *ibid.* and Ovid, *Fasti*, Frazer (London, 1929), II, p. 104.

... mortiferum adverso in limine Bellum
ferreique Eumenidum thalami et Discordia demens
vipereum crinem vittis innixa cruentis,

and we remember also the substitution of Saturnia for Ennius' Discordia (*Annals*, 7) in VII, 622, and the earlier echo in Allecto's report of mission accomplished (VII, 545-6):

en perfecta tibi bello discordia tristi,
dic in amicitiam coeant et foedera iungant.

In Book VI, too, we are permitted to view other gates, the Furies' domain where Allecto's sister, Tisiphone, holds sway. These, the gates of hell, are guarded by another *custos* (VI, 573-7):

tum derum horrsono stridentes cardine sacrae
panduntur portae. cernis custodia qualis
vestibulo sedeat, facies quae limina servet?
quinquaginta atris immanis hiatibus Hydra
saevior intus habet sedem . . .

and it is here that those *qui que arma secuti/ impia* (VI, 612-13) are punished.³¹

Janus, who has not the power to keep the gates of war shut to maintain the peace, resembles in a sense Latinus who had not the power to keep strife without the boundaries of his kingdom.

Latinus, then, in invoking Janus, acts according to sanctioned Roman procedure but, by the invocation, evokes the horror of his last association with the god in the outbreak of the first hostilities, which in turn, by clusters of echo and image, leads us to the very gates of Hell.

It is no wonder then that hard on Janus' heels follow the *vimque deum infernam et duri sacraria Ditis*. Fowler explains the invocation of these deities in Latinus' oath on the ground that Latinus has dead already buried in the earth, while Aeneas does not.³² But surely, on the simplest level, these deities of the underworld parallel the fourth power addressed in Agamemnon's oaths (*Il.*, III, 278-9):

. . . καὶ οὐ ἐπένερθε καμόντας
ἀνθρώπους τίνυσθε, ἔτις κ' ἐπίορκον ὁμόσσηγ.

³¹ See Pöschl, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-8.

³² Fowler, *Death of Turnus*, p. 61.

The oath falls under the special protection of the underworld deities who avenge moral wrongs³³ and Hesiod describes the oath personified as a child of the underworld (*Theog.*, 281-2). This invocation of the gloomy gods, however, is far ranging in its complexity and embraces a variety of interpretation. But we shall return to a more detailed discussion of this problem later.

The king completes his entreaty with Jupiter called *Genitor* rather than *pater omnipotens*, but he is clearly defined as the god *qui foedera fulmine sancit*. It has been stated that this phrase "represents the universal belief that such solemn undertakings were under the special sanction of Jupiter."³⁴ But disregarding Servius' strange comment: "*quia cum fiunt foedera, si coruscatio fuerit, confirmantur,*" does not Jupiter make the treaty sacred by punishing the perjurer with his thunder bolt? This is the implication in the ceremony of the Fetiales (Livy, I, 24). This is Deus Fidius, the god of oaths, regularly portrayed with a thunderbolt, a close kin of Zeus Horkios (Pausanias, V, 24, 9).³⁵ The negative or punitive aspect of the deity should not be overlooked in the phrase *qui foedera fulmine sancit* for it strengthens the allusion to the underworld deities, whose function Homer clearly states is to avenge the broken oath.

The invocation of these deities who enforce the validity of oaths is as traditional as the invocation to Sun, Earth, and Zeus-Jupiter, but it is noteworthy that Aeneas in seven lines of text makes not one reference to these divinities, while Latinus in four lines devotes fully half his space to them.

One more contrast between the two oaths should be mentioned here. Aeneas addresses the gods personally, calling upon them by name. Latinus not only uses indirect address and a jussive subjunctive, but nowhere in this oath does he call upon a god by his proper name except for Janus. Jupiter is *Genitor*, *Latonaegue genus duplex* is a periphrasis, and Dis is not addressed but rather his *sacra*.

³³ See L. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford, 1896), I, pp. 70-1.

³⁴ Fowler, *Death of Turnus*, p. 61.

³⁵ For discussion of Zeus Horkios, see Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 722-6. For discussion of Deus Fidius, see Cook, *ibid.*, and K. Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte* (Munich, 1960), pp. 126-8.

We can conclude, therefore, that the two invocations are strong antitheses. One may be characterized in terms of light and sun and confidence in the relationship and communication with the divinities, but the other is shown in terms of gloom and anxiety with only the pinpoint light of the stars to illuminate the darkness.

Pius Aeneas is in harmony with gods, except for Juno (and she will be won over [XII, 808-40]). The *pax et venia deorum*, the ultimate aspiration, is his. He stands now on the threshold of fulfillment of the prophecies and promises of the fates (*Iuppiter hac stat*, XII, 565). He is prepared to assert his claim to Italy at all costs, even if he is vanquished in the duel. He has carefully carried out all his religious and filial obligations, e. g., the funeral games to his father in Book V, and his descent to the underworld in Book VI. He envisions his future role in Italy as the guardian of religion, *sacra deosque dabo*, reiterating the words of Book I, *inferretque deos Latio*. (Cf. also II, 293.)

Latinus, on the other hand, does not enjoy Aeneas' enviable position. He does not come with a pure heart; he is weighed down with guilt because he and his people broke faith with Aeneas in nullifying the first agreement in Book VII. Like Aeneas, he has had communion with his dead father (the incubation scene with Faunus, VII, 81-101), but unlike Aeneas, he has failed to carry out his father's injunctions. His horror at the outbreak of hostilities and the expectation of retribution are shown then (VII, 594-6) :

“frangimur heu fatis,” inquit, “ferimurque procella!
ipsi has sacrilego pendetis sanguine poenas,
o miseri! . . .”

for he plainly considers the act an act of impiety, although he tries to mitigate his guilt by refusal to open the gates of war (VII, 618-19) :

abstinuit tactu pater, aversusque refugit
foeda ministeria, et caecis se condidit umbris.

But after his failure to negotiate terms of peace in the council of the Latins and the renewal of combat, he acknowledges his responsibility for the inception of the war (XI, 471-2) :

multa se incusat, qui ncn acceperit ultro
Dardanium Aenean generumque asciverit urbi.

Hence, in the rest of his speech here in Book XII, he dwells with almost an obsessive insistence on the inviolability of this oath. In fact, he spends fully eleven lines on the elaboration of this point (XII, 201-11). Nor does Latinus say, as does Aeneas, what he will do, if his side is victorious. Not even for a moment does he envision a triumph of the Latins.³⁶

Like Aeneas, he is a religious king figure (*Pater*) ; like Aeneas, he values piety. He has accepted the omens and oracles ; he has tried to obey the injunctions of Faunus (VII, 373-4) ; he has supported Aeneas' claims ; he has tried to disengage himself from participation in the war ; he has sued for peace again in Book XI (301-35). He has no illusions, such as Turnus

³⁶ The scepter in this passage (XII, 206) is identified with the scepter of Jupiter Feretrius by which oaths were sworn (see Servius, *ad loc.*, XII, 206; but see Alföldi, *op. cit.*, p. 22 for a contradiction of Servius' point). However, the staff that will never again bear leaves is a transposition of the famous lines in the *Iliad* (I, 234-9). But it is a hallmark of Vergil's skill that his imitations, even when they appear most directly derivative, are absorbed into the texture of his poetry, and are subtly transformed to serve his own artistic purposes. As one authority has said about the incorporation of Homer into the *Aeneid*, ". . . only a poet who has deep convictions regarding the metaphoric character of expression and the symbolic value of each human and historic event can be so original when he quotes—only he can perceive the expression of another as the expression of his own experience" (Pöschl, *op. cit.*, p. 8). The meaning of this statement is readily discernible here. In the *Iliad*, Achilles makes his oath by the scepter and only the scepter. His description of the physical transformation of the branch into the scepter is a beautiful embellishment leading up to the concept of the scepter as a symbol of kingly power and dispenser of justice, a worthy token on which to swear an oath. These same Homeric elements are to be found in Vergil, but Latinus is not swearing his oath on the scepter. He is comparing the impossibility of the scepter's restoration to its pristine state with the impossibility of his violating his oath. This elaborate expression is tinged with irony because we know the oath *will* be broken. Juno says to Iuturna just before the opening of this scene (XII, 158-9) :

aut tu bella cie, conceptumque excute foedus.
auctor ego audendi . . . ,

and hitherto Juno has been highly efficient in achieving the mischief she has plotted. Vergil heightens Latinus' unhappy position with this irony. More important, however, is the fact that Vergil uses these lines to replace Aeneas' statement of his future plans and thereby points up Latinus' contrasting despair and spiritual paralysis which prevent the king from considering his future.

has, as to the outcome of a war in which a pledge was defiled (*pace polluta*) and a holy oracle disobeyed. Yet it is of extreme importance to Latinus that at least this *foedus* shall remain inviolate. Then he might assuage the pangs of his conscience and restore honor to his ailing prestige and dignity to his office of kingship.³⁷

We accuse Latinus of weak and vacillating behavior; he has tried to stand firm, but he is prevented from carrying out what he recognizes as the right by higher forces (VII, 586-94, 599) :

ille velut pelagi rupes immota resistit,
ut pelagi rupes magno veniente fragore,
quae sese multis circum latrantibus undis
mole tenet; scopuli nequ quam et spumea circum
saxa fremunt, laterique inlisa refunditur alga.
verum ubi nulla datur ciecum exsuperare potestas
consilium, et saevae nutu Iunonis eunt res,
multa deos aurisque pater testatus inanes,
“frangimur heu fatis,” inquit, “ferimurque procella! . . .
funere felici spolior.” . . .

He knows the undertaking is a *bellum infandum, contra omnia, contra fata deum*; a *perversum numen* is its rallying force. Although the simile of a wave buffeted rock resembles the oak simile of Aeneas in Book IV (411-9), Latinus is barred by Juno in Book VII from effectual resistance. The *furor* of powers both human and divine overwhelms him. As the image of the rock standing firm changes there to the figure of a storm driven ship, here the oath of the king reflects this change from strong leadership to helpless and pessimistic despair.

It is the subtle delineation of this mood which finds expression in Latinus' oath.³⁸ It accounts for the sun king's introduction of the nocturnal stars and moon in an inappropriate atmosphere, his subsequent circumlocution in speaking of the sun, his progenitor, his thought association with the first betrayal of trust as expressed by Janus, and his vehement invocation

³⁷ Cf. his self castigation, *vincit omnia rupi* (XII, 30) and his promise here, *nulla dies pacem hanc Ita'is nec foedera rumpet* (XII, 202).

³⁸ “The whole poem may be viewed as a sequence of moods, a series of changing sensations. I consider this to be the basic truth of Vergilian art, the appreciation of which is the *condicio sine qua non* for understanding (Vergil) . . .” (Pöschl, *op. cit.*, p. 140 [Symbolism of the Sequence of Mood]).

of the might of the underworld divinities. Although we expect him to identify himself strongly with the life and light giving principle that is the sun, he seems to feel that his impiety has cut him off from access to its radiance.

Why does Latinus invoke the underworld gods? We have adduced the precedents in Homer to show that these deities take vengeance upon the perjurer, and have correlated their punitive qualities with those of Jupiter *qui foedera fulmine sancit*. The self imprecation of the oath taker is in itself a powerful expression of the speaker's sincerity; to do so by invoking the underworld gods is perhaps the most powerful statement of this kind, for the *vis* of gods beneath earth, whether expressive of the deities themselves or of other tokens of the underworld, is not a force terrifying only to mortals. The gods themselves swear regularly by the waters of the Styx. Jupiter does so (IX, 104; X, 113) and so does Juno (XII, 816). The Sibyl in describing these rivers in the underworld to Aeneas says (VI, 323-4):³⁹

Cocytus stagna alta vides Stygiamque paludem,
di cuius iurare timent et fallere numen.

Thus Latinus calls the underworld gods to witness together with Zeus Horkios to emphasize his promise that this time he will not break his word—this time the *foedus* shall stand. The act of touching the altars (*tango aras*) is the third element of self imprecation in his oath. "In more serious cases, it was usual to touch an altar when taking an oath; for an oath contains a conditional curse by the swearer, who calls for divine vengeance on himself if he is perjured. He is thus deliberately coming into contact with the power which will smite him if he deserves it."⁴⁰

But aside from the traditional use of the underworld gods in oaths and the particular strength their invocation imparts to the force of the oath, Latinus' invocation of the *di inferi* is of primary importance in the analysis of his attitude. The invocation of these deities is the direct ritual complement of the metaphysical darkness conveyed by the stars and the moon.⁴¹

³⁹ See Hesiod, *Theog.*, 775-806 for a description of the gods' oaths and the punishment for their perjury.

⁴⁰ Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁴¹ The association of night with the underworld and chthonic deities

Firstly, Latinus prays to these gods because of his awareness of the inevitable consequences of the first sacrilege⁴² and because of his apprehension and fear at the death and destruction awaiting the Latins. Perhaps he anticipates his own death as well (*funere felici spolior*). Unlike Aeneas (*ut potius reor et potius di numine firment*) he feels the gods of the *aether* are not on his side and hence he has recourse to the gods of the nether world. Turnus reacts similarly as his doom approaches (XII, 646-7):⁴³

... vos o mihi, Manes,
este boni, quoniam superis aversa voluntas.

Thoughts of death are bound up with the gods of death. This is the psychological connection that Latinus makes.

But thoughts of death also lead to fear and terror. Inherent in the worship of the underworld deities is the apotropaic quality of the aversion of evil and ruin, of *ἀποφοβᾶται*.⁴⁴ Lucretius describes those who claim philosophical enlightenment returning to the old ways of religion, and specifically to the worship of the *di inferi* in time of trouble (*De Rerum Nat.*, III, 48-54):

is a common mode of thought. In cult, for example, black victims are offered as sacrifices at night. In Vergil's underworld darkness prevails (except in Elysium). Note the profound impression of night the poet creates in his prologue to the descent to Avernus (VI, 264-7) which he immediately follows with (VI, 268-72):

Ibant obscuri sola sub nocte per umbram
perque domos Ditis vacuas et inania regna:
quale per incertam lnam sub luce maligna
est iter in silvis, ubi caelum condidit umbra
Iuppiter, et rebus nox abstulit atra colorem,

made all the more distinctive because Aeneas and the Sibyl have left the upper world at daybreak (*priiri sub lumina solis et ortus*, VI, 255). In mythological tradition, the Erinyes are daughters of night, a fact Vergil mentions in connection with Allecto (VII, 331) and twice in his description of the Fury sent to bring death to Turnus (XII, 846, 860).

⁴² See pp. 351-3 *supra*.

⁴³ Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 285. "This might be interpreted as a prayer to the collective dead, but the contrast with the *di superi* makes it far more probable that *Manes* is used here as the equivalent of *di inferi*, which is not infrequently the case in Vergil."

⁴⁴ See J. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (Cambridge, 1903), Chap. I.

extorres idem patria longeque fugati
conspectu ex hominum foedati crimine turpi
omnibus aerumnis affecti, denique vivunt
et quocumque tamen miseri venere parentant
et nigras mactant pecudes et manibus divis
inferias mittunt, multoque in rebus acerbis
acrius advertunt animos ad religionem.

The ritual concept described by Lucretius is evoked here by *duri sacraria Ditis*. *Sacrarium* is the place where the sacred things of the god are kept and consequently the place where ritual is performed. In fact, the invocation to these gods is quite clearly divided into two parts—the *vim deum infernam* refers to the binding force of the oath and *duri sacraria Ditis* refers to the ritual idea of aversion of evil or death.

Closely bound up with the apotropaic ritual of underworld gods is the idea of expiation of guilt. We have demonstrated earlier Latinus' intense feeling of guilt at the breaking of his word to the Trojans and his disregard of the oracle.

If we examine the rest of the poem, we find that the underworld deities are invoked by two others—and both in ritual aspects—Aeneas, in Book VI, 247-54 (exempted from these speculations because, before entrance is made to the underworld, its divinities ought to be invoked for propitiation) and Dido in Book IV (504-11, 607-10).

The obvious parallels are between Dido and Amata in Vergil's language, in their names, in their passionate natures, and in their suicides. Yet Dido and Latinus, both reigning monarchs, both ruling in an enlightened manner, share an important personal characteristic—continued remorse at a guilty act.⁴⁵ Compare Dido (IV, 595-6) :

quid loquor? aut ubi sum? quae mentem insaniam mutat?
infelix Dido, nunc te facta impia tangunt?

and Latinus (XII, 30 and 37) :

promissam eripui genero, arma impia sumpsi.
quo referor totiens? quae mentem insaniam mutat?

The guilty act, indeed, is one and the same—both feel they have not kept faith, Dido with her dead husband, Sychaeus, and

⁴⁶ Other characters profess their guilt, but only at the moment of truth: Amata (XII, 593-603), Mezentius (X, 851).

Latinus with Aeneas, and also with his father, *fatidicus Faunus* whose oracle he disobeyed.

Dido says before the inception of her fateful love affair with Aeneas (IV, 25-7) :

vel Pater omnipotens adigat me fulmine ad umbras,
pallentes umbras Erebo noctemque profundam,
ante, Pudor, quam te violo, aut tua iura resolvo.

We note that Dido speaks of Jupiter's role as punisher of perjurors in the same way as Latinus does in his oath.

The underworld powers are most prominent in the magical rites of Book IV (474-521, 634-40).⁴⁶ The meaning of these rites is very ambiguous. Their outward function was to purge Dido's love for Aeneas (or perhaps to make her a love image to Aeneas again). Their primary function, however, was to provide a camouflage for her plan of suicide. Her suicide was motivated not only by her hopeless love for Aeneas and her queenly refusal to bear the shame of his repudiation, but also by the intense feelings of guilt towards her first husband which return to haunt her (IV, 552) :

non servata fīces, cineri promissa Sychaeo.

It is possible that Dido by these rites intends, at least subconsciously, to expiate her guilty love for Aeneas and at the same time her betrayal of Sychaeus. There is a curious prayer by Dido as she completes the first phase of these rites (IV, 519-21) :

testatur moritura deos et consicia iati
sidera; tum, si quod non aequo foedere amantes
curae numen habet iustumque memorque, precatur.

This passage is surely meant to refer to Aeneas and his breaking of the ties with her which she regards as a *foedus*. And yet, if we scrutinize the wording, there is enough ambivalence in this statement to support the suggestion that she may also be thinking about another *foedus* where she was the guilty partner, and thus she might invoke the gods of the underworld to grant her expiation. At the very least, it may be said that by ridding

⁴⁶ Dido invokes the underworld gods in IV, 608-12 also, but she uses them to curse Aeneas.

herself of her love for Aeneas, she is preparing the path for a reconciliation with her first husband in the underworld and a restoration of that *foedus*. The reconciliation comes to pass in Book VI (472-4) :

tandem corripuit sese, atque inimica refugit
in nemus umbriferum, coniunx ubi pristinus illi
respondeat curis, aequatque Sychaeus amorem.

It is interesting that *aequatque Sychaeus amorem* should be an echo of *non aequo foedere amantes*!

Let us turn to the second part of Dido's rites, *sacra Iovi Stygiæ* (IV, 638). The supplication of Jupiter Stygius is still more relevant in our parallel drawn between Latinus and Dido. Here *piacula* are specifically mentioned. Latinus warns Turnus when war breaks out (VII, 596-7) :

... te, Turne, nefas, te triste manebit
supplicium, votisque deos venerabere seris,

recalling the famous *distulit in seram commissa piacula mortem* (VI, 569).⁴⁷ Expiation of a moral wrong properly belongs to the gods of the underworld who pursue the evil doer.⁴⁸

To summarize the particular relevance of the underworld deities in Latinus' oath, there are four reasons we would give. First, the traditional-religious reason—these are the gods who protect the sanctity of the oath. Second, the psychological factor—the atmosphere of death and destruction is linked with the gods of death. Third, the apotropaic quality of rites performed to these gods. In time of trouble, it is wise to propitiate these deities to avert evil consequences. Finally, the piacular or expiatory impulses—one placates the gods one has previously offended. Latinus' oath exhibits these different layers of meaning of the underworld gods. Cumulatively, the effect of their invocation indicates a mood of gloom, anxiety, and foreboding.

The continued association of Latinus with the abrogated

⁴⁷ See Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-7. Also Bailey, *Phases in the Religion of Ancient Rome* (Berkeley, 1932), pp. 85-6, and W. F. J. Knight, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-7.

⁴⁸ *quique arma securi/impia* (VI, 612-13) are specially singled out for mention in the fragmentary list of the sinners in Tartarus.

foedus is stressed again in references to him after the oath is forsworn (XII, 285-6) :

. . . fugit ipse Latinus
pulsatos referens infe^zto foedere divos,

and (XII, 580-2) :

. . . magna^{que} incusat voce Latinum (Aeneas)
testatur deos iterum se ad proelia cogi,
bis iam Italos hostes, haec iam altera foedera rumpi,

and the contemptuous statement made by Saces, Turnus' ally (XII, 657-8) :

. . . mussat rex ipse Latinus,
quos generos vocet aut quae sese ad foedera flectat.

The tangled skein of Vergil's religious-philosophical thought is difficult to unravel, as Bailey so aptly demonstrates, but in speaking of combinations of deities in the *Aeneid* such as the ones discussed here, he says: "Rarely are these the traditional combinations of the old religion. More often Roman and Greek gods are placed side by side, and especially in the longest and most solemn invocations, we find gods, Greek and Roman, old spirits of the countryside, and cosmological deities run together in incongruous but yet strangely impressive congeries. At times we can see the reason for his combinations, at others they remain mysterious, but it is unlikely that his choice is ever really haphazard."⁴⁹

Through the contrasts in the oaths of Aeneas and Latinus, Vergil has shown us very artfully the spiritual state of each leader. Aeneas, supported by the armor of his divine mother and by the strength of his *pietas* stands out in sharp relief. But it is especially in the oath of Latinus that Vergil's subtle mastery of the creation of a valid psychological mood is fully revealed. He uses invocations that seem, on the surface, to be only conventional utterances and through them has revealed Latinus' dark night of the soul. The old king's gloom and anxiety is only too well justified by the ending events of Book XII that close the epic with Amata's suicide, Latium in flames, and Turnus' spirit *cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras*.

FROMA I. ZEITLIN.

⁴⁸ Bailey, *Religion in Vergil*, p. 197.

THE SECOND STASIMON OF EURIPIDES' *HERACLES* (637-700).

Many critics have consigned the second stasimon of the *Heracles* to that limbo so favoured by puzzled commentators, the category of shoddy writing. In particular, the opening words of the second strophe (673 ff.), in which the singer of this chorus announces that he will never cease to mingle the Graces and the Muses, have been regarded by many as unconnected in theme and structure with the thoughts of the preceding stanzas. Some commentators, accepting the disunity of the ode as a regrettable fact, salvage something from the debris by seeing the opening vaunt of the second strophe as the personal voice of Euripides himself.¹ Such a personal intrusion by the poet into the middle of this ode, which would be an intolerable and almost inconceivable violation of artistic integrity, is a completely unnecessary hypothesis. Several commentators have understood the significance of these particular lines without, however, convincing the sceptical. Clearly, a more decisive exposition of the themes, transitions, and overall structure of this ode is required. The structure is typically Euripidean, in that unity of thought and meaning is achieved by a, to the Greeks, natural progression from general to particular. The less specific sections of the Euripidean ode often, as in this instance, employ maxims or popular philosophising as the backdrop of generality against which the particular is to be seen in its clearest delineation as the principal focus of interest. We shall discover the shape and emphases of Euripides' ode only by first uncovering the traditional pattern, general and particular, which informs it, that is, the relationship between its various parts, its structure. In our analysis of the second stasimon from the *Heracles*, we shall be

¹ See e. g. M. Pohlenz, *Die griechische Tragödie* (Berlin, 1930), p. 319; G. H. Macurdy, "The Dawn Songs in *Rhesus* (527-556) and in the Parodos of *Phaethon*," *A.J.P.*, LXIV (1943), p. 416; G. Norwood, *Greek Tragedy* (London, 1953), p. 326; H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy* (New York, 1954), p. 274. Among counterviews, see particularly Wilamowitz, *Euripides: Herakles*, Zweiter Band (Berlin, 1895), pp. 147 ff.; G. M. A. Grube, *The Drama of Euripides* (London, 1941), p. 253; W. Arrowsmith, *The Conversion of Herakles* (Diss., Princeton, 1954), p. 118.

examining the art of the eulogist. The unity of the ode is achieved by its adherence *throughout* to the general conventions of encomiastic writing. More specifically, the *Heracles* ode would seem basically to be an epinician ode, and one particularly reminiscent of Pindar's songs in honour of mortal victors. At the same time, however, Heracles is lauded with an extravagance which suggests a hymn in honour of a god, and we note in particular the absence of the frequent Pindaric warning that mortal victors are *not* gods. It is no accident that this epinician ode is invested with a hymnal grandeur more appropriate to divinity. For the chorus elevate their hero to so dangerous a height that his fall becomes almost inevitable.

One obvious point should be underlined before we begin our analysis of this ode: that is, that the chorus consists of a group of aged citizens. The composite character of such a group must, therefore, clearly be that of an aged singer. If, then, it can be shown that this ode has a specific dramatic function to perform, and that the whole ode is a perfect unity in which the various parts all are ancillary to this function, there will be no point at which we need suspect a transference from the voice of the chorus' collective person to that of the poet himself. It is essential, therefore, that we examine the inner structure of this ode in some detail.

Strophe a' (636-54)

The ode begins with what has been described as an "artificial" passage on old age.² The sentiments expressed are gnomic rather than artificial, and are no source of embarrassment to a Greek author.³ Since the singers of these words are themselves afflicted

² Kitto, p. 278: "The artificiality of the old age passage here suggests that we should not take it too seriously as Euripides' own lament, but as material pleasurable enough in this chorus; the noble stanza to Song is, however, altogether different; undoubtedly personal and not dramatic." And see P. Descharne, *Euripides and the Spirit of his Drama* (New York, 1906), p. 309.

³ See Aristot., *Rhet.*, 1394a 13 ff. (and especially 1395a 10-11) for the functional value of *gnomai*, particularly in prose encomia (cf. also *Rhet.*, 1367a 3-1363a 9). For my own analysis of this ode as an encomium, I am indebted to the encouragement and advice of Professor E. L. Bundy. More particularly, I have followed Bundy's general approach to the study of the epinician ode as it is set out in his *Studia Pindarica*, I and II (Berkeley, Calif., 1961-1962).

by the disability they curse, there is here some interpenetration of general and personal. This personal element is fully consonant with the dramatic role of the chorus of the *Heracles*, a point to be amplified later. Play upon the themes of youth and old age occurs in more or less conventional form throughout Greek literature, yet each individual variation is none the less pleasing because we recognise its conventionality. Of a large number of passages which could be cited,⁴ the reader's attention is drawn to three in particular, scrutiny of which will shed some light on the Euripidean passage under consideration. The notion that youth is preferable to riches is the theme of Theognis, 719 ff.: riches can ward off (728) ". . . neither diseases nor evil old age" (cf. Solon, 24). The impossibility of the renewal of youth is the theme of Theognis, 1007 ff.: "To be young twice and to escape death is not given to mortals by the gods." And the encomiast Bacchylides, in an important passage to be discussed more fully later (Snell, 3, 88 ff.), laments that a man cannot cast away old age and recover his youth. The singers, then, of Euripides' ode are appealing to the lessons of experience. The ideas expressed are deliberately not new, since the chorus wish their grounds for praising Heracles to be self-evident, not a matter for debate.

The first stanza, then, is an elaborate adaptation of a common motif. The preceding scene has concluded with a speech by Heracles, the personification of *neotas*, to which the chorus react in this ode as the personification of *geras*. The ode begins with that component of the youth/old age polarity which is to be stressed later (637 f.), the blessings of youth being extolled *per contrarium*. As the first strophe proceeds, the positive attributes of youth are developed to some extent, first by the strong asseveration (642 ff.): "Never mine be the wealth of Asian tyranny, nor a house full of gold in exchange for youth . . ."; and then by the universalizing scope of "best in riches, best in poverty" (674 f.), which is a typically Hellenic way of saying "always best." Wealth thus defers to youth as a desirable attribute. In poetry, the rejection of wealth is expressed variously. Wealth is the quintessential symbol of man's worldly and ephemeral hopes,

⁴ Cf. Theogn., 271 ff., 527 f., 567, 1020 ff.; Sapph. (Page), 21; Mimnerm., 1, 1 ff., 11, 1; compare the elegant sophistication of *Anacreont.*, 39, 47, 52, 53; Crates, 21.

and serves thus as a powerful foil for the unpredictable onslaughts of sickness, old age, and eventual death.⁵ Or, as in this passage of Euripides, wealth may be rejected in favour of the higher values of youth, youth being in agonistic contexts a common prerequisite or concomitant of *arete*. In the ideals of what may be called aristocratic poetry, particularly the epinician odes of Pindar, wealth usually is regarded as a desirable attribute of the *laudandus*. However, in all instances the background of the *laudandus* will influence the moral tone adopted with regard to riches.⁶ Also, purely rhetorical considerations may dictate the choice of priorities: for example, it is what Bacchylides approves (1, 159 ff.) when wealth is rejected that counts. The *laudandus* in Euripides' passage is one to whom considerations of wealth are largely irrelevant, and worldly riches patently are set up as foil for the agonistic quality of youth. This idealization of *neotas* in general prepares the ground for the transition to the particular agonistic *neotas* of Heracles later in the ode.

Pindar credits youth with the agonistic qualities of strength and action, the compensations of old age being deliberation and counsel (cf. Pind., *P.*, 2, 63 ff.). In the *Persae* of Aeschylus, the elders are the Queen's counsellors, a function determined by their old age (cf. *Pers.*, 4-7, 142, 170-2, 175); the army, on the other hand, once the bloom of the land and now blighted in the *agon*, was composed of young men, warriors of courage and breeding, in the very prime of life (cf. 441 f., 511 f.). The roles of youth and old age find their literary prototypes in the persons of Achilles and Nestor in the *Iliad* (in Pind., *P.*, 3, 112, it is Sarpedon and Nestor who are coupled to represent the combined virtues of youth and old age). As we shall see later, old age may enjoy the compensation of song rather than of deliberation: the poet's choice of function will depend on the natural circumstances of his piece. The glory of youth is almost always that of physical prowess: Heracles, who often appears in Pindar's odes, is *thrasygnachanos* (*O.*, 6, 67); *hyperbios* (*O.*, 10, 15); *aristomachos* (*P.*, 10, 3). We need hardly wonder that an ode in praise of Heracles opens with a general laudation of

⁵ Cf. *Theogn.*, 145, 1155; *Semon.*, 1, 9 ff.; *Solon*, 14, 9 f.; *Crates*, 1, 6 ff.; *Pers.*, 164, 840 ff.; *Sept.*, 769.

⁶ For the desirable link of *ploutos* and *arete* cf. *Sapph.*, 148; Pind. (*Turyn*), *O.*, 2, 58-9; *P.*, 5, 1; *I.*, 3, 1 ff.; Callim., *Hymn*, 1, 94 f.

the virtues of youth;⁷ and the poet makes it quite clear that *youth* is his theme. The comments on old age serve as foil to highlight youth against a dark background. The structure of the first stanza, with its focus on youth, requires no apology. The thematic background of the ode has been presented, and we understand from the traditional motifs used that the poet is communicating through reference to shared symbols of Greek literary speech. We cannot be certain yet that the ode is indebted to the fund of symbols shared by encomiasts in particular. The possibility, however, is strongly underlined, and possibility becomes certainty in the ensuing stanzas.

Antistrophe a' (655-73)

The structural basis of this strophe is a condition impossible of fulfilment, the rejection of which will enable the reality of the present situation to be accepted and developed climactically (*νῦν δέ . . .*, 669). By this device, the poet, not for the first time,⁸ effects in his ode the transition between general and particular, and thus introduces his climactic theme. Our first question must be, why does Euripides use this device in the second stasimon of the *Heracles*? What, in fact, is being rejected, and what is to be emphasised thereby in the climax of the ode? At a superficial glance, it might be supposed that this second stanza is little more than an elaborate repetition of the first. However, an important shift of emphasis has taken place. If the gods had taken proper thought for man's affairs, they would have rewarded the good man with a double youth. This sentiment effects a natural transition from strophe *a'* to antistrophe *a'*. But as soon as they have uttered these words, the chorus explain what the supreme advantage of such divine beneficence would be: it would permit the revelation of a *φανερὸν χαρακτῆρος ἀπερᾶς* (659). Youth, we are aware, is an excellent quality in the aspirer to *arete*; and it is the *proof* or *revelation* of *arete* which now occupies the thoughts of the chorus. If the good had a double

⁷ And cf. Simon., 115, 1 ff.; Pind., *O.*, 4, 26 ff.; 9, 101, 108 f.; Bacchyl., 18, 56-9; Soph., fr. 239.

⁸ The form of such conditions (or wishes) and their inevitable rejection remains stereotyped from Homer to Euripides: cf. *IU.*, I, 415 ff., III, 173 ff., IV, 318 ff., VI, 345 ff.; *Od.*, V, 308 ff.; *I.A.*, 1211 ff.; *Suppl.*, 786 ff.; *Phoen.*, 236 ff.

youth and the evil but a single youth, then it would be possible to *distinguish* (*γνῶναι*, 66€) between good and evil men, just as the number of the stars (the good) is visible to the sailor between the dark clouds (the evil). This is all very well, but we must return to the hard realities of life—and this is the climactic point of the whole strophe: there is no *clear* (*σαφῆς*, 670) division between good and evil. Time in its rolling course extols only *ploutos*, that is, the very wealth which the poet already has dismissed as a comparable substitute for youth, and by *πλοῦτον μόνον* now dismisses as a comparable substitute for *arete*. So the final link between youth and *arete* has been established. The question now remains, how are we to distinguish between the good and evil—those who are truly possessed of *arete* and those who are not? In their return to reality, the chorus have suggested only that time is of no help: the real answer must wait until the next stanza.

This rhetorical fuss with which the old men preface their outburst of praise in the third stanza is dictated by the conventions of encomiastic poetry. We shall consider this point in more detail in our discussion later of the transition between antistrophe α' and strophe β' . Before examining this vital transition, however, we should append a few comments on the relationship between time and wealth alluded to at the close of the second stanza. Time and wealth are frequent components of ethical concepts pertinent to the encomium. Wealth is a transient blessing, and one in which man dare not put excessive confidence. In this, as in many matters that pertain to mortals, time is the supreme arbiter, the capricious judge. Hence the relation between time and wealth is close, and explains the frequent relegation of wealth by the *laudator* to a station somewhat inferior to the stability of natural inborn qualities—although in certain contexts it is the *combination* of wealth and *arete* which constitutes the supreme blessing (as Sapph., 148; Pind., *O.*, 2, 58-9). Yet the advantage of riches is always hazardous. The poets often urge caution, and express the hope that time may not destroy men's wealth and possessions (cf. Pind., *P.*, 1, 46 f.; *O.*, 6, 97).

Working, then, in traditional motifs, Euripides' chorus advance slowly toward their climax of praise. In this stanza, they establish the principal point of their anticipatory foil; namely, that whatever wishful thinking we may indulge in, time in its

rolling course does nothing to help us discriminate between the good and the evil. If the gods granted a double youth to the worthy, then this bounty would be a sign. But the gods are not so sympathetic or understanding toward human needs. This strophe, then, leaves the major question still to be answered: how *may* the distinction between good and evil be manifested in accordance with the conventions of the epinician ode, and the merits of *arete* praised accordingly?

Strophe β' (673-86)

If the question posed above is the correct one, then we shall be on firm ground when we assert that in the opening words of this stanza, *οὐ παύσομαι τὰς Χάριτας/Μούραις συγκαταμεγνύσ* (673 f.), will lie the clue to the answer. This is a crucial point, since some commentators, despairing of seeing unity or dramatic sense in the ode at this point, have concluded that the poet has ignored whatever it was that he was talking about in the opening stanzas, and has decided to introduce a few personal comments—for the space of seven lines—on his dedication to his art; and then, remembering that he is dealing with Heracles, returns to his subject by an abrupt transition in line 680. However, a number of passages from formal epinician odes help to explain the structure of Euripides' passage, and in particular the transition between the second and third stanzas. From Pindar (*O.*, 1, 115 ff.):

May it be yours to tread on high all this time,
And mine to share the victory
At your side, as singer supreme in Hellas.

That is, the poet's song is fundamental for the illumination of the *arete* of the *laudandus*. Many other passages could be cited to demonstrate the point (cf. Pind., *O.*, 6, 105; *P.*, 3, 114 f.; *N.*, 9, 6 f.), but we must limit ourselves to a few that are particularly germane to our theme. Pindar describes Homer's laudation of the *arete* of Ajax, and adds (*I.*, 3 + 4, 55 ff.):

ἐργμάτων ἀκτίς καλῶν ἀσβεστος αἰέν.
προφρόνων Μουσᾶν τύχομεν, κεῖνον ἄψαι πυρσὸν ὑμνων
καὶ Μελίσσω . . .

i.e., "Homer perpetuated Ajax's *arete* by song, so that the brightness of his fair deeds is ever unquenchable. May I obtain

gracious Muses, to praise Melissus." Lastly, let us reconsider a passage from Bacchylides to which we already have alluded briefly, and which is a fairly close parallel—both in language and structure—to the Euripidean ode under scrutiny (3, 88 ff.):

ἀνδρὶ δ' οὐ θέμις πόλιον π[αρ]έντα
γῆρας, θάλ[εια]ν αὔτις ἀγκομίσσαι
ηβαν, ἀρετᾶ[s γε μ]ὲν οὐ μινύθει
βροτῶν ἄμα σ[ώμα]ατι φέγγος, ἀλλὰ
Μοῦσά νιν τρ[έφει]

"A man may not cast aside his old age and recover his youth; yet the light of *arete* does not die with the body, but is nourished by the Muse (i. e. *by song*)."

Since the intrusion of the Muses and Graces into Euripides' ode has perplexed many, we should examine their traditional role in encomiastic literature. The Muses clearly have an important function to perform.⁹ They are the source of inspiration enabling the poet to do full justice to the excellence of the *laudandus* which he must perpetuate through song. The Muse is also regarded as the inspirer of the *laudandus* as well as of the *laudator* (cf. Pind., *N.*, 3, 1 ff. and 15 f.). Pindar, it should be noted, will often turn to the Muses shortly before the culminating eulogy of the ode—exactly as Euripides' laudator does in the *Heracles* (cf. *O.*, 9, 86 f.; 13, 92 f.; *P.*, 1, 58 f.). The Graces, too, shed their favours equally on poet and victor. They endow a man with attributes which render him marvellous in the eyes of other men (cf. Bacchyl., 1, 151 ff.). Pindar describes how they shed a brilliant lustre (*φλέγοντι*, *P.*, 5, 45) on the victor. This is the problem of distinction with which the *laudator* of the ode from the *Heracles* was wrestling in the second stanza. The Graces can perform a role which is similar to that of the Muses; but, rather than *inspire* the song, they endow it with a beauty and charm which make it acceptable to the listener—an important contribution if *arete* is to be perpetuated through song.¹⁰

⁹ Arrowsmith, p. 123, interprets the Muses here as "life symbols": this connotation, if possible at all, could only be secondary in the conventional context of this encomium.

¹⁰ Cf. Pind., *O.*, 14, 4 ff.; 9, 23-4 ff.; other examples of how the Graces may attest to the victor's *arete* can be found in *O.*, 2, 50 f.; *N.*, 5, 53 ff.; 10, 37 f.

The Muses and Graces are formally linked in many eulogistic passages, and we should note one from Pindar in particular (*N.*, 9, 53 ff.) :

εὗχομαι ταύταν ἀρετὰν κελαδῆσαι σὸν Χάρι—
τεσσιν, ὑπὲρ πολλῶν τε τιμαλφεῖν λόγοις
νίκαν, ἀκοντίζων σκοποῖ' ἀγχιστα Μοισᾶν.

This latter passage occurs at the end of an ode, and the sentiment of εὕχομαι . . . κελαδῆσαι is not dissimilar from the asyndetic choral vaunt in the *Heracles* (673 f.) : οὐ παύσομαι τὰς Χάριτας/
Μοίσαις συγκαταμειγνύς. . . . In brief, the Muses and the Graces shed glory on the *arete* of the *laudandus*, and assist the poet in the illumination of this *arete*, so that it may be conspicuous for all to see and admire.

Through the power of song, then, as personified in the Muses and the Graces, the chorus of the *Heracles* resolve the problem posed in the second stanza of their ode, as to how the *arete* of good men may be manifested. The continuity implied in οὐ παύσομαι (*Her.*, 673) is a frequent *topos* in the panegyric, appearing in the early encomia to gods themselves (cf. *Hom. Hymn.* 3, 177; *Theog.*, 1, 1 ff.). It remains an essentially religious honour, and in our ode invests Heracles with ominously god-like attributes. The simple "I will always sing the praises of . . ." becomes here: "I will always mingle the sources of inspiration; now I sing the particular triumph-song of Heracles." The poet's elaboration of the theme and the asseverative wishes (676 f.), "May I not live without the Muses, but may my head ever be crowned" (cf. *Pind.*, *I.*, 7, 38), heighten the effect of the climactic cry, "I sing forever the praise of victorious Heracles" (680 f.). Here, the transition to the actual subject of praise follows happily the chorus' insistence upon their general powers as singers and encomiasts. Heracles is selected as the immediate object of praise from this wide sphere of general possibilities for praise now opened in perpetuity to these choral bards. The next three lines of our stanza make this point more explicitly. Heracles is to be praised wherever there is wine and music (682 ff.); for the chorus will always respond to song, and sound the praises of their youthful hero on all festive occasions. In so doing, these old men can enjoy to some extent, albeit vicariously, the pleasure of youth. Critics may still be worried by the

abruptness with which strophe β' begins. Yet the Greeks liked to use asyndeta to create impressive effects (cf. Pind., *P.*, 1, 29 ff., where the gloomy and unpleasant connotations of Typho are rejected with violent asyndeton). And we observe that in the *Phoenissae*, 1054, the chorus turn directly to the praise of Menoeceus with just such asyndeton.

To conclude our discussion of this stanza, let us cite one passage from Pindar in which Heracles appears in an encomiastic situation (*P.*, 9, 37 ff.). Here, Heracles is linked with his brother. They are given agonistic qualities—*κρατησίμαχον σθένος νίων* (89); the man who would not confirm Heracles' excellence is described as *κωφὸς ἀνήρ* (90), that is, the man who is *μετ' ἀμουσίας*, being incapable of praise or appreciation; the poet declares his intention to praise—*κομάσομαι* (92); his prayer is that the *καθαρὸν φέγγος Σαρίτων* (we note the suggestion of brightness, clarity) may not leave him: for his catalogue of praise is not yet ended. It would be as unreasonable to infer a personal attitude in the Pindaric passage as it is in the Euripidean. To summarize thus far. The chorus of this ode is to be heard, within the limits of its dramatic personality, as the *laudator* of a fairly conventional encomium. If anything remains outside this role of *laudator*, it is not the voice of Euripides himself, but the collective voice of a group of old men to whom what happens in the play is of some concern. Youth is lauded as an agonistic quality of supreme value, to which the tribulations of old age are opposed as a natural and admirable foil. Had the gods given men a double youth, as a conspicuous badge of *arete*, then one could distinguish the worthy from the unworthy with ease, and praise accordingly. However, such manifestation of *arete* must remain in the realm of wishful thinking. Time may increase a man's wealth: it will not restore his youth. Yet there remains one outstanding means whereby *arete* may be revealed, and that is through the power of song. Herein lies the compensation for old age. Despite their age, the old men express their determination to sing Heracles' praise for as long as they live.

Antistrophe β' (687-800)

The final stanza presents no problems. Just as the Deliades sing a paean to Apollo, so these old men will continue to sing a paean in the halls of Heracles. The mention of Apollo here

adds a further dimension to Heracles' *arete*, since the Muses and the Graces of the aged singers are by implication placed on a par with those attending the God of Music himself. One requirement of the formal encomium is that some catalogue of the *laudandus'* merits, whereby he can be shown to have earned his claim to song and glory, should be included by the poet in his panegyric. The *laudator* here acknowledges his subject's noble qualities ($\tauὸν γὰρ εὖ/τοῖς ἴμυνοῖσιν ἵπάρχει$, 694 f., suggests a wide sweep of praiseworthy material to which the laudator can hardly begin to do justice: cf. *Hom. Hymn*, 1, 19; Pind., *O.*, 11, 7; 2, 109 ff.; 13, 42 ff.; *N.*, 10, 19). The particular items chosen here are: the fact that Heracles has famous ancestry, his father being Zeus himself; and the hero's great achievements on behalf of men. The genealogy of the *laudandus* as a point of merit is a well nigh inevitable feature of most encomia (we observe, for example, the emphasis on Heracles' ancestry in *Hom. Hymn*, 9). The beneficence of the *laudandus* is also a frequent motif in the formal encomium; and the *Orphic Hymn*, 12 (Quandt) to Heracles, 7 ff., specifies his generosity toward mortals (cf. Pind., *O.*, 2, 102-3 ff.; Bacchyl., 18, 18; *Bacch.*, 378 ff.). With this allusion to Heracles' services on behalf of mankind, the laudator in the *Heracles* concludes his song. This triumphal ending is wholly encomiastic, recalling in particular the conclusion of Pindar's *Second Olympian*. It is also transitional, since the last of the *δειματα θηρῶν* to fall victim to Heracles' mighty arm is Lycus—who now enters!¹¹

The second stasimon of the *Heracles* structurally is a perfect unity. The conventional nature of its phraseology indicates that it is an orthodox, epinician ode with hymnal overtones. The climactic themes of the ode are: Heracles' surpassing *arete*; and the need to praise and make manifest this *arete* through the persuasive power of song. The singers of this encomium are a group of old men, and the attitude which they express here toward the trials of old age is fully consistent with their role throughout this play. In this, the chorus reflect the senility of Heracles' father, Amphitryon, and there is a considerable emphasis in the first part of the play on the incapacity of old age (cf. 42, 108 ff., 125 ff., 132 ff., 229 ff., 436 ff.). The contingent

¹¹ See Arrowsmith, p. 119.

longing for youth anticipates the appearance of Heracles, in whose mighty person lies the promise of an answer to all their problems. The old men have but one compensation for their debility—the gift of song, as they remark on their first entrance (109 f.) ; and the chorus assumes the role of *laudator* in all the odes preceding Heracles' catastrophic insanity.¹²

It is important to observe the accumulative effect of these odes.¹³ All are variants of encomia, and the eulogistic content increases in volume and intensity as we draw nearer to the tragic fall of this very embodiment of youthful *arete*. The first stasimon (348 ff.) combines eulogy with lament. The last of Heracles' glorious labours was his descent into Hades, thoughts of which prompt foreboding and lamentation; for the chorus now find themselves forsaken and helpless. Their final words in this ode (440 f.) are a lament for their lost youth. The second stasimon, as we have seen, is a straightforward encomium inspired by Heracles' return. The third stasimon (735 ff.) is a paean of joy unbounded, as the chorus see Heracles' recent feats as proof positive of his divine birth (805 f.). At this point Iris and Lyssa appear. The second stasimon, then, is one of a series of odes which deal with Heracles' prowess with ever increasing intensity, as foil for the terrifying twist when the great hero demonstrates his physical might in the most gruesomely unexpected way. In view of the ode's vital and demonstrable dramatic function, denigration of its inner structure and relevance to the action of the play can be based only on a misunderstanding of the ode's adherence to the conventions of encomiastic poetry.

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¹² The role of the chorus as aged songsters is well established in the *Agamemnon* (104 ff.): there, too, their function is to praise the deeds of heroes. We note that their choral vaunt—*κύριος εἷμα θροεῖν*—is (as in the *Heracles*) asyndetic, rejecting the gloomy premonitions of the previous lines. We observe, too, that this same chorus only a little earlier (72-82) have mourned the infirmity of their old age in contrast to the vigour of youth (a striking parallel is to be found in Yeats' poem, "Sailing to Byzantium," which is cast firmly in the same tradition).

¹³ And see Arrowsmith, p. 74. on the dramatic function of the parodos.

CICERO'S SUCCESSION-PROBLEM IN CILICIA.

In July 51 Cicero arrived in his province of Cilicia accompanied by a staff that included four competent legates, whose selection was no doubt prudently intended to compensate for their proconsul's own relative inexperience in the military sphere.¹ He had arranged that in the very likely event of his departure from the province before the arrival of his successor, the able legate C. Pomptinus would be left in charge in the interval. But by February in the following year Pomptinus had decided to return to Rome ahead of Cicero, and from a series of letters dating after this Cicero appears to have been faced with the rather difficult problem of finding a suitable acting-governor, since he remained as eager as ever to quit the province at the earliest permissible date.² This “πρόβλημα quem praeficiam” and the solution adopted both seem easily explainable: the one by Pomptinus' decision, Cicero's reluctance to leave his brother Quintus behind, or Quintus' reluctance (or refusal) to stay in charge of the province, and the utter incompetence of the quaestor L. Mescinius Rufus; the other by the arrival of a successor to Mescinius.³ The following re-examination is intended to show that the matter was in fact rather more complex, and at the same time to bring into proper perspective Cicero's picture of Mescinius, and his relations with certain of his subordinates.

It is well known that when a governor left his province before

¹ In all references to Cicero's letters the Tyrrell-Purser (*Correspondence of Cicero*) enumeration is indicated by the abbreviation TP.

Cicero's legates included two *praetorii*: the *homo militaris* C. Pomptinus, and Q. Cicerio, also a competent soldier (cf. Sall., *B. C.*, 45, 1; Caes., *B. C.*, V, 24, 38 f.; VI, 32 f.). The other two (M. Anneius, and L. Tullius) were not above quaestorian rank, but were clearly men of military ability (Cic., *Fam.*, II, 15, 4: TP 273; XV, 4, 2-8: TP 238; XIII, 57: TP 254). The quaestor L. Mescinius Rufus had, however, been allocated to Cicero's staff by lot, the usual method for quaestors.

² *Att.*, VI, 3, 1: TP 264; V, 21, 9: TP 250; VI, 5, 3: TP 269; *Fam.*, III, 10, 3: TP 261.

³ See Tyrrell-Purser (2nd ed., 1914), on TP 276, 294; A. Watson, *Select Letters*, pp. 271, n. 11; 281, nn. 5-6; W. W. How, *Select Letters*, II (1926), pp. 170, 245; Fr. Münzer, *R.-E.*, XV, col. 1076; M. Gelzer, *R.-E.*, VII A, cols. 986-7; W. F. Jashemski, *The Origins and History of the Proconsular and Propraetorian Imperium* (1950), pp. 70-1 (citing G. D'Hugues, *Étude sur le proconsulat de Cicéron* [1876], pp. 355-7).

his successor's arrival he placed one of his staff in temporary command. Such an appointment was considered a great honor, and, though in general it seems to have been the quaestor who was thus chosen, the governor who had on his staff a legate of higher than quaestorian rank would normally give preference to the legate.⁴ But the appointment was essentially a *beneficium* conferred by the governor, and part of the patronage which was his to dispense according to his own advantage and inclinations.⁵

In this connection Cicero's letter to Q. Minucius Thermus on the same subject is worthy of consideration, especially as it belongs to the same period when Cicero was writing about his "problem." Thermus, governor of Asia, wanted to appoint one of his legates as acting-governor. Cicero advised him to appoint instead his quaestor L. Antonius who *hoc ipso vincit viros optimos hominesque innocentissimos, legatos tuos, quod et quaestor est, et quaestor tuus*. The legates in this case were themselves of no higher than quaestorian rank, and the quaestor had the advantage of elective office which the legates did not hold. In these circumstances, Cicero implies, the quaestor must rightly view it as a personal *ignominia* if one of the legates was preferred to him. Cicero also seeks to dispel any anxiety Thermus may have on the score of his quaestor's incompetence by reminding him that if the acting-governor makes a mess of things, that is his own affair and no concern of his commander. But the most compelling argument in favor of the quaestor Antonius is the fact that he is *adulescens potens et nobilis*: hence Thermus must appoint him, unless he is prepared to face the *inimicitia* of the Antonii, which is not considered a very pleasant prospect. Even in these circumstances the claims of a quaestor who was not *potens et nobilis* might be overlooked; not so with one who came from a powerful and noble family; for what counted most was not the office of quaestor, but *nobilitas* and *potentia*. That, at any rate, is Cicero's point of view in this letter.⁶

Turning to Cicero's own case, it is important to consider the relevant passages chronologically. The question of an acting-governor first appears in a letter of February 13th. After men-

⁴ *Fam.*, II, 18, 2: TP 258; *Att.*, VI, 3, 1: TP 264; *Pis.*, 88; *Att.*, VI, 6, 4: TP 276; V, 21, 9: TP 250; *Fam.*, II, 15, 4: TP 273.

⁵ On *beneficia* and the Roman notion of gratitude, cf. E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (1958), pp. 3 f.

⁶ *Fam.*, II, 18, 2-3: TP 258.

tioning his plan to leave the province on July 30th, Cicero writes:

Primum contendam a Quinto fratre ut se praefici patiatur,
quod et illo et me invitissimo fiet. Sed aliter honeste fieri
non potest, praesertim cum virum optimum Pomptinum ne
nunc quidem retinere possum (*Att.*, V, 21, 9: TP 250).

The matter has not yet assumed the proportions of a "problem": Quintus, as the only available *praetorius*, is properly given preferential consideration for what is envisaged as only a short interval of temporary command,⁷ even though Cicero would not freely choose to leave him behind, and thinks that Quintus, when offered the position, will be far from willing to accept. By February 24th, when the threat of an imminent Parthian war has arisen, there is still no indication of a "problem" in regard to the temporary succession. Cicero's worry is not yet *quem relinquam qui provinciae praeosit*, but *quid illo fiet quem reliquero, praesertim si fratrem*—which implies the probability of the quaestor Mescinius being appointed *si non fratrem*,⁸ since his claims were now second only to those of Quintus. No change in the situation is indicated by the letters of March and April.⁹

By early May Cicero has come to realize that his deputy is likely to be in charge for a rather longer period than hitherto envisaged, since all the indications are that no decision on the regular succession will be forthcoming from the Senate for some time to come. At the same time he has received news that C. Coelius Caldus, one of the quaestors of 50, has been allotted to succeed Mescinius at the end of the latter's term of office.¹⁰ Early in May this news (which probably came from the two friends of Cicero and relatives of Caldus who wrote *commendationes* to Cicero on behalf of Caldus¹¹) is relayed to Atticus in somewhat non-committal terms:

⁷ Cf. *Att.*, VI, 3, 1: TP 264. At this time, and until May, Cicero was expecting to hear shortly of his successor's appointment. He will hardly therefore have foreseen the need for more than a short interval of acting-governorship (cf. *Att.*, V, 21, 3: TP 250; VI, 1, 4: TP 252; *Fam.*, II, 11, 1: TP 255).

⁸ *Att.*, VI, 1, 4, 14: TP 252; cf. 3, 1: TP 264.

⁹ *Fam.*, II, 11: TP 255; XIII, 57: TP 254; cf. *Att.*, VI, 2, 6: TP 256.

¹⁰ *Att.*, VI, 2, 6, 10: TP 256; cf. VII, 7, 5: TP 298; *Fam.*, VIII, 13, 2: TP 271.

¹¹ Cf. *Fam.*, II, 19, 2: TP 262.

C. Coelium quaestorem hoc venire audisti. Nescio quid sit hominis: sed Pammenia illa mihi non placent (*Att.*, VI, 2, 10: TP 256).

The last two sentences may be paraphrased: "I don't really know the man, but his part in the Pammenes affair is no recommendation"; a remark apparently designed to explore the attitude of Atticus towards Caldus as a prospective subordinate of Cicero.¹² For Cicero elsewhere gives a rather different picture of his reaction to the news about Caldus: the news is there described as "most desirable," and the accident of the lot which assigned Caldus to Cilicia is "delightful"; of the man himself, Cicero thought: *mihi quaestor optatior obtingere nemo potuit*, and looked forward to seeing their official connection develop into a bond of close friendship.¹³ It is in fact hardly to be doubted that Cicero was already considering Caldus as the man for the post of acting-governor. The question was whether he could persuade him to hurry to Cilicia before his own departure on July 30th; and as the weeks went by without further news of Caldus, Cicero began to fear that he would not manage to reach the province in time.¹⁴ By early May, therefore, the chances of Quintus being appointed have become somewhat reduced, even though he has not yet been approached by Cicero on the matter.

It is significant that Cicero does not begin to represent the question of the acting-governorship as a "problem" until after this time (near the end of May, to be more precise); and the problem is stated as follows (to Atticus): in view of the military situation, *pietas* restrains him from wishing to leave his brother in charge, even if Quintus should agree to stay; but the alternative of appointing the quaestor Mescinius is even more problematical, for *quaestorem nemo dignum putat; etenim est levis, libidinosus, tagax*.¹⁵ Not long after this the problem is restated in similar terms (again to Atticus):

¹² The text is that of Tyrrell-Purser. It seems that Caldus was involved in some way in the attempt to deprive young Pammenes (a ward of Atticus and Cicero) of property left by his deceased father. See *Att.*, V, 20, 10: TP 228, and comments of Tyrrell-Purser *ad loc.*

¹³ *Fam.*, II, 19: TP 262.

¹⁴ *Fam.*, II, 19, 1: TP 282.

¹⁵ *Att.*, VI, 3, 1-2: TP 264.

Nihil minus probari poterat quam quaestor Mescinius. Nam de Coelio nihil audiebamus. Rectissimum videbatur fratrem cum imperio relinquere: in quo multa molesta, discessus noster, belli periculum, militum improbitas, sescenta praeterea (*Att.*, VI, 4: TP 268).

In addition to Quintus and Mescinius, Coelius Caldus is now openly mentioned to Atticus as another person under consideration for the position. Moreover, by contrast with the other two, no reservation or hint of unsuitability attaches to his name: in other words Cicero's "problem" must now be little more than a matter of whether Caldus reaches Cilicia before July 30th. Mescinius remains in the picture only because of the lack of news of Caldus, who is here clearly being suggested as the best choice.

On June 21st a long-expected letter from Caldus at last arrived. Cicero anxiously sent out his orderlies and lictors on the first stage of the post with a flattering reply, greeting Caldus with a long-planned offer of *consuetudo*, and urging him to hurry on to Cilicia.¹⁶ The final words of this letter dispel any lingering doubts that from the beginning of May Cicero's idea had been to put Caldus in charge of the province:

Quam ob rem, quaecunque a me ornamenta <proficiunt
poterunt> ad te proficiscentur, ut omnes intellegant a me
habitam esse rationem tuae maiorumque tuorum dignitatis.
Sed id facilius consequar, si ad me in Ciliciam veneris;
quod ego et mea et rei publicae et maxime tua interesse
arbitror.

But no word of all this appears in the letter to Atticus written a few days later (June 26th), where Cicero merely repeats his earlier suggestion that Caldus is the right man for the position:

Et mihi decessionis dies λεληθότως obrepebat: qui cum ad-
venerit, ἀλλο πρόβλημα quem præficiam, nisi Caldus quaes-
tor venerit, de quo nihil certi habebamus (*Att.*, VI, 5, 3:
TP 269).

The matter does not appear again until the announcement that Caldus has been put in charge.¹⁷

The conventional treatment of this episode of Cicero's career

¹⁶ *Fam.*, II, 19: TP 262.

¹⁷ *Att.*, VI, 6, 3-4: TP 276; *Fam.*, II, 15, 4: TP 273; both letters written after Cicero had left the province.

clearly needs modification. First, the position of Quintus. It is certainly not enough to say that Quintus was not interested in the appointment.¹⁸ True (as we have seen), Cicero tells Atticus that Quintus would need to be persuaded to accept the post;¹⁹ and later, in explaining to Caelius Rufus his choice of Caldus, he says that he had failed to persuade him. But this claim is conspicuously absent from the other letter of explanation (this, to Atticus), the whole context of which indeed makes it seem most unlikely that Quintus had refused.²⁰ Cicero frankly gives Atticus (and, to a lesser extent, Caelius Rufus) his real reasons for not appointing Quintus, making a careful distinction between the explanation that was meant "for the public" and that which was meant for confidants like Atticus:

Ergo haec ad populum. Quid quae tecum? Numquam essem sine cura, si quid iraeundius aut contumeliosius aut negligentius, quae fert vita hominum. Quid, si quid filius puer et puer bene sibi fidens? qui esset dolor? (*Att.*, VI, 6, 3-4: TP 276)

si fratrem reliquissem, omnia timerem (*Fam.*, II, 15, 4: TP 278).

Cicero feared that Quintus' performance as acting-governor might be disastrous (judged at least by his own criteria), especially as the acting-governor was now expected to have a fairly long term of office. This fear was strengthened by the prospect of Quintus' headstrong son remaining in the province if his father was left in command.²¹ Nor is it difficult to appreciate Cicero's anxiety. His career is marked by an almost pathological concern for *gloria*, and he saw his own glory as inseparable from that of his family.²² In Cilicia his main ambition was to achieve

¹⁸ An argument followed e.g. by Jashemski, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

¹⁹ See p. 377; cf. *Att.*, VI, 4, 1: TP 268.

²⁰ *Fam.*, II, 15, 4: TP 273; *Att.*, VI, 6, 3-4: TP 276; cf. 9, 3: TP 282. The arguments to Atticus indeed run on the assumption of a straight choice between Quintus and Caldus in which the latter was preferred because the choice of Quintus seemed to Cicero to be *non utile nobis*.

²¹ *Att.*, VI, 6, 4: TP 276; cf. 4, 1: TP 268: *sescenta praeterea*; and 9, 3: TP 282.

²² J. Ferguson, L. A. Thompson, *et al.*, *Studies in Cicero* (Collana di Studi Ciceroniani dir. E. Paratore, II [1962]), pp. 40 f., 62, 71-2. This concept of *gloria* was indeed traditionally Roman (cf. U. Knoche, *Philologus*, LXXXIX [1934], pp. 109-10), but Cicero's concern seems to

his ideal of *gloria iustitiae et abstinentiae* without prejudice to the vested interests of Roman businessmen.²³ Since he had little confidence in his brother as an administrator or in his ability to handle businessmen in the way in which a would-be successful governor must, Cicero naturally preferred to leave in Cilicia someone whose errors could only very indirectly, if at all, affect the glory of the Tullii Cicerones.²⁴

From Quintus we turn to the quaestor Mescinius. Cicero's damaging judgement on this man is generally accepted as at least substantially valid.²⁵ But several considerations combine to suggest doubts. The point of view noted above in the letter to Thermus prompts the belief that, had Mescinius been *nobilis et potens*, Cicero might have had fewer reservations about him. This belief gains ground from the circumstances of the unfavorable reports on the man: only twice is he badly spoken of; and both cases occur in the immediate context of Cicero's "problem"; moreover, both references date after the news of Caldus' allocation to Cilicia, which reached Cicero more or less simultaneously with his realization that a considerable period of office was in store for his deputy, and his consequently greater reluctance to appoint Quintus.²⁶ Assuming that Mescinius was incompetent and "unreliable, lustful, and light-fingered," Cicero's problem ought surely to have been all the more serious before Caldus entered the picture and thereby widened the area of choice. Yet we find that the opposite is the case: Cicero begins to speak in terms of a problem only *after* Caldus' entry into the picture, and no mention of Mescinius' incompetence and thievishness appears until the end of May, when Caldus has already

have been extraordinary even by Roman standards, probably because of his *novitas*.

²³ Cf. W. Allen Jr., *T.A.P.A.*, LXXXV (1954), p. 125; Ferguson, Thompson, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-4; How, *Select Letters*, II, p. 170; D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, pp. 394-5; *Att.*, V, 17, 5: TP 209; 21, 8: TP 250.

²⁴ Cf. *Q. F.*, I, 2: TP 53.

²⁵ See references under n. 3, above. Even Carcopino (*Cicero: The Secrets of his Correspondence* [1951], pp. 124-5) accepts the idea of Mescinius as a "robber," though he notes some inconsistency in Cicero's picture.

²⁶ See above, p. 380. The first mention of Caldus appears at the end of the same letter in which we first observe the realization that *omnia potius actum iri quam de provinciis* (*Att.*, VI, 2, 6, 10: TP 256).

entered Cicero's consideration. Up to this point Mescinius appears both implicitly and explicitly as a model of *abstinentia*; and until Cicero begins to write of a "succession-problem," the one (very inconsequential) exception to the general picture of abstinence among his staff is not Mescinius, but the legate L. Tullius.²⁷

Mescinius, it is true, is not mentioned in any capacity other than his functions as quaestor; but this cannot be taken to imply incompetence, unsatisfactory behavior, or bad relations with Cicero. The four legates had been selected with a view to the main military roles, and it is naturally these men who appear in such roles.²⁸ On the administrative side, we are told of only one case where Cicero delegated authority to a subordinate: the prefect Q. Volusius was sent to Cyprus to handle lawsuits relating to Roman businessmen. Cicero regarded this man as "a safe and extraordinarily abstinent man," who could, presumably, be trusted not to offend the *publicani* and *negotiatores*. Volusius was himself a party to some financial transaction in Cilicia, in which two other members of the staff were also involved as sureties.²⁹ The *Letters* are, naturally, relatively silent on the role of Mescinius, in comparison with the legates and prefects who had all begun their service as friends (or friends of friends) of Cicero—appointed, not *sorte* like Mescinius, but *voluntate Ciceronis*.³⁰ Pomptinus, as is well known, was a close friend of Cicero; L. Tullius, a friend of Atticus, had been recommended to Cicero by his friend the money-lender Q. Titinius; Volusius, son-in-law of a friend of Atticus, was later described as Cicero's *discipulus*.³¹ But Mescinius' relations with Cicero were clearly

²⁷ *Att.*, V, 10, 2: TP 198; 14, 2: TP 204; 15, 5: TP 207; 16, 3: TP 208; 17, 2: TP 209; 21, 5: TP 250. Carcopino's interpretation (*loc. cit.*) of the obvious inconsistency in Cicero's picture of Mescinius is that the earlier mention of "abstinence" was mere whitewashing designed to give Atticus a more favorable view of Cicero's own administration. But Carcopino's view is that Cicero aided and abetted a light-fingered Mescinius in order to fill his own pockets with ill-gotten gains without taking the blame for it!

²⁸ *Fam.*, XV, 4, 2-8: TP 238; III, 6, 5: TP 213. But Mescinius will no doubt have been a member of the *consilium* mentioned in *Fam.*, XV, 2, 5: TP 219. On his duties as quaestor, cf. *Att.*, VI, 7, 2: TP 270; *Fam.*, V, 20: TP 302.

²⁹ *Att.*, V, 21, 6: TP 250: *certum hominem et mirifice abstinentem*; cf. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Pallologus*, CV (1961), pp. 72 f.

³⁰ *Att.*, V, 14, 2: TP 204; II, 4, 1: TP 31; VII, 18, 4: TP 316; V, 21,

good, perhaps in large measure because of their common interest in the humanities.³¹ It may also be noted that Cicero practically entrusted to Mescinius the whole business of making up the accounts, and so must actually have placed a great deal of confidence in the man, which he would hardly have done with a light-fingered quaestor.³²

All later references to Mescinius are highly favorable,³³ though Münzer (*op. cit.*, 1077) inferred (wrongly) from one passage an apology by Mescinius for unsatisfactory behavior in the province. The passage comes from a letter to Mescinius written in March 49:

Etsi mihi numquam dubium fuit quin tibi essem carissimus, tamen cotidie magis id perspicio, exstatque id, quod mihi ostenderas quibusdam litteris, *hoc te studiosorem* in me colendo fore quam in provincia fuisses (etsi meo iudicio nihil ad tuum provinciale officium addi potest) *quo liberius iudicium esse posset tuum* (*Fam.*, V, 19, 1: TP 390).

It is clear from the words I have italicized that Mescinius had merely meant to emphasize the personal nature of his regard for his ex-commander (and the genuineness of it, since he was no longer bound to show any regard for Cicero), as distinct from

5-6: TP 250. Note also Cicero's early references to individual members of his staff where Mescinius is merely "quaestor," by contrast with *tuus Tullius*, *Lepta noster*, and others mentioned by name and in a familiar manner (*Att.*, V, 11, 14: TP 200; 17, 2: TP 209; 4, 2: TP 187; VI, 1, 22: TP 252).

³¹ Cf. *Fam.*, XVI, 4, 3: TP 288; V, 21, 2: TP 458; XIII, 26, 1: TP 521; XIII, 28: TP 523.

³² *Fam.*, V, 20, 2: TP 302. Mescinius seems to have employed his cousin Mindius, a provincial banker, to work on the accounts; but this with the full approval of Cicero. The *servus scriba* of Cicero no doubt brought documents and instructions from his master to Mescinius; but a light-fingered quaestor might still have abused his rank and authority for his own ends. This letter may seem suggestive of a certain unpleasantness in the relations between Cicero and Mescinius; but the querulous attitude of the latter is to be explained rather by Cicero's undue haste in sending his accounts to the *aerarium* (See Tyrrell-Purser, *ad loc.*; Shackleton Bailey, *art. cit.*, and *Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc.* [1958-9], pp. 7-8), without allowing him a chance finally to check over certain points, including a rather odd entry authorized by Cicero the aim of which was to save Volusius, one of the legates, and the *praefectus fabrum* Lepta from serious financial loss.

³³ In addition to the references given in n. 31, see *Fam.*, V, 21: TP 458; XVI, 9, 4: TP 292; V, 19: TP 390.

his former official relationship: now that his relationship with Cicero was a matter of his own free will, he promised to be all the more assiduous in cultivating him. The obvious implication of the passage and of the letter as a whole is that Mescinius, on his return from Cilicia, took the initiative in assuring his ex-commander's *patrocinium* for his future career.³⁴ The contrast in tone and content between Cicero's later references to Mescinius and the earlier unfavorable estimate of him in the context of the "problem" is patent, and has been explained on the ground that the later references are too friendly to be sincere.³⁵ The truth is that the earlier and unfavorable characterization is too hostile to be convincing.

Finally, the case of Coelius Caldus. It is important to note that Cicero's confidants had a rather unflattering opinion of this young man's abilities. In reply to Cicero's letters on the "problem," Atticus gave no positive advice towards a solution, but urged that the younger Quintus should not be allowed to remain in the province, and stated the case as he saw it against Caldus.³⁶ Both Atticus and Caelius saw Caldus as a "silly little boy" who lacked *gravitas* and *continentia*—a demerit which (*pace* Cicero) disqualified Mescinius. Cicero himself felt the need to be apologetic about his choice, admitting the validity of his friends' rather low opinion of Caldus.³⁷ He could add by way of defense that he had followed the general practice in appointing his quaestor, there being no one of higher rank available, since Quintus had refused (*Fam.*, II, 15, 4: TP 273) / since he did not wish to appoint Quintus (*Att.*, VI, 6, 3-4: TP 276). But neither of his correspondents will have known that Caldus' presence in time for the appointment had been the result of Cicero's eager initiative,³⁸ but for which this would have been no less cogent an argument in favor of Mescinius.

The estimate which Cicero (in the context of the "problem") wishes us to draw of the relative merits of Caldus and Mescinius

³⁴ See Tyrrell-Purser, *ad loc.*; cf. *Historia*, XI (1962), pp. 346-9; *Fam.*, V, 19: TP 390: especially on Mescinius' promise to follow Cicero's lead in the civil war—a promise which he kept.

³⁵ Münzer, *R.-E.*, XV, col. 1077.

³⁶ *Att.*, VI, 9, 3: TP 282; 6, 3: TP 276.

³⁷ *Att.*, VI, 6, 3-4: TP 276; *Fam.*, II, 15, 4: TP 273.

³⁸ Both these letters show that neither Atticus nor Caelius Rufus was as yet aware of the facts established from the letter to Caldus.

is very much open to question. He preferred Caldus, not because Mescinius was incompetent, but because Caldus was *nobilis adulecens*. In his estimation, it would have been folly to miss a fortunate opportunity of attaching to himself a young noble of good connections. After all, even powerful dynasts like Pompey and Caesar never omitted such opportunities: they even *created* them by appointing well-connected young men as their quaestors *sine sorte*. In grasping his opportunity (by conferring on Caldus the *beneficium* and *ornamentum* of the temporary command) Cicero was only acting *potentissimorum durum exemplo*. He could overlook Caldus' faults because of his *nobilitas* and the *dignitas* of his family: though not completely unconcerned about the possibility of Caldus proving to be a disastrous deputy, he was far less so than he would have been in the case of Quintus—whose misgovernment would have affected his own *gloria* directly—or of Mescinius, who had no *nobilitas* and *dignitas* or promise of noble *officia* to offer in compensation.³⁹

It was for this reason that Cicero had from early May conceived the idea of appointing Caldus. But he found it necessary to justify his idea to his friends: if Atticus could be induced to believe that "no one could be more unsuitable than the quaestor Mescinius," then, in view of his fears about Quintus, Cicero would appear to have a real problem on his hands; and Atticus (with his memories of the Pammenes affair) would be less likely to object to the choice of Caldus.⁴⁰ It is difficult to see any better

³⁹ *Fam.*, II, 15, 4: TP 273; 19, 2: TP 262; *Att.*, VI, 6, 4: TP 276; cf. *Proc. Afr. Class. Ass.*, V (1962), p. 20. True, Cicero also explains that his object in appointing Caldus was not so much to gain his *amicitia* as to avoid his *inimicitia*, which would have been aroused had he been passed over. But Caldus would hardly have reached Cilicia before Cicero had appointed someone else had not Cicero himself urged him to hurry on! Clearly therefore an insincere argument. Also insincere is the statement that he saw Caldus as the most suitable person available only after the recession of the Parthian threat; on the continuation of which, cf. *Att.*, VI, 5, 3: TP 269. For the known details of the careers and backgrounds of Caldus and Mescinius, see *R.-E.*, IV, cols. 195-6; XV, cols. 1076-7.

⁴⁰ Note the curious remark to Atticus at the end of the letter explaining the choice of Caldus (VI, 6, 4: TP 276): *At te apud eum (sc. Caldum), di boni, quanta in gratia posui! eique legi litteras non tuas sed librari tui.* It is a matter of a letter containing friendly references to Caldus, dictated by Cicero to a secretary of Atticus in his employ,

THE *ADYNATON* AS A STYLISTIC DEVICE.

Frequently in Greek and Latin poetry one encounters a phenomenon known to modern scholars as the *adynaton*, an example of which is the following passage from Vergil's *Eclogues* (I, 56-63) :

ante leves ergo pascentur in aethere cervi
et freta destituent nudos in litore piscis,
ante pererratis amborum finibus exsul
aut Ararim Parthus bibet aut Germania Tigrim
quam nostro illius labatur pectore vultus.

Ernest Dutoit defines it in the following way: *le poète, pour représenter un fait ou une action comme impossibles, absurdes ou invraisemblables, les met en rapport avec une ou plusieurs impossibilités naturelles.*¹ Scholars may be disappointed that a definition has been supplied from modern scholarship rather than from ancient rhetoric. The explanation is that, although previous studies have been prompt to recognize it as a rhetorical device, they have not found it listed in the ancient handbooks of rhetoric and style. In the absence of ancient authority three conjectures have been offered.

The earliest designation of the *adynaton* by modern scholars appears to have been *comparatio ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύνατον*.² The basis for this term is Lactantius Placidus, who called an *adynaton* in the *Thebaid* a *comparatio ab impossibili*.³ No mention, however, is made of a *comparatio ab impossibili* in any rhetorical treatise, and the term appears to have originated with Lactantius.⁴

¹ *Le thème de l'adynaton dans la poésie antique* (Paris, 1936), p. ix. Dutoit's work contains a complete and accurate list of *adynata* in Greek and Latin poetry.

² C. Orelli, *Quintus Horatius Flaccus* (Zurich, 1843), *ad Epodes*, 16, 25-35; Johann Demling, *De Poetarum Latinorum ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύνατον Comparationibus* (Würzburg, 1898), p. 1.

³ *Comment. in Statii Thebaida et Achilleida, ad Thetaid*, VII, 552.

⁴ Demling, *op. cit.*, p. 3, admits, *Grammatici autem, si eos consulturi sumus, nobis prorsus desunt; omnes ἀδύνατον nescio quomodo praetermiserunt.* Richard Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer* (2d ed., Leipzig, 1885), does not cite this term. Likewise Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* (2 vols., Munich, 1960), II, p. 866, includes an extensive list of the uses of *comparatio* but not a *comparatio ab impossibili*.

Another designation was given by Brandt, whose *σχῆμα ἐξ ἀδυνάτου* has the familiar ring of ancient rhetoric, although he did not cite his source.⁵ Subsequently Brandt's term was found in the rhetorical treatise of Fortunatianus, but it had nothing to do with the *adynaton*, as modern scholars recognize it.⁶ The third and most widely accepted designation is *ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ τὸ ἀδύνατον*, which is derived from the remarks of Demetrius on the hyperbole.⁷ But when one examines Demetrius' impossible-type hyperbole, he will immediately perceive that it has little in common with the *adynaton*.⁸

⁵ P. Brandt, *P. Ovidi Nasonis De Arte Amatoria, Libri Tres* (Leipzig, 1902), *ad I*, 269-74.

⁶ *Artis Rhetoricae Libri III*, I, 3 (Halm, p. 83). Fortunatianus is not discussing figures of speech or style in this passage; instead he is listing certain cases which cannot be proved and which the lawyer should avoid. One such case is the *σχῆμα ἐξ ἀδυνάτου*, and the following example is given: *ut si infans accusetur adulterii, quod cum uxore cubarit aliena*. Clearly this has nothing to do with the *adynaton*, but Nicola Pirrone, "Αδύνατον," *Athenaeum*, II (1914), p. 38, carelessly cited the passage as the stylistic designation and description of the *adynaton*. H. V. Canter, "The Figure 'Αδύνατον' in Greek and Latin Poetry," *A.J.P.*, LI (1930), p. 32, without investigating Pirrone's citation boldly asserted, "The technical designation of the figure is *σχῆμα ἐκ (ἀπὸ) τοῦ ἀδυνάτου*." Canter also neglected to cite Pirrone directly as his source of information, and as a result he has received the blame for what was originally Pirrone's mistake (cf. O. Schultz-Gora, "Das Adynaton in der altfranzösischen und provenzalischen Dichtung nebst Dazugehörigem," *Archiv f. d. Studium d. n. Sprachen*, CLXI [1932], 204).

⁷ *De Elocutione*, 124-7.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 124: *κατὰ τὸ ἀδύνατον, ὡς τὸ οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξε κάρη*. Strangely enough, after Pirrone had used the word *σχῆμα* to describe the *adynaton*, he went on to say that it was a hyperbole (which is usually a trope not a *schema*), *op. cit.*, p. 39. Canter, *loc. cit.*, again followed Pirrone, and his remarks formed the gist of the article in *Dictionary of World Literature*, ed. Joseph T. Shipley (Paterson, New Jersey, 1960), *s. v.* *adynaton*. Neither Pirrone nor Canter, however, include Demetrius' example (which is found in the *Iliad*, IV, 443 and imitated by Horace in *Odes*, I, 1, 36) in their collections of *adynata*. On the other hand, the *adynaton* is not included in studies on the hyperbole; cf. R. Hunziker, *Die Figur der Hyperbel in den Gedichten Vergils* (Berlin, 1896). It would seem that Pirrone's designation of the *adynaton* as a hyperbole does not even correspond to his own conception of it. At any rate, Schultz-Gora, *op. cit.*, pp. 204, 205, has convincingly shown that it has little to do with the hyperbole.

The preceding conjectures are unsatisfactory. They do not correspond to what is generally considered an *adynaton*. What is more important, they are not substantiated by the ancient rhetoricians and stylists. It must be insisted that more than conjecture is needed if we are to understand and appreciate the function of the *adynaton* in Greek and Latin poetry.⁹ On the other hand, it cannot be said that they occupied no fixed position in the ancient theory of style. There are nearly two hundred examples of *adynata* from Homer to Juvenal. A brief glance at these examples will reveal a uniformity which could only be the result of a standardized regard for their purpose and execution. Although the rhetoricians and stylists appear to be completely silent about the *adynaton*, there is one aspect of its study, overly neglected, which promises to provide the evidence for its place in the classical theory of style.

Passing notice of the popular and proverbial flavor of the *adynaton* has been made by many who have been interested in this problem.¹⁰ Striking statements denoting things which are absurd, paradoxical, or impossible are found in the proverbs of all nations. The extensive collections of Greek and Latin proverbs abound in these statements, many of which appear as *adynata* in Greek and Latin poetry.¹¹ Of particular significance is a

⁹ This point cannot be stressed enough. Previous studies have usually acted on the assumption that the *adynaton* is primarily a rhetorical figure; cf. R. H. Coon, "The Reversal of Nature as a Rhetorical Figure," *Indiana University Studies*, XV (1928), pp. 3-20; J. G. Fucilla, "Petrarchism and the Figure ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ," *Zeitschr. f. rom. Phil.*, LVI (1936), p. 681, speaks of "rhetorical unrestraint," and Dutoit, *op. cit.*, pp. 155, 156, regularly mentions the rhetorical *abus* of many *adynata*. Yet none of these studies has presented proof that the *adynaton* was regarded primarily from the standpoint of rhetoric in antiquity. Hans Herter, review of *Le thème de l'Adynaton dans la Poésie antique*, by Ernest Dutoit, *Gnomon*, XV (1939), p. 210, is right when he suggests that its significance went beyond rhetorical ornamentation.

¹⁰ I. V. Zingerle, "Der Rhein und andere Flüsse in sprachwörtlichen Redensarten," *Germania*, VII (1862), pp. 187-92; Wilhelm Kroll, *Studien zum Verständnis der römischen Literatur* (Stuttgart, 1924), pp. 166, 167. The proverbial nature of *adynata* did not escape Canter, *op. cit.*, p. 41, but he had accepted Pirrone's erroneous views and consequently did not pursue the relationship between the *adynaton* and the proverb. Dutoit, *op. cit.*, noted many of the popular origins of the *adynata*, and his work has been invaluable for my own studies.

¹¹ E. L. Leutsch and F. G. Schneidewin (eds.), *Corpus Paroemio-*

proverb collection attributed to Plutarch—the so-called *Eclogue of Plutarch*.¹² Unlike most of the collections of Greek proverbs it is arranged according to subject rather than in the usual quasi-alphabetical order. The collection's first subject division has the caption, ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΔΥΝΑΤΩΝ, and contains solely impossible-type proverbs or *adynata*. That there were other collections of such proverbs seems more than likely. Plutarch quotes an *adynaton* and remarks that it is a proverb found ἐν τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις.¹³ Since this proverb is not in the *Eclogue*, nor, for that matter, in any of the other early collections of Greek proverbs, we may assume that Plutarch is referring either to a lost portion of the *Eclogue* or to lists of *adynata* which are no longer extant. The latter view is more probable. One would expect Plutarch to be more exact if he were referring to a specific collection, whereas his citation leaves the impression that lists of *adynaton*-type proverbs were fairly common and were regarded as a distinct group.

The scholia frequently identify *adynata* in poetry as proverbs.¹⁴ The comment of one scholiast deserves special attention. Concerning an *adynaton* in Aristophanes' *Peace* (1075-6) he states, τὸ ἀδύνατον δὲ εἶπε, and directs his reader to a similar *adynaton*

graphorum Graecorum (2 vols. and suppl., Göttingen, 1839-1851), hence referred to as C.P.G.; R. Strömberg, *Greek Proverbs* (Göteborg, 1954); A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (Leipzig, 1890). K. Rupprecht, "Παρούσια," *R.-E.*, XVIII, pt. 4, cols. 1713, 1714, states, "Einen besonders breiten Raum nehmen im griechischen Spr. die sog. *ἀδύνατα* ein."

¹² C.P.G., I, pp. 343-8. It is highly doubtful that Plutarch is the author; cf. K. Ziegler, "Plutarchos," *R.-E.*, XXI, 1, col. 880.

¹³ *Moralia*, 950F. J. J. Hartman, *De Plutarcho Scriptore et Philosopho* (Leiden, 1916), p. 584 labels this passage as *insulsum balbumque scioli additamentum*. I have not been able to find an edition which omits it. The recent Teubner edition, *Moralia*, Vol. V, fasc. 3 (Leipzig, 1960), edited by C. Hubert and M. Pohlenz, retains it. However, even if we are dealing here with a scholiast, the fact does not substantially weaken the case for the existence of *adynaton*-type collections.

¹⁴ E.g., G. Dindorf, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem ex Codicibus Aucta et Emendata* (Oxford, 1875-1888), *ad Iliad*, XXII, 262, 263; E. Schwartz, *Scholia in Euripidem* (Berlin, 1887), *ad Medea*, 410; Fr. Dübner, *Scholia Graeca in Aristophanem* (Paris, 1877), *ad Aves*, 967-8. Cf. also Eustathii Comment. *ad Homeri Iliadem et Odysseam*, ed. G. Stallbaum (photo repr., Hildesheim, 1960), *ad Iliad*, XXII, 262, 263; *Porphyrionis Comment. in Heratium Flaccum*, ed. A. Holder (Innsbruck, 1894), *ad Odes*, I, 29, 10-13.

in the *Iliad* (XXII, 262).¹⁵ The scholiast is certain to have recognized this passage in Aristophanes as a well-known proverb. Elsewhere he exhibits an acute knowledge of his author's proverbs, and it is generally believed that he had access to the fine collections of Didymus and Lucillus.¹⁶ The use of the article before *ἀδύνατον* and the reference to another passage indicate that his comment is to be regarded as a technical term and not an explanation of the passage, which offers no difficulty for clarification. Since the scholiast undoubtedly recognized the phrase as a proverb and was at the same time familiar with the most learned and extensive collections of proverbs, it seems more than reasonable to conclude that he is stating the technical term of a distinct type of proverb—the *adynaton*.

The collections of proverbs (particularly the *Eclogue of Plutarch*), the testimony of Plutarch, and the scholia justify the conclusion that the *adynaton* in poetry was regarded by ancient scholars as belonging to the category of proverbs. They are the only technical sources which account for it. But there is one major objection to this conclusion. Ernest Dutoit, who was the first scholar to attempt a thorough investigation of the relationship of the *adynaton* and the proverb, observed that not every *adynaton* could be found in the extant collections of Greek and Latin proverbs, and consequently declined to accept the proverb as its stylistic classification.¹⁷ The immediate answer to Dutoit's objection is that the collections, as we now have them, have undergone centuries of epitomizing with the result that there remains only a portion of the earlier list of proverbs and the exhaustive comments which accompanied them. They cannot be the sole determining factor as to what is a proverb and what is not.

Proverbs, in the truest sense, are concrete representations of abstract truths as opposed to the *sententiae* which are merely concise statements of abstract truths. Thus *nudo detrahere vestimenta* is a proverb, but *praeterita mutare non possumus* is a

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*

¹⁶ Karl Rupprecht, "Paroemiographoi," *R.-E.*, XVIII, 4, col. 1759.

¹⁷ Dutoit, *op. cit.*, p. 154. Dutoit apparently was not interested in tracing the *adynaton*'s place in the theory of style. He did not adopt any of the views of his predecessors, and instead invented his own term, *thème*, *ibid.*, p. xii.

sententia. The subject matter of the proverb is drawn mainly from the realm of nature as seen through the eyes of common people. Frequent use is made of animals, plants, and elements which have to do with the constitution of the earth and the universe (e.g., rivers, fire, ocean, and stars). The *adynata* in poetry have this same subject matter; in fact, most of them represent natural forces functioning in reverse or contrary to nature's laws. Rivers reverse their courses and run uphill; animals by nature hostile toward each other suddenly abandon their hostility and join as mates; trees produce fruit alien to their kind; and stars reverse their courses. The coincidence of subject matter, however, does not prove anything; the favorite source for nearly all poetic imagery is the realm of nature. But the *adynata* share another characteristic with proverbs which is of paramount importance. Like the proverbs, they consistently reflect folklore motifs. The great majority of them can be traced to fables, *märchen*, magic, oracles, and prodigies.¹⁸

It is not my intention to assert that every *adynaton* employed by the poets was an accepted proverb, but rather that the poets, when they employed it, were working in the realm of proverbs and popular speech. When an *adynaton* appeared which could not be found in the proverb collections, it was nevertheless

¹⁸ It is beyond the scope of this study to go into detail here. For an insight into the relationship of the *adynaton* to fable and *märchen* cf. O. Crusius, "Märchenreminiscenzen im antiken Sprichwort," *Verhandlungen der vierzigsten Versammlung Deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner in Görlitz* (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 31-47. One will find numerous examples of *adynata* in H. Hendess, *Oracula Graeca Quae Apud Scriptores Graecos Romanosque Exstant* (diss., Halle, 1877); note especially nos. 64 and 87. A folklore motif which is often represented by the *adynaton* is that of the impossible task, such as the numbering of the waves of the sea or carrying water in a sieve; cf. Eugene McCartney, "Popular Methods of Measuring," *C.J.*, XXII (1927), pp. 325-44. Two other studies which treat the popular aspect of the *adynaton* are G. van der Leeuw, "Adunata," *J. E. O. L.*, II (1939-42), pp. 631-41; and Otto Weinreich, "Volkskunde," *Arch. R. W.*, XXIX (1931), pp. 276-7. Dutoit, *op. cit.*, made many observations along these same lines, but his work suffered from a lack of systematic treatment. In my dissertation, "The *Adynaton* and the Statement of Perpetuity in Greek and Latin Poetry" (Dept. of Comparative Literature, Vanderbilt University, 1963), I expanded upon the contributions of Dutoit and sought to present the popular aspect of the *adynaton* in a systematic manner.

accepted as a proverbial saying. There are three indications for this: The first is the sense of decorum observed by the poets when working with the *adynaton*. It is found chiefly in personal poetry (lyric and elegiac), while in epic it appears rarely and then always in the mouths of characters. Instances of *adynata* in comedy are numerous; Plautus alone has fourteen. Bucolic poetry, with its use of the dialogue and its common-type characters, uses them frequently. As a striking instance of the sense of propriety with which it is used, one may note that Ovid, who has more *adynata* than any other poet, confines his examples mainly to elegiac poetry; only three examples are to be found in the *Metamorphoses*, whose narrative form tended to preclude proverbial and popular expressions. By limiting the *adynata* to personal utterance the poets testify to their popular character.

A second indication for a proverbial basis lies in the accumulations of *adynata* in a single passage, where well-known proverbs appear with other *adynata* whose connection with proverbs is vague or non-existent.¹⁹ The following passage from Propertius (III, 19, 5-10) will serve as an example:

flamma per incensas citius sedetur aristas
 fluminaque ad fontis sint redditura caput,
et placidum Syrtes portum et bona litora nautis
 praebeat hospitio saeva Malea suo
quam possit vestros quisquam reprehendere cursus
 et rabidae stimulos frangere nequitiae.

Of the four *adynata* in this passage the first two, the fire in a cornfield and the rivers reversing their courses, are proverbs²⁰; the fourth, although it is not a proverb, relates to a proverb²¹; the third *adynaton* is not listed in any of the extant collections. While the poet has definitely established the atmosphere of popular speech, he has also added *adynata* of his own making. The originality of the poet here, as in other passages, does not prevent us from seeing that his principal source for these motifs has been proverbs. In fact the modification and addition of motifs is exactly what one would expect where the demands of

¹⁹ With the exception of Greek epic and tragedy accumulations of *adynata* are the rule. As an interesting coincidence Demetrius, *De Elocutione*, 156 mentions that Sophron used accumulations of proverbs.

²⁰ C. P. G., I, 47, 346.

²¹ Otto, *op. cit.*, pp. 206, 207.

theme and meter, as well as the poet's genius, require originality in the treatment of traditional material.

Thirdly, the poets regularly associate the *adynata* with a popular setting. Vows and covenants are often expressed by *adynata*. A typical example is Horace's sixteenth epode (25-34) :

sed iuremus in haec: simul imis saxa renarint
vadis levata, ne redire sit nefas:
neu conversa domum pigeat dare lintea, quando
Padus Matina laverit cacumina,
in mare seu celsus procurrerit Appenninus,
novaque monstra iunxerit libidine
mirus amor, iuve ut tigris subsidere cervis,
adulteretur et columba miluo,
credula nec ravos timeant armenta leones,
ametque salsa levis hircus aequora.

The first motif in this series of *adynata*, the impossibility of sunken rocks floating to the surface, is an unmistakable allusion to the famous pledge of the Phocaeans, who sank iron weights into the sea before they left their city and vowed not to return until the weights reappeared on the surface.²² Similar vows are to be found in ancient histories and documents.²³ As an example of the *adynaton's* association with oracles one may note the list of *adynata* which the oracle monger in Aristophanes' *Peace* (1075-86) addresses to Trygaeus. Magic is another setting in which *adynata* are found. The witch Canidia in an effort to recapture the affections of Varus concocts a powerful charm and makes the following promise (*Horace, Epodes*, 5, 79-82) :

priusque caelum sidet inferius mari
tellure porrecta super,
quam non amore sic meo flagres uti
bitumen atris ignibus.

Many other examples could be cited, but the preceding references suffice to show the poets' awareness that they were working in the area of popular speech and beliefs when they employed

²² Herodotus, I, 165. Zenobius includes in his proverb collection Φωκαέων ἀρά, *C.P.G.*, I, 171, 172. Cf. also *C.P.G.*, I, 345. For the background of the other *adynata* in Horace's accumulation cf. A. Kiessling and R. Heinze, *Q. Horatius Flaccus. Oden und Epoden* (Berlin, 1960), pp. 182, 183, n.

²³ Cf. A. E. Raubitschek, "The Covenant of Platea," *T.A.P.A.*, XCI (1960), pp. 182; 183, n.

adynata. Dutoit's objection that not all the *adynata* in Greek and Latin poetry can be found in the extant proverb collections²⁴ is of little consequence in the light of the rich popular background which they manifest in every instance.

If the *adynaton* is regarded as a type of proverb, it is possible to find its place in rhetoric. Previously, in attempting to reduce the *adynaton* to a figure of style ($\sigmaχῆμα$), modern scholars have been baffled by the great variety of forms in which it appears. It is usually found in temporal clauses, in conditions, in comparisons, and in parataxis.²⁵ Dutoit is right when he observes that the *adynaton* *ne se laisse heureusement pas réduire à la notion d'un pur σχῆμα*.²⁶ It is likewise useless to seek unity of form for the proverb.²⁷ Both expressions are dependent on individual authors for their forms. The basis of their uniformity is in their function. The function of the *adynaton* is, as Dutoit rightly observes, *pour représenter un fait ou une action comme impossibles, absurdes ou invraisemblables*,²⁸ and to bring this about the poet places the thing regarded as impossible in juxtaposition with one or more natural impossibilities. In other words, the idea of impossibility is represented by a concrete example. Otto defines the function of the proverb in much the same terms:

Das Sprichwort in engerem Sinne oder, wie man es auch nennen könnte, das eigentliche Sprichwort kennzeichnet neben der Verbreitung und Anerkennung im Volke die Vertretung und Übertragung eines allgemeinen Gedankens auf ein Besonderes, Partikulares, d. h. das Bildiche, Tropische und Allegorische im Ausdruck.²⁹

Dutoit's definition is easily subsumed under Otto's definition. Both the proverb and the *adynaton* have as a common denominator a topical function.

²⁴ *Supra*, note 17.

²⁵ Canter, *op. cit.*, has arranged his collection of *adynata* according to the forms in which they are expressed.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. xiii.

²⁷ Otto, *op. cit.*, p. xxxi, observes, "Rein rhetorische Figuren, die doch sonst von den Römern angelegentlich ausgebildet und gepflegt wurden, sind dem Charakter des Sprichworts und überhaupt der Volksrede . . . zuwider."

²⁸ *Supra*, note 1.

²⁹ Otto, *op. cit.*, p. vii. Cf. also Rupprecht, "Παροιμία," *op. cit.*, col. 1712; Fr. Seiler, *Deutsche Sprichwörterkunde* (Munich, 1922), p. 5.

There is ample evidence that the proverb was regarded as a trope in ancient rhetoric. Aristotle's definition, *ai παροιμίαι μεταφοραι ἀπ' εἰδούς ἐπ' εἰδός εἰσι*,³⁰ was apparently the beginning of a fairly consistent tradition that extended through the Middle Ages. In the preface to his collection of proverbs Diogenianus affirms that the proverb is a trope and adds that it is a species of allegory.³¹ There is good reason to suspect that the words of Diogenianus have been borrowed from Chrysippus, who, like Aristotle, had exhibited a great interest in proverbs.³² Early Roman rhetoricians do not classify the proverb, but the late rhetoricians and grammarians reflect the views of Aristotle and Chrysippus (or Diogenianus) by classifying the proverb as a trope usually under allegory.³³

It is the conclusion of this study that the *adynaton* was regarded by the ancients as a type of proverb. Its use of the paradoxical, impossible, or absurd thought is in accordance with the proverbial manner in speech. The scholia and ancient commentators identify the *adynata* as proverbs. Plutarch indicates that collections of *adynaton*-type proverbs were in circulation at his time, and the *Eclogue of Plutarch* provides an example of such collections. To the objection that not every *adynaton* can be traced to the proverb collections it has been pointed out that in nearly every instance the *adynata* are invested with the characteristics of proverbs. They embody popular ideas and superstitions, they are reserved for personal utterance rather than narrative, and they are used by the poets in popular settings. The *adynaton* has the same function as the proverb; both attempt to represent abstract ideas by means of concrete images. Since it was a type of proverb, the *adynaton* was regarded by the ancient rhetoricians as a trope.

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³⁰ *Rhetorica*, II, 11, 1413a 15.

³¹ *C. P. G.*, I, 178.

³² *Ibid.*, I, vi.

³³ Charisius, *Ars Grammatica*, IV, 2 (Keil, I, 276) includes proverb with allegory under the heading of trope. Diomedes, *Ars Grammatica*, II (Keil, I, 462) states, *paroemia est vulgaris proverbii usuratio rebus temporibusque accomodata, cum aliud significatur, quam quod dicitur*. Beda, *De Tropis* (Halm, p. 615), also places the proverb under allegory.

AGAMEMNON, 78, 706, 1056-8, 1421-4.

I. "Αρης δ' οὐκ ἔνι τχώραξ. We may accept the authority of Fraenkel's edition on previous attempts to deal with this famous crux: *nemo sanavit*. Page's argument, that ἔνι can stand here for ἔστιν ἐν instead of ἔνεστι, is not supported by the lines he gives as parallels (*Pers.*, 738; *P.V.*, 294) and it ignores the altogether convincing parallel of ἔνεστι "Αρης at Aesch., *Supp.*, 749 and Soph., *El.*, 1243-4.

I suggest XAPMH for ΧΩΡΑΙ. Since χάρμη with its epic meaning "war-lust" survives in only one other passage from the post-Homeric classics (Pind., *Ol.*, 9, 86), this reading at *Ag.*, 78 would indeed be *difficilior*—unless the scribe had his *Iliad* firmly in mind, as Aeschylus obviously did throughout this parodos. The men of the Chorus are no longer εἰδότες χάρμης (Ε 608; cf. the changes rung on the formulaic μνήσεσθαι / λήθεσθαι χάρμης); they are of necessity εἴξαντες / παίσαντες χάρμης (Δ 509, Μ 389, Ρ 602); ἐρωήσουσι δὲ χάρμης (Ξ 101). But the best parallel seems to be N 104: ἀνάλκισες, οὐδές ἔπι χάρμη. Aeschylus has given new life to the proverb reflected at *Supp.*, 749 and *El.*, 1243-4 by making it ring with a distinct Homeric echo.

The "Αρης of the proverb must now be put into the genitive, to accommodate the Homeric subject of the verb; and the resulting "Αρεως χάρμη is simply the χάρμη of Homer, τὴν σφι θεὸς ἔμβαλε θυμῷ (N 82)—in place of which the god now breathes into the Elders a far different *arete* (*Ag.*, 105-6). We might compare the "Αρεως αἰχμή that inspires Aeschylus' Sarpedon (fr. 145, 17, Mette), or the "Αρεως πνοαί that lift the κύματ' ἀνδρῶν of war at *Sept.*, 63-4 and 115.

II. At *Ag.*, 706, Fraenkel's text is firm on the left side: ἐκφάτως. Only the right-hand page, carrying his translation, is marred by the interrogative: "loudly (?)." He chooses to be colorless with Paley rather than bold with, e.g., Ahrens ("weirdly"), Verrall ("expressively," significantly), or Wilamowitz-Headlam-Page (by way of explicit consent, in "bold avowal," with "loud approval"). But though the adverb is a *hapax*, the verb ἐκφάσθαι is used twice in the *Odyssey* in a negative formula opening the hexameter—when the frightened Eurylochus is impeded from getting his story out (κ 246), and when

Athena warns Odysseus not to blurt out his story before sizing up the situation in Ithaca (*v* 308). The inhibition in the one case and the prohibition in the other are not against speaking in a loud manner, as Paley takes them, but against speaking at all. Compare the formula ἔξαύδε, μὴ κεῦθε νόμῳ used twice by Thetis to her son (A 363, § 74) and once by Achilles to Patroclus (II 19), asking one who is obviously troubled to “speak freely,” with complete confidence in the other’s sympathy. (For this one might compare the Homeric use of ἔξονυμάζειν for initiating intimate conversation, the kind of conversation in which one’s hand is first touched: cf. Ahrer.d, *Typischen Scenen bei Homer*, pp. 29-34). At Herod., IX, 89, 2, ἔξαγορέειν is used for incautiously giving away information that might be useful to an enemy (the ἐκφάσθαι of *v* 308); and the same word is used at II, 170, 1 for revealing mysteries (compare Luc., *Pisc.*, 33).

In view of these passages, I suggest that ἐκφάτως at *Ag.*, 706 indicates that the Trojans *burst out* in song (cf. verbs like ἐκγελᾶν, ἐκκράζειν) without sufficient caution or consideration. Unreflecting and precipitate, they consider too late the real import of their song, so that ἐκ- stands in sharpest contrast with the μετα- of μεταμνθάνουσα δέ νύνον (*v.* 709). In terms of the *ālōs* which immediately follows this antistrophe, and which dominates the entire ode, the Trojans have unthinkingly fondled the lion cub that will destroy them. It is a knowledge that dawns on them only at length (*ἐντέρῳ χρόνῳ* at *v.* 703 corresponds to *χρονισθείς* of the *ālōs*, *v.* 727), after a sudden reversal (*τοτὲ ἐπέρρεπε . . . μετα- . . . δέ* of *vv.* 707-9 and *ταρακλίγασ'* of *v.* 744). Interpretations that would *anticipate* this total reversal, by making the Trojans’ actions conscious and deliberate (Wilamowitz glosses with *διαρρήδην*, though the word were better glossed with, e. g., *παρρησιαστικῶς*), or by giving the song a sinister sound from the start (*ἐκφάτως* = ἀφάτως; Ahrens’ *ungeheuer*, Blomfield’s *modo ineffabilis*, Stanley’s *supra modum*), miss the dramatic movement repeated over and over in the ode—from placid, unsuspecting, untroubled enjoyment of the song/lion/bride/φρόνημα/βέλος/ἄνθος to horrified recognition of its true *ἡθος*. There is no “avowal” or “approval” in the thoughtless fondling of the cub or singing of the song. Only after their terrible *anagnorismos* do the Trojans *consider* their song, and recognize that it has all along been more a dirge than an epithalamion: ἀπέδειξεν *ἡθος*.

III. Fraenkel's text for *Ag.*, 1056-8 is given in this form:

τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιας μεσομφάλου
ἔστηκεν ἥδη μῆλα τπρὸς σφαγὰς πυρός†.
[ώς οὐποτ' ἐλπίσασι τήνδε ἔξειν χάριν·]

Only one line (1056) appears sound, and even in its appearances are deceptive, since the commentary expands on the doubts about the genitive that are expressed in the translation: “For they, the sheep, are standing before (?) the central hearth . . .” In v. 1057, Fraenkel (followed here by Page) argues convincingly against Musgrave's attempt to restore sense by substituting *πάρος* (which still stands in the Headlam-Thomson and Murray-Maas texts) for *πυρός*. With Wilamowitz, he deletes 1058, as out of character for Clytemnestra and containing a motiveless repetition (and therefore a pastiche) of *οὐποτ' ἐλπίσαντες* in v. 1044.

To begin with *πυρός*: this is usually taken to mean the fire used in the sacrifice, and *σφαγὰ πυρός* could conceivably mean “the fire's slaughter” in the sense that the fire does the slaughtering or is the god to whom the victims are sacrificed—but this is not in accord with the facts of the rite. The phrase *cannot* mean, what is demanded if we are to take this *πῦρ* as the ritual fire, that the slaughtered things are offered up *in* the fire. But *does* the word refer to the altar-fires? The genitive *πυρός* occurs ten times in this play, eight times at the end of the line, twice in phrases concluding the line (vv. 9, 21, 282, 299, 304, 311, 497, 588; 475, 490; cf. final *πυρὶ* at 295)—and each time it refers to the beacon-fires of the signal from Troy. Apart from v. 1057, every reference to actual fire is to this signal-fire (*πῦρ* is used twice in a symbolic sense, in each case with a presumed reference to proverbs about fire—at vv. 651 and 1435). One must at least consider the possibility, then, that the *πῦρ* of v. 1057 is also the beacon fire. But if we give the word this meaning, can any sense be wrested from the phrase *τρὸς σφαγὰς πυρός*? Fraenkel points out that *πρὸς* cannot mean that the sheep stand “ready for” sacrifice or “as” victims, though he must settle on “for (?) slaughter” in his translation of the phrase he obliterates. But *πρὸς* can also mean “because of” (cf. L. S. J., C iii 2; Kühner-Gerth, II, 441 iii b), and *πυρός* can be taken as one of Aeschylus' quasi-possessive genitives where the word in the genitive is partially personified (*Ag.*, 21, 739, *Eum.*, 490-1, 832). The phrase could then mean that the sheep have been prepared “because

of the sacrifices for the beacon.” And in fact this is how Verrall interpreted *πυρός* (though not *πρός*).

But the passage seems very obscure, even for Aeschylus, if we take it this way. Perhaps the corruption is not to be sought (with Musgrave) in *πυρός*, but in *σφαγάς*. *Cho.*, 1037 (*πυρός τε φέγγος*), referring to Apollo’s purifying fire, and *Eum.*, 1029 (*φέγγος . . . πυρός*), where the fires of celebration at last replace Clytemnestra’s sinister beacons of the first play, suggest *φέγγος* may have stood in 1057 (cf. *Ag.*, 288, 311, 602, 1577). But perhaps more likely is the phrase *πρὸς φάτιν πυρός* (the fire has a *φάτιν* at v. 9, a *βάξις* at v. 10—and it is in character for Clytemnestra to insist on this, against the Chorus’ assertion that smoke-muffled fire can have no *βίξις*, v. 498, or at best a doubtful one, vv. 475–8). Furthermore, *πρός* with the meaning “because of” is most frequently used when action takes place *because of a message*—*πρὸς φήμην* (Herod., III, 153, 2), *πρὸς ρήματα* (*ibid.*), *πρὸς ἐπιστολάς* (Thuc., VIII, 39, 2), *πρὸς κήρυγμα* (Herod., III, 52, 1).

Not only would such an emendation clarify v. 1057; it may help us toward a solution for the difficulties in vv. 1056 and 1058. First, in 1056: since *πρός* has no longer to be taken *locally*, it does not have to stand in such close connection with *ἔστηκε*. We can place a comma at the caesura in 1057 after *ἥδη*, which makes the genitive *ἔστιας* comprehensible as one of the semi-personified possessives of Aeschylus. Clytemnestra says she cannot linger any longer *outdoors* (*θυράᾳ τῆδε* in v. 1055), since the *indoors’ things* are already in place—namely, the sheep readied because of the prior fire-signal. Several editors have followed Peile in making *τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιας* mean “as for the hearth-things,” in one of those introductions of new subject matter that are classified as “in apposition to the sentence.” But Hermann observed that this *τὰ μέν* has a far more specific function, fixed by the *οὐ δέ* of v. 1059, than the transitional *τὰ μέν* of such phrases. With W. Sewall (see Fraenkel’s note 1 on p. 481), I take *τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιας* as the true subject of the sentence, with *μῆλα* in rather loose apposition, almcst as an afterthought. Professor Christopher M. Dawson, who read a first draft of my suggestions on these lines (and offered many shrewd and helpful comments), made me realize what savage breadth of reference Clytemnestra achieves with her *τὰ ἔστιας*. All the things connected with the hearth, the warmth and coolness of the home

(vv. 970-2), the central pillar of the roof (vv. 897-8), the *πίτα* of all domestic growth (vv. 966-7), the *master* of the hearth whom she has already imagined stepping up to the *ἴστρια* (v. 968), and this watchdog herself, who has all the while been waiting (v. 607)—all those things she has summoned up and dwelt on in her fulsome, mock-domestic speeches—are now ready. From the first, Clytemnestra has mingled a feigned submission as wife with a barely-restrained exultation in her role as priestess-avenger before Zeus (vv. 973-4). Thus, the *abusio* that Fraenkel notices in v. 1056, the lofty Delphic epithet she gives to the home's central altar to Zeus, derives from her awareness of her solemn role in the real sacrifice she is thinking of offering for her home.

As for v. 1058: if we take *πυρός* as referring to the beacon, this gives the specifying *τῆνδε* of v. 1058 an antecedent—it is the *χάρος* announced by the *signals*. Fraenkel (p. 482, n. 3) is puzzled by the *ως* in this line, but the joy of those who receive good things *παρ' ἐλπίδα* was proverbial, and has already been referred to by Clytemnestra (v. 899) in what Fraenkel himself (on v. 899) calls a *τόπος*; so to be *ως οὐποτ' ἐλπίσας* is to be in the position of the proverbial ones surprised by good fortune. Clytemnestra may further be gloating over the men of the Chorus who doubted the beacons' news, and saying that she is as happy as if she had been one of *them*: “The earth-centering hearth's own things stand ready—the sheep ready because of the fire's speech—for us, who are like ones who did not hope for this blessing.” Wilamowitz and Fraenkel do not like the reminder, here, of v. 1044 (they do not refer to v. 899). At 1044 Clytemnestra described those who are so stunned by unexpected good fortune that they become irresponsible in their use of their possessions—including their slaves' lives. Here Clytemnestra calls *herself* one of those so stunned by joy: she is rapturously contemplating the sacrifice of the home's inmost treasure. She has taken several occasions to exult in its sacredness, before spilling it; she will pour out blood more rich than slaves'. In the parodos, the Chorus was amazed at the sacrifice of the kingly incense, brought from the depths of the house to be burned on all the city's altars (vv. 88-96); and the Queen had called on all the sea's dyes to justify the extravagance of the robes thrown down before the King (vv. 958-62). Her *ἐλπίζον κέαρ*, with a last touch of irony, now says it is as ready for prodigality as one who gains un hoped-for

wealth—to waste. Thus, except for the parenthetic and deceptive reference to the *μῆλα*, these lines (1056-8) all speak, with terrible directness, of the unholy sacrifice Clytemnestra is planning; and they are addressed to one of her victims, who can also see, even now, the *true* sacrifice to be enacted in the house.

IV. Here is the text, as Fraenkel (and Page) give it, of the sentence at *Ag.*, 1421-4:

λέγω δέ σοι
τοιαῦτ' ἀπειλεῖν, ώς παρεσκευασμένης
ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων, χειρὶ νικήσαντ' ἐμοῦ
ἀρχειν.

In the apparatus, Fraenkel says that he suspects a lacuna after *ὁμοίων*, though he found no way of marking this in the text itself. He translates, accordingly: “But I tell thee this: thou must utter such threats as these in the knowledge that I am prepared no less than thou . . . (that) he who has conquered me by force shall rule me.” This is clumsy in itself and, in context, nonsense. It makes Clytemnestra say “We are both equally prepared to submit,” although, in the very next sentence, she says that the Chorus will only learn to submit when it is too late! Further, it makes her present *both* alternatives—victory for her, or for them (so that, in either case, either side is prepared to submit); yet the next sentence begins as if it were *introducing* the second of two alternatives (*ἐὰν δὲ τούπελων . . .*). And, finally, it is tortuous in itself, and hardly consistent with Clytemnestra’s aggressiveness, to present the alternatives as if this were a contest in the ability to *submit* with good grace. These anomalies point up what we are led to expect of this sentence, if it is to fit its context. We must expect, first, that *one* alternative is presented in vv. 1421-4, and the reverse in 1424-5; second, that a threat is involved here, and that the threat made by either side is to oppress the other, not to submit (that, therefore, *ἀρχειν* will mean that one is prepared to *rule*, not “prepared [that someone] rule”); and third, in line with the last expectation, that *ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων* will not mean “equally prepared” (to submit), but “prepared, on the same terms, to rule.” Without going into all the reasons why the text, as it stands, cannot meet these legitimate expectations (which have all been expressed, in varying ways, in the course of the long discussion on these lines to be found in editions and commentaries), can we find some

easily understood corruption which, once removed, makes the entire sentence fall into its expected shape?

As it stands *παρεσκενασμένης* agrees with the word at the end of the following line. Assume, for a moment, that it originally agreed with the word at the end of the preceding line. Restore concord thus, fit the punctuation to this change, and the entire passage runs this way:

λέγω δέ σοι
τοιαῦτ' ἀπειλεῖν ὡς παρεσκενασμένῳ
ἐκ τῶν ὄμοίων, χειρὶ νικήσαντ', ἐμού
ἀρχειν· ἐλλ θέος,
γνώσῃ διδαχθεὶς ὁψὲ γοῦν τὸ σωφρονεῖτ.

The primary difficulty in the passage as it stood—that *παρεσκενασμένης* was followed by an accusative with the infinitive—is now removed, since the elision in v. 1423 is of *νικήσαντι*, not *νικήσαντα* (for these datives with the infinitive, see Kühner-Gerth, II, 475, 2b and 2c, 2; and II, 496). In fact, except for the fact that *παρεσκενασμένῳ* makes it clear that the elided word is *νικήσαντι*, one might emend the passage by reading *σέ* (for *σοΐ*) and *παρεσκενασμένον*. But for the elision, such a reading would be perfectly acceptable: at *O. T.*, 350-3, *ἐννέπω σε* is followed, three lines later, by *ὡς ὄντι* agreeing with an understood (*σοΐ*); but one could not identify this construction where the word is elided (cf. *O. T.*, 366-7, where *ὄμιλοῦντ'* must, naturally, be taken as an accusative following *σέ*).

The Chorus, suffering moral shock itself, has attempted to find some feeling of guilt in the Queen. But she tells them that the only point at issue between them is the simple question of power—Who is stronger? Like most Machiavellians, she wants to convince her foes that they too are motivated by nothing but the drive for naked power, though they dignify their threats with religious terms for the exclusion of pollution from the city. By such moral aggression they mean to cow her (*ἐμοῦ ἀρχειν*); but if her own play for power is destined to succeed, they will learn, in weak old age at least (*γοῦν*), not to challenge another's power until they are certain they possess superior force (for *σωφρονεῖν* as "non-involvement," see Gomme, *Comm. Thuc.*, I, pp. 166-8). The sense of the passage, then, is this: "I tell you you are threatening me in this way because you are ready, on the same terms (I deal in)—conquest by force—to rule over me. But if some god brings about the reverse of this, you will learn, though at your late age for being taught, what it is to submit."

ARISTOTLE ON BREATHING IN THE *TIMAEUS*.

At *De Respir.* 472 b 20 Aristotle criticizes Plato for having the breathing of the newborn commence with exhalation instead of inhalation. The commentators have uniformly sanctioned this verdict. Thus the latest edition of the *Parv. Nat.* terms Aristotle's stricture "omnino justa." But is it?

Plato's account will be found in the *Timaeus* 77 E-79 E. Within this account three parts can be distinguished: (1) 78 D 1-E 3, the "lobster-pot" analogy and its implications for the digestive process; (2) 79 A 5-C 7, the cyclical thrust mechanism as such; and (3) 79 C 7-E 6, the attraction of like (the inborn fire) for like (the external fire) as the supplementary mechanism accounting for the reciprocating nature of cyclical thrust. Let A and B designate inhalation and exhalation by mouth and nose and pore-exhalation (and, of course, vice versa), this and pore-inhalation. Then in the first part Plato observes the sequence AB b a. Given the simultaneity of inhalation by mouth and nose and pore-exhalation (and, of course, vice versa), this is clearly to be taken in the sense of A a B b. Consistently, at E 3 he sums up this sequence by saying that the Demiurge called the one (A a) *ἀναπνοή*, the other (B b) *ἐκπνοή*. In the second part Plato enters upon a more detailed account of the alternation of pore-inhalation (corresponding to exhalation by mouth and nose) and pore-exhalation (corresponding to inhalation by mouth and nose). The entire description is characterized as *τὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς πάθος*. Here *ἀναπνοή* is obviously used not, as at 78 E 3, in the specific sense of inhalation (which Aristotle prefers to call *εἰσπνοή*) but in the generic sense, normal for Aristotle himself, of respiration. Plato's reason for entering into details here is clear. He must clarify the principle of cyclical thrust before applying it to the explanation of the origin of breathing in the third part. There, finally, he mobilizes the supplementary mechanism of inborn fire striving to join its counterpart outside in order to explain how the whole process gets started (mechanically, not ontogenetically), and why, once started, it follows a reciprocating pattern. As it rises the inborn heat pushes the blood ahead of it toward the surface of the body, causing a corresponding volume of heated air to be extruded through the

pores and by circular chain-reaction to be pushed into ("inhaled through") mouth and nose. Thus fanned, the inborn fire pushes air out again through mouth and nose. The general attraction of inborn to celestial fire combines with a specific attraction of the warm air extruded to the residual warmth left in the "exit," the pores, through which it had left the body in the first instance. For though cooler than the air inside the body near the source of vital heat, the pores are still warmer than mouth and nose.¹

But to revert to the second part of Plato's account. The cyclical thrust mechanism there represents an ingenious attempt, derived from Empedocles by way of Philistion, to accomodate the possibility of thrust within the conceptual framework of a *plenum*-physics. Breathing like every other motion must be explained in terms of this mechanism. To carry conviction to the layman, however, the relevance of the unfamiliar cyclical thrust mechanism to the familiar phenomena attending breathing must first be established. Plato is therefore forced to begin with the one aspect of respiratory thrust that no one can fail to grasp. What is that aspect? Not surely the rise of inborn fire to the surface of the skin (and its corollary: inhalation by mouth and nose) in the third part of our text. For though chronologically prior to pore-inhalation (and its corollary: exhalation by mouth and nose), it is invisible. It is merely inferred on analogy with exhalation by mouth and nose by one already familiar with the general principle of cyclical thrust and its relevance to breathing. Had Plato, therefore, in the second part of his account, used the invisible because internal phase of breathing to illustrate that general principle, he would have been guilty both of begging the question and of explaining *ignotum per ignotius*. To establish his general principle here in the second part he wisely starts, instead, from the one instance of respiratory thrust which no one can fail to understand, from exhalation by mouth and nose. For at this point in his exposition it is clearly more important that he succeed in conveying the general nature and relevance of cyclical thrust to breathing than that he observe the correct

¹ Cf. Solmsen's trenchant argument for reading *θερμόν* instead of the *θερμότερον* of the MSS: "On Plato's Account of Respiration (*Tim.* 79 c ff.)," *Stud. Ital.*, XXVII-XXVIII (1956) (= Pasquali Memorial Issue), pp. 544-8.

respiratory sequence. Once the general principle is grasped, the correct sequence will take care of itself, as it does in fact in the third part. Conversely, if the basic mechanism is not here grasped, no amount of fidelity to the correct sequence can save the argument.

In sum, the second part of Plato's exposition deliberately follows the "false" respiratory sequence B b a A. That this has purely expository and no absolute significance is confirmed by the sequence followed in the third part of the account where the invisible, internal phase of breathing is discussed (79 C 7 ff.). That sequence is the "correct" one, a A b B, paralleling the A a B b of the first part.²

Now what about Aristotle's criticism (*De Respir.* 472 b 12-21) that Plato has the newborn start with exhalation (by mouth and nose) rather than inhalation? It is obviously based on what we have called the second part of Plato's account, to wit, on *Tim.* 79 A 5-C7 with its sequence B b a A, in isolation. Neither the first part, with the sequence A B b a, nor the third part, with the sequence a A b B seems to enter into Aristotle's awareness. The almost verbal echoes of *Tim.* 79 B 1 and C 1 at *De Respir.* 472 b 16 and of *Tim.* 79 B 2 at *De Respir.* 472 b 13 strengthen that impression.

Yet how are we to explain this extraordinary miscarriage of criticism? Two courses of explanation are open to us. Either we must assume that it is Aristotle himself who first misunderstood Plato's "lobster-pot" analogy, specifically, the *ēykúrtia* of 78 B 6 and D 3 as analogue for the cavity of lungs and belly instead of for mouth and nose. Or we must assume that Aristotle did understand Plato's analogy but carelessly fixed on the wrong part of Plato's total account, perhaps even consulted it in excerpt only. In the first case, we should in effect be saying that years of marine research following upon years of close asso-

² Cf. the analogous sequence in Empedocles' klepsydra-simile (DK 31 B 100, 14 ff.). Plato was, of course, indebted to Empedocles' general theory by way of Philistion (Jaeger, *Diodorus von Karytos* [Berlin, 1938], pp. 7-11). Empedocles, too, was bound by the accident of his chosen example to begin with exhalation by mouth and nose (a klepsydra must be immersed before it can be retrieved full of water). Yet he has the infant properly start with inhalation by mouth and nose (see *Empedocles' Mixture, Eudoxan Astronomy, and Aristotle's Connate Pneuma* [Amsterdam, 1960], pp. 63-9), nevertheless.

ciation with Plato could still have left Aristotle unclear as to what these *έγκυρτια* were. In the second case, we should leave unquestioned Aristotle's expertise in the *realia* of marine research, but at the expense of his scrupulousness in the criticism of his predecessors. D'Arcy Thompson's *Aristotle as a Biologist* and Cherniss' monumental documentation of Aristotle's frequently unfair or hasty criticism of the Presocratics and Plato combine to decide us in favor of the latter course of explanation. Aristotle cannot have been in doubt as to the nature of Plato's "lobster-pot" and its *έγκυρτια*. But he was in as great a hurry to settle the exact point of Plato's analogy of "lobster-pot" and breathing as he was, on the very next page, to settle that of Empedocles' klepsydra-simile. Notoriously, he there mistook Empedocles' "pores" for "nostrils." Here, on the contrary, he mistakes *έγκυρτια*, Plato's analogue for mouth and nostrils, as the analogue for the cavity of lungs and belly (accessible to air via the pores). And he makes this mistake because, for whatever reason, he fixed on the wrong part of Plato's total exposition. But once he had fixed on the wrong passage, no amount of technical familiarity with nets and dredging-devices could redeem him. He was bound to impute an absolute, biological significance to a sequence which Plato had intended merely to illustrate the general relevance of the cyclical thrust mechanism to breathing. Conversely, no amount of philological care in Galen's study of the *Timaeus* could make up for his unfamiliarity with the net at issue. When Galen (and more recently, Taylor) took *έγκυρτια* as analogue for the cavity of lungs and belly instead of (as Cornford has shown) for mouth and nose, he not only blinded himself to Aristotle's error but was actually bound to feel confirmed by his *de facto* agreement with it. Moreover, had Aetius, IV, 22, 1 happened to include a discussion of the *Timaeus* under his rubric *π. ἀναπνοῆς*, he would certainly have copied Aristotle's error here no less than he copies it in his confused summary of Empedocles' view. True, he starts with a correct account of the embryological origin of breathing according to Empedocles. In this he can be shown to follow the excellent, independent account of Meno, not Theophrastus-Aristotle (see *Empedocles' Mixture, Eudoxan Astronomy, and Aristotle's Connate Pneuma* [Amsterdam, 1960], pp. 70-7). But what he proceeds to patch on to this account is Aristotle's confusion of

pores and nostrils, of inhalation and exhalation, in the Empedoclean fragment at hand.

One looks in vain for redeeming features of the sort which Morrow has recently pointed out in connection with another Aristotelian criticism of Plato ("Aristotle's Comments on Plato's Laws," in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century* [Stockholm, 1960], pp. 145-62). The melancholy conclusion remains that in Aristotle's critique of the Timaean account of breathing we have yet another instance, so far perhaps unnoticed, of historically unreliable reporting.

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LUDWIG EDELSTEIN

The Editorial Board of the *American Journal of Philology* wishes to express its profound sense of loss at the death of Ludwig Edelstein on August 16 of this year. Professor Edelstein joined the Editorial Board in 1953 and served on it until his death. Whether he was at the Johns Hopkins University or elsewhere, he was generous in devoting his time, meticulous scholarship, and wisdom to the best interests of the *Journal*. He was the Board's expert on ancient philosophy and many an article that appeared in the *Journal* in that field owed much of its quality to the careful criticism and suggestions which he had made to the author. Although his passing is mourned by all scholars, it is felt with particular sorrow by his editorial colleagues.

REVIEWS.

BROOKS OTIS. Virgil. A Study in Civilized Poetry. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963 (copyright 1964). Pp. xiii + 436. \$7.20.

This is a rich and rewarding book. Professor Otis discusses in thorough detail the style, structure, and content of Vergil's three authentic works, with especial emphasis on the Augustan symbolism which runs through and unifies the poetry and (for the *Aeneid*) Vergil's use of Homer and the striking differences in the style of the two epic poets. No review, however extended, could do justice to the author's many acute and sensitive observations; he builds in part on the views of earlier scholars (e.g., Heinze, Klingner, Pöschl, Büchner, and Dückwirth) but he has much that is new and significant. *Brill's Weekly* of June 27, 1964 (No. 836) advertises the book as "meant for the scholar which *<sic>* is already well-versed in Virgilian criticism." I disagree; every teacher, student, and lover of Vergil should buy and read it and ponder Otis' many new suggestions and interpretations. Some may not agree with every detail, but all will have a deepened and enriched understanding of Vergil's poetry.

I shall summarize, as briefly as possible, the salient features of each chapter and then consider various specific points, especially (A) where the author expresses his opinion on several controversial issues, and (B) where I applaud or (occasionally) question certain of the author's conclusions.

I

In a brief opening chapter, "I. The Mystery of the *Aeneid*" (pp. 1-4), Otis presents the basic task and problem of the book: how was it possible for Vergil to do what no one had done before him and no one was able to do after him? "Only the *Aeneid* aspired to be both heroic and civilized, both remote and contemporary, both Homeric and Augustan" (pp. 2 f.).


"II. From Homer to Virgil: The Obsolescence of Epic" (pp. 5-40). Otis here traces the course of Greek and Roman epic from Homer (whose objective style "mirrored a real world," p. 5) through Apollonius and Ennius to Vergil, with many writers devoting themselves to historical or Homeric epic¹ far more frequently than is often realized, but doing so without success; he shows the essential correctness of Callimachus in turning to "little epic" with a narrative style characterized by realism, a familiar (often ironical) tone, a subjectivism of approach, and a brevity and asymmetry of narrative (cf. p. 11), and points out the important influence of Callimachus and Theocritus upon the *novi poetae*, and especially upon Vergil and Horace. "The *Aeneid* had no true precursors"; Homer and the post-Homeric writers of epic "were objective in their narrative . . . ; Virgil was subjective and transmitted to his narrative the colour of his own purpose" (p. 40).

¹ There are three basic types: "the panegyric-historical, the regional-historical and the Antimachean or Apollonian" (p. 16).

This leads directly to the theme of the third chapter ("The Subjective Style," pp. 41-96), one of the most fascinating and significant portions of the book and absolutely necessary for the chapters which follow. By "subjective style" Otis means both the manner in which Vergil shares the emotions of his characters (*empathy*) and presents his own personal reaction to their emotions (*sympathy*); this "empathetic-sympathetic style" is new in epic poetry and makes possible both a continuous psychological narrative and his symbolic structure (especially the *fatum-furor-pietas* complex); "without these, the *Aeneid* would never have succeeded in combining Homeric material with an un-Homeric, contemporary ideology" (p. 90). Otis illustrates the nature of Vergil's subjective style by a detailed comparison of *Aen.*, V, 315-42 with *Iliad*, XXIII, 757-83 (the two foot races); *Aen.*, V, 114-243 with *Iliad*, XXIII, 287-652 (ship race and chariot race) and the Dido story (*Aeneid* I and IV) with the Medea story (*Argonautica* III and IV). These comparisons show conclusively how Vergil differs from both Homer and Apollonius: "Virgil not only reads the minds of his characters; he constantly communicates to us his own reactions to them and to their behaviour" (p. 88).²

"IV. The Young Virgil" (pp. 97-143). This chapter, devoted to the *Elegies*, has two main themes: the psychological continuity of narrative which appears in an embryonic form in *Elegies* 8, 2, and 6 (the Pasiphaë story in 45-60), and the "symbolic structure" found in Virgil's arrangement of the poems. Otis examines earlier Roman poets, especially Catullus, for traces of empathy (Catullus LIV is rich in empathy but it is put to no dramatic use). His analysis of *Elegy* 8 reveals the manner in which Vergil has created a new type of narrative out of isolated scraps of Theocritus.

Vergil's arrangement of the ten poems, "their position in a total plan, is perhaps the single most important clue to their meaning" (p. 128). The poems fall into three main categories: Theocritean (2, 3, 7, 8), Theocritean, but with a Roman, contemporary bearing (5, 10), and non-Theocritean (1, 4, 6, 9); these are arranged in the reciprocal pattern already stressed by Maury, Duckworth, and others:



² Otis lists certain characteristics of Vergil's subjective style as follows: "the empathy and sympathy, revealed in sentence structure, tense differentiation, metric, and choice of words and similes; the 'editorial' intrusion of the author by 'finger-pointing' epithet, explicit declaration of *parti pris* and the implicit bias of his language; the relative absence of objective characters, speaking their own words and with emotions distinct from those of their author" (p. 61).

But they are also divided into two halves: "Eclogues 1-5 are relatively forward-looking, peaceful, conciliatory, and patriotic in a Julio-Augustan sense. Eclogues 6-10, on the contrary, are neoteric, ambiguous or polemic, concerned with the past and emotively dominated by *amor indignus*, love which is essentially destructive and irrational and is implicitly inconsistent with (if not hostile to) a strong Roman-patriotic orientation" (pp. 130 f.). Otis thinks that 6-10 were written in part to form a contrast with 1-5 and gives the order of composition as 2, 3, 5, 9, 1 ("the turning point in Virgil's composition of the *Eclogue Book*," p. 132), 4 and 6 next (closely related), then 7 and 8 and finally 10 (to balance 2, 3, and 5). Especially important are Otis' analyses of 4 and 6 to show their close relationship: in 6 we go from the golden age to the age of Heroes and the iron-age *amores* (symbolic of moral decline); in 4 we progress from the iron age (*sceleris vestigia nostri*) to the age of Heroes and the Age of Gold; 6, neoteric, a *deductum carmen*, reveals man's fall from the *Saturnia regna*, while 4, prophetic and inspired, in a loftier strain (*paulo maiora*) portrays the rebirth of the *Saturnia regna*.³ Similarly, 5 and 10 present a contrast between rebirth and *amor indignus*. In 10 Vergil takes his leave of love and the *deductum carmen*; his devotion is now the new *Romanitas* represented by Octavian (cf. p. 142).

"V. The *Georgics*" (pp. 144-214). In turning to didactic poetry Vergil is still faithful to Callimachean and neoteric principles; but the work is didactic, a guide to farmers, only in a superficial sense: it is "a most intricate structure of symbols and its major concerns are those most central in both human life and Augustan Rome: work, play and man's relation to nature in both, and, beyond these, life, death and rebirth. It is the transformation of Hesiodic and Lucretian didactic into a single homogeneous poem" (p. 146).

This chapter, like the preceding, falls into two parts: a lengthy analysis of the *Georgics* book by book, with emphasis on the many important contrasts (between I and II; between III and IV; between I-III and II-IV; and between I-II and III-IV), and a discussion of the Aristaeus and Orpheus stories in IV and their significance for the meaning of the entire poem; cf. p. 190 on the symbolism: "Life emerges from death: in political terms, the Augustan restoration from the anarchy of civil war; in symbolic terms, the Golden Age from the Age of Iron. . . . There comes a point where the symbolism does not carry its weight, where man has to re-emerge from the symbols and, so to speak, correct or illuminate them by personal intervention. This, as I see it, is precisely the function of the Aristaeus story." As to the Orpheus story, it is the first great example of a new style, utterly subjective and dramatic; we have "an empathetic identification of the narrator with Orpheus" (p. 200), and this is all the more effective because Vergil has deliberately made the style of the framing Aristaeus tale completely objective: "the Homeric atmosphere is maintained in the *Aristaeus* as it is in no other portion of Virgil's

³ Otis here provides an effective answer to O. Skutsch, "Zu Vergils *Eklogen*," *R. M.*, XCIX (1956), pp. 193-201, who rejected (p. 196) any connection between *Eclogues* 4 and 6.

poetry" (p. 197). The themes of the two stories "are reversed images of each other: the successful resurrection of the *Aristaeus* is counter-mirrored by the unsuccessful resurrection of the *Orpheus*" (p. 208), the result of his *furor* which undoes all he had achieved. "Love and death are linked here as closely as in Book III" (p. 212). For Otis' final interpretation of the *Georgics*, see p. 213; he concludes: "Man is, so to speak, at the centre of a vast network of cosmic sympathy and moral law. There is both *injustitia* and *humanitas* at the heart of things."

The next chapter ("VI. The Odyssean *Aeneid*," pp. 215-312) is the longest and, for many teachers of Vergil, the most important. Otis begins with the elaboration of the Augustan symbols which "is in fact that bridge that connects the *Georgics* with the *Aeneid* and, indeed, the *Elegies* with both" (p. 215). The resurrection motif appears in the *Elegies* in 5, the middle piece of the ten poems, in the *Georgics* at the end of IV, where the two halves are united; the *Aeneid* likewise falls into two halves, with the theme of death and resurrection in VI, at the end of the first half. Also, the *Aeneid* resembles the *Elegies* in that the correspondence in each half is in reverse order, around VII as the middle book.⁴ "Though 7 is in this sense the centre of the poem (that to which everything leads, from which everything follows), 6 is . . . the turning point, the death and resurrection piece, that converts the defeat, passion, and uncertainty of Books 1-5 into the victorious and unshaken valour of Books 8-12. . . . In short, the *Aeneid* is, like the *Elegies* and *Georgics*, the story of death and rebirth by which unworthy love and destructive *furor* are overcome by the moral activity of a divinized and resurrected hero" (p. 218).

Otis next discusses briefly Aeneas as a hero (*theios-aner*), Vergil's relation to Homer, and the problem of Fate and Free Will in the poem (see below, II A), and then turns to an analysis of *Aeneid* I-VI, the Odyssean half. He looks upon I, 1-304 as an important introduction which shows clearly the two main strands of the epic, the subjective, empathetic narrative and the cosmic symbolism—that is, the human and divine elements of the action.⁵ "Both sides of Aeneas—his weakness and his strength, his submission to *furor* and his courageous exemplification of *pietas*—are revealed" (p. 232). The irony of I is that he sees safety, pity, hospitality, in what is actually his greatest danger (cf. p. 238). Book II emphasizes Aeneas' *dolor* and *furor*; he is portrayed as a typical Homeric hero, but "he had to be a hero on the old model before he could be one on the new" (p. 244). Otis points out the effective contrasts between 13-267 (Laocoön and the Horse)⁶ and 634-729 (Anchises and the Oracles); Anchises at the end of II becomes "the agent of Jupiter and the very embodiment of the new *pietas* of Rome and

⁴ This is a new and important structural pattern for the *Aeneid*, to which I shall return later; see below, II B.

⁵ Cf. V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils* (Innsbruck, 1950), pp. 23 ff., who considers I, 1-296 a symbolic anticipation of the entire poem, and especially an introduction to the Odyssean half.

⁶ I prefer to end the story of Laocoön and the Horse at 249; see G. E. Duckworth, "Tripartite Structure in the *Aeneid*," *Vergilius*, VII (1961), p. 3; Otis' analysis on p. 247 goes only to line 233.

the future" (p. 250). Otis says of III: "No book is more Odyssean, yet what gives the tone and sets the mood are precisely its non-Odyssean elements" (p. 251). The *leitmotif* of the book is Aeneas' uncertainty and desolation. The Helenus episode (294-505) is the turning point of the book and marks the end of his uncertainty as to his goal, but not the end of his nostalgia and sense of desolation. The Achaemenides episode symbolizes the death of Anchises; both Achaemenides and Aeneas are deserted by the one on whom their safety and hope depended (cf. pp. 263 f.). Books II-III reveal Aeneas' "*dolor* and *furor*, the black despair, the absence of initiative, the dependence on Anchises, that together made Aeneas so exceedingly vulnerable to all that Dido represented" (p. 265).

Otis' analysis of Book IV appeared earlier, in Chapter III (see pp. 68-88) and here he explains merely why the emphasis in IV is so exclusively on Dido: 1) Dido is an *alter Aeneas* (p. 265: mission to found a new city; *pietas* toward dead; sacrifices duty to love) and 2) Aeneas' lack of initiative in IV is a revelation of his moral failure, his *culpa*, his passion for Dido. Book V is "a most subtle and complex composition in which nothing is quite what it appears, at first sight, to be" (p. 270; cf. n. 1: "it is *not* fundamentally a book about *games*"). The "pleasant games" anticipate the future, but are less important than the burning of the ships, for here Aeneas' weakness is driven home to him; this prepares for VI, where he must undergo death and rebirth. Otis gives a detailed analysis of Book VI.⁷ The *mythological* (Homeric) Hades, in which Aeneas meets Palinurus (from V), Dido (from IV) and Deiphobus (from II), represents the past and the *philosophical* (Platonic) Hades, where the souls await rebirth, depicts the future; when Aeneas passes from the first to the second, "he is also passing from past to future, from death to new life" (p. 290). He must encounter the past and leave it behind him before he can be ready for the realities of the future, before he can become a *theios-aner* like Hercules and Romulus before him and Augustus (VI, 791 ff.) after him. Pages 305-12 summarize the Odyssean *Aeneid*, especially 1) the manner in which the psychologically continuous narrative corresponds to the elaborate symbol-structure throughout, and 2) the differences between Vergil and the "objective" Homeric Greek epic (Homer, Apollonius). The first five books reveal the extent to which Aeneas is dependent on Anchises and helpless without him. In VI Aeneas gains a firm and independent *pietas*; from a normal man and an Homeric hero, he becomes a Roman hero and an Augustan prototype.

"VII. The Iliadic *Aeneid*" (pp. 313-82). The Latin War is an instance of *furor* or *violentia*, and "Aeneas' *pietas* comes out not only in his opposing such violence . . . , but in the *way* he opposes it. . . . His is the *humanitas* that sees war as a terrible necessity" (p. 315); "Aeneas finally emerges as the divine man or 'saviour' of the *Eclogues* and *Georgics*" (p. 317). Alleto in VII is "a combination of two major motifs—the *Discordia* of Ennius and the *Lyssa* of Euripides' *Mad Heracles*" (p. 323); she is the symbol

⁷ Pp. 281-305. On the symbolism of several passages, see also Otis, "Three Problems of *Aeneid* 6," *T. A. P. A.*, XC (1959), pp. 165-79.

of individual *furor* raised to a new dimension—the evil of social violence. In VIII, Aeneas, the divine man of Roman destiny, "stands in a present that is framed by a past and a future: the Arcadian Rome whose *theios-aner* was Hercules and the future Rome whose *theios-aner* is to be Augustus. All three symbolize the eternally Roman struggle of *pietas* and *humanitas* against savage barbaric violence, against the force represented by Cacus, Mezentius and Antony" (p. 330). The main theme of the shield "is the constant opposition of *virtus*, *consilium* and *pietas* to the forces of violence in all Roman history" (p. 341; see below, II B). Book IX reveals Turnus' *stāucia* (haughty pride that blinds him to reality), *ira*, and *furor*; he is a blend of Achilles (in his wrath) and Hector (as Aeneas' main opponent). The *dīra cupido* of Nisus' question (184 f.) "is meant to be a noble desire for true glory; it becomes an ignoble lust for blood and booty,"⁸ resembling the *caedis insana cupido* of Turnus in 760.

The *concilium deorum* at the beginning of X—the only one in the *Aeneid*—is "an indication of the central significance of the book" (p. 353; see below, II B). The Pallas episode reveals Turnus' *superbia* and *inhumanitas*; Aeneas' conduct at the slaying of Lausus is the very opposite. When Juno removes Turnus from battle, his realization that he has deserted his friends and allies "from now on constitutes Turnus' great problem" (p. 358). Otis likewise considers the main problem of XI to be "the bearing of Turnus' behaviour in 10 on his motives and actions here" (p. 364).⁹ Of his reply to the speeches of Drances and Latinus, Otis says: "Turnus quite refuses to face his own responsibility for the lost battle and the war. . . . It is clear that Turnus has in fact not the least desire to fight Aeneas in single combat and *therefore* wants the war to go on" (pp. 367 f.). His withdrawal from the ambush at the end of XI shows that, "as in the final fighting of Book 9, he is defeated by his own *furor*" (p. 362). In XII Turnus welcomes the breaking of the truce and again he abandons his men in their hour of need.¹⁰ His speech to Juturna (632-49) is "the turning point of the Iliadic *Aeneid*" (p. 375); he recognizes his guilt and rejects the aid of the counter-fates. His tragedy is that the decision is too late. Juno and Juturna are not the cause of his tragedy; it is through his own character and will that both Juno and Juturna are defeated. The final decision of the epic is not who should win, but whether Turnus

⁸ P. 349; for the broader and more important meaning of Nisus' question, see below (II B) on *Aeneid* X.

⁹ This problem, says Otis (*ibid.*), "no commentator or critic seems ever to have taken seriously"; but cf. G. E. Duckworth, "Turnus as a Tragic Character," *Vergilius*, IV (1940), p. 10: "This passage [X, 668-679], it seems to me, deserves more emphasis than is usually accorded to it. . . . the sense of shame and dishonor which he feels at this time is not a momentary emotion, but, I believe, abides with him and affects both his words and actions in the two final books of the poem."

¹⁰ The similarities here and elsewhere between Turnus and Duryodhana (in the *Mahābhārata*) seem far too close to be accidental; see G. E. Duckworth, "Turnus and Duryodhana," *T. A. P. A.*, XCII (1961), pp. 81-127, esp. pp. 103 ff., and 114 ff.

should be spared. Aeneas is about to show *clementia* when he sees the infamous belt; Turnus must pay the penalty for his treatment of Pallas. "He is truly a tragic character who can only buy honour with death" (p. 381).

"VIII. Conclusion" (pp. 383-94). The final chapter stresses the novelty of Vergil's achievement. He had no real precedent for the *Aeneid*. "Aeneas is, in effect, an Augustan-type—a *divine man*, . . . embodying the Augustan ruler-ideal" (p. 384). The *Aeneid* is "the creation of Roman civilization out of Homeric barbarism." Vergil "alone employed the kind of sustained empathy that permitted a psychologically continuous narrative. . . . It is on his 'subjective style' in short that his whole intricate structure of symbols and motifs depends" (p. 385). The *Aeneid* portrays the triumph of *pietas* and *humanitas* over *furor*, *violentia*, *indignus amor*, but there is no gloating of conqueror over conquered; the emphasis is on the tragic pathos of defeated heroism. As opposed to Homer, Vergil is thus a civilized poet; the implication that Homer is *therefore* the greater poet is, Otis believes, unjust to Vergil.

The concluding chapter is followed by nine short appendices (pp. 395-420), several primarily bibliographical; the others deal with specific topics: 2. Historical Epic (pp. 396-8); 3. Apollonius and Theocritus (pp. 398-405); 7. The Ending of *Georgics* IV (pp. 408-13); 9. The Composition of the *Aeneid* (pp. 415-20). The book ends with a General Index (pp. 421-31) and an Index of Texts and Passages Discussed (pp. 432-6). The bibliographical appendices are especially valuable as they supplement the footnotes which are all too few (261 notes to 394 pages, but many of these are merely cross-references). This brings me to the one unfortunate feature of the book, originally part of "an enormous manuscript on the 'Augustan epic,' whose major sections were devoted to Virgil and Ovid" (Preface, p. viii). A portion of the MS has been reduced to the present volume on Vergil, but, as Otis says (*ibid.*), "this has meant, among other things, the elimination of rather more than nine-tenths of its original notes and scholarly apparatus." He has retained the most indispensable references, but many readers will regret the loss of so many other notes. Also, the elimination of this material may make it more difficult to realize that Otis says so many things about Vergil that are new.

II

A. I list here Otis' views on several controversial and much-discussed problems and topics.

1) The *Appendix Vergilianana*. Otis considers this "the very inferior production of a Virgilianizing poet of the later Augustan age or thereafter" (p. 97).¹¹

¹¹ But what about the *Catalepton*? Büchner accepts 5 and 8, Bickel 1, 5, 7, and 8, and Westendorp Boerma 1-8; see G. E. Duckworth, "Recent Work on Vergil (1940-1956)," *C. W.*, LI (1957-58), pp. 92, 116. Westendorp Boerma, *P. Vergili Maronis Libellus Qui Inscriptitur Catalepton*, Pars Altera (Assen, 1963), accepts also 10, 11 (probably), and 12 (possibly); see pp. 32, 52, 62, 70.

2) *Eclogue* 5. "The identification of Daphnis with the recently assassinated and deified Julius Caesar has been doubted by several scholars but seems none the less quite certain" (p. 133). *Eclogue* 5 marks the conclusion of the forward-looking, more Julio-Augustan half of the *Eclogue Book*.

3) *Eclogue* 6. See above, Chapter IV and note 3.

4) *labor improbus* (*Georg.*, I, 145 f.): "It does not seem to me that *improbus* here can be wholly divested of its harsh and bitter connotations" (p. 157; see n. 1, and cf. p. 169).

5) The revision of *Georgics* IV. The Aristaeus-Orpheus stories have an essential place in the unity of the poem; a complete revision of the second half of the book "is incredible and false to the spirit and balance of the *Georgics* as a whole" (p. 412). Concerning the parallel passages (*Georgics*, IV and *Aeneid*, I, II, and VI) Otis argues effectively, against Büchner and Richter, that the priority of the *Georgics* passages (on the basis of style) is practically certain.¹² But Otis is willing to admit that a few lines concerning Gallus (ten to twenty at most) may have been deleted.

6) *Aen.*, II, 567-88 (the Helen episode). Otis agrees with Büchner that these lines "are Virgilian but *tibicines* (props) that Virgil would have later replaced since they conflict with the Deiphobus narrative of Book 6" (p. 243, n. 1).

7) *Aen.*, VIII, 190-267. The Hercules-Cacus story is "an example of the conduct by which man can become divine and by which Hercules himself became the true predecessor of Aeneas, Romulus and Augustus" (p. 335; see n. 1, where Otis obviously favors the Hercules-Augustus analogy).¹³

8) Homer and the *Aeneid*. "Vergil did not 'start' with Homer but with his own Augustan 'symbol-complex' and his own subjective style. He did not so much 'copy' Homer as fit Homeric motifs into a radically un-Homeric scheme that he had elaborated without reference to either Homer or the epic genre. . . . Homer really came last in the genesis of the *Aeneid*; . . . he was a model only in the sense that he was made to fit a pre-existent structure. What he did to Virgil—how Virgil's central design, in other words, was affected by Homeric motifs—is the important question. Homer contributed nothing to the design itself" (p. 221).

9) The hero of the *Aeneid*. "Essentially the real 'plot' of the *Aeneid* is that of the formation and victory of the *Augustan* hero" (p. 222). "The *pius Aeneas* is thus the ideal man or hero of Virgil's Augustan ideology" (p. 225). The first six books depict his inner struggle for *pietas*, the last six the triumph of his *pietas* over the *impia*.¹⁴ It is wrong to deny (as does Pöschl) "any internal development or maturation of his character" (p. 307). "Aeneas thus stands for a new idea in history, the idea that *violentia* and *superbia*

¹² See below, note 32, end.

¹³ See now Bellen (Hercules' victory over Cacus suggests Octavian's victory over Antony) and Buchheit (Hercules and Cacus symbolize Aeneas and Turnus); cf. G. E. Duckworth, "Recent Work on Vergil (1957-1963), *C. W.*, LVII (1963-64), p. 209.

¹⁴ The third level of conflict, that between Fate (Jupiter) and Counter-Fate (Juno), extends throughout all twelve books.

can be controlled, that a just *imperium* can be established, that universal peace can be a fact as well as an ideal" (p. 382).

10) Fate and Free Will. "Freedom is not an alternative to predestination but an essential component of it. . . . both men and gods can accept fate with piety; both men and gods can reject fate with *furor*; and fate itself is the predestined product of their interpenetrating acceptances and rejections" (p. 227).¹⁵

11) Turnus as a tragic character: see above, under *Aeneid* XII (Chapter VII).

12) The composition of the *Aeneid*. Otis rejects the theories of various scholars (e.g., Noack, Sabbadini, Gericke, and, more recently, Paratore and D'Anna) that the *Aeneid* underwent serious changes (both in plan and in detail) during its composition. He says (p. 416): "It seems to me quite impossible to suppose that Virgil ever planned the even books without the odd. . . . It likewise seems to me impossible that he could ever have conceived the *Iliadic* without the *Odyssean Aeneid* and vice versa." Otis believes (p. 419) that Vergil first worked on the pivotal books: VI, I (at least 1-304), VII, and the main action books (IV, X), followed closely by II, XIII, and VIII; see below on the structure of the *Aeneid* (II B).

B. I agree heartily with the following points (among numerous others): Daphnis in *Eclogue* 5 is to be identified with Julius Caesar (above, II A); the contemplated epic to which Vergil refers in the proem of *Georgics* III is not an historical epic, but the *Aeneid*, the poem of Augustus and Aeneas (pp. 38 f.); the Aristaeus-Orpheus stories are necessary to the structure of the *Georgics* as a whole (above, II A); Dido's love story "is a fully human one without the slightest need for divine motivation" (p. 94); the *Troius lusus* in *Aen.*, V, 545-603 is not one of the contests (p. 271);¹⁶ there is a major division in the narrative after VIII, 596 (p. 330);¹⁷ in VIII Aeneas "first stands in the 'empty theatre' and then carries off with him its visible completion, the active life of Rome at peace and in war" (p. 342);¹⁸ Otis says of the breaking of the *foedus* in XII: "The intervention of Juturna (at Juno's behest) clearly reflects a prior human motivation (it is the same as with Iris in 5, Allecto in 7)" (p. 373); these are excellent examples of what has been termed "double causation."¹⁹

¹⁵ Cf. p. 319: "Acceptance or rejection of fate is free but it is precisely through this freedom that fate works."

¹⁶ Cf. G. E. Duckworth, *Vergilius*, VII (1961), pp. 5 f.; "Mathematical Symmetry in Vergil's *Aeneid*," *T. A. P. A.*, XCI (1960), p. 190, n. 12; *Structural Patterns and Proportions in Vergil's Aeneid* (Ann Arbor, 1962), pp. 25 f.

¹⁷ This division is ignored by almost all editors; see Duckworth, *T. A. P. A.*, XCI (1960), p. 199, n. 30; *Structural Patterns and Proportions*, p. 89. I should point out, however, that Otis' analysis of *Aeneid* VIII is not tripartite, nor is that of V; see below on structure.

¹⁸ This view of the shield (cf. A. Cartault, *L'art de Virgile dans l'Énéide* [Paris, 1926], p. 634) is far better than the theory of "great escapes" (W. W. Fowler, *Aeneas at the Site of Rome* [Oxford, 1918], pp. 103-6).

¹⁹ See G. E. Duckworth, "Fate and Free Will in Vergil's *Aeneid*," *C. J.*, LI (1955-56), p. 358, and n. 10 (p. 363).

Any book as rich and comprehensive as this inevitably contains many statements which one will want to query. I mention the following:

Vergil originally thought of writing a Roman epic (*res Romanae*) but turned instead to the *Bucolics* (p. 33; cf. pp. 35, 215); this seems most unlikely, and the statement in *Vita Donati* 19 may well have been a wrong assumption from *Ecl.*, 6, 3-5. Otis stresses the Augustan nature of *Elegies* 1-5 and identifies Daphnis in 5 with Julius Caesar; it seems strange, therefore, that he fails to connect the *puer* of 4 with Octavian; his words concerning the child are merely: "whoever he may be and whatever parents he may have" (p. 139). He says of *Aeneid* VII-XII: "The psychological and subjective emphasis of the first six books is gone" (p. 313); this is misleading; Aeneas' inner struggle is over, but we now shift to other characters—Nisus, Euryalus, Mezentius, and especially Turnus.²⁰

Otis' treatment of the Catalogue in VII (pp. 328 f.) could have been expanded: many of the Italian warriors have Greek ancestors or Greek connections (e.g., cf. 723: Halaesus described as *Agamemnonius*, *Troiani nominis hostis*), and this makes the Latin war a continuation of the Trojan war. Also, the arrangement of the Latin warriors is not without interest.²¹

Otis says: "The simultaneity of Books 3 and 9 is essential to Virgil's purpose. . . . Turnus and the Latins would not wait for him [Aeneas] to return" (p. 332; cf. p. 342); "Virgil was thus not consistent in his times" (p. 343). This is true only if we assume that Nisus was correct in his belief that Aeneas was in Pallanteum the night of the Nisus-Euryalus episode. There is all the greater irony if Aeneas was at Caere that night and the expedition was doomed at the outset. I favor the view that the first day of *Aeneid* IX is the second day of *Aeneid* VIII.²²

Otis discusses briefly the *concilium deorum* in *Aeneid* X (pp. 353 f.), but much more could have been done with the speeches of Venus and Juno, especially the manner in which each goddess distorts the truth and misleads her hearers. Venus is more in the right, but makes the poorer speech; Juno, on the wrong side, ends her speech with an irrefutable argument: Venus herself is to blame (88-95); Otis therefore is misleading when he says: "Juno . . . blames the Trojans' troubles on Aeneas and themselves" (p. 353). It is also inaccurate to speak of Jupiter's "deliberate abdication of authority"; this passage (111 f.) is the answer to the question

²⁰ Otis later rectifies this: "The empathetic 'spot-light' is no longer on Aeneas mainly but on several Trojan and Latin figures and most positively on Turnus" (p. 318).

²¹ The arrangement is both alphabetical and geographical and, in addition, has one or more striking alternations; cf. Duckworth, *Structural Patterns and Proportions*, pp. 20 f., 34, notes 4 and 5; R. D. Williams, "The Function and Structure of Vergil's Catalogue in *Aeneid* 7," *C. Q.*, XI (1961), pp. 146-53.

²² Otis (p. 343, n. 1) refers to Krókowski; see also G. E. Duckworth, "The Chronology of *Aeneid* VIII-X," *A. J. P.*, LIX (1938), pp. 135-44, esp. pp. 137 f.

of Nisus (IX, 184 f.) in its broadest sense, and Vergil makes this clear by the phrase *sua cuique* which recalls the similar words of Nisus. Mortals can and must work out their own salvation.²³

Otis refers to the *superbia* of Turnus in connection with the killing of Pallas in *Aeneid* X and (p. 356) speaks of the *iussa superba* (443). He omits the equally important passage after the slaying (*superbum caede nova*, 514 f.); this is perhaps the result of his tripartite analysis, with 510 ff. assigned to his third division.²⁴

This brings me to Otis' emphasis on structure, which, both in individual poems (*Eclogues*) and books (*Georgics* and *Aeneid*) and in the three works as a whole, he considers the key to their symbolic meaning.²⁵ His analyses of the books of the *Aeneid* differ from the tripartite divisions recently suggested;²⁶ he divides five books (II, III, VII, X, XI) into three parts, but he has four to seven main divisions for the other seven books.²⁷ Otis accepts the alternation between the even and odd books (cf., e.g., pp. 343 f., 416), the *Aeneid* as a trilogy,²⁸ and the parallelism of the halves (I and VII, II and VIII, III and IX, etc.).²⁹ He favors, however, a fourth pattern—the correspondence of the halves in reverse order, around VII as the middle book,³⁰ as follows:

²³ See Duckworth, *C. J.*, LI (1955-56), pp. 360-1; cf. above, II A, 10.

²⁴ See below, note 27.

²⁵ See pp. 128-31, 216 (*Eclogues*), pp. 148-54, 189-90, 216 (*Georgics*); pp. 217 f., 305 f., 317, 344, 391 f., 418 f. (*Aeneid*). On the individual books of the *Aeneid*, see, e.g., p. 271 (on V: "its structure is in large part the key to its meaning"), p. 330 (on VIII), p. 352 (on X), p. 361 (on XI). Yet, curiously enough, the word "Structure" does not appear in the index; see under "*Aeneid*, plan of," "*Eclogues*, plan of," "*Georgics*, plan of."


²⁶ Cf. Duckworth, *Vergilius*, VII (1961), pp. 2-11; *Structural Patterns and Proportions*, pp. 25-33.

²⁷ There is no need to discuss the divisions of the books in detail, for the reader can make his own comparisons; I add merely the following comments: Aeneas' reaction to Pallas' death (X, 510-605) belongs with the second section on Pallas, which I begin at 362; Otis begins his second section at 260 (p. 352), but this blurs the main divisions and minimizes the important role of Pallas in the book; Otis (p. 362) calls his third division of *Aeneid* XI "The attack on Laurentum"; this is perhaps misleading as the actual attack occurs in *Aeneid* XII and seems unfair to Camilla, who plays the major role in the third main division of the book; Otis (p. 371) includes the Dirae and the departure of Juturna (XII, 843-86) with the Jupiter-Juno scene (791-842); I consider the latter a unit and favor adding 843-86 to Otis' final section, "IV. (c) Final phase of the combat."

²⁸ He follows Camps, however, in looking upon *Aeneid* V-IX (rather than V-VIII) as the central portion; cf. p. 419. But surely the emphasis on Augustus at the end of VIII suggests that this is the climax of the central portion; also, the importance of Turnus in IX links this book with X-XII.

²⁹ Cf. pp. 372 (n. 1) and 392, where he stresses the correspondence of VI and XII.

³⁰ Pp. 217 f., 392, 418-20.



This is, of course, similar to the arrangement of the ten *Eclogues* (see above, I, under Chapter IV). Books I and VII, and IV and X, correspond in this pattern as in the parallelism of the halves mentioned above. Otis' parallels between V and IX (pp. 273 f.) are most impressive, those between VI and VIII (pp. 331 f.) less so, since the two major books in each third of the trilogy (II-IV, VI-VIII, X-XII) have many similarities.³¹ I am not convinced that Otis' new arrangement of the books is as fundamental a part of Vergil's plan as the parallelism in which II (Troy) balances VIII (Rome) and VI (the final book of the Odyssean *Aeneid*, with its emphasis in 853 on *clementia* and *iustitia*) balances XII (the final book of the Iliadic *Aeneid*, where Aeneas at the end desires to show *clementia* and changes to *iustitia* when he sees the sword-belt of Pallas). But Otis is to be commended for adding a new and valid structural pattern to those of the *Aeneid* already published.

This is a great book. Professor Otis has made a most important contribution to our understanding of Vergil's poetry, especially the *Aeneid*.³²

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³¹ See G. E. Duckworth, "The *Aeneid* as a Trilogy," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXXVIII (1957), pp. 7 ff.; B. Fenik, "Parallelism of Theme and Imagery in *Aeneid* II and IV," *A.J.P.*, LXXX (1959), pp. 1-24.

³² The misprints and mistakes which I have noted are mostly unimportant: p. viii (line 7 from end); read "Hirtzel," not "Hirzel"; p. 100 (line 5): read "Peleus and," not "and Peleus"; p. 125 (line 2): the Pasiphaë story is sixteen, not fifteen lines; p. 329 (line 17 from end): read "sacrifice," not "sacrifice"; p. 334 (line 3 from end): the Hercules-Cacus story itself is VIII, 190-267, not 115-275; p. 352 (line 6): read "besieged," not "besieged"; p. 416 (line 5 from end): read "Iliadic without the," not "Iliadicwitho utt he"; p. 418 (paragraph 3, line 8): the reference to p. 312 should be to p. 392.

Page 412 (paragraph 3, lines 1-4) contains a serious error; the text reads: "To sum up, the style of the *Aeneid* is quite different from that of either the *Aristaeus* or the *Orpheus*. To suppose that the former (the *Aristaeus-Orpheus*) preceded the latter (*Aeneid*) is to imagine an almost incredible reversal of form." As the second sentence stands, it reverses Otis' entire argument in Appendix 7, that the second half on *Georgics* IV did in fact precede the parallel passages in *Aeneid* I, II, and VI and is to be dated not later than 30/29 B.C. The sentence in question should undoubtedly read: "To suppose that the former (the *Aeneid*) preceded the latter (the *Aristaeus-Orpheus*) is to imagine an almost incredible reversal of form."

Scholia in Aristophanem. Edidit edendave curavit W. J. W. KOSTER.
 Pars IV: Jo. Tzetzae Commentarii in Aristophanem. Ediderunt
 LYDIA MASSA POSITANO, D. HOLWERDA, W. J. W. KOSTER.
 Fase. 1, continens Prolegomena et Commentarium in Plutum,
 quem edidit Lydia Massa Positano. Pp. cxxviii + 365; 2 pls.
 1960. Fase. 2, continens Commentarium in Nubes, quem edidit
 D. Holwerda. Pp. ii + 323 [= Vol. IV, pp. 367-689]; 2 pls.
 1960. Fase. 3, continens Commentarium in Ranas et in Equites,
 Argumentum Equitum, quae edidit W. J. W. Koster. Pp. i +
 478 [= Vol. IV, pp. 691-1168], 2 pls. 1962. Indices. Pp. 169.
 1964. Groningen, J. B. Wolters; Amsterdam, Swets & Zeitlinger.
 Fascicles 1-3, \$20.00 each; index-fascicle, \$8.25. (*Scripta
 Academica Groningana*.)

The Scholia on Aristophanes, as every scholar knows, constitute a veritable treasure-house of information of all sorts, concerning not only the eleven Comedies themselves, but touching upon practically every other department of Greek letters as well. Now there can be little doubt that the extremely topical nature of many of Aristophanes' hits and puns was a large contributing factor in their points being so soon forgotten: as White observes, "Men in particular who lived in the great outlying new Greek world that Alexander had created needed help. They were doing Greek at this time [*sc.* late fourth century] in Bactria!" (*The Scholia on the Aves of Aristophanes*, Introduction, p. xv). Moreover, the third century saw the rise of textual and metrical difficulties, especially when the Comedies—or some of them, at any rate—began to be used as school texts. The prolific Didymus made a variorum commentary on Aristophanes; another was made by Symmachus; these, plus others, were incorporated in excerpted form into an anonymous commentary made about the fourth or fifth century after Christ. The extant MSS go back to this version, according to White (*op. cit.*, p. lxxii), or to yet another ("second anonymous") version of about the tenth century, according to Zacher (*Die Handschriften und classen der Aristophanesscholien*, pp. 736 ff.).

Now, important and valuable as these scholia are, it would at first glance seem strange that the standard edition for nearly a century and a quarter has been the Firmin-Didot compilation, brought out by Dübner in 1842 and reprinted in 1855 and 1877. Apart from these reprints of Dübner, and the publication in 1896 by Rutherford of the scholia in R only, there has been in all this time no edition embracing all the scholia on all the Comedies. White intended to furnish such an edition, but never got beyond the scholia on the *Aves*, which he published in the exemplary edition of 1914 referred to above. The Dübner volume has the virtues of handiness and accessibility, but as an edition it has lamentable disadvantages. Its system of parentheses and brackets is bewildering; its treatment of textual matters is sometimes quite cavalier.¹ The best short outline

¹ An egregious example of the "Willkür" which characterizes the *Dindorf-Dübnersches scholiencorpus* is the notorious scholium on *Nub.* 1311; see, *inter alia*, Meritt's *The Athenian Year* (Univ. of California

of the way in which this compilation was assembled is that by Zacher (*op. cit.*, p. 503): "Den grundstock haben von anfang an die scholien der Aldina gebildet, diese sind in den folgenden ausgaben mit ziemlich zufälligen oder willkürlichen zusätzen aus handschriften vermehrt worden, dann hat Dindorf die scholien der beiden ältesten handschriften, des Ravennas und Venetus, mit denen der Aldina zusammen veraarbeitet und noch einiges aus anderen handschriften hinzugestan, und Dübner endlich hat wider zahlreiches handschriftliches material hinzugefügt. Aber erstens sind, wie schon von verschiedenen seiten constatirt worden ist, Dindorfs angaben über den Ravennas und Venetus unzuverlässig, zweitens weiss niemand, nach welchem princ:p er aus den anderen handschriften ausgewählt hat, welchen scholienbestand und wert diese haben. Man hat die überzeugung, dass einen nicht unerheblichen bestandteil dieses Dindorf-Dübnerschen scholiencorpus junge scholien aus byzantinischer zeit bilden, aber welches diese scholien sind und von wem sie herrühren, ist bis jetzt nir eine sache der vermutung gewesen." It is Zacher's great service to scholarship to have laid the foundations for the establishing of the classes of scholia. Still, it is clear that the labors involved in making a new edition, namely the re-working of the MSS and the sorting of the material into the different strata, are enormous. It is this very enormity of the task that perhaps accounts for the length of time that the scholarly world has had to make do with the Dübner book.

However that may be, whatever the causes for the long lack, the distinguished Dutch palaeographer W. J. W. Koster has now begun a new edition, destined to embrace four large volumes, and founded upon extraordinary sensitivity for the language, coupled with modern critical scholarship of the highest order. The fourth volume (or "pars"), which has now been published entire, consists of three large fascicles of text plus a fourth of indices, and exhibits the generally happy results of an industry which, to my mind at least, is staggering. Professor Koster has been at work upon the Aristophanic scholia and related material for forty years or more, but the extent of the labor which is the foundation of a work such as this must surpass even his prodigious capabilities, for he has enlisted the collaboration of his sometime colleague and co-author D. Hölderda, as well as that of the eminent Eyzantinist Lydia Massa Positano. What the division of labors will be in the first three volumes has not yet been made known; in Volume IV it is as follows: Fascicle 1, Commentary on the *Plutus*, Massa Positano; Fasc. 2, Comm. on the *Nubes*, Hölderda; Fase. 3, Comm. on the *Ranae* and *Aves*, plus Argument to the *Equites*, Koster. In addition, Fasc. 1 contains the general introduction in the form of three prolegomena.

White pointed out in 1914 (*op. cit.*, p. lxxxi, n. 1) the need for "properly edited transcripts of the commentaries of Tzetzes and his successors," and, lest some question arise as to the necessity

Press, 1961), pp. 43-4, and Koster's 1927 edition of the Scholia on the *Plutus* and the *Nubes*, chart facing p. 44, referred to by Meritt. On page v of the Praefatio of that edition, Koster says, "Quicumque autem editionem Didotianam inspexit, non ignorat sigla in ea tam vario modo apposita esse, ut interdum dubitemus, qui codex fuerit; et, quod gravius est, multis locis, qui fuerit codex, omnino non indicatum est."

or even the propriety of publishing Tzetzes' commentaries on the "Byzantine Triad" first, in view of the great need of a new edition of the scholia proper, the *scholia vetera*, Koster advises us: "Variae . . . causae impulerunt, ut a Tzetza laborem incoharem. Primo commentarius in Aristophanem inter Tzetzae opera maiora solum adhuc ineditum est, si pauca frustula στοράδην in diversis libris publici iuris facta excipit; et Tzetzae exegesi[s], quamvis multis vitiis laboret, tamen non omnino [est spernenda]. . . . Tunc, quod ad ipsa scholia in Aristophanem attinet, ea recte in classes separatas segregari nequeunt, si Tzetzae praesto non sunt, cum haec medium locum inter vetera et recentiora senioris aevi (Thomae Magistri, Triclinii, aliorum) obtineant. Hoe denique alicuius momenti est, quod Tzetzes assidue scholiis veteribus usus est, ut ad ea melius cognoscenda tzetziana neglegenda non sint, cum praesertim et saepe scholia vetera ipsis verbis in suum commentarium receperit et interdum scholia vetera pleniora et meliora, quam in codicibus nostris extant, adhibuerit" (Prooemium, p. v). From these statements, as well as from the material so far published, it seems that we are to infer a sequence of the volumes that will be roughly in accord with the chronology of the commentators. Yet what about "[scholia] Thomae Magistri, Triclinii, aliorum"? Are these commentators' works to be put somewhere in one of the still-to-be-published earlier volumes? Or, perhaps, will there be more than four volumes? Or, if the sequence is not, after all, to be according to the chronology, why is this volume designated "IV"?

Tzetzes, not unlike learned men of more recent date, brought out two quite separate editions (or "recensiones") of his commentaries on Aristophanes. His reasons for doing so are set forth quite well, and at some length, by Koster (pp. xxv ff.), and need not, I think, be rehearsed here. What is important to note (for it is perhaps the chief value in Tzetzes' work) is that he generally, though by no means always, adhered rather closely to the *scholia vetera* (which go back to Symmachus and beyond, and which we desire to retrieve, to the extent that this is still possible) in the first recension, and departed more from them in the second. Frequently the first recension is an almost exact transcript of the *scholia vetera*, so far as one can make out by comparing with Dübner; in the second recension he has, as a rule, more of his own material than he had had in the previous one, and he corrects errors (both his own and, especially, those of others—and that too sometimes in a most polemical tone²), elucidates "hard" or "obscure" words, and so on. But the reverse is also sometimes the case, i. e. he sometimes adheres closely to the *scholia vetera* in the second recension, where he had departed from them in the first.

The need for properly edited transcripts of the Tzetzean commentaries has been mentioned already. These fascicles fill this need admirably, though one feels obliged to make the reservation that the commentaries are themselves of questionable intrinsic value—even Koster is forced to the grudging half-admission that they are not "*omnino spernendae*." To quote White again: "One must in decency commend the spirit which animated these late Byzantine

² E. g. he does not hesitate to refer derisively to his predecessors as *οἱ παλαιοί*, or occasionally, as *κοπρογράφοι*.

scholars, but may still without offense remain unmoved by their actual performance. Students of our poet will feel but languid interest in their school-exegesis of the comedies and in their mistaken metrical theories. We wish rather to learn how the great scholars of the better time far removed answered the countless questions that come thronging as we read our poet. Our interest in the late commentary, then, centres in the equivocal desire *to learn its earmarks in order that we may exclude it*. The task is not so simple as it might seem. Beginning with the Princeps the printed commentary on the three Byzantine plays reeks of it, and there is hardly an annotated manuscript, dating in the fourteenth, fifteenth, or sixteenth century, of any of the other five comedies which were most widely read that is uncontaminated. Many men were roused to independent effort in the revival; there were ambitious schoolmasters both before and after Thomas Magister" (*op. cit.*, pp. lxxx f.; italics mine). Tzetzes is one of this tribe of "ambitious schoolmasters": at times he is quite doctrinaire, while at other times he admits quite frankly that he does not know the reason for this or that, or that he is merely filling up a page!³

In each text-fascicle of Volume IV there is presented a text of each of the two different Tzetzean recensions. Where both recensions have the same wording, the text is printed across the entire page. If on the whole the texts are the same, with but minor variations of a word or two here and there, or at times a phrase or so, then the word or phrase of Recensio I is printed in smaller type above the line, and the variant, in the same smaller type, below the line (this method obtains, however, only in Fasce. 2 and 3). On the other hand, where Rec. I and Rec. II have substantially different notices, or where one of them has no notice at all, parallel columns of text are printed on the single page, Rec. I left and Rec. II right. The textual transmission of both recensions is fairly simple: Rec. I rests mainly upon U (= Vat. Gr. Urbinas 141 [fourteenth century]), and Rec. II, mainly upon two MSS, Amb(rosianus Gr. C 222 inf. [thirteenth century]) and Lut (= Parisinus Suppl. Gr. 655 [fourteenth century]). I must leave evaluation of the Editors' palaeographical arguments to those who possess the knowledge and experience in this field which I frankly do not have.⁴ To me these argu-

³ Cf. sch. *Plut.* 677b, the text of which is as follows in Lut: *ισχάδας δὲ καὶ τρωγάλια πρώην ἀκηκούσις ζυγως· καὶ νῦν δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐροῦμεν, ἵνα τὸν ὑπολειπόμενον ἀγραφῆ χάρτην τῆς τῆδε σελίδος ἀναπληρώσαιμεν.* οὗτος ήν πάλαι, κτλ. The fact that Am̄ omits the clause about filling the page is taken by Massa Positano to be indicative, as indeed it seems to be, of a scribe with brains: "Rarissime autem scholium, quod Lut praebet, totum Amb omittit: fere semper eas scholiorum partes (nonnunquam per pauca verba) neglegit, quae sine sententiae et syntaxeos damno relinquunt poterant" (*p. ci*). "Quae res vere sagacis excerptoris indicium est, cum librario cuidam tibui non possit" (*p. cii*).

⁴ See the excellent reviews by Hartmut Erbse in *Gnomon*: Fasc. 1 reviewed in XXXIII (1961), pp. 457-61; Fasc. 2, in XXXIV (1962), pp. 348-51; Fasc. 3 and Indices, in XXXVI (1964), pp. 741-4. William M. Calder, III, reviews the three text-fasce. jointly in *C.P.*, LIX (1964), pp. 289-91, and the index fasc. alone, *ibid.*, LX (1965), pp. 133-4. Douglas MacDowell, in *J.H.S.*, LXXXIII (1963), pp. 164-6, calls especial attention to Holwerda's ingenuity in determining the pagination

ments and discussions appear cogent, in most instances closely reasoned, and usually quite convincing. Perhaps, however, a few reservations may be permitted me. In his discussion of the glosses in U and the time of their insertion, Koster says (p. lvii): "Quod ad glossas attinet, quae eisdem litteris pusillis, quibus scholia marginalia, scriptae sunt, in gl. *Ran.* 224c apparat eam post sch. mrg. 217 scriptam esse, cum eius glossae verba δὰ φροντίδος super textus verbum μέλει in angustias redacta sint spatio vicino iam occupato illo scholio mrg. Cum autem scribendi et disponendi ratio in universum valde aequalis sit et indicia desint, quibus effici possit glossas nunc hoc, nunc illo temporis momento additas esse, ex hoc uno exemplo, quod notavi, concludi licet omnino glossas postremo (semper eadem manu) superscriptas esse." Now I have no wish to be merely argumentative, but really this seems to me to press the evidence entirely too far. To be sure, given the very nature of glosses, it is doubtless possible—indeed it seems quite probable—that "omnino glossas postremo superscriptas esse," though one would have to see the MS oneself in order to make a judgment on this point. Even then it seems likely that no certain case could be made out. Koster himself seems to admit as much when he says, "cum . . . scribendi et disponendi ratio in universum valde aequalis sit et indicia desint," etc. It seems to me that on the basis of one piece of evidence, no matter how certain that one instance may appear, one cannot properly draw so sweeping a conclusion. From what Koster tells us of the MS, all that can be stated with certainty is that the one gloss looks as though it was written after the marginal scholium, and that all the glosses seem to have been written by the same hand as that which wrote the marginal scholia. And as a matter of fact there is some doubt about that "same hand," too, for earlier (p. liii) Koster says, "Stornajolo hunc codicem tribus manibus sⁱ XIV scriptum esse dicit, sed ex eis unius tantum ratio habenda est, quae totius codicis textum et scholia scripsit; reliquae (*si duae sunt*; *ego unam tantum distinxi*, manu principe recentiore, sed adhuc sⁱ XIV) breves et paucas annotationes (praesertim mrg.) adiecerunt" (italics mine). If even those who, experienced in these matters, have seen the MS or (as in Koster's case) a photocopy cannot agree, how much less certain does the whole matter appear.

In the discussion of manuscript-sources we read (p. lxviii): "Lemmata utraque manus Ambrosiani interdum breviora reddidit, id quod ex comparatione lemmatum Urbinatis appareat. In lemmatis contractis verba hic illic mutata sunt; hoc quibusdam saltem locis iam a Tzetzza ipso factum esse probatur consensu U Amb, velut in sch. *Ran.* 569/70." That the lemmata frequently reproduce the poet's words in recognizable, albeit inexact, form, is a matter of fact; that sometimes these versions are from Tzetzes' own hand seems likely enough indeed, but cannot be more than a probability. I am convinced, after examination of text and lemma, that the inference is no doubt correct for this example: it seems most unlikely that precisely this jumble of the original words would have arisen independently in two different sources. But certainty is not possible here,

of Tzetzes' autograph: this is indeed a fascinating demonstration of deductive logic.

only strong probability; and the second question, whether the corruption is from Tzetzes' own hand, is more remote. It is, in fact, the sort of estimate which can be made with confidence only by those who have long familiarity with Tzetzes' style and with the kinds of error he is likely to make.

Massa Positano, in her description of Cod. Vindobonensis philos. et philol. Gr. 167 (fifteenth or sixteenth century), points out (pp. xcvi f.) that von Holzinger, who described the codex "accuratissime," and who called attention to the fact that the marginal scholia on the *Plutus* are partly Tzetzean and partly Thomano-Triclinian, was nevertheless unable correctly to distinguish, in all cases, the Thomano-Triclinian from the Tzetzean. "Recte autem Holzingerius e verbis προσεχέτω δ' εἰδήμονι Τζέτζη τρὸς τὸ μὴ ψευδὲς γράφεν τι in sch. Vind 1002 Vindobonensis scribae (vel eius fonti) praesto fuisse commentarium Tzetzianum affirmavit." Holzinger's affirmation seems likely enough, as does Massa Positano's acceptance of it. But Massa Positano then continues, "Quod etiam ex eo quod in eodem scholio Amb et Vind in lectione corrupta αὐτὸν pro αὐτῶν . . . consentiunt, comprobari potest." Here again, as it seems to me, a single piece of evidence has been pressed too far. After all, confusion among the several forms αὐτόν, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν looks like the kind of thing to which even the best scribes might on occasion be susceptible; such confusion would be still more understandable if the word-endings were abbreviated in the source, as they often are in the extant MSS. Thus it seems quite possible that this common error may well have come from a different source in the case of each MS.

Sometimes things are done which are baffling (or at least to me). On page cxxiv, for example, in his discussion of the commentary on the *Nubes*, Holwerda says: "Gl. 9 b e quattuor partibus constat, quarum prima tantum in Cs [= Laurentianus conv. soppr. 66, fourteenth century] occurrit. Apparet autem hanc partem tzetziana, ceteras alterius esse indolis." This gloss is to be found in Fasc. 2, p. 378, and it belongs entirely to Rec. I. The text is as follows: "9 b. τῆς νυκτός] δέ δλης, κατὰ τὴν νύκτα, ἐν τῷ καιρῷ. ἔστι δὲ τὸ σχῆμα ἀττικόν." The critical apparatus on this gloss gives us the following information: "9 b: U; δέ δλης tantum Cs||" What is the evidence for the statement that only the first part is Tzetzean? Why, if this is the only genuinely Tzetzean part, was it not printed alone in the text, the other three parts being relegated to the apparatus? Holwerda also says (*loc. cit.*), "In gl. 761 tres interpretationes eiusdem vocis coniunctae sunt, quarum una non-tzetziana; eam Cs omittit." Once again: how do we know that it is non-Tzetzean? And if it is, then why print it in the text, instead of putting it in the apparatus? We are not expressly informed that what is in Cs only is genuinely Tzetzean and what is not in Cs is non-Tzetzean, but this certainly seems to me to be the inference we are to make. Why then employ U or Chis, except as controls on Cs? Yet this is not the situation at all.

At this point I must pause to emphasize that the fascicles I have seen are exemplary both in their general scholarship and, on the whole, in their format. I do not intend to detract from this estimate by the remarks made already, nor by the points I shall raise below.

In a work of this scope it is doubtless inevitable that some disagreement should arise on various matters, and my remarks are, admittedly, concerned with mostly minor points. There is one question of greater import, to which I shall come later.

It seems to me that, given the form in which the Editors have seen fit, of course after long consideration of the peculiar nature of these commentaries (see Koster's remark, Fase. 3, p. i), to release their work to the scholarly world, the prolegomena might perhaps more profitably have appeared separately, each with its own fasc. of the volume. The Editor-in-Chief might then have written a more general introduction to the whole work. As things are, however, Fase. 1 has three prolegomena, in which are set forth in great detail all the discussions, descriptions of the MSS, remarks on Tzetzes and the nature of his work, and so on, which pertain to the commentaries in all three fascicles. Prolegomena I is divided into two parts, xix-lxxiv by Koster and lxxiv-lxxix by Holwerda; Prolegomena II (lxxx-cxii) is entirely by Massa Positano; Prolegomena III (cxiii-cxxviii) is entirely by Holwerda. The material here is set out on no principle that I can discover: the same things are discussed by all three Editors, but in different places; finding one's way is quite difficult, so that to locate all the remarks on a given topic one has very nearly to read all three prolegomena through repeatedly. Also, when Koster or Holwerda refer to scholia or glosses in illustrating a discussion, one has to turn to another fascicle to examine the text. And these "fascicles" are themselves really big volumes, each a quarto-sized tome of several hundred glossy pages. The constant shuffling to and fro, especially when it involves two or more big books, is tiresome and difficult. It is to the Editor's great credit that (so far as I can tell) there are no inaccuracies. But I cannot help feeling that organization along less complicated lines would have been equally useful, would have involved far less chance of mechanical error, and would have been less tiring for the user.

The Editors have devised a new system of signs and abbreviations, which, though based upon standard usage, has some confusing differences. Many of the symbols are pertinent for this work alone, and some not throughout, at that. Now this seems a disadvantage in a work designed as a reference work, a tool, which one will consult upon occasion. Some of the differences confuse, while not really giving useful information. For example, in the commentary on the *Plutus*, Rec. II, p. 3, we read: "la. ὡς ἀργαλέον ((πρᾶγμ' ἔστιν)):" The apparatus has the following: "10 sq.) πρᾶγμ' ἔστιν: Lut, om. Amb||" Why complicate unnecessarily what could have been done so simply: "ώς ἀργαλέον πρᾶγμ' ἔστιν," plus the comment, "10 sq. πρᾶγμ' ἔστιν om. Amb"? Similarly, Rec. I, *ibid.*, lines 12 f., has: "οὗτω δὲ <τοῦ> "ώς" πέπλεκται ή δάνοια·" and, in the apparatus, the note: "12) τοῦ: addidi cl. sch. Db ||" Far simpler would be "12 τοῦ addidi cl. sch. Db." In the same recension, at 1b, lines 19 f., the text reads: "ἀργαλέον: χαλεπόν, δύσκολον, δυσάρεστον·" The critical note reads: "20) δυσάρεστον: scripsi (cf. Hesch. δυσάρεστος· δυσχερῆς), δυ * * * U||" Now if <τοῦ> in la, why not δυ<σάρεστον>

in 1b? And anyhow, why not δυσάρεστον?⁵ On p. 139, Rec. II, 4 f., Massa Positano prints γράφειν ἡκριβωμένως, and the notice: "4 sq.) γράφειν ἡκριβωμένως: Amb, ἡκριβωμένως γράφειν Lut||" It would have been just as informative to print "4 sq. ἡκριβωμένως γράφειν Lut," and it would have been much less cumbersome and confusing to the eye. The second and third fascicles have examples of the same sort of thing. On p. 823 (Fasc. 3), line 1 (here I select at random a passage where both recs. have the same text) has, *inter alia*, the phrase αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἀγοραῖος, and Koster's note says, "1) καὶ ἀγοραῖος: U, ἀγοραῖος Amb||" The word καὶ appears thrice in this line, but even so would not "καὶ secundum om. Amb" have been simpler? To be sure, these are fairly trivial matters; they do, however, make commentaries already difficult to use still more so. One feels, moreover, that such unnecessary duplication and the reporting of such minute variations among the MSS, when multiplied over hundreds of pages and thousands of notices, must have increased the number of pages by a considerable amount.

The presentation of both recensions side by side is an extremely useful aid to the reader. I cannot envision, in fact, how else the simultaneous printing of both texts might have been accomplished in a practical and equally useful way. But in this case there is one serious drawback, for, since in most scholia Rec. II has a longer text (often far longer) than does Rec. I, the simultaneous presentation of parallel columns often causes the left column to be nearly blank, and at times completely bare. (Less often the reverse takes place: right column bare, or nearly so.) A rough-and-ready estimate places the blank space at nearly one third of the total amount of space available. The result is a procedure which is most uneconomical, especially in books which cost twenty dollars apiece.

Had the Editors all employed the same system in arranging their material, more consistency would have resulted. Thus Massa Positano separates all the glosses from the scholia and prints the former after the main body of the text (pp. 234-69), whereas both Holwerda and Koster print the glosses right in as numbered entries in the main body of their respective texts. In Fasc. 1, moreover, the *animadversiones criticae* are listed separately at the back (pp. 270-365), and they go only as far as the scholium on *Plut.* 223. (Why only this far?) The other two fascs. print their *animadv. crit.* extensively along the bottoms of the pages, and this is to my mind a more useful method, since the reader thereby has more before him.

The index-fascicle (169 pages) is divided into four parts: i. Auctores citati; ii. Nomina propria (etiam adiectiva) et similia; iii. Voces grammaticae, metricae, rhetoricae, sermoni scholiastarum propriae; and iv. Reliquae voces (selectae). What proofing I have done indicates that the accuracy approaches perfection. In nearly all other respects, alas, this index is to me very disappointing. I for one want guidance to the points discussed in the lengthy prolegomena: these matters are of cardinal importance, but there seems to be no system in their elaboration. No such guidance is to be found in this index. Very little is given except individual words, and

⁵ This point is made by MacDowell, *op. cit.*

even here the information is not complete. You do not find every occurrence of a word, nor the oblique forms. No context is given: you get a word and a reference to page and line. Comparisons, though odious, may sometimes be instructive, and when I think of indices the names Todd (Aristophanes) and Powell (Herodotus) come immediately to mind. O'Neil's new concordance to Tibullus (Monograph No. 21 of the American Philological Association [1963]) should serve also as an *exemplum* of what such a work can be. The most useful kind of index for the Tzetzean commentaries would be a single index, with everything interfiled in one continuous alphabetical listing, and comprising not only individual vocabulary-entries (and these with context), but also subject-heads. And the whole should be exhaustive.

I come now to a question of larger import, pertinent not directly to the generally superior labors of Koster and his associates, but rather to the general purpose of works such as this one. Scholia in general, and those on Aristophanes in particular, are, one would imagine, primarily concerned with the elucidation of the works of the particular author. So here the very existence of the Comedies justifies that of the *scholia vetera*, Tzetzean commentaries, Thomano-Trielinian commentaries, and all the rest. But this proposition does not work the other way around. Any information we derive from the scholia which pertains to matters other than the Comedies is, so to speak, an extra benefit. Though not on that account less valuable, neither is it the heart of the matter. Now if this is the case, as I believe it is, then the most satisfactory and the most useful way to present the scholia would be in one large volume, as Dübner did, and as Greene has done in the case of the Scholia Platonica. Unfortunately, this is a manifest impossibility with the Aristophanic scholia, for the relevant material is simply far too extensive. Dübner's book, from which we are not yet free,⁶ is handy and accessible; but, apart from the other respects in which his edition is unsatisfactory, he also took next to no account of Tzetzes and his successors. Then the next best thing would be to have everything in eleven smallish volumes, one per play, with all the material

⁶ It is this fact that seems to me one of the most telling criticisms that Erbse makes. When he suggests, however, that perhaps the Tzetzean commentaries are not really worth publication, that perhaps they could be done in some manner of excerpts, I cannot agree: of course they must be published in entirety, for otherwise we have no way of judging for ourselves later on, when the entire series is complete. One hopes that in subsequent volumes the Editors will furnish us with a keyed list of changes in the present volume, so that users of the Tzetzean commentaries may correct the references to the *scholia vetera* to accord with the new edition, rather than to the Dübner book. When Koster replies (Fasc. 3, *Addendum*) to Erbse's first review, "Haec . . . censura in eo maxime vertitur, quod nostra edendi ratio, quam post multas considerationes textui nobis edendo propter eius peculiarem indolem aptissimam eandemque lectoribus maxime perspicuum fore iudicavimus, viro cl. Erbse displicet," he does not really answer the points which Erbse raises. After all, "nostra edendi ratio" covers a wide latitude of meaning, and subsumes all the little things which "displease" those who are going to use the work. We are not on this account any the less grateful to the Editors.

pertinent to a given verse or part of a verse gathered together conveniently in one place and arranged in chronological order of its composition (so far as this can be made out). This is, alas, not possible either, and for much the same reason: the material is not only vastly extensive, it is also quite diffuse, and, as mentioned already, the later material of Tzetzes, Thomas Magister, Demetrius Triclinius, and others, requires to be edited and published first. Now, when the new edition is finally complete it will still be necessary to have several large volumes in front of you as you read Aristophanes. And, if you please, as you read these big books, you will have to shuffle pages to and fro in order to follow the critical comments on the elucidatory material. At that point you will be reading commentaries on commentaries on Aristophanes. The sublime will have become ridiculous.

Already the *Scholia in Aristophanem* seem to have attained very nearly the status of a specialty within a specialty: a most secondary tail thus wags a quite important dog. And though it is unquestionably true that Tzetzes' notices are sometimes of considerable value, because of the information (sometimes the very wording) of the *scholia vetera* that is to be found there, it is also true that his contribution is often trivial, and sometimes even wrong. The unfortunate thing is that you cannot tell until you have digested his remarks, for you never know what nugget of valuable information may lie buried in a mass of schoolmasterish paraphrase. It is well known that the old fellow was afflicted with logorrhea.⁷ One or two examples should make the point abundantly clear. Cario says (*Plut. 1-7*): ὡς ἀργαλέον πρᾶγμ' ἔστιν ὁ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοὶ | δοῦλον γενέσθαι παραφροῦντος δεσπότου. | ἦν γὰρ τὰ βέλτισθ' ὁ θεράπων λέξας τύχη, | δόξῃ δὲ μὴ δρᾶν ταῦτα τῷ κεκτημένῳ | μετέχειν ἀγάγκη τὸν θεράποντα τῶν κακῶν. | τοῦ σώματος γὰρ οὐκ ἔη τὸν κύριον | κρατεῖν ὁ δαίμων, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐωημένον. This is perfectly simple and straightforward. Largely truisms, of course, but plainly put. And if truisms, do they really need commentary? But Tzetzes must have thought his pupils needed help here, for he scribbled down what in our present edition (counting both recs.) amounts to four and a half pages of commentary on these seven lines. His commentary is diffuse, not altogether accurate, and at least once positively misrepresents Aristophanes' clear sense: Cario does not say, as Tzetzes (or his *fons*) says he says, that the slave is whipped if his good advice is not heeded. The same kind, and a similar extent, of verbiage is occa-

⁷ See Carl Wendel's article in *R-E.*, VII A (1948), cols. 1959-2010, esp. 2007-8. Wendel, incidentally, thinks (col. 1973) that Tzetzes' commentary "sich . . . ursprünglich nicht auf die Schulstücke beschränkt haben kann. . . . Man . . . möchte . . . schliessen, dass T. den Aristophanes zweimal erklärt hat, eine grössere Anzahl von Komödien in enger Anlehnung an die alten Scholien [= Koster *et al.*, Rec. II] und die drei Schulkomödien noch einmal in freierer Form und breiterer Fassung [= *idd.*, Rec. II]." The Editors agree that Tzetzes wrote two separate editions—Zacher had already offered tentative evidence of that; they do not agree that in the first one anything more than the "Byzantine Triad" was expounded: "Tzetzam plures comoedias instruxisse . . . neque ex Arg. Ávium Tzetzae in Amb servato, quo Wendel nititur, neque ex alia re demonstrari potest" (Fasc. I, p. xl).

sionally exhibited in the other two commentaries. On *Nub.* 6a ἀπόλοιο δῆτ' ὁ πόλεμος, Tzetzes writes fifteen lines (both recd. have the same text); on *Ran.* 479a (Xanthias speaks to Dionysus) οὐρανός, τί δέδρακας; (again both recd. have the same text), the commentary runs to eleven lines, in which, this time, there is some useful information. What we have here is clearly lecture-notes, but as we read them we have the feeling that Strepsiades' two-verse outburst against the War (*Nub.* 6f.) is just about as succinct as one can be, and surely Cario's old saws need no further explanation. Some useful sidelights are imbedded in the passage on the *Ranae*, it is true. All three passages, however, because they slow us down considerably, therefore disturb the transmission: they are all excellent examples of what Whatmough, adopting engineering terminology, has called "noise," i.e. disturbance of whatever kind in the communication.⁸

The four fascicles are beautifully printed and handsomely bound in lovely dark green cloth, with gold-stamped titles on the spines. The six plates are photographically excellent; those in Fasc. 1 (Lut foll. 2^v and 20^r) are reduced *cc.* 25% from life size, those in Fasc. 2 (U foll. 86^v and 135^r), the same amount, and those in Fasc. 3 (Amb foll. 48^v and 93^v), by over two thirds. I have noticed three small printing slips, which do not appear in the addenda et corrigenda (Fasc. 3, pp. 1165-8): Fasc. 1, p. xcvi, fifth line from the bottom, for "3r-52v *Plutus*" read "3r-52v *Plutus*"; *ibid.*, p. cii, last line, insert a full stop between "praebet" and "De scholiis . . ." Fasc. 3, p. 938, right column, line 5 of the exegetical note, for *τετράδιον* read *τετράδιον*. (Without the second tau the word has the look of a *vox nihili*, and anyhow *τετράδιον* [= *quaternio*] is both required by the sense and supported by the text to which this note is a commentary.)

Despite its deficiencies, which are perhaps really only small differences of opinion over matters of format, this work is a magnificent contribution to scholarship, and we are all very much in the Editors' debt. Seeing the overall lack of intrinsic worth in the Tzetzean commentaries themselves, it may perhaps be said without malice that the extent and quality of the Editors' labors, and the results thereof, far exceed the material itself: in a word, a first-class edition of a decidedly third-rate work. At the same time, it is a necessary third-rate work. The continuation and eventual completion of the entire series is to be looked forward to with anticipation. The price of these fascicles is high, and perhaps only specialists and libraries

⁸ See especially *Poetic, Scientific, and Other Forms of Discourse* (Univ. of California Press, 1956), pp. 141 f., 151, and 219. In general the principle is: the less outside interference ("noise," "any phenomenon which transforms the message in an unpredictable manner" [p. 151]), the greater the efficiency of transmission. Granted, the proportion can, at least in theory, reach a point where there is too little "noise," or redundancy, and communication is impaired then, too. But commentaries are by nature external to the work commented on, and so they are bound to disturb the efficiency of transmission by reducing it. Thus Tzetzes too often disturbs Aristophanes' plain, sensible communication, and that without adding much in the way of information.

will be able to afford the entire set. But no serious student of Aristophanes can neglect this work in any of its parts. To have brought such an edition into being is itself the Editors' chief reward: *suam laudem praebet opus.*

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MARIO ATTILIO LEVI. *L'impero romano* (dalla battaglia di Azio alla morte di Teodosio I). Turin, Società editrice internazionale, 1963. Pp. viii + 675; 19 sheets of maps; illustrated. Lire it. 12,000. (*Enciclopedia classica*, sez. I: *Storia e Antichità*; vol. II: *Storia di Roma*, a cura di Paolo E. Arias; tomo II.)

This extensive and handsome history of the Roman Empire is merely the second half of a "volume" on Roman history in an *Enciclopedia Classica* on Greek and Roman civilization planned for fourteen volumes, many of which are subdivided into several "tomes." The whole series, of which several other portions have already been published, should, when (and if) completed, almost rival Müller's *Handbuch* in scale of treatment, though not in breadth of coverage nor in specific citation of texts and reference material for sources, to judge from this instance. Professor Levi of Milan, a careful and imaginative scholar, writes clearly, accurately, and forcefully. He has selected as a natural starting point the Battle of Actium on September 2nd, 31 B.C., and for his conclusion the moment generally preferred by European historians of Rome, the final separation of West from East on the death of Theodosius on January 17th, 395 A.D. He justifies this terminus in the following terms from his last paragraph (pp. 633-4): "The true function of the Roman Empire in history consisted in the creation of a single communal state among all the people who shared in classical civilization. The empire was declining into ruin chiefly due to its excessive dimensions, which had always created difficult problems, and these became impossible of solution from the moment in which the policy of economic centralization by the autocracy had impoverished the state, thereby creating misery and demographic regression. . . . With the death of Theodosius, the unity of the empire became definitively split, even if only by a fortuitous chance. Thus on January 17th, 395, there came to an end the historical evolution which had determined the creation of a single united state throughout the whole ancient Mediterranean world. . . . There was thus concluded a long period of the story of mankind."

The publishers have afforded Professor Levi ample space both in the six hundred and thirty-four pages of text and in their generous size. The text is divided into nine chapters and each into numerous sections. Levi has followed the practice so conveniently applied in his shorter *Storia Romana degli Etruschi a Teodosio* (1960), that of interspersing his account with comprehensive and useful bibliographical notes. He also supports his general arguments by analysis of specific documents, especially inscriptions, though

unfortunately he usually does not afford specific texts or references for these. Similarly, he fails to make effective use of his many illustrations of monuments, inscriptions, and particularly portraits on coins. These do not always occur at the point in the text which they illustrate; they lack the sharpness which modern photographic techniques should afford; and they carry no specific identification by catalogue, collection, or the like, nor is there any table listing them. Following the text, Professor Clementina Gatti has provided three "analytical indices": a chronological outline from 30 B.C. through 395 A.D. (pp. 637-47), a full index of proper names (pp. 649-72), and a regrettably brief one of important topics (pp. 673-5). Dr. Franco Ferrario has supplied twenty-four sketch maps on nineteen sheets at the rear of the book; all but two of the sheets are folded and carry on the outside no indication of numbers or of the nature of the maps, and, again, there is no table of them. The maps show the extent of the empire at various moments, details of important frontiers, and such economic matters as trade routes, agricultural products, and industries. It would have been convenient (though more expensive) had they been so mounted that they could be folded out alongside the text. These are, however, minor blemishes on a generally admirable presentation, in clear type on heavy glossy paper, and with no observed misprints.

To comment in detail on so full a text would require both more space than a review should occupy and as thorough a familiarity with the many aspects of the Empire as that evinced by the author. Better, therefore, simply to indicate some of the main lines of interest. The narrative is presented in a competent and lively manner; it is closely interwoven with the more interpretative discussions and the titles of sections tend to emphasize the latter so that it is sometimes not easy to find a specific narrative passage. In the narrative, this reviewer was particularly appreciative of the clear presentation of the complexities of the third century, a period for which there is now also available an admirable and elaborate bibliography by Georg Walser and Thomas Pekáry, *Die Krise des römischen Reiches: Bericht über die Forschungen zur Geschichte des 3. Jahrhunderts (193-284 n. Chr.) von 1939 bis 1959*, published in 1962 by de Gruyter in Berlin. In the discussion of the third century, a few points might be noted. Levi (pp. 472-7) regards the general persecution by Decius in 249 as specifically directed against the Christians, in part at least to bring under state control the then extensive properties of the Church, rather than as a particular manifestation, intense because of Christian non-conformity, of a general policy of trying to unite the empire in a common religious as well as worldly effort to save the state. He holds (p. 489) that the first overt territorial division of the empire was not that by Diocletian but that of 256 between Valerian in the East and Gallienus in the West. And, basing himself on five Iranian reliefs of Valerian kneeling before Shapur, he makes the interesting suggestion (pp. 492-3) that Valerian voluntarily took refuge with the Persians, perhaps to escape from mutinous troops, and that this "desertion" accounts for the failure of Gallienus to take any steps for his recovery. Like many other historians, he sees (pp. 514, 527) Aurelian as a forerunner of Diocletian both

in military and economic reforms and in enunciating fully the concept of the emperor as a divine ruler.

Levi devotes particular attention to the changing concept of rule, or of the imperial power. He regards Augustus as having accepted an increasing limitation of power in the face of the still unreconciled republican aristocracy. Indeed his ultimate estimate of Augustus (pp. 175-5), after he has described the breakdown of his system under the Julio-Claudians, echoes his early *Ottaviano Capoparte* (1933) by an unfavorable contrast with Caesar: "A man lacking in courage and creative energy, Octavian Augustus had inaugurated a new policy, wholly based on compromise, on voluntarily accepted equivocation, on the ultimate wisdom of postponing decisive commitments. Far, far from the revolutionary and demiurgic spirit of his adoptive father, Octavian was very clever at reconciling the irreconcilable." As recently Pierre Grenade in his *Essai sur les origines du principat* (1961; reviewed in *A.J.P.*, LXXXV [1964], pp. 77-81), Levi places the real beginning of the empire as an enduring form of government at the accession of Tiberius. Augustus was the genial creator and guarantor of peace and prosperity; Tiberius, for all his desire to abide by the pattern set by Augustus, failed because of his own temperament, because of difficulties with family and ministers, and because of his isolation from and hostility towards the senatorial aristocracy. Tiberius' successor Gaius modeled himself on Alexander, a figure who always fascinated the imagination of Roman leaders and who was to do so increasingly during the empire. He inaugurated two trends which would continue to characterize the opposition between more absolutist rulers and the Augustan or republican tradition, namely sympathy for the Greek East as against the Italian West and overt attack on the landed senatorial class. Though Claudius represents for Levi a temporary reaction towards the Augustan principate and, indeed, came nearest to realizing the projects of Julius Caesar, Nero pushed Gaius' grandiose concept of rule to an extreme unacceptable to the West and to the legions—or rather to their commanders—and also, by his extravagance and executions he created an economic and social crisis. Throughout this critique of the failure of the Augustan principate, Levi, while recognizing the significance of the hostility of the old republican families in the senate, does not place sufficient blame on their inadequate response to the challenge and opportunity which Augustus had offered them to be real "partners" in the rule.

Under the Julio-Claudians, the rule had been based on loosely defined powers, on family prestige, and on *cuctoritas*, and had not, therefore, been consolidated or institutionalized sufficiently to survive by its own momentum Nero's fall and the succeeding year of Civil War. Vespasian on the one hand reacted from the absolutism of Nero towards a more Augustan concept of rule, but on the other so defined its nature and powers as to render it overtly monarchical. Domitian swung towards an international absolutism, free from the restraining influence of the senatorial (by now, the bureaucratic) aristocracy. Though his assassination gave opportunity for a brief reaction under Nerva, both Trajan and Hadrian, despite their diverse personalities and policies, strengthened the trend towards autoocracy. Antoninus again shifted back towards collaboration with

the senate and bureaucracy, but the pattern had become fixed. Marcus, for all his Stoicism, further "centralized autocracy" (p. 353). Levi fails to give a wholly convincing explanation of why Marcus associated with himself two such weak persons as Verus and Commodus. He regards (p. 357) collegiality of rule as on the one hand not inconsistent with tradition, which was not yet fully monarchical, and yet on the other irreconcilable with the developing concept of a superhuman autocrat. In the case of Verus, he suggests (pp. 354-6) that collegiality represented an effort to divide the civil and military responsibilities of the emperor. He sees (pp. 376-7) Commodus as the first emperor whose legitimacy derived from having been "born in the purple" as a guarantee of divine favor. The difficulties of Commodus as sole emperor were due not merely to his personality but also to the continuing unwillingness of the aristocracy and bureaucracy to accept the concept of an independent autocracy (p. 384).

Septimius, more on account of Julia Domna's eastern than of his own African origin (p. 401), established a rule both fully autocratic and also presented, like near eastern monarchies, as under divine favor; in this way Septimius freed himself from the tradition of cooperation with the senatorial and bureaucratic upper class. Caracalla, the tyrant, and Elagabalus, arch-orientalizer, and Alexander, despite the pro-senatorial tradition about him, continued the concentration of power in the hands of an autocratic emperor under divine protection. Levi, however, regards (p. 455) the Severan divine autocracy not as merely "militaristic" but as a domination over every class and every political activity in the state.

For Levi, the next change in the concept of rule was adumbrated by Aurelian and given full expression by Diocletian. To counteract the collapse of military defense, the general loss of public morale, and the separatist tendencies during the third century, the emperor had to become a *dominus deus*, a divine ruler, hedged about by ceremonial and distinguished by an elaborate costume (pp. 527-30). At the same time, the rule had to be shared among several individuals who could be immediately responsive to widely separated emergencies. But Diocletian's systematization of the division and succession of rule broke down as soon as he retired. When Constantine finally became master of the empire, he therefore returned to a monarchical autocracy. Since, however, his adoption of Christianity made it impossible for him to be a divine ruler, he presented himself as ruler by the grace of God, and symbolized this with the pearl studded diadem which he first adopted (p. 575). Moreover, he made himself master of Church as well as of State and bequeathed the concept of rule as Caesaropapism to Byzantium. At the end of the fourth century, however, St. Ambrose's successful resistance to Theodosius freed the West from the incubus of this concept (pp. 631-2).

In thus unifying his account around the development of the concept of rule, Levi may at times read more into the character of various reigns than the emperors themselves might have intended or conceived. Nevertheless his overall interpretation both accords with modern special studies in the constitutional history of the Empire and illuminates the changes and policies of different periods.

As a background for this development, Levi finds tensions in each period. Under the Julio-Claudians, the tension was obviously between the republican tradition and the new concepts of monarchical or autocratic rule. But under the Flavians, new men from the non-senatorial classes and particularly from the provinces, men who had risen through the imperial service, constituted the bulk of the senate. Thus the tension came to be between the concept of the autocratic ruler and one who, in the Stoic sense, governed in collaboration with other good men, i. e. with the senate, the bureaucracy, and the army commanders. After Domitian's effort to free himself from this collaboration had ended in assassination, the Stoic concept was accepted by the emperors of the second century. But a new tension developed, that between the military and the civil, exemplified in the contrast between Trajan and Hadrian, or Antoninus and Marcus. Commodo's hostility to the senate prepared the way for the triumph of autocracy under the Severi, though, as has been indicated, this for Levi was not as purely military as it was regarded, e. g., by Rostovtzeff. The last real attempt of the civilians to regain control came after the murder of Alexander in 235, when the senate and the Gordians resisted Maximin the Thracian. And the tradition of this opposition survives in the *Augustan History*. Levi does not think (p. 498) that Gallienus introduced, as Aurelius Victor says, a sweeping exclusion of senators from command but that, by mid-century, most important posts had in fact come to be filled by equestrian "vicars" in place of senators.

The third century witnessed the emergence of a new tension, that between the State and Christian Church, first marked, as already noted, in a general fashion by Decius' persecution of 249. Diocletian, eager to establish the control of the state over all aspects of economic and social life, instituted the second general persecution. Levi (p. 557) sees the hostility of the State to the Church as from the beginning not ideological but an effort to maintain public security against Christian non-conformity, to which was added from the middle of the third century a desire to get control of Church property. Licinius, at first a partner in the Edict of Toleration of 313, came to oppose Christianity in the East. Constantine, who continued to favor it in the West and who finally defeated Licinius in 324, put an end to this tension by uniting under his autocratic control both Church and State. Pagan opposition did, indeed, continue throughout the fourth century and had a temporary success under Julian, whom Levi (p. 607) regards as less hostile to Christianity than tradition presents him. But this century witnessed the development of new tensions, that of dogmatic quarrels within the Church and that between East and West in the State.

Levi's view that a succession of tensions continually conditioned the changing concept of rule by the adjustments to the conflicts made by different emperors helps to explain the pendulum swings of emphasis which do in fact characterize successive reigns or periods, and it thus affords an underlying rhythm to the history of the Empire.

Levi evinces marked interest and competence in the economic history of the empire. His main thesis is that the emperors were

increasingly compelled to pursue what he calls "statization," namely state control not only of money but of production, particularly of agriculture. While this process went on continuously, a major concentration of economic control in the State occurred under Septimius, as is evidenced both in his wide confiscation of the property of his senatorial opponents, and also in his reorganization of the *patrimonium* and his institution of the *res privata*, both measures intended to handle the greatly expanded imperial properties (pp. 412-19). The culmination of the policy of statization came with Diocletian, who "tried to save the unity and functionality of the empire by making it an authoritarian entity superior to any and every individual, and by aspiring to discipline every activity and private initiative and to subordinate them to the ends of the collectivity which he felt himself to embody" (p. 542). This process bore most heavily neither on the very rich nor on the laboring classes, including the soldiers, but on the small landowners, who were slowly forced out of productive existence. The State was not equipped to replace this loss of production, and a concomitant result was the decrease in manpower so ably analyzed by A. E. R. Boak in his *Manpower Shortage and the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West* (1955). Along with statization went, as is well known, a steady devaluation of the currency or, as Levi prefers to regard it, a constant revaluation of the metals used for currency in terms of commodity prices. This meant, beginning with the Severi, a partial shift to an economy based on exchange of produce rather than on money (p. 423). And it resulted under Constantine in the recognition of a monometallic standard of value, namely gold (p. 576). Levi concludes (p. 580) with respect to economic deterioration in the same terms as have already been quoted from his general summary: "The Roman Empire had guaranteed peace, had increased exchanges, had assured a long survival to classical culture, but all this had rendered necessary a political regime adapted to hold together, to defend and administer a state whose dimensions, given the means of communication available at the time, are not to be compared even with the dimensions of the larger modern states. The price for the conservation of this over-large state was slow collective impoverishment and the financial ruin of the state itself." Whether or not the failure of the Empire was basically, as Levi feels, an economic failure, and whether the breakdown of the economy reflected an overextension in terms of the exchange of goods and services so that the State became as it were a body too overgrown to be adequately fed by its veins, must be left for the economic historians to debate.

Despite his concern for economic problems, Levi does full justice to cultural, intellectual, and spiritual developments. He effectively interprets the art, and particularly the architecture, of the early Empire to illustrate the spirit of the various builders, e.g., the Golden House and other buildings of Nero (pp. 157-8), the Colosseum and Palace of Domitian (pp. 236-8), and Hadrian's Villa at Tivoli (p. 300). Curiously he gives much scantier treatment to such characteristic later architectural monuments as Diocletian's Baths in Rome and his Palace at Spalato (p. 535). Nor does he even mention the architecturally original and artistically brilliant

villa, probably of Maximian, at Piazza Armerina in Sicily. He gives a good picture of the "cultural unity" between Greek and Latin achieved in the early second century. Interesting, but beyond proof, is his suggestion (p. 298) that the *Lives of the Twelve Caesars*, published, he thinks, in 121, contributed to the dismissal of Suetonius in 122, because Hadrian did not like their unflattering portrayals. Hadrian is unlikely to have cared much how his first century predecessors were described and the fall from grace of Suetonius' patron, the praetorian praefect Septicius Clarus, suffices to explain his own dismissal from his secretarial post. Similarly, the bulk of modern scholarly opinion does not accept, as does Levi (p. 603), Baynes' argument that the *Augustan History* was put together under Julian and prefers to see in it an expression of pagan and senatorial traditionalism in Rome under Theodosius. Levi pays particular attention to the emergence of Christianity, but more in its relation to the State, to society, and to economics than for its doctrinal and organizational history.

Levi is also interested in frontier policy, particularly that in the East. He sees in Domitian a preserver of the *status quo* on the frontiers (p. 231), rather than, with some modern scholars, an unsuccessful expansionist, or, with some modern scholars, a forerunner of Trajan. He regards Trajan's eventual failure to complete his eastern conquests as evidence that "Rome had already exceeded the maximum limit of her possibilities" (p. 262), but he praises Trajan's innovations in administration and law, which are usually overshadowed by the much more significant contributions of Hadrian in these areas. A century later, he comments (p. 456) that the assassination of Alexander in 235 "opened new, and at the same time old, problems of legitimacy and of political stability" at a moment when also the frontiers were subject to new pressures from the emergent Sassanid state in Iran and from fresh Germanic peoples pushed westward by the Huns. Thus for him (p. 484) the crisis of the third century was basically a military one, due to the persistence of the Hadrianic defensive system into a period when it was no longer suited to the new situation on the frontiers. In consequence, the barbarians infiltrated the frontiers, the morale both of troops and of civilians weakened, and various portions of the empire turned to self-help and separatism. Here again, scholars will argue whether the military breakdown in the third century was the cause or simply an aspect of the overall crisis.

This brief review of some of Levi's interpretations of various aspects of Roman history will indicate how ably his book reaffirms the excellence of Italian scholarship in this field. His narrative is detailed, accurate, conservative, and well-rounded. His analyses of constitutional, economic, administrative, military, cultural, religious, and especially economic matters are both grounded in a thorough familiarity with the ancient evidence and modern scholarship and are also imaginatively stimulating.

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KONRAD GAISER. Platons ungeschriebene Lehre. Studien zur systematischen und geschichtlichen Begründung der Wissenschaften in der platonischen Schule. Stuttgart, Ernst Klett Verlag, 1963. Pp. xii + 573.

This book is representative of a new departure in Platonic studies in Germany. In its approach it is closely related to H. J. Krämer's *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles* (1959). Both authors are devoted students of W. Schadewaldt and trace the further origin of their approach to the investigations of J. Stenzel. Both seem to reflect the effects of an intellectual climate in which the philosophy of Heidegger and the philosophical impact of theoretical physics have been important factors.

Gaiser's book consists of about 300 pages of text, about 100 pages of notes, and an appendix in which the most important sources of his analyses are printed and briefly annotated. A special feature of the work is a large number of "figures," i. e. charts and diagrams which are meant to facilitate the understanding of the author's construction of Plato's philosophy.

Gaiser's basic theses concerning Plato's thought are discussed in a section with the title "Mathematics and Ontology." This is followed by a much shorter section called "History and Ontology" and an even shorter third one that tries to determine "Plato's Position in the History of Scientific Thought."

As the title of the book suggests, Gaiser aims at a new reconstruction of Plato's oral teachings. He believes that this can be done in a more complete manner than it had been supposed even by the most ardent earlier apostles of such a reconstruction.

The unwritten doctrine is not to be confused, according to Gaiser, with the *arrheton* in Plato's philosophy. On the highest level of thought Plato expects a sudden illumination to occur which cannot be anticipated by any doctrine, written or unwritten. The domain of the unwritten doctrine, therefore, lies between the *arrheton* and the doctrine of the literary dialogues, although there is some overlapping with the latter.

Gaiser assumes that the oral teaching in the Academy included both discussions and formal lectures. He does not really share Krämer's view that there was a deliberate attempt to keep the esoteric teachings secret. But he suggests that these teachings were graded, that there were tests—in the way Dionysius was tested by Plato according to *Epist.*, VII, 340 A f.—and that the *whole* of Plato's thought was known but by a small group of students.

Though the oral teachings included both political philosophy and the philosophy of mathematics, the present book deals chiefly with the latter subject. As Gaiser tries to point out, Plato both made major contributions to the development of mathematics and used mathematics as "a model field and a field of verification" for general ontology (p. 7). The core of his argument is the thesis that the key not only to Plato's mathematics but also to his ontology is his analysis of the relations which obtain between the spatial dimensions, i. e. the sequence which starts with the unit, progresses to the line, the plane, and ends with the body.

Arguing for his thesis, Gaiser feels justified "to add from the

context single features which cannot be directly and explicitly documented, if the subject warrants it" (the latter words are offered as a translation of *von der Sache her*; I have here and elsewhere neglected Gaiser's use of italics). It is true Gaiser asserts that such additions are to be considered as hypothetical and that their value "at first" remains problematic. But he is less cautious in his practice and even his restricting words are at once relativized by the claim that "on the whole the sources are sufficient to ascertain the *Sache*, the inner reasonableness (*Vernünftigkeit*) and evidence of which must be recognized as a standard" (p. 2).

The point of departure for Gaiser's argument that the dimensional sequence to Plato represents an "ontological model" is his interpretation of Aristotle, *De anima*, 404 b 16-27. For the further development of his thesis he relies heavily on Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.*, X, 248-83. Both passages have been repeatedly discussed in the debate on Plato's oral doctrine (cf. G. Vlastos, *Gnomon*, XXXV [1963], pp. 644 ff.). It would seem that the use Gaiser makes of them would impose upon him the obligation seriously to discuss why he thinks that those who deny the usefulness of these passages for a reconstruction of Plato's thought are wrong. Yet in both cases he fails to do so.

Concerning the *De anima* passage, Gaiser accepts the view that Aristotle here refers to his dialogue *De philosophia*, but he adds that Philoponus and Simplicius "indirectly attest" that the same ideas had been discussed in *De bono* and hence in Plato's famous lecture (p. 44). In the appendix Gaiser prints the respective sentences of Philoponus and Simplicius and states in a footnote that, according to P. Moraux, both of them probably obtained the information from Alexander's lost commentary on *De anima*. But Gaiser ignores what Cherniss has shown in an article to which he himself refers (p. 345, n. 39), namely that Philoponus and Simplicius simply confused *De bono* and *De philosophia*, apparently because they did not know that there had existed a work with the latter title; and that there are serious objections to the assumption that the content of their writings derives from Aristotle's *De bono* (cf. *Gnomon*, XXXI [1959], pp. 36 ff.). Instead of a discussion, Gaiser simply declares "The Platonic origin of Aristotle's report of the 'dimensional-ontological' theory can be clearly enough recognized from Aristotle's text in *De anima*," and, after listing a few writings representing both sides of the controversy, arbitrarily concludes: "... the opinion that Aristotle actually and reliably refers to Plato seems on the way to prevail among scholars again."

In dealing with the Sextus passage, Gaiser re-affirms his view on the relation of *De philosophia* to *De bono*. Still without any attempt at seriously assessing the problem, he makes the following claims: (1) Sextus' report reflects both the content and the structure of Plato's lecture on the Good (p. 85, after P. Wilpert); (2) using his *Nachschrift* of Plato's lecture, Aristotle both explained and criticized Plato's doctrine in his exoteric dialogue *De philosophia* (pp. 474 f.); (3) Aristotle's dialogue probably (*wohl*) was a substitute for Plato's once planned dialogue *Philosophus* which Plato did not write, because he thought the subject was not fit for a literary work and should be reserved to oral teaching (p. 400, n. 208, partly

after Krämer); (4) also the Sextus passage goes back to Aristotle's *De philosophia* "under the presupposition that the Platonic doctrine was reported in Aristotle's dialogue explicitly enough" (p. 475); (5) in Aristotle's dialogue Plato's doctrine was possibly represented as Pythagorean (p. 475). On several occasions Gaiser suggests that his various contentions support one another. But one doubts whether this is possible, if not one of them stands on firm ground.

Leaving the question of the authenticity aside, let us turn our attention to what Gaiser derives from the *De anima* passage. As he sees it, the text proves that Plato recognized a unity or analogy (both expressions occur) of structure in the sequence of the numbers (ideas), the dimensions of space (unit or number,¹ length, width, and depth), and the faculties of knowledge (*νοῦς*, *ἐπιστήμη*, *δόξα*, *αἰσθῆσις*). But Gaiser immediately takes another step in that he assumes that the dimensional structure pervades all these fields. "In the world of ideas the dimensions . . . occur idea-like (*ideenhaft*) and in a quite original form (*αὐτός, πρῶτον*); in the soul they probably appear in a subordinate second class form; and in the bodily domain one may assume that they at last appear concretely-visibly" (pp. 45 f.). The first part of this statement is subsequently explained by the sentence: "It is therefore to be assumed that the 'first' idea-like forms of unit, length, width, and depth mean the numbers One, Two, Three, and Four" (p. 46). In other words, the first four numbers—or ideas—are interpreted not just as numbers but as the first manifestations of the dimensions.

Still another inference is immediately drawn from the same text. "The sequence of the dimensions," Gaiser maintains, "also determines the structure and gradation of the realms of being. This is suggested by the connexion of unit or number and ideas on the one side and of body and appearance on the other" (p. 46). In other words, the relation of the ideas to the soul and to the phenomena is itself understood after the pattern of the relation of number to line-plane and of the latter to the body. By a certain artifice—and such occur repeatedly in this book²—line and plane are both related to the soul which "from the point of view of its dimensional structure, is to be designated as linear-plane-like (*linear-flächenhaft*)."
Gaiser adds that "in this [designation] there is a certain sense, that is, if the view prevails that the living body receives its 'form' from the soul just as every bodily structure is determined in its form by the lines and planes which border it" (p. 52). In a note Gaiser remarks: "Still (!) Aristotle considers the soul as a form-giving principle . . ." (p. 348, n. 41).

As the author sees it, the dimensional model not only reveals the

¹ Gaiser points out, yet without explaining its significance, that in those ancient reports which mention a dimensional sequence the place prior to line is attributed to number and not to the point "which Plato treats as ontologically unreal" (p. 46).

² An especially disturbing example of switching from one number to another is Gaiser's interpretation of *Rep.*, VI, 511 B. Gaiser maintains that the ascent *έπι τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν* leads to "the single contrast of principles in Plato's universal ontology" (*den einen universalontologischen Prinzipiengegensatz Platons*), that is the One and the dyad (p. 94).

eternal order but it also explains the ontological origin of the more complex entities from the simpler ones. In order to demonstrate the transition from the earlier dimensions to the later ones, Gaiser connects the dimensional sequence with the ontological principles of the One and the indefinite dyad on the one hand and with the mathematical theory of the incommensurables on the other.

In the tenth book of Euclid's *Elements*—which Gaiser with some other scholars traces back to Plato's friend Theaetetus in its entirety—even such quantities which only become commensurable when squared are called *rational*, i. e. "rational." Geometrically such a relation can be represented by incommensurable lines which are the sides of commensurable squares. A case of special interest is when the side of the square is the geometric mean between the two lines. If a square is to be constructed that has the same content as a given rectangle, the side of the square would be the geometric mean between the sides of the rectangle. Observing Plato's predilection for the geometric mean, Gaiser conjectures: "If Plato knew and understood the special relation between rectangle and square ontologically, it certainly did not appear to him that the side of the square was irrational and the side of the rectangle was rational; it would be Platonic rather to see the standard unit in the regular (*gleichmässigen*) figure that originates by the formation of the geometric mean" (p. 70). In other words, Gaiser designs a Platonic mathematics in which the geometric mean is considered to be rational and the quantities between which it is the mean are considered to be irrational.

The geometric mean also helps Gaiser to show that there is an axiological significance in the dimensional structure. It is especially for this purpose that he refers to the Sextus passage, building on the interpretations of Wilpert and Krämer. Since in Sextus' text reference is made to the equal and unequal, Gaisner identifies the equal with the side of the square which is the geometric mean between the unequal sides of the rectangle. "Existing for itself [the side of the square] illustrates the uniform (*einheitliche*) standard of the regular and the 'good,' the norm of being good (*des Gutseins*) and of the good in itself" (p. 76). The sides of the "bad" figure of the rectangle, on the other hand are characterized by *ὑπερβολή* and *ἔλλειψις*. They do not exist for themselves, since one length depends on the other. Ontologically this means "that the single good thing stands between the dimensions and, being freed from the lower realm of becoming and perishing, extends into the higher realm of pure being. The mean (*Mittlere*) which exists in the higher dimension for itself and to which the good figure [i. e. the square] can be reduced . . . would be the standard-setting, absolutely good, idea-like being. In the infinitely multiform irregular figure which is not limited by fixed sides one would have to see the many appearances of an idea in the sensual world" (p. 79).

Gaiser also interprets Plato's alleged identification of numbers and ideas dimensionally, though he admits that the numerical aspect does not reveal the full significance of an idea. He first derives the numbers of the decad "dimensionally" and on the basis of this derivation asserts that they are "principles of being" and that is ideas. Subsequently the "single ideas" (like "man" or "horse")

are also explained numerically, but they are only co-ordinated with fractions, i. e. "logoi which can be traced back to whole numbers" (p. 128). In spite of the extended argument, it is not clear whether the author thinks that in the ontological hierarchy: ideas—soul (*das Seelische*)—bodily appearances (p. 124) numbers are to be co-ordinated with the highest or with the intermediate order, as it had been stated earlier that there is a close correspondence between the soul and the mathematical objects. Whatever his answer may be, I cannot see how he can avoid contradicting himself.³

Instead of listing further examples of Gaiser's reasoning, I want to conclude with some remarks about the meaning of the "ontological model" and about Gaiser's method in general.

As Gaiser sees it, the objects of mathematics are for Plato a part of the total reality, namely that which stands between ideas and phenomena. Since the dimensional structure is a property of mathematical objects, the model is not a hypothetical construct like the atomic model of the physicists but is a generalization of a description of a segment of reality.

In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger considers the existential domain to be so constituted that an analysis of "existence" provides the key for the analysis of being. In Gaiser's book the mathematical realm and especially its dimensional structure is treated as if it had a similar significance for Plato's ontology, and the author concludes that the ontological validity of this model was Plato's major metaphysical presupposition. "This assumption of an analogy between the total structure of reality and the special domain of mathematics may be designated as the fundamental presupposition of the whole Platonic ontology. For on the basis of this general conception Plato can use the realm of mathematics—which permits a rigorous systematic penetration—as a field of verification (*Vergewisserungsbereich*) for the general doctrine of being" (p. 22). The next sentence affirms that this model character especially pertains to the dimensionality.

It thus appears that the "ontological model" is meant not only as an analogy but even as Plato's standard of being. If at this point it is remembered that the whole argument for the extended significance of dimensionality was based on conjecture, the assertion

³ Even Gaiser's derivation of the numbers of the decad is full of contradictions. 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 are explained by sections of the line, the plane, and the body. 10 which cannot be derived in this manner is considered to be the limit of the decad but not as a part of it. 5 and 7 are prime numbers, and these, we are reminded, were excluded from the generation of numbers by Aristotle himself, if this is the meaning of the words ἐξω τῶν πρώτων (*Met.*, 987 b 34). As Gaiser recognizes, however, that there is the difficulty that 2 and 3 are primes also, in a footnote he suggests an alternative interpretation. "Ἐξω τῶν πρώτων may also mean "the numbers beyond the first (four)" (p. 365, n. 94). Even if this were possible, it would not clarify the status of 5 and 7 nor would the reader know what he ought to think now of the derivation of 2, 3, and 4. But the author is satisfied that "the suggested 'dimensional' explanation of the generation of the idea-numbers from the principles can be considered as convincing, since it meaningfully fits into the total context of the Platonic ontology" (p. 124).

that it is the fundamental presupposition of Plato's ontology and his final standard of being lacks all plausibility. I do not know whether this review has made it sufficiently clear that practically every important statement on Plato's ontology in this book is a conjecture or derived from other conjectures. But the author seems not to realize that if various conjectures lead to more or less consistent conclusions, this may only prove the consistency of his imagination. For the sciences as well as for historical studies there are standards which determine the degree to which conjectures are useful and the controls to which they are subjected. For historical studies such standards have been established through the practice of generations of responsible scholars. I believe that the author of this book has disregarded them to his own disadvantage.⁴

A final word may be added about interpreting a text *von der Sache her*. *Sache* in this context may be said to have two different meanings. On the one hand, it is the philologically established context of the various sources. The obligations which this imposes upon the interpreter have been discussed in the preceding paragraph. On the other hand, philosophers have insisted that, in order to explain a philosophical text, the interpreter must have some understanding of the subject matter and in this sense must not lose sight of the *Sache*. Would Gaiser's interpretation meet such a standard? Speaking for myself, I submit that he has failed to show that there is a meaningful truth in an ontological system which is characterized by the conception of a dimensional sequence. I would say that the same is true for a large part of his interpretation of Plato's philosophy of history which I have not discussed. This does not imply that I think that investigations of Plato's oral doctrine should be dismissed, if it should turn out that its content is foreign to us. But it does imply that there is an important philosophical *Sache* accessible to us through Plato's dialogues and that this must not be distorted or obscured by unilluminating conjectures on Plato's unwritten doctrine.

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⁴ Gaiser mentions a few times Léon Robin who, like Stenzel, had worked to recover Plato's unwritten doctrine. There are indeed analogies in Gaiser's and in Robin's approaches and even in some of their conclusions. There is, however, this difference, that for Robin the texts are not only points of departure but that his discussion remains interpretation throughout and that it is therefore possible to appraise each of his statements by hermeneutical standards. More than of Robin's investigations one is reminded of Gaston Milhaud's *Les philosophes géomètres de la Grèce* (Paris, 1900).

Carmina: MCMLXIII. An Anthology of Latin Verses in the Metres of Lyric, Epigram and Comedy, edited and produced by H. H. HUXLEY. Shrewsbury, England, Wilding and Son, Ltd., 1963. Pp. 51. 15 s.

This is a charming collection of verses written in sixteen Latin metres. The special feature of the book is that elegiac couplets, continuous hexameters, sapphics, and alcaics have been deliberately excluded, and that the metres which have been chosen are seldom attempted in schools and universities. Seven of these metres are taken from Horace's *Odes*, three from his *Epodes*, five from Catullus, and one from Plautus.

There are forty-three poems, and the twenty-six contributors represent seven universities, including Oxford, Cambridge, and Manchester, and ten schools, including Eton, Winchester, and Shrewsbury.

The collection is edited by H. H. Huxley of the University of Manchester, who admits that "it is fashionable today to set a low value on Greek and Latin verse-composition," but adds that some of his contributors "have stated emphatically that the hours they have spent in this form of *mimesis* have deepened their understanding of the Latin poets and made their teaching more effective." The writer would like to endorse this view. In his experience Latin verse-composition has been of immense value to students and teachers in helping them to appreciate Latin poetry.

The metres used are as follows:

| | Poems |
|-------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| 1. Alemanian (Horace, <i>Odes</i> , I, 7)..... | 2 |
| 2. Fourth Archilochian (<i>Odes</i> , I, 4)..... | 2 |
| 3. Asclepiadic (<i>Odes</i> , I, 1)..... | 1 |
| 4. " (<i>Odes</i> , I, 11)..... | 1 |
| 5. " (<i>Odes</i> , I, 3)..... | 3 |
| 6. " (<i>Odes</i> , I, 15)..... | 4 |
| 7. " (<i>Odes</i> , I, 5)..... | 2 |
| 8. Iambic Trimeter and Dimeter (<i>Epode</i> 1)..... | 1 |
| 9. Lesser Pythiambic (<i>Epode</i> 15)..... | 1 |
| 10. Iambic Senarii (<i>Epode</i> 17)..... | 1 |
| 11. Phalaeccean Hendecasyllables (Catullus, 1)..... | 16 |
| 12. Choliambics (Cat., 8)..... | 4 |
| 13. Three Glyconics, one Pherecratean (Cat., 34)..... | 1 |
| 14. Four Glyconics, one Pherecratean (Cat., 61)..... | 2 |
| 15. Priapean (Cat., 17)..... | 1 |
| 16. Bacchiac Tetrameters (Plautus)..... | 1 |
| | <hr/> 43 |

Huxley has a good translation (p. 15) of a poem by Sir George Etherege ("It is not, Celia, in our power/To say how long our love will last"):

Est nobis vetitum noscere quamdiu
Sit mansurus amor, Lesbia, mutuus,

and of his four epigrams the one (p. 41) about a bishop is most

amusing ("My Bishop's eyes I've never seen,/Though the light in them may shine;/For when he prays he closes his,/And when he preaches, mine"):

Aspexi ocellos, Pontifex, tuos nunquam.
fortasse lucent veritate divina!
causam requiris? tu tuos premis fundens
preces, meos cum praedieare coepisti.

J. T. Christie, Principal of Jesus College, Oxford, is a brilliant writer of verse. Of his four contributions the first (p. 7) is a translation of an anonymous poem from the *Oxford Magazine*, a dialogue between a master and a scholar, where the scholar has his own idea of reading ("Of Life not Aristotle holds the keys;/ Kant cannot heal the heart that lies a-bleeding;/Nature hath spread her book beneath the trees—I have been reading"):

Zeno vivere non docet,
nec sanare potest cor lacerum Platon.
pandit rus quoque paginas,
quas sub fronde iacens arborea legam.

In his translation of a poem by A. E. Housman who compares his thoughts with those of others ("Mine were of trouble,/And mine were steady,/So I was ready/When trouble came") the last lines have great power in Latin (p. 27):

At me somnia praescium doloris
immotum tamen, anxerant; meumque
in peetus dolor irruit paratum,

and he has a fine version of "Weep not today" by Robert Bridges (p. 39), especially the last four lines.

Maurice Platnauer, formerly Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford, gives us an excellent translation (p. 21) of a poem by Sir Charles Sedley ("Love still has something of the sea/From whence his mother rose;/No time his slaves from doubt can free/Or give their thoughts repose"):

Unde est orta Venus nescioquid maris
nato restat adhue. quem puer adserit
servum nulla dies solverit anxium
nec menti sequiem dabit;

and T. W. Melluish of the Fee School in London translates (p. 15) an old favourite by Thomas Ford ("There is a lady sweet and kind,/Was never face so pleased my mind;/I did but see her passing by,/And yet I love her till I die"):

Est suavis Glycera et mentis amabilis;
nullius dominae tam facies placet.
vidi' praetereuntem,
ad mortem tamen hanc amo.

The short third line is perfect in its simplicity.

As might be expected, J. B. Poynton of Winchester College, the author of a well-known book of "Versions," shows his usual skill in translating the letter to Miss Pecksniff in Charles Dickens, *Martin Chuzzlewit* (p. 43):

Iamque vale; nostri vive immemor, et procis superbi,
 seu Scaurus ambit seu places Metello.

Finally D. S. Colman keeps up the tradition established by *Sabrinae Corolla* at Shrewsbury School with a translation of Tennyson, *The Miller's Daughter* (p. 21).

This book is inexpensive and would make a welcome gift for any friend who is interested in the Classics.

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PIERRE LÉVÈQUE and PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET. Clisthène l'Athèenien: Essai sur la représentation de l'espace et du temps dans la pensée politique grecque de la fin du VI^e siècle à la mort de Platon. Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1964. Pp. 167. (*Annales Littéraires de l'Université de Besançon*, 65.)

This book is much more than its main title implies; its subtitle is much more indicative of its scope. The authors use Cleisthenes as a springboard from which to plunge into investigations ranging from the Greek spirit in the archaic period to the political ideas of Plato. They state at the outset (p. 9) that they are not writing the complete monograph on Cleisthenes. However, in the first four chapters, or about half the book, they do discuss the reforms in detail, except for the chronological problems. Their main interest is in Cleisthenes' motivation in introducing his new tribes and trittyes. Unfortunately, this discussion was out of date when printed, since the authors were unlucky enough to write just before the appearance of Eliot's *Coastal Demes of Attika*. In their analysis of the reasoning behind Cleisthenes' trittyes, they follow closely D. M. Lewis' thesis (*Historia*, XII [1963], pp. 22-40) that it was primarily an attempt to break up the political influence of the landed nobility exercised through the control of local cults. But Lewis' case has been much weakened by Eliot's demonstration of the geographical unity of at least three of the trittyes. Although the verdict is not yet in, this is an indispensable element in any useful discussion.

This section of the book is weakened further by the authors' fascination with numbers. They state candidly at the outset that they went into the problem because they were struck by the occurrence of 3, 10, 100, and 500 in Cleisthenes' system and by the possibility that Glotz was right in attributing this to Pythagorean influence. Although their conclusion on the latter is negative, they never escape the numbers' spell. It leads them to accept the text of Herodotus which says that Cleisthenes created only 100 demes.

This they state *ex cathedra*, with no argument at all, a fact which strikes one as surprising in such a well-documented book, especially since the position is such a weak one that it could be described by Raubitschek (*Dedications from the Athenian Akropolis*, p. 468) as "more recently even ignored, by practically all historians." Nor do they even mention the discussion and opposite conclusion of Lewis (*op. cit.*, p. 30), who elsewhere is quoted and followed extensively. Yet there seems to be no realization that postulating an even hundred demes cuts away much of the ground for any real discussion of Cleisthenes' motives.

Perhaps the best, or worst, example of the authors' search for a hidden meaning in numbers is the brief discussion of the Boeotian Confederacy (pp. 112-13). The number of the Boeotarchs, eleven, is said to have been adopted as an anti-Cleisthenic measure, but in itself it still seems to intrigue them, and only with reluctance do they admit that it was "perhaps" suggested by the number of cities in the confederacy.

In Cleisthenes' division of Attica into three districts, the authors see characteristics of the intellectual climate of the sixth century, a parallel to the symmetry of the maps of the Ionian philosophers and even the tripartite divisions of the sculpture in the pediments at Delphi. Such excursions into the *Zeitgeist* are intriguing but, for me at least, do little to illuminate Cleisthenes' motives. Perhaps I see in him too much of the practical politician. On the other hand, I should heartily agree with the authors' explanation of the choice of ten tribes as the natural number, in a society using the decimal system, when one wishes to get away from the traditional and religious connotations of twelve. The authors also think that Cleisthenes wanted to announce a break with the Ionians in dropping this number typical of their institutions, and so, they feel, Herodotus was right in a sense in saying that Cleisthenes was following his grandfather as a model. This is possible but seems unlikely in view of Athens' help in the Ionian Revolt a few years later.

The contrast between the last two chapters best illustrates the authors' weaknesses, strengths, and interests. In Chapter VII, the influence and destiny of the reform are treated rather perfunctorily, without even a mention of the great changes brought on by the introduction of pay; the changing traditions concerning Cleisthenes are discussed rather mechanically. But Chapter VIII, twice as long, details in a most interesting fashion the changing ideas among the city-planners and philosophers, down through Plato, regarding the concept of space in a city, and shows that the purpose of the divisions within it became completely reversed, to separate, rather than to unite, the citizens.

The book's importance seems to lie in this, that it surveys Cleisthenes and his reforms from a philosophical rather than from a political point of view. I am still not convinced that most of us are wrong in emphasizing the latter, but it is healthy to get a new slant.

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PAUL AUBIN, S. J. Le problème de la ‘conversion.’ Étude sur un terme commun à l’Hellénisme et au Christianisme des trois premiers siècles. Paris, Beauchesne et ses Fils, 1963. Pp. 236. Fr. 20.

Many scholars will open this book thinking of another, now very well known, A. D. Nock's *Conversion*, first published in 1933. Nock's book dealt with the old and new in religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo. Aubin's book is at once narrower, inasmuch as it confines itself to the period of the first three centuries A. D., but is both wider and deeper in other respects, since it treats of philosophical notions of conversion quite independently of religious, and is based on a close analysis of the key-terms *ἐπιστρέφειν* and *ἐπιστροφή* in the ecclesiastical and philosophical authors of the period selected.

It might seem at first blush that little can be expected from what is essentially a study of the use of terms in some 1500 instances, not selected on the basis of their interest or importance, but on that of a special period and its authors. Aubin is at pains to indicate that the terms he studies are but one element in a complex edifice and that his conclusions, therefore, are not only limited, but partial. He is still further aware that, narrow as his compass is, he cannot pretend to be certain that he has covered it absolutely, much less that the categories of his thinking, however subtle and flexible he has tried to make them, do not do violence to words as they were used so long ago. It is clear, of course, from all of this that the author's modesty is the index of a true critical spirit.

Not surprisingly, therefore, he comes up with results that are solid, interesting, and important. They are not original; but he arrives at them and states them in a way which lends clarity and significance to already accepted conclusions which have commended themselves to us more because they were plausible than demonstrated. Inevitably, too, they run counter to several views, surely improbable, on the approximation of Christian thinking to Neo-Platonism.

It will suffice, here, to mention just a few of the points which Aubin makes so well. The Fathers of the Church used the terms in question in a sense which derives directly from Scripture, but especially the Septuagint. On the other hand the philosophers, some of whom employ the terms very frequently, do not reveal the source of their meaning for them: while previous philosophers (Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, Philon, Plutarch) reveal no remarkable fondness for these terms, suddenly with Epictetus there is an unexplained preoccupation with them. Their employment in Plotinus is *massif*—but even here there is no explanation in antecedents (in Numenius or the Stoics or the Gnostics) or a contemporary environment, such as Alexandria, a meeting-place of Eastern introversion and Western speculation. But whatever be the explanation for the philosophers, the terms *ἐπιστρέφειν* and *ἐπιστροφή* are greatly used by both ecclesiastical and philosophical writers in the first three centuries A. D. One has to add immediately that the significances attached to them by both are, for all that, irreconcileable. The philosophers were fond of the phrase *ἐπιστρέφειν εἰς ἑαυτόν*; the Christians seem to have avoided it almost altogether—they talk of conversion more frequently

in relation to repentance or bringing the masses (unworthy of the notice of many of the philosophers) to Christianity. This might seem to be a discrepancy in the use of the terms of significant proportions, but there is an even greater. While an essential part of the Christian teaching was that God "turned toward" man, even to the extent of emptying Himself in becoming man, the Neo-Platonist shuddered at such a notion: some of the hypostases might "turn themselves" towards what is above, but not to what is below (in this connection Aubin may be simplifying just a little). A practical consequence of this difference in meaning is to be seen in prayer: for Plotinus' prayer was an interior concentration of the soul seeking its own essence or, alternatively, a magic formula which produced a necessary result in virtue of a sympathy which binds the world (*Enn.*, IV, 4, 30); for the Christians' prayer had its place in the pedagogy of the Christian life by which men were trained through reward and punishment, advice and entreaty. The philosopher's conversion was a metaphysical ascent towards hypostases; the Christian's was through fear towards degrees of perfection. Ultimately the goal of the Neo-Platonist was the eternity imaged in cyclic time; that of the Christian was a simple rectilineal return to the Creator and an eternity of rest.

A book such as this reveals most clearly how fond are the notions that Platonism and Christianity are reconcilable. It is true that Christians have been at pains to emphasize the points in common between them and the philosophers at all times—and this has been part of the strength of Christianity—but ultimately they have had no illusions: "Again I read there, that God the Word was born not of flesh nor of blood, nor of the will of man, nor of the will of the flesh, but of God. *But that the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, I read not there*" (*Augustine, Confessions*, VII, 14). Only the Pseudo-Denis has attempted to reconcile the Platonist cyclical and the Christian rectilineal image of time by considering time as a spiral (*De divinis nominibus*, IV, 9). The problem, very important for Christians and non-Christians alike, rests.

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HERMANN FUNKE. Die sogenannte tragische Schuld: Studie zur Rechtsidee in der griechischen Tragödie. Druck: Photostelle der Universität zu Köln, 1963. Pp. 166. (Inaugural-Dissertation, Universität zu Köln.)

Dr. Funke's dissertation attempts to discuss a difficult subject: the application of Attic law, especially homicide law, to the problem of guilt and *áμαρτία* in Greek tragedy. Following in the wake of a number of German monographs on the Greek notion of personal guilt and obligation (including, for example, Kurt von Fritz, *Tragische Schuld und poetische Gerechtigkeit in der griechische Tragödie*, in *Studium Generale*, VIII [1955]), Funke traces the course of the Sin-Guilt phenomenon in Greek literature down to the fifth century, with the concomitant problem of *Atē* and divine

retribution (pp. 14-46). This is an excellent summary of the scholarly discussion to date, with the literature and the basic references. The next section (pp. 47-85) is the heart of the dissertation, being a discussion of the guilt of Oedipus against the background of fifth-century Attic jurisprudence, and in particular the tripartite division into justifiable homicide, deliberate murder, and accidental homicide (see the summary, for example, by Kurt Latte, "Mord," *R.-E.*, XVI [1933], cols. 278-89). Here the results are quite predictable: certainly Oedipus considered himself legally innocent, and in Funke's view, the Athenian audience would have acquitted him. And yet Oedipus' sense of guilt derives from his awareness of his transgression of the eternal laws, a transgression into which the gods have, for their own reasons, brought him. Thus Sophocles' treatment of the problem of guilt becomes part of the poet's reaction against the sophistic ideas of the Greek enlightenment, and a harking back to a more Heracitean view of the divine law and the universe. The discussion of the other tragedies is undertaken only insofar as they are relevant to the main problem; and it is interesting to note that Funke finds the *Oedipus Tyrannus* closest to the *Trachiniae* in its treatment of guilt and retribution. I may add (though Funke does not) that his findings in this respect tend to confirm the growing conviction that the *Oedipus* and the *Trachiniae* are quite close to each other in date; for both preeminently express the poet's fundamental attitude to the problem of law and transgression. Here again Funke finds the *Oedipus* to be the *paradeigma* of all Greek tragedy in the spirit of Aristotle's *Poetics*.

It is unfortunate, however, that the author was not more familiar with recent English scholarship, as for example, with Gerard Else's superb commentary on the *Poetics*. His discussion of the Aristotelian *ἀμάρτια* is weak; in any case, I think it is incorrect to suggest that *ἀμάρτια* in the *Poetics* has nothing to do with a moral dimension (pp. 71-2); for even though in other spheres the "mistake" might be in any order, yet the mistakes Aristotle considers relevant in Greek tragedy are precisely those which involve moral obligation and the divine law (e.g., murder, disobedience, incest, and the like), even where the deed is performed unwittingly. One of the defects of the dissertation is the author's way of jumping from one text to another, often from author to author, without adequate commentary; often the sequence between the different sections of the book is quite difficult to follow. Part of the difficulty is the vastness of the material under discussion; at the same time the author reveals everywhere a firm grasp of the basic problems involved and his taut discussion should prove extremely useful to all workers in the field. The University of Köln and the author's distinguished mentors should be congratulated on a doctoral monograph of such high quality.

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ROBERT FLACELIÈRE. *Sagesse de Plutarque*. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1984. Pp. 249.

In this volume the distinguished French Hellenist and Plutarchist presents a popular introduction to Plutarch's moral, theological, and philosophical thought in the form of his own translations of a medley of selections from the *Moralia*. *De Pythiae oraculis*, accompanied by the same valuable map of the tour of Delphi that appears with Flacelière's Greek edition of this dialogue in the "Collection Érasme" (Paris, 1962), is translated in its entirety. Nine other treatises and dialogues are represented by excerpts of varying length: *De tranquillitate animi*, 1-10 and 17-20 (the beginning and end); *De garrulitate*, 1-2 and 5-11; *Septem sapientium convivium*, 1-3 (ending with Thales' explanation of the meaning of the newborn centaur brought to Periander); *De genio Socratis*, 21-2 (the myth of Timarchus); *Amatorius*, 3-9 (the heated argument about the two kinds of love and Plutarch's defense of the proposed marriage of the youth to the wealthy widow) and 21-6 (Plutarch's concluding apology for heterosexual and conjugal love); *De Iside et Osiride*, 1-3 (the introduction), 11-20 (the myth of Osiris), and 35 (the identification of Osiris with Dionysus); *De sera numinis vindicta*, 4-6 (the beginning of Plutarch's first discourse) and 15-33 (including the final part of the discussion and the concluding myth of Thespis); *De defectu oraculorum* 1-22 (ending with Cleombrotus' account of his visit with the miraculous foreigner) and 46-52 (the conclusion); *De E apud Delphos*, 1-7 and 17-21 (omitting only the chapters dealing with the properties of the number five). Each selection is provided with an introductory notice and a thorough set of footnotes, while a general introduction surveys briefly Plutarch's life, works, and literary influence, particularly on French authors. The translations impress me as both readable and accurate.

Of interest to the specialist should be Flacelière's exposition in the introduction (pp. 18-21) of his thesis that there is in Plutarch's thought an evolution from a philosophical to a theological stage that is traceable in his treatments of the Pythia's sources of inspiration and in his attitude toward Epicureanism. This is a thesis that Flacelière has previously used with profit in his analysis of the *Amatorius* (*Plutarque: Dialogue sur l'Amour* [Paris, 1952], pp. 11-12, 25-7).

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